‘Nothing but humiliation for Russia’: Moscow and NATO’s eastern enlargement, 1993-1995

ABSTRACT

This article recounts Russia’s response to NATO’s eastern enlargement. It argues that NATO enlargement was seen as perfectly acceptable in Moscow, as long as it was inclusive of Russia, which would gain in status as America’s key partner and ally. Once it became apparent that Russia would not be invited to join, the narrative changed to active opposition, as Boris Yeltsin sought domestic legitimacy from being perceived as thedefender of the national interest against Western encroachment. The article highlights the fluid nature of so called national interests, which are defined and redefined in ways affording the greatest legitimation to the political elites.

KEYWORDS:

• NATO enlargement
• Russia-US relations
• Bosnia

Acknowledgment

The author would like to thank the participants of the ‘Cold War on Zoom’ seminar series for their kind comments on an earlier draft of this paper, and, especially, Mary Sarotte for her extensive and constructive engagement. Further, the author is grateful to three anonymous reviewers for their detailed and helpful comments. Special thanks are also due to Sergei Karaganov, Vladimir Lukin, Vladimir Pechatnov, and Sir Malcolm Rifkind.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Correction Statement

This article has been republished with minor changes. These changes do not impact the academic content of the article.

Notes

¹ E.g. Sergei Karaganov, ‘Europe: A Defeat at the Hands of Victory?,’ Russia in Global Affairs No. 1 (2015); Igor Ivanov, Evropeiiskii Vektor Vneshnei Politiki Sovremennoi Rossii (Moscow: Eksmo, 2017); Aleksandr Lukin, Povorot k Azii: Rossiiskaya Vneshnyaya Politika na Rubezhe Vekov i Ee Aktivizatsiya na Vostochnom Napravlenii (Moscow: Ves’ Mir, 2014), 35–37, 173–183; Andrei Kokoshin, ‘Strategicheskaya Stabil’nost v Usloviyakh Kriticheskogo Obostreniya Mezhdunarodnoi Obstanovki,’ Polis. Politicheskie Issledovaniya 2 (2018), 7–20; Vladimir Lukin & Sergei Oznobishchev, ‘Rossiya v Mire XXI Stoletiya: Sversheniya i Nadezhdy,’ Polis. Political Studies, No. 6 (2018), 180–188; Sergei Rogov, ‘Rossiya i SShA na Poroge XXI Veka,’ in A.V. Torkunov (ed.), Sovremennye Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniya i Mirovaya Politika (Moscow: MGIMO, 2004), 541–560. English language studies that draw on and amplify these narratives include, e.g. J.L. Black, Russia Faces NATO Expansion: Bearing Gifts or Bearing Arms (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000).

² Thus, while recognizing Washington’s mistakes, Sergei Kortunov blames the worsening of Moscow’s relations with the West primarily Russia’s own political elites, and the Soviet legacies, e.g. Sergei Kortunov, Natsional’naya Identichnost: Postizhenie Smysla (Moscow: Aspekt Press, 2009), esp. 518–560. Similarly, Tat’yana Parkhalina argues that it is not NATO’s enlargement that threatens Russia but Russia’s own myth-making in relation to NATO. Tat’yana Parkhalina, ‘Rossiya i NATO: Problema Vospriyatiya,’ in Aktual’nye Problemy Evropy 2 (2000), 105–125. Elsewhere, she blames both sides for the crisis in relations. See Tat’yana Parkhalina, ‘Otnosheniya Rossiya – NATO: Problemy i Perspektivy,’ Aktual’nye Problemy Evropy 4 (2004), 114–134. See also Igor Klyamkin (ed.), Rossiya i Zapad: Vneshnyaya Politika Kremlya Glazami Liberalov (Moscow: Liberal’naya Missiya, 2009). Aleksei Arbatov, while recognizing the harmful impact of NATO’s enlargement on Russia’s national interests, nevertheless argue in favour of close cooperation. See Aleksei Arbatov, ‘Rasshirenie NATO i natsional’nye interesy Rossii,’ Politiya No. 2 (2006), 94–103.

³ When I say the ‘mainstream,’ I am of course acutely aware of the contrarian narrative, which includes such prominent figures as George Kennan who memorably called NATO enlargement ‘the most fateful error of American foreign policy in the entire post-cold-war era.’ See George Kennan, ‘A Fateful Error,’ NYT, 5 February 1997, A23.

⁴ For a good overview of the state of the field, see the Special Issue of International Politics, ‘Legacies of NATO Enlargement: International Relations, Domestic Politics, and Alliance Management,’ Vol. 57, Issue 3 (June 2020). The mainstream, however, is fuzzy; there is plenty of scope for contrarian views. E.g. Andrey A. Sushentsov and William C. Wohlforth, ‘The tragedy of US–Russian relations: NATO centrality and the revisionists’ spiral,’ International Politics 57/3 (June 2020), 427–450; William H. Hill, No Place for Russia (New York: Columbia UP, 2018), 116–117.

⁵ Early studies of NATO enlargement include James M. Goldgeier, Not Whether But When: The US Decision to Enlarge NATO (Washington D.C.: Brookings, 1999) and Ronald Asmus, Opening NATO’s Door (New York: Columbia, 2004). Goldgeier highlights the central role of ‘policy entrepreneurs’ like Antony Lake and Richard Holbrooke in pushing through the enlargement agenda. Asmus (himself a key figure in the early US debate on enlargement) draws attention to lobbying by CEE countries. See also James M. Goldgeier and Michael McFaul, Power and Purpose (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2005), 183–210, which centres mainly on the American side of the story.

⁶ See also Joshua Shifrinson’s contribution to this volume, and, earlier: Joshua R. Shifrinson, Rising Titans, Falling Giants: How Great Powers Exploit Power Shifts (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 2018) and Joshua R. Shifrinson, ‘Deal or no deal? The end of the Cold War and the US offer to limit NATO expansion,’ International Security 40/4 (2016): 7–44. Mary Sarotte has written extensively on Bush’s and Clinton’s policy on the question of NATO enlargement. See especially Mary Sarotte, ‘How to Enlarge NATO: The Debate inside the Clinton Administration, 1993–95,’ International Security 44/1, 7–41; also, earlier, Mary Sarotte, ‘A Broken promise: What the West really told Moscow about NATO expansion,’ Foreign Affairs 93/5 (September/October 2014), 90–97; Mary Sarotte, ‘Perpetuating US Preeminence: the 1990 deals to “Bribe the Soviets out” and move NATO in,’ International Security 35/1 (2010), 110–137.

⁷ One notable exception is Svetlana Savranskaya and Tom Blanton (eds.), ‘NATO Expansion: What Yeltsin Heard,’ National Security Archive Briefing Book, No. 621 (16 March 2018), https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/russia-programs/2018-03-16/nato-expansion-what-yeltsin-heard.

⁸ Vast literature exists on domestic and international aspects of ‘legitimacy.’ In my discussion, I especially benefited from the work of Ian Clark, e.g. his Legitimacy in International Society (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2005), although my use of the term is very different from his.

⁹ Letter from Rodric Braithwaite to Anthony Lake, March 1, 1993. UK National Archive (TNA): PREM 19/4420/2.

¹⁰ Memorandum of Conversation, Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin, 4 April 1993, Clinton Presidential Library (CPL): 2015–0782-M. The number refers to a specific FOIA request. Some of these were requested by the author; many were not. Attribution in these cases is problematic since CPL does not list the names of the requesters. It is clear, however, that Mary Sarotte did some of the heavy lifting. See, in particular, Svetlana Savranskaya and Mary Sarotte, ‘The Clinton-Yeltsin Relationship in Their Own Words,’ National Security Archive Briefing Book No. 640 (2 October 2018), https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/russia-programs/2018-10-02/clinton-yeltsin-relationship-their-own-words.

¹¹ Memorandum of Conversation, Bill Clinton and Lech Walesa, 21 April 1993, CPL: 2009–0223-M.

¹² For discussion the relative importance of ‘civilizational,’ as opposed to security themes in Poland’s approach to Western institutions, see, e.g. Joanna A. Gorska, Dealing with a Juggernaut: Analyzing Poland’s Policy toward Russia, 1989–2009 (London: Lexington Books, 2010), 64. See also Andrei Kozyrev, The Firebird: The Elusive Fate of Russian Democracy (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2019), 81.

¹³ Ronald Asmus, Opening Nato’s Door, 24.

¹⁴ Memorandum from Christopher Prentice (FCO) to J.S. Wall (10 Downing Street), 26 February 1993, TNA: PREM 19/4347.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Presidential Review Directive NSC-36, 5 July 1993, CPL: 2010–0190-M.

¹⁷ ‘Russian and Polish Presidents Hold News Conference,’ TASS, 25 August 1993.

¹⁸ Joanna A. Gorska, Dealing with a Juggernaut, 80. Strobe Talbott, however, notes in his memoirs that the Polish at the time informed the Americans that Yeltsin was sober when he made his pronouncement, and that there was a quid pro quo entailing Poland’s non-interference in any Russian-Ukrainian dispute. Strobe Talbott, The Russia Hand: a Memoir of Presidential Diplomacy (New York: Random House, 2002), 95–96. Mary Sarotte, based on the contemporaneous US record, also highlights the quid pro quo argument: Sarotte, ‘How to Enlarge NATO,’ 14–16.

¹⁹ Andrei Kozyrev, The Firebird, 215.

²⁰ ‘Yeltsin Would Not Bar Czech Republic from NATO,’ CTK National News Wire, 26 August 1993.

²¹ Strobe Talbott, The Russia Hand, 96.

²² From the US Secretary of State to **** [sic], 3 September 1993. CPL: 2017–0771-M.

²³ The text of the letter is in Savranskaya and Blanton, ‘NATO Expansion: What Yeltsin Heard,’ https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/dc.html?doc=4390818-Document-04-Retranslation-of-Yeltsin-letter-on. See also ‘British-German summit, 25 November. Background,’ undated (1993), TNA: PREM 19/4167.

²⁴ Memorandum from Lynn Davis to Warren Christopher, 7 September 1993, in Savranskaya and Blanton (eds), ‘NATO Expansion: What Yeltsin Heard,’ https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/dc.html?doc=4390816-Document-02-Strategy-for-NATO-s-Expansion-and.

²⁵ For a detailed account of deliberations at the State Department and the NSC in October 1993 see James M. Goldgeier, Not Whether But When, 36–40.

²⁶ Memorandum of Conversation, Bill Clinton and Carlo Ciampi, 17 September 1993, CPL: 2015–0755-M.

²⁷ For the evolution of the Partnership for Peace see especially James M. Goldgeier, Not Whether but When, 24–29. Another detailed account is Mary Sarotte’s ‘How to Enlarge NATO.’

²⁸ For a nuanced overview of these events, see Michael McFaul, Russia’s Unfinished Revolution (Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 2001), 161–204. See also James M. Goldgeier & Michael McFaul, Power and Purpose: US Policy Towards Russia After the Cold War (Washington D.C.: Brookings, 2003), 127–130.

²⁹ “Khasbulatov Claims Bigger Role in Foreign Policy,” TASS, 19 July 1993.

³⁰ For Rutskoi’s take on these events (where he accuses the United States of collusion with Yeltsin), see Aleksandr Rutskoi, Lefortovskie Protokoly (Moscow: Paleya, 1994).

³¹ Strobe Talbott, The Russia Hand, 59.

³² ‘Showdown in Russia,’ ABC News Nightline, 21 September 1993.

³³ Memorandum of Conversation, Warren Christopher and Boris Yeltsin, 22 October 1993, CPL: 2017–0771-M.

³⁴ Talbott papers over the confusion. Kozyrev, in his memoir, blames Christopher for failing to properly deliver Clinton’s message. See Talbott, The Russia Hand and Kozyrev, The Firebird, 217–221. For a more detailed discussion, see James G. Goldgeier, ‘Bill and Boris: A Window Into a Most Important Post-Cold War Relationship,’ Texas National Security Review 1/4 (August 2018). Goldgeier notes that, never mind Yeltsin, most observers outside the Clinton Administration understood that PfP would replace enlargement. James M. Goldgeier, Not Whether But When, 45.

³⁵ On Yeltsin’s comments to Woerner, see Telcon, Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin, 22 December 1993. CPL: 2015–0782-M. On Woerner’s earlier assurance re NATO’s non-enlargement, see, e.g. Savranskaya and Blanton (eds.), ‘NATO Expansion: What Yeltsin Heard’, document 1. On Woerner’s enthusiastic backing of expansion, ‘Woerner on Expanding NATO membership,’ Memorandum, from the State Department to the NSC, 3 September 1993, US Department of State FOIA reading room (hereafter, State FOIA): M-2017-12017.

³⁶ Memorandum of Conversation, Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin, 13 January 1993. CPL: 2016–0117-M.

³⁷ Conversation between Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger, 11 May 1973, in Douglas E. Selvage and Melissa J. Taylor (eds.), Foreign Relations of the United States, Soviet Union, June 1972-August 1974, Vol. XV (Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 2011), 451.

³⁸ Memorandum of Conversation, Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin, 13 January 1993. CPL: 2016–0117-M.

³⁹ Anatolii Adamishin, V Raznye Gody: Vneshnepoliticheskie Ocherki (Moscow: Ves’ Mir, 2016), 296.

⁴⁰ Cited in Leonid Mlechin, MID: Ministry Inostrannykh Del (Moscow: Tsentrpoligraf, 2003), 554.

⁴¹ Ibid., 329. Adamishin had access to the record of Yeltsin’s conversation with Kohl.

⁴² Vladimir Lukin, ‘Our Security Predicament,’ Foreign Policy, No. 88 (Autumn 1992), 72.

⁴³ Report from Madeleine Albright for the President et al, 26 January 1994, CPL: 2015–0755-M.

⁴⁴ For an interesting discussion of whether Vladimir Zhirinovskii’s views qualify as fascist see Andreas Umland, ‘Zhirinovskii as a Fascist: Palingenetic Ultra-Nationalism and the Emergence of the Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia in 1992–93,’ Forum für osteuropäische Ideen- und Zeitgeschichte, vol. 14, no. 2 (2010), 189–215.

⁴⁵ Vladimir Zhirinovskii, Poslednii Brosok na Yug (Moscow: LDPR, 1993).

⁴⁶ ‘Yeltsin Leaves for Brussels, Says Russia is Accepted in Europe,’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 9 December 1993.

⁴⁷ Author’s interview with Andrzej Olechowski, 17 June 2020.

⁴⁸ Memorandum of Conversation, Bill Clinton and Lech Walesa, 12 January 1994, CPL: 2017–0771-M.

⁴⁹ UK Embassy in Washington to the FCO, 11 January 1994. TNA: PREM 19/5113/2. Clinton, in the meantime, dutifully highlighted the notion that no dividing lines were to be drawn in his own conversations with the CEE leaders in January 1994. See Mary Sarotte, ‘How to Enlarge NATO,’ 22.

⁵⁰ Memorandum from Strobe Talbott to Warren Christopher, undated (January 1994), CPL: 2014–0905-M.

⁵¹ Andrei Kozyrev, The Firebird, 250.

⁵² Anatolii Adamishin, V Raznye Gody, 334.

⁵³ Ibid., 417.

⁵⁴ ‘Perspektivy rasshireniya NATO i interesy Rossii: doklad sluzhby vneshnei razvedki,’ Izvestiya, 26 November 1993, 4.

⁵⁵ Evgenii Primakov, Vstrechi na Perekrestkakh (Moscow: Tsentrpoligraf, 2018), 207.

⁵⁶ Andrei Kozyrev, The Firebird, 247.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ ‘Perspektivy rasshireniya NATO i interesy Rossii: doklad sluzhby vneshnei razvedki,’ Izvestiya, 26 November 1993, 4. See also Leonid Mlechin, Primakov (Moscow: Molodaya Gvardiya, 2007), 367.

⁵⁹ Christopher Boian, ‘Yeltsin sacks counterintelligence chief, seeks to contain amnesty fallout,’ Agence France Press – English, 28 February 1994.

⁶⁰ Transcript of the Duma proceedings, 23 February 1994, http://transcript.duma.gov.ru/node/3233/.

⁶¹ ‘Prime Minister’s visit to Washington: Russia,’ 2 March 1994, TNA: PREM 19/5113/1.

⁶² ‘Prime Minister’s breakfast with senior Americans: Russia,’ 28 February 1994, TNA: PREM 19/5113/1.

⁶³ ‘Prime Minister’s visit to Washington: Russia,’ 2 March 1994, TNA: PREM 19/5113/1.

⁶⁴ Roderic Lyne to Prime Minister, 27 February 1994. TNA: PREM 19/5113/2. Lake claimed in subsequent interviews that he still held out the prospect of Russia’s membership in NATO, and of NATO turning into a ‘CSCE with teeth that included Russia.’ But these recollections are plainly at odds with his considerably more negative view of the prospect in 1994. See James M. Goldgeier, Not Whether But When, 49.

⁶⁵ ‘Note of a meeting between the Prime Minister and a Group of US Congressmen, led by Speaker Tom Foley,’ 28 February 1994, TNA: PREM 19/5113/1.

⁶⁶ Roderic Lyne to Prime Minister, 27 February 1994. TNA: PREM 19/5113/2.

⁶⁷ For an in-depth account of the siege of Sarajevo, see Robert J. Donia, Sarajevo: a Biography (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2006).

⁶⁸ Jeffrey A. Engel, When the world seemed new: George H.W. Bush and the end of the Cold War (Boston; New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2017), 475.

⁶⁹ ‘Summary of conclusions for Meeting of NSC principals committee,’ 6 May 1993, CPL: https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/36614.

⁷⁰ For a good overview, see George Packer, Our Man: Richard Holbrooke and the End of the American Century (New York: Alfted A. Knopf, 2019). For differences between US and European policy through the spring of 1993, see David Owen (ed.), Bosnia-Herzegovina: the Vance-Owen Peace Plan (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2013).

⁷¹ ‘Former Yugoslavia: change in US policy,’ July 1993. TNA: PREM 19/4513. It is interesting that the historiography portrays NATO’s increasing involvement in Bosnia as a consequence of EU and UN failure, not as an effort to defend NATO’s credibility. E.g. William Hill, No Place for Russia, 76–77.

⁷² Anatolii Adamishin, V Raznye Gody, 358.

⁷³ Ibid., 370.

⁷⁴ For Kozyrev’s account, see Andrei Kozyrev, The Firebird, 121. For records of the discussions in the Supreme Soviet see Ye. Yu. Gus’kova (ed.), Yugoslavskii Krizis i Rossiya, Vol. 2 (Moscow: Slavyanskaya Letopis, 1993), 83–110. See also Ye. Yu. Gus’kova, Istoriya Yugoslavskogo Krizisa (Moscow: A. Solov’yev, 2001), 517–518. For a critical view of pan-Slavinism in the Supreme Soviet, see Sergei Romanenko, ‘“Chto v imeni tebe moem?” Nezavisimaya Rossiya i raspad Yugoslavii,’ Migracijske i etničke teme 21 (2005), 4: 339–364. See also Jim Headley, ‘Sarajevo, February 1994: The First Russia-NATO Crisis of the Post-Cold War Era,’ Review of International Studies, Vol. 29, No. 2 (Apr., 2003), 209–227.

⁷⁵ Memorandum of Conversation, Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin, 3 April 1993, CPL: 2015–0782-M

⁷⁶ Anatolii Adamishin, V Raznye Gody, 373–374.

⁷⁷ Ibid., 374–375.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ Memorandum, from US Embassy, Moscow to Secretary of State, 8 May 1993, State FOIA: M-2017-11839

⁸⁰ Strobe Talbott, The Russia Hand, 75.

⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ Interview with Vladimir Lukin, 13 August 2020.

⁸⁴ Letter from Lord Owen to the Secretary of State, 31 July 1993. TNA: PREM 19/4513.

⁸⁵ Memorandum of Conversation, Bill Clinton and Alija Izetbegovic, 8 September 1993, CPL: 2011–0964-M.

⁸⁶ Steven L. Burg, Paul S. Shoup, The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2000), 166–167. A November 2006 Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia concluded, upon consideration of conflicting UN reports and testimony, that the ‘Trial Chamber’s finding that the mortar shell came from SRK positions was not one that no reasonable trier of fact could have made.’ https://www.icty.org/en/press/stanislav-galić-sentenced-life-imprisonment-appeals-chamber-crimes-committed-during-siege. For the full judgment and the dissenting opinions, see https://www.icty.org/x/cases/galic/acjug/en/gal-acjud061130.pdf. See also K.V. Nikiforov, Mezhdu Kremlem i Respublikoi Serbskoi (Moscow: Institut Slavyanovedeniya RAN, 1999), 33–35.

⁸⁷ ‘Markale Shelling, Sarajevo,’ CNN, 5 February 1994, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YswcyeGGe5U

⁸⁸ ‘Zhirinovsky: Russia Should Quit UN If NATO Bombs in Bosnia,’ The Associated Press, 28 January 1994; ‘Russia to test “laser” superweapon in Bosnia: Zhirinovsky,’ Agence France Press – English, 1 February 1994. Also Strobe Talbott, The Russia Hand, ch5.

⁸⁹ Transcript of the Duma proceedings, 9 February 1994, http://transcript.duma.gov.ru/node/3243/

⁹⁰ ‘Kozyrev: Russia Watchful About Aerial Operations in Bosnia,’ TASS, 12 February 1994.

⁹¹ ‘Summary of conclusions for meeting of NSC principals committee,’ 18 February 1994, CPL: 2010–0533-M

⁹² ‘Yeltsin, Clinton Talk About Bosnia,’ Associated Press Worldstream, 11 February 1994.

⁹³ Strobe Talbott, The Russia Hand, 122.

⁹⁴ Ye. Yu. Gus’kova, Istoriya Yugoslavskogo Krizisa (Moscow: A. Solov’yev, 2001), 385.

⁹⁵ Memorandum from Roderic Lyne to R.J. Sawers, ‘Prime Minister’s Visit to Croatia and Bosnia,’ 21 March 1994, TNA: PREM 19/5051.

⁹⁶ Conversation between Ivan Rybkin and the FRY Ambassador in Moscow Milan Roćen, 23 February 1994. State Archive of the Russian Federation (GARF): fond 10100, opis 3, delo 1, list 42.

⁹⁷ Memorandum from C.R.V. Stagg (FCO) to Roderic Lyne (10 Downing Street), 24 February 1994, TNA: PREM 19/5113/2.

⁹⁸ Telcon, Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin, 20 February 1994, CPL: 2015–0782-M.

⁹⁹ Memorandum of Conversation, Tom Pickering and Dmitrii Ryurikov, 24 February 1994, State FOIA: F-2017-13804.

¹⁰⁰ Memorandum of Conversation, Ivan Rybkin et al & William Perry et al, 8 March 1994, GARF: fond 10100, opis 3, delo 5, list 130.

¹⁰¹ Memorandum of Conversation, Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin, 10 April 1994, CPL: 2015–0782-M.

¹⁰² Transcript of the Duma proceedings, 13 April 1994 http://transcript.duma.gov.ru/node/3215/

¹⁰³ K.V. Nikiforov, Mezhdu Kremlem i Respublikoi Serbskoi, 42.

¹⁰⁴ Strobe Talbott, The Russia Hand, 123.

¹⁰⁵ Memorandum from Philippa Leslie-Jones to R.J. Sawers, ‘Prime Minister’s Talks with President Clinton at Chequers,’ 6 June 1994, TNA: PREM 19/5114.

¹⁰⁶ Cable from the British Embassy in Moscow to the FCO, 5 June 1995, TNA: PREM 19/5393.

¹⁰⁷ K.V. Nikiforov, Mezhdu Kremlem i Respublikoi Serbskoi, 43.

¹⁰⁸ Interview with Vladimir Lukin, 13 August 2020.

¹⁰⁹ George Packer, Our Man: Richard Holbrooke and the End of the American Century.

¹¹⁰ Anatol Lieven, Chechnya: Tombstone of Russian Power (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999), 40.

¹¹¹ ‘Ministerial Meeting of the NOrth Atlantic Council Final Communique,’ 1 December 1994, https://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1994/p94-116e.htm.

¹¹² Boris Yeltsin’s remarks at the CSCE meeting in Budapest (audio), 5 December 1994, Yeltsin Centre Archive: https://yeltsin.ru/archive/audio/9035/.

¹¹³ On the genesis of Yeltsin’s speech, see also Andrei Kozyrev, The Firebird, 283. For the background on the US side, see James M. Goldgeier and Michael McFaul, Power and Purpose, 189–194.

¹¹⁴ Strobe Talbott, The Russia Hand, 154.

¹¹⁵ Memorandum of Conversation, Bill Clinton and Helmut Kohl, 5 December 1994, State FOIA: M-2017-11531.

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

¹¹⁷ Cable, US Embassy in Bonn to Secretary of State, 26 May 1994, CPL: 2017–0771-M.

¹¹⁸ Cable, US Embassy in Bonn to Secretary of State, 13 May 1994, CPL: 2017–0771-M.

¹¹⁹ A brief for Prime Minister, undated (May-June 1994), TNA: PREM 19/5114.

¹²⁰ Cable, UK Embassy in Moscow to the FCO, 20 June 1994, TNA: PREM 19/4919.

¹²¹ On Rühe’s position, see also James M. Goldgeier, Not Whether But When, 34–35.

¹²² Memorandum from the Secretary of State for Defense (Malcolm Rifkind) to the Prime Minister, 5 January 1995, TNA: PREM 19/5227/1.

¹²³ Author’s interview with Malcolm Rifkind, 29 June 2020.

¹²⁴ Strobe Talbott, The Russia Hand.

¹²⁵ Ibid.

¹²⁶ See James M. Goldgeier, Not Whether But When, 73–76.

¹²⁷ Memorandum, Anthony Lake to Bill Clinton, 13 October 1994. CPL: 2015–0755-M.

¹²⁸ For a more detailed discussion of the debate in the NSC, see Mary Sarotte, ‘How to Enlarge,’ 31–32.

¹²⁹ Memorandum, Anthony Lake to Bill Clinton, 13 October 1994. CPL: 2015–0755-M.

¹³⁰ Memorandum, Anthony Lake to Bill Clinton, 13 October 1994. CPL: 2015–0755-M. For Christopher’s promise, see Memorandum of Conversation, Warren Christopher and Boris Yeltsin, 22 October 1993, CPL: 2017–0771-M. For therecord of Thomas Pickering’s conversation with Ivan Rybkin, 6 October 1994, see GARF: fond 10100, opis 3, delo 1, listy 186–188.

¹³¹ See also Mary Sarotte, ‘How to Enlarge,’ 35.

¹³² Report on a visit by a Duma delegation to the 40th session of the North Atlantic Assembly, undated (November 1994), GARF: fond 10100, opis 3, delo 11, listy 133–139.

¹³³ Talbott vehemently denied the ‘strategic hedge’ charge, although the allegation was true. (In fact, those very words were being used in the internal policy discussion).

¹³⁴ Cable, US Embassy in Moscow to the Secretary of State, 16 December 1994, State FOIA: F-2017-13804.

¹³⁵ Strobe Talbott, The Russia Hand, 144.

¹³⁶ Memorandum of Conversation, Ivan Rybkin and Philippe Séguin, 15 December 1994, GARF: fond 10100, opis 3, delo 1, listy 275–282.

¹³⁷ Author’s discussion with Vladimir Pechatnov.

¹³⁸ Henry Kissinger, ‘Not This Partnership,’ The Washington Post, 24 November 1993.

¹³⁹ Ibid.

¹⁴⁰ Memorandum of Conversation, Ivan Rybkin and Al Gore, 14 December 1994, GARF: fond 1001, opis 3, delo 1, listy 267–273.

¹⁴¹ Memorandum of Conversation, Bill Clinton et al and Jean-Luc Dehaene et al, 11 February 1995, CPL: 2015–0755-M.

¹⁴² Cited in Mary Sarotte, ‘How to enlarge NATO,’ 36–37; Ronald Asmus, Opening NATO’s Door, 111–112.

¹⁴³ Letter from Dmitrii Volkogonov to Boris Yeltsin, 3 December 1994, Yeltsin Centre Archive: https://yeltsin.ru/archive/paperwork/12616/.

¹⁴⁴ Mary Sarotte, ‘How to enlarge NATO,’ 35

¹⁴⁵ E.g. Memorandum of Conversation, Ivan Rybkin and Jiang Zemin, 16 May 1994, GARF: fond 10100, opis 3, delo 1, listy 125–131. For an account of Jiang Zemin’s Sept. 1994 visit to Moscow see Zhong Zhicheng, Weile Shijie Geng Meihao (Beijing: Shijie Zhishi Chubanshe, 2006), 54–60..

¹⁴⁶ Evgenii Primakov, Vstrechi na Perekrestkakh, 181–182.

¹⁴⁷ Conversation between Yegor Stroyev and Li Fenglin, 11 August 1998, GARF: fond 10100, opis 10, delo 135, list 148.

¹⁴⁸ Conversation between Ivan Rybkin and Tariq Aziz, 6 June 1995, GARF: fond 10100, opis 3, delo 12, listy 79–80.

¹⁴⁹ For Yeltsin’s offer, see Memorandum of Conversation, Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin, 27 September 1994. CPL: 2015–0782-M.

¹⁵⁰ Memcon, Vladimir Lukin and Deputy Foreign Minister of Iran Mahmoud Vaezi, 13 October 1994, GARF: fond 10100, opis 3, delo 1, list 219.

¹⁵¹ Report on a Russian parliamentary delegation’s visit to Iran, undated (March 1995), GARF: fond 10100, opis 3, delo 15, listy 36–45.

¹⁵² On Tehran’s role in the Tajikistan talks see e.g. Evgenii Primakov, Vstrechi na Perekrestkakh, 170–173.

¹⁵³ Robert J. Einhorn and Gary Samore, ‘Ending Russia’s Assistance to Iran’s Nuclear Bomb,’ Survival 44/2 (Summer 2002), 51–70.

¹⁵⁴ Strobe Talbott, The Russia Hand, ch. 6. Also, James M. Goldgeier and Michael McFaul, Power and Purpose, 176–181.

¹⁵⁵ Memorandum of Conversation, Ivan Rybkin and Slobodan Milosevic, 10 August 1995, GARF: fond 10100, opis 3, delo 12, listy 95–101.

¹⁵⁶ Report on a Russian parliamentary delegation’s visit to Slovakia, undated (February 1995), GARF: fond 10100, opis 3, delo 15, listy 24–29.

¹⁵⁷ Boris Yeltsin’s Statement to the Federal Assembly, 16 February 1995, Yeltsin Centre Archives: https://yeltsin.ru/archive/paperwork/12591/.

¹⁵⁸ Georgy Bovt, Natalia Kalashnikova, ‘Poverty of Diplomacy and Diplomacy of Poverty,’ Russian Press Digest, 15 March 1995.

¹⁵⁹ Cable, US Embassy in Moscow to the Secretary of State, 21 March 1995, CPL: 2017–0771-M.

¹⁶⁰ Andrei Kozyrev, The Firebird, 299–300.

¹⁶¹ Memorandum for the President from Warren Christopher, 23 March 1995, FOIA State: M-2017-11920.

¹⁶² Alexei Pushkov, ‘Kozyrev Loses Credibility Both at Home and Abroad,’ Moscow News (Russia), 5 May 1995.

¹⁶³ Memorandum of Conversation, Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin, 10 May 1995, CPL: 2015–0782-M.

¹⁶⁴ Memorandum from Anthony Lake to Bill Clinton, 17 July 1995. CPL: https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/101137.

¹⁶⁵ Cable, US Embassy to the Secretary of State, 19 May 1995, State FOIA: M-2017-12619.

¹⁶⁶ Memorandum, Anthony Lake to Bill Clinton, 17 July 1995. CPL: https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/101137. On Ryurikov’s relations with Kozyrev, see Adamishin, V Raznye Gody, 417.

¹⁶⁷ ‘Russian Security Council: Partnership with NATO linked to its Expansion,’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 25 May 1995.

¹⁶⁸ Letter from Boris Yeltsin to Bill Clinton, 26 May 1995, State FOIA: M-2017-11655.

¹⁶⁹ Andrei Kozyrev, The Firebird, 302.

¹⁷⁰ On this point, see in particular James M. Goldgeier, Not Whether But When, 108–151.

¹⁷¹ Note from Sergei Karaganov to the author, 23 August 2020.

¹⁷² Anatolii Adamishin, V Raznye Gody, 290.

¹⁷³ Alexander Wendt, ‘Anarchy is What States Make of It: the Social Construction of Power Politics,’ International Organization 46/2 (Spring 1992), 395–425.

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Notes on contributors

Sergey Radchenko

Sergey Radchenko is Professor of International Relations at Cardiff University. He is the author of Two Suns in the Heavens: the Sino-Soviet Struggle for Supremacy (Stanford UP & Wilson Center Press, 2009) and Unwanted Visionaries (Oxford UP, 2014). He is a co-author (with Campbell Craig) of The Atomic Bomb and the Origins of the Cold War (Yale UP, 2008).