Building the Somali National Army: Anatomy of a failure, 2008–2018

ABSTRACT

Over a decade of security force assistance (SFA) initiatives to build an effective Somali National Army (SNA) failed because of the interrelated effects of political, contextual and operational challenges. The key political challenges were interest asymmetry between international actors and Somali elites, insufficient focus on institution-building and a lack of donor coordination. The principal contextual challenges in Somalia were the legacies of two decades of state collapse and the negative effects of clan dynamics. The main operational challenges were building an army while simultaneously fighting a war, the complexities of military integration, and the severe capability gaps afflicting the SNA.

KEYWORDS:

• Security force assistance (SFA)
• security sector reform (SSR)
• Somalia
• African Union
• al-Shabaab

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank Lesley Warner for her constructive comments on an earlier draft of this article. This work was supported by the Elliott School of International Affairs at the George Washington University via a SOAR award.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

¹ In May 2017, the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) recognised the value of conducting ‘a Joint Verification exercise’ of its armed forces. SNA presentation to AMISOM Joint Review team, Mogadishu, 23 May 2017. Following discussions with its international partners, the FGS agreed to conduct a comprehensive verification of the SNA and Somali Police Force across all sectors of operations as part of AMISOM’s exit strategy. AU document PSC/PR/COM.(DCC), 12 July 2017, §15. This exercise was subsequently renamed the Operational Readiness Assessment, which began in September.

² Operational Readiness Assessment – Final Report (Somali Ministry of Defense 1 December 2017).

³ The United States military defines SFA as ‘unified action to generate, employ, and sustain local, host nation or regional security forces in support of a legitimate authority’. US, Commander’s Handbook for Security Force Assistance (Kansas: Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance 14 July 2008), 1.

⁴ The providers of SFA to the SNA since 2008 include Burundi, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Italy, Kenya, Sudan, Turkey, the UAE, Uganda, the United Kingdom, the United States, as well as the African Union (AU), European Union (EU) and United Nations (UN).

⁵ The name came from a commando battalion used by the SNA before the civil war of the late 1980s.

⁶ S/RES/1744, 20 February 2007, §4.

⁷ Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia pursuant to Security Council resolution 1811 (2008) (S/2008/769, 10 December 2008), §19.

⁸ EUTM website, https://www.eutm-somalia.eu.

⁹ S/RES/2124, 12 November 2013.

¹⁰ Between 2010 and May 2017, the US obligated approximately $66 million for SNA stipend-related activities. Inspection of the Bureau of African Affairs’ Foreign Assistance Program Management (US Office of Inspections, ISP-I-18–02, October 2017), 11.

¹¹ Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia pursuant to Security Council resolution 1853 (2008) (S/2010/91, 10 March 2010), §191 and Colin Robinson, ‘Revisiting the rise and fall of the Somali Armed Forces, 1960–2012’, Defense & Security Analysis 32/3 (2016), 249.

¹² For details of the UK’s support see Jon Lunn, Somalia: February 2017 Update (House of Commons Briefing Paper No.7298, 16 February 2017).

¹³ See Robinson, ‘Revisiting’, 247 and Menekse Tokyay, ‘Turkish military base in Somalia’, Arab News, 17 August 2017, http://www.arabnews.com/node/1145846/middle-east.

¹⁴ Although debate continues over whether Somaliland will reunify with the rest of Somalia, this article focuses on developments in south-central Somalia and to a lesser extent the autonomous region of Puntland.

¹⁵ Paul D. Williams with Abdirashid Hashi, Exit Strategy Challenges for the AU Mission in Somalia (Mogadishu: HIPS, February 2016).

¹⁶ Communique of the London Conference on Somalia, 11 May 2017, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/london-somalia-conference-2017-communique .

¹⁷ Robinson, ‘Revisiting’, 239.

¹⁸ Ibid., 241.

¹⁹ Mohamed Mubarak, ‘Somali Military has more Problems than Lack of Guns’, African Arguments, 28 February 2014, http://africanarguments.org/2014/02/26/somali-military-has-more-problems-than-lack-of-guns-by-mohamed-mubarak/ .

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Situation in Somalia (AU document PSC/PR/2(LXIX) 19 January 2007), §33.

²² Cited in the President’s Foreword to the 2011 Somali NSSP.

²³ The 2009 assessment was compiled outside of Somalia, largely donor-led and based on interviews with key actors. It was limited to south-central Somalia for political reasons and was stimulated by donor concerns about the TFG forces. The 2011 assessment was carried out in Somalia and was more Somali-driven and linked to the idea of developing a revised NSSP. Author’s communication, contractor engaged in the process, 31 July 2012.

²⁴ Somalia Security Sector Assessment (AU, US, EU, TFG, World Bank and UN: 1 January 2010), §1i.

²⁵ ‘Letter from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council’ (S/2008/804, 19 December 2008), Annex.

²⁶ Wikileak Cable, 09ADDISABABA717, 25 March 2009, §8.

²⁷ Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea pursuant to Security Council Resolution 2244 (2015) (S/2016/919, 31 October 2016), Annex 2.1 §3.

²⁸ Robinson, ‘Revisiting’, 243.

²⁹ Somalia Security Sector Assessment (January 2010), §16a9b12b.

³⁰ Ibid, §16a15.

³¹ SEMG Report, 10 March 2010, §17.

³² Somalia Security Sector Assessment (January 2010), §16a9a.

³³ Security Sector Assessment (June 2011), 5.

³⁴ Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia (UN document S/2011/549, 30 August 2011), §69.

³⁵ Report on TFG Military Forces (November 2011) (AU internal document, November 2011), 1.

³⁶ Ibid, 7.

³⁷ Military Strategic CONOPS (February 2012), §15.

³⁸ See Paul D. Williams, Fighting for Peace in Somalia: A History and Analysis of the African Union Mission (AMISOM), 2007–2017 (Oxford UP, 2018) Ch.8.

³⁹ See UNSOM, The Somali National Army (UNSOM briefing Version 1.06, 31 January 2015).

⁴⁰ In June, the Federal Government launched its Heegan (‘readiness’) plan for the police force.

⁴¹ Guulwade (Victory) Plan (SNA internal document, 9 April 2015), 9.

⁴² Communication, US official, 10 January 2018.

⁴³ Communication, UN official, 1 September 2017.

⁴⁴ Interview, Somali government official, Djibouti, 27 February 2016.

⁴⁵ Securing Payroll: Somali National Army (FGS and DFID, unpublished document, March 2017), 6.

⁴⁶ World Bank, ‘Summary Update: Security Public Expenditure Review, Somalia Comprehensive Approach to Security Conference, Mogadishu, December 2017’, unpublished document, 1.

⁴⁷ This analysis is based on Danab Battalion Update (Bancroft Global Development briefing, November 2014) and author’s confidential interviews.

⁴⁸ See, for example, Stephen Biddle, ‘Building Security Forces and Stabilizing Nations: The Problem of Agency’, Daedalus 146/4 (2017), 126–138; and Stephen Biddle, Julia McDonald, Ryan Baker, ‘Small Footprint, Small Payoff: The Military Effectiveness of Security Force Assistance,’ Journal of Strategic Studies 41/1–2 (2018), 89–142.

⁴⁹ William Reno, ‘The Politics of Security Assistance in the Horn of Africa,’ Defence Studies 18/4 (2018), 499.

⁵⁰ This will be an ongoing issue as international partners decide how much SFA to give directly to regional forces instead of the SNA.

⁵¹ International Crisis Group, Somalia and the Gulf Crisis (Report No.260/Africa, 5 June 2018).

⁵² Details of the Index are at www.transparency.org .

⁵³ Wikileak Cable 09ADDISABABA1409, 26 June 2009, §4 and §6.

⁵⁴ Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 2002 (2011) (S/2012/544, 13 July 2012) 7.

⁵⁵ Since the new FGS was established in September 2012, SNA troops were supposed to receive a monthly wage of $260 ($100 from the government, $60 for rations, and $100 from a donor). Due to financing constraints, by 2016, the average SNA soldier was scheduled to receive: $50 salary from the Federal Government, $60 for food rations ($30 to be received in cash, $30 to be received in-kind), and $100 donor financed stipend per month for the average soldier. Between 2013 and 2016, over 80% of SNA expenditures went on wages and rations (with the remainder going on operations). Author’s confidential interview, March 2017. See also UNSOM and World Bank, Somalia Security and Justice Public Expenditure Review (UNSOM and World Bank, January 2017) xii, 24 and 59.

⁵⁶ Security Sector Assessment (June 2011) 26.

⁵⁷ Wikileak Cable 09NAIROBI1798, 25 August 2009, §5.

⁵⁸ Somalia Security Sector Assessment (January 2010) §16a9b10.

⁵⁹ Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1916 (2010) (S/2011/433, 18 July 2011), §133. See also Wikileak Cable 09NAIROBI1520, 15 July 2009, §7.

⁶⁰ Wikileak Cable 09NAIROBI1370, 2 July 2009, §6.

⁶¹ SEMG Report, 18 July 2011, §135.

⁶² Ibid, Annex 5.1, 231.

⁶³ UNSOM and World Bank, Somalia Security, 104 and x.

⁶⁴ Communication, US official, 10 January 2018.

⁶⁵ See Reno, ‘The Politics’, 500.

⁶⁶ ‘Letter dated 19 April 2013 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council’ (S/2013/239, 19 April 2013) Annex §43.

⁶⁷ See, for example, the similar conclusions reached in Somalia Security Sector Assessment (January 2010); AU, Report on TFG (November 2011); Security Sector Assessment (June 2011); and Brief Report (October 2011).

⁶⁸ Interview, FGS official, Djibouti, 27 February 2016.

⁶⁹ Security Sector Assessment (June 2011), 33.

⁷⁰ As set out in the London Somalia Conference Security Pact, 11 May 2017, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/london-somalia-conference-2017-security-pact .

⁷¹ Brief Report (October 2011).

⁷² Telephone interview, UN Official, 7 September 2017.

⁷³ Stig Jarle Hansen, Al-Shabaab in Somalia (London: Hurst 2013), 96.

⁷⁴ Roger Carstens, ‘Analog War: How to rid Somalia of al-Shabab once and for all – in six (not-so) easy steps’, Foreign Policy.com, 7 October 2013. The Jazeera Training Centre, located southwest of the Mogadishu International Airport, had trained Somali troops since at least 2010. By 2012, there were 45 instructors from Burundi, Kenya and Uganda, 25 Somali instructors, and supplementary staff from the AMISOM force headquarters.

⁷⁵ Somalia Security Sector Assessment (January 2010), §16a9b8j.

⁷⁶ IRIN, ‘Somali Security’.

⁷⁷ Guulwade Plan, 5.

⁷⁸ SNA presentation to AMISOM Joint Review team, Mogadishu, 23 May 2017.

⁷⁹ Ken Menkhaus, ‘Governance without Government in Somalia’, International Security 31/3 (2006/07), 74.

⁸⁰ Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia pursuant to Security Council resolution 1724 (2006) (S/2007/436, 18 July 2007) 11.

⁸¹ Between 2013 and 2016, four IRAs were established across south-central Somalia: Jubbaland, Southwest Somalia, Hirshabelle and Galmudug, each of which sought to develop their own regional forces not all of which were integrated into the SNA.

⁸² See, for example, Tobias Hagmann, Stabilization, Extraversion and Political Settlements in Somalia (Nairobi: Rift Valley Institute, 2016).

⁸³ Security Sector Assessment (June 2011), 30–31.

⁸⁴ Brief Report (October 2011).

⁸⁵ Cited in Robinson, ‘Revisiting’, 246.

⁸⁶ Paul R. Camacho and Ibrahim Mohamed Abukar, Somalia’s Security: The Reconstruction of the Somali National Army (Mogadishu: Center for Policy Analysis and Research February 2017), 8. See also Mubarak, ‘Somali Military’.

⁸⁷ Robinson, ‘Revisiting’, 245. A similar point is made by Camacho and Abukar, Somalia’s Security, 7.

⁸⁸ Robinson, ‘Revisiting’, 246. On the importance of business interests, see Aisha Ahmad, ‘The Security Bazaar: Business interests and Islamist power in civil war Somalia’, International Security 39/3 (2014/15), 89–117.

⁸⁹ Before 1976, the armed forces sought a balance between the major clans, even specifying the proportional number of recruits from each district. See Robinson, ‘Revisiting’.

⁹⁰ ‘Leaked SEMG letter, S/AC.29/2014/COMM.13 (OC.8), 6 February 2014,’ 5 cited in UNSOM, The SNA, 15.

⁹¹ AU, Report on TFG (November 2011), 9 and 1.

⁹² Ibid, 6.

⁹³ UNSOM, The SNA, 6.

⁹⁴ Matt Bryden and Jeremy Brickhill, ‘Disarming Somalia: Lessons in Stabilisation from a Collapsed State’, Conflict, Security & Development 10/2 (2010), 239–62.

⁹⁵ Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea pursuant to Security Council resolution 2244 (2015): Somalia (S/2016/919, 31 October 2016) Annex 2.2, §8.

⁹⁶ On the important symbolic roles of national armies in the unifying war-torn territories see Roy Licklider, ‘Introduction’, in Roy Licklider (ed.), New Armies from Old (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press 2014).

⁹⁷ ‘Somali Security Sector Reform’, IRIN, 13 May 2013, http://www.irinnews.org/analysis/2013/05/13/somali-security-sector-reform.

⁹⁸ US, Security Sector Reform (US AID, Department of Defense, Department of State, February 2009), https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/115810.pdf .

⁹⁹ See Policy Framework on Security Sector Reform (Addis Ababa: AU 2013) Section D.

¹⁰⁰ UNSOM, The SNA, 21; author’s communication, Colin Robinson, 6 August 2017.

¹⁰¹ Wikileak Cable 09NAIROBI1962, 18 September 2009, §2.

¹⁰² Security Sector Assessment (June 2011), 6.

¹⁰³ Carstens, ‘Analog War’.

¹⁰⁴ Licklider, ‘Introduction’, 3.

¹⁰⁵ Alice Hills, ‘Security Sector or Security Arena? The Evidence from Somalia’, International Peacekeeping 21/2 (2014), 165–80. In 2016, ACLED identified 150 distinct armed groups in Somalia. See https://www.acleddata.com/dashboard/#706.

¹⁰⁶ Ronald Krebs, ‘So What?’, in Licklider (ed.), New Armies from Old, 255.

¹⁰⁷ Camacho and Abukar, Somalia’s Security, 11.

¹⁰⁸ Guulwade Plan, 2–8. Similarly long lists of equipment and infrastructural shortages can be found in Security Sector Assessment (June 2011) and Brief Report (October 2011).

¹⁰⁹ Although note that the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia concluded the SNA should have received almost 9 million rounds of ammunition. Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea pursuant to Security Council resolution 2182 (2014): Somalia (S/2015/801, 19 October 2015), §136.

¹¹⁰ In 2011, AMISOM estimated that 80% of SNA weapons belonged to warlords, clans and individuals rather than the Federal Government. AU, Report on TFG (November 2011), 7–8.

¹¹¹ For years, the TFG troops had to rely on commercial mobile phone networks for communications or walkie-talkie handsets. Somalia Security Sector Assessment (January 2010), §4ag and Brief Report (October 2011).

¹¹² Interview, UNMAS official, Mogadishu, 24 June 2018.

¹¹³ SEMG Report, 19 October 2015, §136.

¹¹⁴ By late 2011, the Martini Hospital in Mogadishu was the SNA’s only medical facility. It had a 20-bed capacity, one volunteer doctor and about 12 nurses. AU, Report on TFG (November 2011), 5.

¹¹⁵ For a list of SNA withdrawals and salary-related incidents between September 2015 and August 2016, see SEMG Report, 31 October 2016, Annex 2.6.

¹¹⁶ FGS/DFID, Securing Payroll, 41. See also SEMG Report, 31 October 2016, Annex 2.3.

¹¹⁷ AU, Report on TFG (November 2011), 8.

¹¹⁸ See Peter Albrecht and Paul Jackson, Securing Sierra Leone, 1997–2013 (London: Routledge 2015).

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by a SOAR Award from the Elliott School of International Affairs at the George Washington University.

Notes on contributors

Paul D. Williams

Paul D. Williams is Associate Professor in the Elliott School of International Affairs at the George Washington University. His books include Fighting for Peace in Somalia: A history and analysis of the African Union Mission (AMISOM), 2007–2017 (Oxford University Press, 2018) and War and Conflict in Africa (Polity, 2nd edition, 2016).