Extended deterrence and assurance in an emerging technology environment

ABSTRACT

How do emerging technologies impact strategic stability in the international system? I focus on how one aspect of strategic stability, extended deterrence commitments inherent to alliances, may be impacted by the development of new technologies and capabilities. I ask how technological innovations will impact the market deterrence and assurance dynamics in particular. I argue that while technologies may enhance the ability to provide extended deterrence, allies may be less assured by these new capabilities. To test these hypotheses, I explore emerging capabilities in new domains such as drones and hypersonic glide vehicles on international stability.

KEYWORDS:

• Alliances
• extended deterrence
• drones
• international stability

Acknowledgement

I thank Todd Sechser, Caitlin Talmadge, Neil Narang, Erik Gartzke, Michael Horowitz, Brendan Rittenhouse Green, Heather Williams, and the participants POSSE Emerging Technologies and Strategic Stability Workshops (supported by the Carnegie Corporation of New York) for invaluable comments and suggestions on various drafts of this manuscript. I am also grateful to the editors of the Journal of Strategic Studies, as well as to anonymous reviewers for their thoughtful questions and valuable recommendations.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

¹ Office of the Secretary of Defense, ‘Nuclear Posture Review’, RefID: 2001872886, 2018; White House Press Statement, ‘Vice President Mike Pence to Travel to Republic of Korea, Japan, and Lead Presidential Delegation to the 2018 Olympic Winter Games’, 2018, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/vice-president-mike-pence-travel-republic-korea-japan-lead-presidential-delegation-2018-olympic-winter-games/>.

² Sang-Hun Choe and David Sanger, ‘Kim Jong-un’s Overture Could Drive a Wedge Between South Korea and the U.S.’ The New York Times, 2018, <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/01/world/asia/kim-jong-un-offer-talks-south-korea-and-us.html>.

³ Choe and Sanger, ‘Kim Jong-un’s Overture Could Drive a Wedge’; Max Fisher, ‘North Korea, Far From Crazy, Is All Too Rational.’ The New York Times, 2016, <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/11/world/asia/north-korea-nuclear-missile-programs-rational.html?mcubz=1>.

⁴ Choe and Sanger, ‘Kim Jong-un’s Overture Could Drive a Wedge’.

⁵ Philip H. Gordon and Jeremy Shapiro, ‘How Trump Killed the Atlantic Alliance: And How the Next President Can Restore It.’ Foreign Affairs, 2019.

⁶ Lawrence Rubin and Adam N. Stulberg, (eds), The End of Strategic Stability: Nuclear Weapons and the Challenge of Regional Rivalries (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press 2018); John D. Steinbruner, ‘National Security and the Concept of Strategic Stability’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 22/3 (1978), 411–28.

⁷ Library of Congress, ‘HR 932: United States-Israel Strategic Partnership Act of 2013-2014’, Library of Congress, 2013-2014, <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c113:H.R.938:>.

⁸ Justin V Anderson. Jeffrey Larsen, and Polly Holdorf, ‘Extended Deterrence and Allied Assurance: Key Concepts and Current Challenges for US Policy’, INSS Occasional Paper 69, 2013.

⁹ James Fearon, ‘Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands versus Sinking Costs’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 41/1 (1997), 68–90; James Morrow, ‘Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Model of Alliances’, American Journal of Political Science 35/4 (1991), 904–33; Alastair Smith, ‘Alliance Formation and War’, International Studies Quarterly 39/4 (1995), 405–25.

¹⁰ Quoted in Matthew Fuhrmann and Todd S. Sechser, ‘Signaling Alliance Commitments: Hand-Tying and Sunk Costs in Extended Nuclear Deterrence’, American Journal of Political Science 58/4 (2014), 919–35. See also: Brett V. Benson, Constructing International Security: Alliances, Deterrence, and Moral Hazard (Cambridge University Press 2012).

¹¹ Glenn H. Snyder, ‘The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics’, World Politics 36/4 (1984), 461–95; Fearon, ‘Signaling Foreign Policy Interests’; Brett V. Benson, Adam Meirowitz, and Kris Ramsay, ‘Inducing Deterrence through Moral Hazard in Alliance Contracts’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 58/2 (2014), 307–35; Brett Ashley Leeds, ‘Do Alliances Deter Aggression? The Influence of Military Alliances on the Initiation of Militarized Interstate Disputes’, American Journal of Political Science 4/3 (2003), 427–39; Mira Rapp-Hooper, ‘Absolute Alliances: Extended Deterrence in International Politics’, PhD Dissertation, Columbia: Columbia University, 2014; Neil Narang and Rupal N. Mehta, ‘The Unforeseen Consequences of Extended Deterrence: Moral Hazard in a Nuclear Protégé’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 63/1 (2017), 218–50; Matthew Fuhrmann and Todd S. Sechser, ‘The Moral Hazard Myth: Nuclear Umbrellas and Reckless Allies’, Revise and Resubmit, 2018; Rupal N. Mehta. “Extended Deterrence and Assurance in Multiple Domains,” in Erik Gartzke and Jon Lindsay (eds), Cross-Domain Deterrence: Strategy in an Era of Complexity, (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press), 2019, 234–256.

¹² Fuhrmann and Sechser, ‘The Moral Hazard Myth’; Narang and Mehta, ‘The Unforeseen Consequences of Extended Deterrence’; Matthew Kroenig, The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy: Why Strategic Superiority Matters (New York, NY: Oxford University Press 2018); Paul Avey, ‘The Historical Rarity of Foreign-Deployed Nuclear Weapon Crises’, Security Studies 27/1 (2017), 89–119.

¹³ Michael Howard, ‘Reassurance and Deterrence: Western Defense in the 1980s’, Foreign Affairs 61/2 (1982); Jeffrey W. Knopf, ‘Varieties of Assurance’, Journal of Strategic Studies 35/3 (2012), 375–99.

¹⁴ David S. Yost, ‘Assurance and US Extended Deterrence in NATO’, International Affairs 85/4 2009, 775–80.

¹⁵ Yost, ‘Assurance and US Extended Deterrence in NATO’.

¹⁶ James Igoe Walsh, The International Politics of Intelligence Sharing (New York, NY: Columbia University Press 2010).

¹⁷ Yost, ‘Assurance and US Extended Deterrence in NATO’.

¹⁸ Erik Gartzke and Koji Kagotani, ‘Trust in Tripwires’, Working Paper, 2014.

¹⁹ Todd Sechser, Neil Narang, and Caitlin Talmadge, ‘Emerging Technologies and Strategic Stability in Peacetime, Crisis, and War’, Journal of Strategic Studies Special Issue, Forthcoming (2019); Heather Williams, ‘Asymmetric Arms Control and Strategic Stability: Scenarios for Limiting Hypersonic Glide Vehicles’, Journal of Strategic Studies Special Issue, Forthcoming (2019).

²⁰ Jacquelyn Schneider, ‘The Capability/Vulnerability Paradox and Military Revolutions: Implications for Computing, Cyber, and the Onset of War’, Journal of Strategic Studies Special Issue, Forthcoming (2019).

²¹ Erik Gartzke, ‘The Myth of Cyberwar: Bringing War in Cyberspace Back down to Earth’, International Security 38/2 (2013), 41–73; Jon Lindsay, ‘Stuxnet and the Limits of Cyber Warfare’, Security Studies 22/3 (2013), 365–404.

²² Rupal N. Mehta, The Politics of Nuclear Reversal (Oxford University Press 2018 Forthcoming).

²³ Evan Braden Montgomery, ‘Extended Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age: Geopolitics, Proliferation, and the Future of U.S. Security Commitments’, Center for Strategic And Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) Report, 2016; Steven Pfifer et al., ‘U.S. Nuclear and Extended Deterrence: Considerations and Challenges’, Brookings Arms Control Series Paper 3, 2010.

²⁴ Reuters, ‘Pakistan Considers Saudi Arabia’s Request for Military Assistance in Yemen’, PRI, 2017.

²⁵ Fuhrmann and Sechser, ‘The Moral Hazard Myth’; Narang and Mehta, The Unforeseen Consequences of Extended Deterrence’.

²⁶ Alexei Arbatov and Vladimir Dvorkin, ‘The Great Strategic Triangle’, The Carnegie Papers, 2013; Caitlin Talmadge, ‘The Escalation Implications of Emerging Technologies’, Working Paper, 2016; Elaine Bunn and Vincent Manzo, ‘Conventional Prompt Global Strike: Strategic Asset or Unusable Liability?’ Strategic Forum, 2011, pp. 1–24; Austin Long, ‘Correspondence: Going Nowhere Fast: Assessing Concerns about Long-Range Ballistic Missiles’, International Security 34/4 (2010), 166–84.

²⁷ Talmadge, ‘The Escalation Implications of Emerging Technologies’.

²⁸ Narang and Mehta, ‘The Unforeseen Consequences of Extended Deterrence’; Rupal N. Mehta and Neil Narang,, ‘Do Nuclear Umbrellas Increase the Diplomatic Influence of Client States? A Theory and Empirical Evidence’, Working Paper, 2018.

²⁹ Charles Kegler and Gregory Raymond, The Global Future: A Brief Introduction to World Politics (Cengage Learning 2011).

³⁰ Schneider, ‘The Capability/Vulnerability Paradox and Military Revolutions’.

³¹ Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York, NY: McGraw-Hill Press 1979); Stephen M. Walt, The Origin of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 1987).

³² Matt Schiavenza, ‘What Exactly Does It Mean that the U.S. Is Pivoting to Asia’, The Atlantic, 2013, <https://www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/04/what-exactly-does-it-mean-that-the-us-is-pivoting-to-asia/274936/>.

³³ Gartzke, ‘The Myth of Cyberwar’.

³⁴ Se Young Jang, ‘The Evolution of US Extended Deterrence and South Korea’s Nuclear Ambitions’, Journal of Strategic Studies 39/4 (2016), 502–20; Sung Gul Hong, ‘The Search for Deterrence: Park’s Nuclear Option’, in B.K. Kim and E. Vogel (eds.), The Park Chung Hee Era: The Transformation of South Korea (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 2011); Jae-bong Lee, ‘U.S. Deployment of Nuclear Weapons in 1950s South Korea & North Korea’s Nuclear Development: Toward the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,’ Asia–Pacific Journal 8 (2009), 1–17.

³⁵ George Perkovich, ‘Extended Deterrence on the Way to a Nuclear-Free World’, International Commission on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament, 2009; Yost, ‘Assurance and US Extended Deterrence in NATO’.

³⁶ Stephanie Von Hlatky, & Andreas Wenger (Eds.), The Future of Extended Deterrence: The United States, NATO, and Beyond (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press 2015); Michael Ruhle, ‘NATO and Extended Deterrence in a Multinuclear World.’ Comparative Strategy 28/1 (2009), 10–16.

³⁷ Fuhrmann and Sechser, ‘The Moral Hazard Myth’.

³⁸ Office of the Secretary of Defense, ‘Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2015. Annual Report to Congress’, RefID: D-117FA69, 2015.

³⁹ Anderson, Larsen, Holdorf, ‘Extended Deterrence and Allied Assurance’.

⁴⁰ Narang and Mehta, ‘The Unforeseen Consequences of Extended Deterrence’; Fuhrmann and Sechser, ‘The Moral Hazard Myth’.

⁴¹ Lawrence D. Freedman, ‘The Drone Revolution: Less than Meets the Eye’, Foreign Affairs, 2016; Paul Scharre, ‘Why Drones are Still the Future of War: Troops Will Learn to Trust Them’, Foreign Affairs, 2018.

⁴² Matthew Fuhrmann and Michael C. Horowitz, ‘Droning On: Explaining the Proliferation of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles’, International Organization 71/2 (2017), 397–418; Michael C. Horowitz, Sarah E. Kreps, and Matthew Fuhrmann, ‘Separating Fact from Fiction in the Debate over Drone Proliferation’, International Security 41/2 (2016), 7–42.

⁴³ Fuhrmann and Horowitz, ‘Droning On’.

⁴⁴ John Brennan, ‘Speech on Drone Ethics’, National Public Radio, 2012, <

⁴⁵ Jacquelyn Schneider and Julia MacDonald, ‘Presidential Risk Orientation and Force Employment Decisions: The Case of Unmanned Weaponry’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 61/3 (2017), 483–510.

⁴⁶ Theodore R. Johnson, ‘Will the Department of Defense Invest in People or Technology’, The Atlantic, 2015; Bob Work, ‘The Third U.S. Offset Strategy and Its Implications for Partners and Allies’, Deputy Secretary of Defense Speech, Department of Defense, 2015.

⁴⁷ Horowitz, Kreps, and Furhmann, ‘Separating Fact from Fiction in the Debate’.

⁴⁸ Sukjoon Yoon, ‘Proliferated Drones: A Perspective on South Korea’, Center for New American Security Report, 2018, <http://drones.cnas.org/reports/a-perspective-on-south-korea/>.

⁴⁹ Johnson, ‘U.S. To Deploy Attack Drones to South Korea amid Surging Tensions with Pyongyang’, Japan Times, 2017; Yoon, ‘Proliferated Drones’.

⁵⁰ Fuhrmann and Horowitz, ‘Droning On’.

⁵¹ Jo Harper, ‘Eastern Europe’s Defense Industry: From Boom to Bang?’ DW, 2016, <

⁵² David B. Larter, ‘To Combat Russian Subs, NATO Allies are Teaming up to Develop Unmanned Systems at Sea’, Defense News, <

⁵³ Horowitz, Kreps, and Fuhrmann, ‘Separating Fact from Fiction in the Debate’.

⁵⁴ Horowitz, Kreps, and Fuhrmann, ‘Separating Fact from Fiction in the Debate’; Talmadge, ‘The Escalation Implications of Emerging Technologies’.

⁵⁵ Horowitz, Kreps, and Fuhrmann, ‘Separating Fact from Fiction in the Debate’.

⁵⁶ Narang and Mehta, ‘The Unforeseen Consequences of Extended Deterrence’; Fuhrmann and Sechser, ‘The Moral Hazard Myth’.

⁵⁷ James Acton, ‘Hypersonic Boost Glide Vehicles’, Science and Global Security 23 (2015), 191–219; Williams, ‘Asymmetric Arms Control and Strategic Stability’.

⁵⁸ Richard H. Speier, George Nacouzi, Carrie A. Lee, and Richard M. Moore. 2017. ‘Hindering the Spread of a New Class of Weapons.’ RAND Corporation Report.

⁵⁹ Acton, ‘Hypersonic Boost Glide Vehicles’, Science and Global Security 23 (2015), 191–219.

⁶⁰ Joseph Trevithick, ‘Here’s How Hypersonic Weapons Could Completely Change the Face of Warfare’, The War Zone, 2017.

⁶¹ Work, ‘The Third U.S. Offset Strategy and Its Implications for Partners and Allies’.

⁶² Lora Saalman, ‘China’s Calculus on Hypersonic Glide’, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2017; Arbatov and Dvorkin, ‘The Great Strategic Triangle’.

⁶³ Fuhrmann and Sechser, ‘Signaling Alliance Commitments’; Morrow, ‘Alliances and Asymmetry’.

⁶⁴ Talmadge, ‘The Escalation Implications of Emerging Technologies’.

⁶⁵ Saalman, ‘China’s Calculus on Hypersonic Glide’.

⁶⁶ Office of the Secretary of Defense, ‘Nuclear Posture Review’.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Rupal N. Mehta

Rupal N. Mehta is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Nebraska–Lincoln