France’s military operations in Africa: Between institutional pragmatism and agnosticism

ABSTRACT

This article examines France’s institutional preferences in the context of its military operations in Africa. It argues that, if France had its multilateral moment in the 1990s and 2000s, it has since become institutionally agnostic. Institutional agnosticism means that France no longer has strong institutional preferences when running military operations; instead, it has over the last six or seven years opted for various frameworks based on a pragmatic analysis of what institutions – the UN, the EU, the G5 Sahel or regional organisations – bring. France is opportunistic as it wants to keep open all options while retaining the right to run unilateral missions. The first part presents the evolution of French military operations over time and how they have become increasingly multilateral after the end of the Cold War. The second part aims to unpack why France has embraced multilateralism, identifying three main issues: multilateralism as burden-sharing, multilateralism as legitimacy provider, and the African continent as a theatre for the operationalisation of the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy. In the third part, the article looks at why France has become institutionally agnostic and why it continues to run national operations as a consequence of institutional agnosticism.

KEYWORDS:

• France
• Africa
• military operations
• multilateralism
• institutional agnosticism

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

¹ French Republic, ‘Defence and National Security’, Strategic Review (2017), 54.

² Emmanuel Macron, ‘Initiative for Europe’, Speech (La Sorbonne, Paris 26 Sept. 2017).

³ Evacuations operations since 1990 include the ones in Zaire (1993), Rwanda (1994), Congo (1997), Democratic Republic of the Congo (1998), Ivory Coast (2002), and Chad (2008).

⁴ French Republic, ‘Defence and National Security’, Strategic Review (2017), 73.

⁵ Robert O. Keohane, ‘Multilateralism: An agenda for research’, International Journal 45 (1990), 731–64.

⁶ Sarah Kreps, ‘When does the Mission determine the Coalition? The Logic of Multilateral Intervention and the Case of Afghanistan’, Security Studies 17/3 (2008), 536.

⁷ See on this Kreps, ‘When does the Mission determine the Coalition? The Logic of Multilateral Intervention and the Case of Afghanistan’, 535–7.

⁸ In 1978, the French led an operation in Zaire (Kolwezi) together with the Belgians. In 1990, troops from Zaire and Belgium also briefly contributed to the French-led operation Noroît in Rwanda.

⁹ Pierre Lellouche and Dominique Moisi, ‘French Policy in Africa: A Lonely Battle Against Destabilization’, International Security 3/4 (Spring 1979), 108–33.

¹⁰ Thierry Tardy and Marco Wyss, ‘Africa: The Peacekeeping Laboratory’, in Tardy and Wyss (eds.), Peacekeeping in Africa. The Evolving Security Architecture (London: Routledge 2014).

¹¹ Thierry Tardy, and Dominic Zaum, ‘France and the United Kingdom at the UN Security Council’, in David Malone, Sebastian Einsiedel and Bruno S. Ugarte (eds.), The UN Security Council in the 21st Century (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner 2015).

¹² From April 2004 to June 2017, the UN deployed the UN Operation in Ivory Coast (UNOCI).

¹³ As of July 2013, the UN has deployed the Mission multidimensionnelle intégrée des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation au Mali (MINUSMA).

¹⁴ As of April 2014, the UN has deployed the Mission multidimensionnelle intégrée des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation en République centrafricaine (MINUSCA).

¹⁵ Niagalé Bagayoko-Penone, ‘L’opération Artémis, un tournant pour la politique européenne de sécurité et de défense?’ Afrique contemporaine 209/1 (2004), 101–16.

¹⁶ Jolyon Howorth, Security and Defence Policy in the European Union, 2nd edition (London: Palgrave Macmillan 2014); and Benjamin Pohl, ‘The Logic Underpinning EU Crisis Management Operations’, European Security 22/3 (2013).

¹⁷ See Dijkstra Hylke, ‘The Military Operation of the EU in Chad and the Central African Republic’, International Peacekeeping 17/3 (2010), 395–407.

¹⁸ Ian Hurd, ‘Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics’, International Organization 53/2 (Spring 1999), 379–408.

¹⁹ John G. Ruggie, Multilateralism matters. The theory and praxis of an institutional form (Columbia University Press 1993).

²⁰ For an exploration of the underlying beliefs of French policymakers, see Benedikt Erforth, ‘Multilateralism as a tool: Exploring French military cooperation in the Sahel’, Journal of Strategic Studies, this special issue.

²¹ Pascal Chaigneau, La politique militaire de la France en Afrique (Paris: Centre des hautes études sur l’Afrique et l’Asie modernes 1984); and Rachel Utley, ‘“Not to do less but to do better …”: French military policy in Africa’, International Affairs 78/1 (2002), 129–46.

²² ‘Financial and Economic Data Relating to NATO Defence’, NATO Press Release, PR/CP(2011)027 (10 Mar. 2011) 6; and ‘Le budget du ministère des Armées pour 2018ʹ, https://www.gouvernement.fr/le-budget-du-ministere-des-armees-pour-2018.

²³ French Senate, ‘Défense. Section Forces terrestres’, Avis No.62, Paris (21 Nov.1989), 43; and Ministry of armed forces, ‘2018. Les chiffres clés de la défense’, Paris, 16.

²⁴ French Senate, Information Report, No.450 (3 Jul. 2006), 7; and Shaun Gregory, ‘The French Military in Africa: Past and Present’ African Affairs 99/396 (July 2000), 435–48.

²⁵ Ministry of Defence, website, https://www.defence.gouv.fr/english/operations/barkhane/dossier-de-presentation/operation-barkhane.

²⁶ French National Assembly, ‘Information Report on the evolution of the French military posture in Africa’, Report No. 2114 (Paris, 9 Jul. 2014), 16–26.

²⁷ Report No. 2114, French National Assembly (9 Jul. 2014), 99–110.

²⁸ French Republic, ‘Defence and National Security’, Strategic Review (2017), 14.

²⁹ Rachel Utley, ‘“Not to do less but to do better … ”: French military policy in Africa’, International Affairs 78/1 (2002), 138.

³⁰ See ‘La recherche d’un partage des tâches’ (19–20), in French Senate, Information Report on ‘Crisis management in sub-Saharan Africa’, No.450 (3 Jul. 2006).

³¹ Thierry Tardy, ‘France’, in A. Bellamy and P. Williams (eds.), Providing Peacekeepers: The Politics, Challenges and Future of UN Peacekeeping Contributions (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2012).

³² The current Chief of the Defence Staff, General Lecointre, served in the UN operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina where he led a counter-offensive against the Bosnian Serb forces in Sarajevo in May 1995, an episode that is considered in France as the turning point in France’s policy vis-à-vis the UN operation.

³³ French Ministry of Defence, ‘Doctrine d’emploi des forces terrestres en stabilisation’, Centre de Doctrine d’Emploi des Forces (Paris 2006); and French Ministry of Defence, ‘Enseignements Tactiques. Les opérations terrestres de l’armée de terre des années 90 – Témoignages’, Cahier de la réflexion doctrinale, Centre de Doctrine d’Emploi des Forces (Paris 2005).

³⁴ ‘US Military Offers Support, but Not Troops, to Aid France in Africa’, The New York Times, 12 May 2017. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/12/world/africa/africa-us-military-aid-france.html.

³⁵ Thierry Tardy, ‘France: The Unlikely Return to UN Peacekeeping’ International Peacekeeping 23/5 (2016), 610–29.

³⁶ Robert Keohane, ‘The Contingent Legitimacy of Multilateralism’, in E. Newman, R. Thakur, & J. Tirman (eds.), Multilateralism under Challenge? Power, Institutional Order, and Structural Change (Tokyo: UNU Press 2006), 57.

³⁷ Inis Claude, ‘Collective Legitimation as a political function of the United Nations’ International Organization 20/3 (1966), 367–79. Also see ‘L’ONU, une source de légitimité indispensable’ (17–19) and ‘L’Union européenne. Une légitimité particulière’ (33–35), in French Senate, Information Report on ‘Crisis management in sub-Saharan Africa’, No.450 (3 Jul. 2006).

³⁸ Fritz Scharpf, Governing in Europe: Effective and Democratic? (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1999).

³⁹ Chafer, Gordon and van der Velde talk about a process of self-legitimation of these operations. Tony Chafer, Gordon Cumming, Roel van der Velde, ‘France’s Interventions in Mali and the Sahel: A Historical Institutionalist Perspective’, Journal of Strategic Studies (same Special issue).

⁴⁰ Raphaël Granvaud, ‘Interventions militaires françaises en Afrique. Nouvelle donne géopolitique’ NAQD 1/31 (2014), 247–69; French Senate, Information Report on ‘Crisis management in sub-Saharan Africa’, No.450 (3 Jul. 2006).

⁴¹ Rachel Utley, ‘“Not to do less but to do better … ”: French military policy in Africa’, International Affairs 78/1 (2002), 129–46; Bruno Charbonneau, ‘Dreams of Empire: France, Europe, and the New Interventionism in Africa’, Modern & Contemporary France 16/3 (2008), 279–95; Katariina Simonen, ‘Qui s’excuse, s’accuse … An Analysis of French Justifications for Intervening in Côte d’Ivoire’, International Peacekeeping 19/3 (2012), 363–76; and Roland Marchal, ‘Petites et grandes controverses de la politique française et européenne au Tchad’, Comité de suivi de l’Appel à la Paix et à la Réconciliation, N’Djamena, Apr. 2015.

⁴² Tony Chafer, ‘Chirac and “la Françafrique”: No Longer a Family Affair’, Modern & Contemporary France 13/1 (2005), 7–23; Catherine Gegout, ‘The persistence of the French Pré Carré’ (135–207), in Why Europe intervenes in Africa. Security, prestige and the legacy of colonialism (Hurst 2017); and Vincent Hugeux, ‘La Françafrique fait de la résistance’, Politique africaine 1/105 (2007), 126–39.

⁴³ Daniela Kroslak, The role of France in the Rwandan genocide (London: Hurst 2007); Guillaume Ancel, Rwanda, la fin du silence, témoignage d’un officier français (Paris: Les Belles Lettres 2018); and Patrick de Saint-Exupéry, L’inavouable. La France au Rwanda (Paris: Les arènes 2004).

⁴⁴ See Stefano Recchia, ‘A legitimate sphere of influence: Understanding France’s turn to multilateralism in Africa’, Journal of Strategic Studies, this special issue.

⁴⁵ French Republic, ‘French White Paper on Defence and National Security’ (2008), 7.

⁴⁶ Antoine Sadoux, ‘La PESD: un moyen d’assurer la position de la France en Afrique?’ Défense nationale 10 (2005), 67–77.

⁴⁷ Tobias Koepf, ‘Interventions françaises en Afrique: la fin de l’Européanisation?’ Politique étrangère (February 2012), 415–46.

⁴⁸ Niagalé Bagayoko-Penone, ‘L’opération Artémis, un tournant pour la politique européenne de sécurité et de défense?’ Afrique contemporaine 209/1 (2004), 103–5.

⁴⁹ Challenges Annual Forum 2018, ‘Action for Peacekeeping: Strengthening the Effectiveness of Future Peace Operations’, Policy Brief (January 2019).

⁵⁰ Hadewych Hazelzet, ‘The added value of CSDP operations’, Brief No. 31 (Paris: EUISS 2013).

⁵¹ Jane Boulden (ed.), Responding to Conflict in Africa. The United Nations and Regional Organizations (New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2013).

⁵² Interviews, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, France, Paris, Oct. 2014.

⁵³ As of April 2019, France had sent 40 personnel (out of 14,790) in the MINUSMA and 17 personnel (out of 13,660) in the MINUSCA in the CAR. https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/3-country_and_mission.pdf.

⁵⁴ ECFR, ‘Article 42.7: An explainer’ Commentary, 19 Nov. 2019, https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_article_427_an_explainer5019.

⁵⁵ Cour des Comptes, ‘Les opérations extérieures de la France, 2012–2015ʹ, Communication à la commission des finances du Sénat (Paris Oct. 2016).

⁵⁶ Jolyon Howorth, ‘La France, la Libye, la PSDC et l’OTAN’, Annuaire français de relations internationales, XIII (2012), 281.

⁵⁷ Michel Goya, ‘La guerre de trois mois: l’intervention française au Mali en perspectives’, Politique étrangère 2 (2013), 157–68.

⁵⁸ John Karlsrud and Adam Smith, European Military Participation in MINUSMA. Experiences and Lessons-Learned (New York: International Peace Institute February 2015).

⁵⁹ RFI, ‘RCA: pour le patron de la force européenne, le compte n’y est pas’, 19 Mar. 2014, http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20140319-rca-patron-force-europeenne-fait-moyens-bord; and Philippe Chapleau, ‘D’EUFOR RCA à EUMAM RCA: les mêmes mais en moins nombreux’, Lignes de défense, 13 Mar. 2015, http://lignesdedefense.blogs.ouest-france.fr/archive/2015/03/13/d-eufor-rca-a-eu-mam-13668.html.

⁶⁰ ‘France and Germany are Pushing Rival Models for Defence Co-operation’, The Economist, 2 Feb. 2019. https://www.economist.com/europe/2019/02/02/france-and-germany-are-pushing-rival-models-for-defence-co-operation.

⁶¹ French Republic, ‘Defence and National Security’, Strategic Review (2017), 61.

⁶² Ibid., 54.

⁶³ Ibid., Introduction, 14.

⁶⁴ Ibid., 60.

⁶⁵ EATC: European Air Transport Command; FNC: Framework Nation Concept; NORDEFCO: Nordic Defence Cooperation.

⁶⁶ Ibid., 60.

⁶⁷ Emmanuel Macron, ‘Initiative for Europe’, Speech, La Sorbonne (Paris 26 Sept. 2017).

⁶⁸ The E2I brings together nine countries: Belgium, Estonia, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the UK.

⁶⁹ ‘Letter of Intent concerning the development of the European Intervention Initiative (EI2)’ (25 June 2018).

⁷⁰ ‘European Intervention Initiative’, French MOD website, https://www.defence.gouv.fr/english/dgris/international-action/l-iei/l-initiative-europeenne-d-intervention.

⁷¹ Alice Pannier, ‘Macron’s “European Intervention Initiative”: More Questions than Answers’, Commentary, European Leadership Network (November 2017); and Alice Billon-Galland and Martin Quencez, ‘European Intervention Initiative: The Big Easy’, Berlin Policy Journal (15 October 2018).

⁷² Douglas Barrie et al., Protecting Europe: meeting the EU’s military level of ambition in the context of Brexit (London: IISS and DGAP November 2018).

⁷³ Sergei Boeke and Bart Schuurman, ‘Operation ‘Serval’: A Strategic Analysis of the French Intervention in Mali, 2013–2014’, Journal of Strategic Studies 38/6 (2015) 801–25; and Susanna D. Wing, ‘French Intervention in Mali: Strategic Alliances, Long-term Regional Presence?’ Small Wars & Insurgencies 27/1 (2016), 59–80.

⁷⁴ ‘La France doit rompre avec la rhétorique martiale qui prévaut au Sahel’, Le Monde, 21 Feb. 2018.

⁷⁵ Nathaniel K. Powell, ‘A Flawed Strategy in the Sahel. How French Intervention Contributes to Instability’, Foreign Affairs, 1 Feb. 2016, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/west-africa/2016-02-01/flawed-strategy-sahel.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Thierry Tardy

Dr Thierry Tardy is the Director of the Research Division at the NATO Defense College in Rome. Previously he held Senior Research Positions at the EU Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) in Paris and at the Geneva Center for Security Policy (GCSP). He has taught at Sciences Po Paris, La Sorbonne, the Graduate Institute (Geneva) and the College of Europe in Bruges.