Pulled East. The rise of China, Europe and French security policy in the Asia-Pacific

ABSTRACT

This article delivers the first post-Cold War history of how France – the European power with the largest political-military footprint in the Asia-Pacific – has responded to the national security challenges posed by the rise of China. Based upon a unique body of primary sources (80 interviews conducted in Europe, the Asia-Pacific and the United States; declassified archival documents; and leaked diplomatic cables), it shows that China’s growing assertiveness after 2009 (and national policymakers’ perceptions thereof) has been the key driver of change in French security policy in the region, pulling France strategically into the Asia-Pacific. Specifically, growing threat perceptions of China’s rise – coupled with steadily rising regional economic interests – have led Paris to forge a cohesive policy framework, the Indo-Pacific strategy, and to bolster the political-military dimension of its regional presence. By investigating this key yet neglected dimension of French and European security policies, and by leveraging a unique body of primary written and oral sources, this study fills an important gap in the scholarly literature on both European and Asia-Pacific security dynamics. The findings of this article also shed new light on the political and military assets that France can bring to bear in the formulation of a common EU security policy toward the Asia-Pacific and on the implications thereof for the prospect of a transatlantic strategy vis-à-vis China.

Acknowledgments

For useful and constructive feedback, the author would like to thank Nicolas Blarel, Stephen G. Brooks, Mario Del Pero, Mathieu Droin, Clément Godbarge, Frédéric Grare, Jean Joana, Alexander Lanoszka, Mélissa Levaillant, Avinash Paliwal, Alessio Patalano, Luis Simón, Bruno Tertrais, and Marco Wyss. The author is grateful to Konstantin Jannone and Maximilian Reinold for their outstanding research assistance. The project upon which this article is based received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under the Marie Skłodowska-Curie grant agreement No 752790.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Supplementary material

Supplemental data for this article can be accessed here.

Notes

1. Scott Brown, for instance, argues that the EU has been characterized by a high degree of convergence around the perception that China opened significant economic and political opportunities for the EU, rather than being a potential national security challenge. Scott A. W. Brown, Power, Perception and Foreign Policymaking: US and EU Responses to the Rise of China (New York, NY: Routledge, 2018), 5, 30, 108, 197, 199 and 200 (among others). See below for an overview of the existing scholarship.

2. For analytical purposes, this article distinguishes three geographical groupings. The ‘Asia-Pacific’ encompasses the region from Myanmar to Australia and to Japan (excluding India and Russia). ‘Asia and Oceania’ embraces the Asia-Pacific and South Asia (Bangladesh, India and Pakistan). The ‘Indo-Pacific’ refers to a larger area which includes Asia-Oceania and the broader maritime Indian and Pacific Oceans areas. The data used in the article (e.g. on trade, naval deployments, forward deployed forces, etc.) refer to different geographical groupings because it was sometimes not possible, based upon publicly available figures, to disaggregate the data for the various groupings. To ensure consistency and avoid anachronisms, the article mostly refers to ‘Asia-Pacific’ when discussing French policies from the early 1990s to the mid-2010s, and uses ‘Indo-Pacific’ label for the post-2018 period, when this new label was adopted.

3. To be sure, China’s muscular regional posture is not the only security challenge that France faces in Asia-Pacific (e.g. North Korea’s nuclear program, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, piracy or terrorism in south-east Asia). Yet, as this article intends to demonstrate, Chinese rising assertiveness – and French policymakers’ perceptions thereof – has been the overarching driver of the change in Paris’ foreign and security policy in Asia-Pacific. Also, even though France has had overseas territories in the region for several centuries, the Asia-Pacific’s importance in the hierarchy of French diplomatic priorities had declined with decolonization; and it is only in the 2010s that greater attention and resources were again devoted to the region, largely because of the regional ramifications of China’s rising assertiveness.

4. On China’s rising assertiveness in the Asia-Pacific after 2009, see, for instance, Michael Yahuda, ‘China’s New Assertiveness in the South China Sea’, Journal of Contemporary China 22/81 (2013), 446–459; Nien-Chung Chang Lao, ‘The Sources of China’s Assertiveness: the System, Domestic Politics or Leadership Preferences?’, International Affairs 92/4 (2016), 817–833; Kai He and Huiyun Feng, ‘Debating China’s Assertiveness: Taking China’s Power and Interests Seriously’, International Politics, 49/5 (2012), 633–644; Robert S. Ross, ‘The Domestic Sources of China’s “Assertive Diplomacy,” 2009–2010: Nationalism and Chinese Foreign Policy’, in Rosemary Foot, ed., China Across the Divide. The Domestic and Global in Politics and Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 72–96. For a contrarian perspective and a discussion, Alastair Iain Johnston, ‘How New and Assertive Is China’s New Assertiveness?,” International Security, 37/4 (2013), 7–48. For a different periodization, see Andrew Chubb, ‘PRC Assertiveness in the South China Sea: Measuring Continuity and Change, 1970–2015’, International Security 45/3 (2021): 79–121.

5. This guideline can be translated as: ‘Observe calmly; secure our position; cope with affairs calmly; hide our capacities and bide our time; be good at maintaining a low profile; and never claim leadership.’ For a discussion, see Ronald C. Keith, Deng Xiaoping and China’s Foreign Policy (New York: Routledge, 2017), ch. 1.

6. See, e.g. David Shambaugh, ‘China Engages Asia: Reshaping the Regional Order’, International Security, 29/3 (Winter, 2004/2005), 64–99; Cheng-Chwee Kuik, ‘Multilateralism in China’s ASEAN Policy: Its Evolution, Characteristics, and Aspiration’, Contemporary Southeast Asia, 27/1 (2005), 102–122.

7. On China’s contestation of US regional hegemony, see Rosemary Foot, ‘China’s Rise and US Hegemony: Renegotiating Hegemonic Order in East Asia?’, International Politics, 57/1 (2020), 150–165; Evelyn Goh, ‘Contesting Hegemonic Order: China in East Asia’, Security Studies, 28/3 (2019), 614–644.

8. On the variety of explanatory factors of Chinese assertiveness, see foonote 4.

9. A ‘regional order’ can be defined as rule-governed interactions among states in a given region in which ‘shared norms, rules, and expectations constitute, regulate, and make predictable international life;’ in the Asia-Pacific, these norms and rules include the respect of sovereignty, free trade, and international law (and in particular freedom of navigation and the peaceful resolution of disputes). See, e.g. Evelyn Goh, The Struggle for Order: Hegemony, Hierarchy and Transition in Post-Cold War East Asia (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 7; and Barry Buzan and Yongjin Zhang, ‘Introduction: Interrogating Regional International Society in East Asia’, in Barry Buzan and Yongjin Zhang, eds., Contesting International Society in East Asia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 1–28.

10. On the concept of tyranny of distance, see Geoffrey Blainey, The Tyranny of Distance: How Distance Shaped Australia’s History (Sydney: Macmillan, 2001).

11. On the concept of ‘milieu goals’, see Arnold Wolfers, Discord and collaboration: essays on international politics (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1965), 73–74. See also Christopher Hill, Foreign policy in the twenty-first century, 2nd edn (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 54, 131 and 312.

12. See for example, Nicola Casarini, Remaking Global Order: the Evolution of Europe-China Relations and its Implications for East Asia and the United States (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); Thomas Christiansen, Emil Kirchner, Philomena B. Murray, eds., The Palgrave Handbook of EU-Asia Relations (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013); Andrew Cottey, ‘Europe and China’s Sea Disputes: Between Normative Politics, Power Balancing and Acquiescence’, European Security 28, no. 4 (2019), 473–492; Emil J. Kirchner, Thomas Christiansen and Han Dorussen, eds., Security Relations between China and the European Union: From Convergence to Cooperation? (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016); Thomas Christiansen, Emil Kirchner and Uwe Wissenbach, The European Union and China (London: Red Globe Press, 2019); Thomas Christiansen, Emil Kirchner, and See Seng Tan, eds., The European Union’s Security Relations with Asian Partners (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2021); David Kerr and Liu Fei, eds., The International Politics of EU-China Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); Frans-Paul van der Putten and Chu Shulong, eds., China, Europe and International Security: Interests, Roles and Prospects (London: Routledge, 2011); Eva Pejsova, ed., Guns, Engines and Turbines: The EU’s Hard Power in Asia (Paris: EUISS, 2018); Michael Reiterer, ‘The EU’s Comprehensive Approach to Security in Asia’, European Foreign Affairs Review 19/1 (2014), 1–22; Robert S. Ross, Øystein Tunsjø, and Tuosheng Zhang, eds., US-China-EU Relations: Managing the New World Order (London: Routledge, 2010); David Shambaugh, Eberhard Sandschneider and Zhou Hong, eds., China-Europe Relations: Perceptions, Policies and Prospects (New York: Routledge, 2007); May-Britt Stumbaum, The European Union and China: Decision-Making in EU Foreign and Security Policy towards the People’s Republic of China (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2009); Reuben Y. Wong, The Europeanization of French Foreign Policy: France and the EU in East Asia (New York: Palgrave, 2006).

13. On this point, see Hugo Meijer and Marco Wyss, ‘Upside Down: Reframing European Defence Studies’, Cooperation and Conflict 54/3 (2019), 378–406.

14. Hugo Meijer, ‘Transatlantic Perspectives on China’s Military Modernization: The Case of Europe’s Arms Embargo against the People’s Republic of China’, Paris Paper no. 12, Strategic Research Institute (IRSEM), 2014; Hugo Meijer, Trading with the Enemy: The Making of US Export Control Policy toward the People’s Republic of China (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), ch. 7; Hugo Meijer, Lucie Béraud-Sudreau, Paul Holtom and Matthew Uttley, ‘Arming China: Major Powers’ Arms Transfers to the People’s Republic of China’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 41/6 (2018), 850–886; Oliver Bräuner, Mark Bromley and Mathieu Duchâtel, Western Arms Exports to China (Stockholm: SIPRI, 2015); Stumbaum, 2009, ch. 6. On European arms transfers to the Asia-Pacific, see Mathieu Duchâtel and Mark Bromley, ‘Influence by Default: Europe’s Impact on Military Security in East Asia’, ECFR Policy Brief, May 2017.

15. Casarini, 2009, 57. A comprehensive presentation of this argument is to be found in Brown, 2018. Whereas some scholars have examined the approach of Europeans toward non-traditional security challenges in the Asia-Pacific, few have provided an in-depth analysis of their responses to the national security challenges posed by China’s rise. On the EU and non-traditional security challenges in the Asia-Pacific see for instance Thomas Christiansen, Emil Kirchner and Tan See Seng, ‘EU-Asia Security Relations – Cooperation Against the Odds?’, Paper presented at the 16th Biennial Conference of EUSA, Denver, May 2019; Christiansen and Dorussen, 2016; May-Britt Stumbaum, ‘Impact of the Rebalance on Europe’s Interest in East Asia: Consequences for Europe in Economic, Diplomatic, and Military/Security Dimensions’, in Hugo Meijer, ed., Origins and Evolution of the US Rebalance toward Asia: Diplomatic, Military, and Economic Dimensions (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 223–252; Liselotte Odgaard, ‘European Engagement in the Indo-Pacific: The Interplay between Institutional and State-Level Naval Diplomacy’, Asia Policy 14/4 (2019), 129–159; Michael Reiterer, ‘The EU’s Comprehensive Approach to Security in Asia’, European Foreign Affairs Review 19/1 (2014), 1–22.

¹⁶ Jean-Pierre Bat, Le syndrome Foccart: La politique française en Afrique, de 1959 à nos jours (Paris: Gallimard, 2012); Stefano Recchia and Thierry Tardy, eds., Special issue ‘French military operations in Africa: Reluctant multilateralism’, Journal of Strategic Studies 43/4 (2020); Olivier Schmitt, ed., Special issue ‘Myths and Realities of the French Way of War’, Journal of Strategic Studies 40/4 (2017); Daniel Kuthy, ‘Old Interests, New Purpose: French Foreign Policy in the Middle East’, in Jack Covarrubias and Tom Lansford, eds., Strategic Interests in the Middle East: Opposition and Support for US Foreign Policy (Aldershot: Asghate, 2007), 42-74. Few notable exceptions on French policies in the Asia-Pacific include: Andrea Gilli, ‘France’s New Raison d’être in the Indo-Pacific?’, in Sharon Stirling, ed., Mind the Gap: Naval Views of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (Washington DC: The German Marshall Fund, 2019), 18-21; Iskander Rehman, ‘The Indian Ocean in France’s Global Defence Strategy’, CNA Roundtable Proceedings, 18 January 2018, 21–26; David Scott, ‘France’s “Indo-Pacific” Strategy: Regional Power Projection’, Journal of Military and Strategic Studies 19/4 (2019), 76-103; Nicolas Regaud, ‘France and Security in the Asia-Pacific: from the End of the First Indochina Conflict to Today’, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Strategic Insights (December 2016); Nicolas Regaud, ‘France’s Indo-Pacific Strategy and its Overseas Territories in the Indian and Pacific Oceans: Characteristics, Capabilities, Constraints and Avenues for Deepening the Franco-Australian Strategic Partnership’, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 25 June 2021, https://www.aspi.org.au/report/frances-indo-pacific-strategy-and-its-overseas-territories-indian-and-pacific-oceans.

17. On France’s colonialism in the Indian and Pacific Oceans, see Robert Aldrich, The French Presence in the South Pacific, 1842–1940 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1990); Edmond Maestri, Les îles du Sud-Ouest de l’Océan Indien et la France de 1815 à nos jours (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1994).

18. MFA, ‘The Indo-Pacific Region: a Priority for France’, Country Files, August 2019. On France’s forward deployed forces in the region, see the Online Appendix.

19. Between January 2013 and June 2021, eighty interviews were conducted in Berlin, Brussels, Paris, London, Seoul and Washington DC with current and former civilian and military officials in charge of political-military and Asia-Pacific affairs in the Executive office of the President, Ministries of Foreign Affairs (MFA), Ministries of Defence (MoD), in the interagency coordinating bodies in charge of political-military affairs as well as in embassies (in Delhi and Seoul). In Brussels, the interviewees include officials in charge of Asia-Pacific Affairs in the EU External Action Service (EEAS) and in NATO.

20. The article leverages previously undisclosed declassified archival documents retrieved from the Centre of Diplomatic Archives in Nantes (CADN), ‘Ambassade de France à Pékin, 1989–1992ʹ, 513PO/2004038.

21. Dozens of relevant cables from the State Department and the US embassies in Europe and the Asia-Pacific were found in the Wikileaks/Cablegate archive (1990–2010). Through the minutes of meetings, these cables bring to light the debates (and the key considerations therein) between French and European diplomats and their American counterparts over their respective foreign and security policies toward China. Because of space constraints, the article references only part of this large body of documents.

22. Data retrieved from the magazine of the French Navy (Cols Bleus).

23. The article relies on a wide-ranging examination of the statements by French policymakers in front of parliamentary committees in the National Assembly and the Senate as well as on parliamentary reports.

24. Regaud, ‘France and Security in the Asia-Pacific’, 4.

25. Data retrieved from: UN Comtrade – International Trade Statistics Database, https://comtrade.un.org; and World Bank’s World Integrated Trade Solutions (WITS), https://wits.worldbank.org.

26. Ibid.

27. Wong, The Europeanization of French Foreign Policy, 28.

28. National Assembly, Les échanges commerciaux entre la Chine et la France, Committee on Finance, General Economics and the Plan, 13 July 2005, 55.

29. President Jacques Chirac, Interview with the New China Agency (Xinhua), 14 May 1997a.

30. See, among others, MFA, White Paper – 2030 French Strategy in Asia-Oceania. Towards an Inclusive Asian Indo-Pacific Region, 2018a, 3.

31. UN Comtrade – International Trade Statistics Database, https://comtrade.un.org.

32. MFA, ‘Les relations économiques entre la France et la région Asie-Ocanie’, Country Factsheet, June 2018b (2017 data); and MFA, ‘Fiche Pays – Repéres économiques’, Direction de la diplomatie économique, avril 2021b, https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/politique-etrangere-de-la-france/diplomatie-economique-et-commerce-exterieur/la-france-et-ses-partenaires-economiques-pays-par-pays/asie/article/chine.

33. Ibid.

34. Ibid.

35. Senate, Reprendre pied en Asie du Sud-Est, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Armed Forces, Report no. 723, 2014b, I.C.1.

36. MoD, France and Security in the Indo-Pacific, 2014, foreword by the Minister of Defence.

37. Senate, La France face à l’émergence de l’Asie du Sud-Est, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Armed Forces, Report no. 723, 14 July 2014, 199.

38. Luc Viellard, Mathieu Anquez and Jean-Pierre Histrimont, Vulnérabilités de la France face aux flux maritimes, European Company of Strategic Intelligence, Report Commissioned by the MoD, 31 January 2012, 124.

39. National Assembly, Enjeux stratégiques en mer de Chine méridionale, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Report no. 1868, 10 April 2019a, 48.

40. MoD, French White Paper on Defence and National Security, 2013, 118.

41. Senate, 2014, 169.

42. On regional arms imports, see SIPRI, ‘Trends in international arms transfers, 2018ʹ, Fact Sheet, March 2019, 9.

43. MoD, France and Security in the Indo-Pacific, 2019b, 17.

44. MoD official, interview, Paris, 13 October 2017.

45. Interviews with former senior diplomats and with former MoD officials in office in the 1990s – 2000s, Paris, January–December 2017 and March 2020.

46. Interview, Paris, 16 March 2020.

47. See MoD, Livre Blanc sur la défense, 1994, 10; MoD, French White Paper on Defence and National Security, 2008, 34.

48. Interviews with MoD officials working in the 1990s and 2000s, Paris, January-March 2020.

49. Interviews with MoD officials working in the 1990s and 2000s, Paris, January-March 2020.

50. Interview, Paris, March 2020. The only indirect public reference to this decision is to be found in a speech by former PM Lionel Jospin (1997–2002) in which he referred to the role of nuclear deterrence in countering threats ‘whatever their origin, even distant’ (Address to the Institute for Higher National Defence Studies, Paris, 22 October 1999). See also Bruno Tertrais, ‘French Nuclear Deterrence Policy, Forces, and Future’, FRS Research & Documents, no. 1 (January 2019), 33.

51. Interviews with officials in the MFA and MoD, January-December 2017 and January-March 2020.

52. Chief of the Staff of the Navy, Admiral Christophe Prazuck, Testimony before the National Assembly’s Committee on National Defence and Armed Forces, 26 July 2017, 2–3.

53. MoD, Strategic Update, January 2021, 21.

54. Interview, Paris, 6 July 2013. DGRIS stands for Directorate General for International Relations and Strategy.

55. Ibid. This point was confirmed in interviews with officials in the Office of the President, MFA and MoD, Paris, January-December 2017.

56. Interviews with former MoD officials, Paris, October–December 2017 and January–March 2020.

57. See for instance MoD, 2013a, 34–35.

58. Interview, Paris, 6 July 2017.

59. MoD, Strategic Review of Defence and National Security, 2017a, 42.

60. MoD, France’s Defence Strategy in the Indo-Pacific, 2019a, 8.

61. See, e.g. Minister of the Armed Forces Florence Parly, Speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue, Singapore, 3 June 2018; Senate, 2014, 71; MoD, 2017a, 26.

62. MoD, 2016a, 2. See also Office of the Prime Minister, National Strategy for the Security of Maritime Areas, 2015, 8.

63. Interview, Paris, 27 March 2017.

64. MoD, 2018c, 8; MoD, 2019a, 13.

65. Interview, Paris, 6 July 2017.

66. Interview, 3 February 2020.

67. National Assembly, 2019a, 6.

68. Viellard, Anquez and Histrimont, 2012.

69. Ibid., 113 and 121–126.

70. Interview, 14 November 2013.

71. Interviews with MoD officials, January–March 2020.

72. MoD, 2013a, 35; MoD, 2017a, 26.

73. Interview, 6 July 2017.

74. Interview, 11 October 2017.

75. Ibid.

76. French Government, ‘Déclaration conjointe franco-chinoise pour un partenariat global’, signed by Jacques Chirac and Jiang Zemin, Beijing, 16 May 1997.

77. Former senior diplomat in office in the 1990s and 2000s, interview, 13 March 2020.

78. President Jacques Chirac, Speech in Beijing, 15 May 1997b.

79. ‘Relations bilatérales franco-chinoises’, French Embassy in China to MFA, 30 January 1992, CADN, 513PO/2004038. See also ‘Relations franco-chinoises,’ MFA to French Embassy in China, 15 September 1989, CADN, 513PO/2004038.

80. President Jacques Chirac, Speech in Singapore, 29 February 1996.

81. Senior adviser to President Chirac, interview, Paris, March 2020.

82. François Godement, ‘Une politique française pour l’Asie-Pacifique ?’, Politique étrangère 60/4 (1995), 959 and 967. For a similar assessment, see also René Dorient, ‘Un septennat de politique asiatique’; Paul Stares and Nicolas Regaud, ‘Europe’s Role in Asia‐Pacific Security’, Survival 39/4 (1997), 117 and 131; and Hadrienne Terres, ‘La France et l’Asie: l’ébauche d’un “pivot” à la française’, French Institute of International Relations (IFRI), April 2015, 9.

83. Interview, Paris, 16 May 2017.

84. Nicolas Regaud, first Deputy Assistant Director for Regional Affairs at the MoD’s DAS (1997–1999) and later Deputy Director for International Crises and Conflict at the SGDN (2000–2005), interview, Paris, 21 March 2017.

85. Interviews with MoD officials, Paris, January–December 2017 and January–March 2020.

86. MoD, 2014.

87. MoD, 2013b.

88. These reports included, among others, MoD, 2013b, 2017a; MFA, 2018a; MFA, The French Strategy in the Indo-Pacific, 2019a; MoD, 2014a; MoD, France and Security in the Asia-Pacific, 2016; MoD, 2018c; MoD, 2019a. See also the speeches by French Defence Ministers at the Shangri-La Dialogue listed in the bibliography.

89. President’s Office, ‘Discours à Garden Island’, Sydney, Australia, 3 May 2018; MFA, 2018a, 2019a; and MoD, 2018c.

90. See among others Rory Medcalf, Contest for the Indo-Pacific: Why China Won’t Map the Future (Melbourne: La Trobe University Press, 2020).

91. President’s Office, ‘Discours à Garden Island’; MFA, 2018a, 1–4; MFA, 2019a, 5 and 35; MoD, 2019a, 5 and 12–14; Minister of Defence Jean-Yves Le Drian, Speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue, Singapore, 5 June 2016; Minister of the Armed Forces, 2018.

92. MFA, 2018a, 4–6. See also MFA, 2019a, 31 and 35; and President Macron quoted in ‘Macron Wants a Balance against China in the Pacific’, Radio New Zealand, 7 May 2018.

93. Interview, 13 December 2016.

94. The concept of ‘patchwork’ as applied to France’s policy in the region was first used by Stares and Regaud, ‘Europe’s Role in Asia-Pacific Security’.

95. The end of French nuclear tests removed a major issue of contention in France’s relations with South Pacific countries (e.g. Australia and New Zealand) and, more broadly, across the Asia-Pacific – thereby enabling greater diplomatic and economic cooperation in the subsequent decade. Senate, Australie: quelle place pour la France dans le Nouveau monde?, Report no. 222, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Armed Forces, 2016, 87–88.

96. Lawrence R. Sullivan, Historical Dictionary of the People’s Republic of China (Boulder: Rowman and Littlefield, 2016), 258.

97. For more details, see Hugo Meijer, Trading with the Enemy: The Making of US Export Control Policy toward the People’s Republic of China (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 248–250; and Meijer, ‘Transatlantic Perspectives on China’s Military Modernization’, 39–48.

98. US Embassy in France, ‘MOD Advisor Upbeat on Bilateral Relationship; Sees Rapprochement on Middle East; No Change on EU China Arms Embargo’, Confidential, Wikileaks Cablegate, 18 March 2005; US Embassy in France, ‘Codel Smith Meets Chirac, French Officials’, Confidential, Wikileaks Cablegate, 31 January 2005.

99. Interviews with former MFA and MoD officials, September-December 2013. See also, e.g. US Embassy in France, ‘Codel Smith Meets Chirac, French Officials’; US Embassy in France, ‘France/GAERC: Agreement On Most Issues Except China Embargo’, Confidential, 8 December 2006, Wikileaks/Cablegate. For details on the revision of the Code of Conduct, see Meijer, ‘Transatlantic Perspectives on China’s Military Modernization’, 22–24.

100. Former MoD official, interview, Paris, 16 July 2013. The EU arms embargo on China was also seen as counterproductive in that, according to French officials, it had spurred China to indigenously develop its defence and technological industrial base. MoD official, interview, Paris, 29 July 2013. See also, e.g. then Minister of Defence Michèle Alliot-Marie (2002–2007) quoted in Peter Spiegel and John Thornhill, ‘France Urges End to China Arms Embargo’, Financial Times, 15 February 2005.

101. See, e.g. US Embassy in Belgium, ‘Is the EU Retreating on the China Arms Embargo?’, Confidential, Wikileaks Cablegate, 24 March 2005. See also Meijer, Trading with the Enemy, 248–250; and Meijer, ‘Transatlantic Perspectives on China’s Military Modernization’, 26–48.

102. This approach allowed reaping diplomatic benefits for the Franco-Chinese bilateral relationship while avoiding the political costs and fallouts that would emerge given the existing intra-European and transatlantic disagreements on this issue. For more details, see Meijer, 2016, 248–250; Meijer, 2014, 39–48; and Hugo Meijer, Lucie Béraud-Sudreau, Paul Holtom and Matthew Uttley, ‘Arming China: Major Powers’ Arms Transfers to the People’s Republic of China’, Journal of Strategic Studies 41/6 (2018), 850–886.

103. See, e.g. National Assembly, Enjeux stratégiques en mer de Chine méridionale, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Report no. 1868, 10 April 2019a, 52.

104. See, e.g. National Assembly, La place de la France en Inde, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Report no. 4187, 18 January 2012; Indian MFA, ‘India-France Bilateral Relations’, Indian Embassy in Paris, April 2018.

105. Rodolfo Severino, The ASEAN Regional Forum (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009), 22–23.

106. Frédéric Bozo, La politique étrangère de la France depuis 1945 (Paris: Flammarion, 2012), 230–231.

107. Christian Lechervy, ‘La France, l’Europe et l’Asie-Pacifique’, Institute for Strategic Research, Lettre de l’IRSEM, no. 2 (2013), 1.

108. Christian Lechervy, ‘L’ASEM : le début d’un (mini-)pivot européen vers l’Asie-Pacifique ?’, Relations internationales 4/168 (2016), 126.

109. Interview, 20 March 2017.

110. On French forward deployed forces in the region, see the Online Appendix. See also the analysis of French capability shortfalls and of how they affect its regional presence in Regaud 2021, p. 20.

111. Both the 2013 White Paper and the 2017 Strategic Review, for instance, ranked European security, sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and the Persian Gulf before the Asia-/or Indo-) Pacific MoD, French White Paper on Defence and National Security, 2013, ch. 4; MoD, Strategic Review of Defence and National Security, 2017a, ch. 2.

112. MoD official, interview, 13 October 2017.

113. Ibid.

114. Ibid.

115. See Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Japan-France Relations (Archives)’, https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/europe/france/archives.html.

116. See, among others, MFA, ‘Indo-French Dialogue on Maritime Cooperation and Signing of White Shipping Agreement’, French Embassy in Delhi, New Delhi, 19 January 2017; Indian MFA, ‘India-France Bilateral Relations’, Indian Embassy in Paris, April 2018.

117. Interview, New Delhi, 12 December 2018.

118. On the diversification of French security partnerships in South-East Asia, see among others Senate 2014, 2014b.

119. Australian Government, Agreement Between the Government of Australia and the Government of the French Republic Regarding Defence Cooperation and Status of Forces, Paris, France, 14 December 2006 (ratified in 2009).

120. MFA, ‘Joint Statement of Enhanced Strategic Partnership Between Australia and France’, 3 March 2017. See also Australian Government, ‘Joint Statement of Enhanced Strategic Partnership between Australia and France’, 19 January 2012; Senate, Australie, 96–103.

121. The bid also included Germany’s ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems (TKMS) and a Japanese consortium comprising Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and Kawasaki Shipbuilding Corporation. Xavier Vavasseur, ‘France and Australia Reaffirm Commitment to the Attack-class Submarine Program’, Naval News, 18 February 2020.

122. Xavier Vavasseur, ‘Naval Group Inks Major “Attack-class” Submarine Contract with Australia’, Naval News, 1 February 2020.

123. Julian Kerr, ‘Attack class – Plan of Action’, Australian Defence Magazine, 10 October 2019.

124. Senate, La France face à l’émergence de l’Asie du Sud-Est, 171; Singaporean MoD, ‘Singapore and France Strengthen Defence Relations Through 18^th Defence Policy Dialogue’, News Releases, 1 February 2019.

125. Imports from France represented between 16% and 21% of total Singaporean arms imports between 2009 and 2018 (and imports from the US between 46% and 57%). SIPRI, ‘Trends in International Arms Transfers 2018ʹ, Factsheet, March 2019, 6.

126. Interview with a former defence official in Singapore, Paris, 28 April 2017.

127. Senate, 2014, 57.

128. Helping develop Malaysia’s submarine force from scratch entailed a long-term technical, operational and training collaboration that helped strengthen bilateral defence cooperation over time. Interviews with a former defence attaché to Malaysia, Paris, 28 June 2017, and with a former official in the MFA’s Directorate of Defence and Security Cooperation, Paris, 19 April 2017.

129. Senate, 2014, 171; Airbus, ‘Malaysia Takes Delivery of its First Airbus A400M’, Media, 10 March 2015; Defence Industry Daily Staff, ‘Malaysia Ordering EC725 SAR Helicopters’, Defence Industry Daily, 3 June 2019; Giovanni de Briganti, ‘DCNS Confirms Sale of 10 Gowind Corvettes, Expects More’, Defense Aerospace, 31 October 2014; National Assembly, 2019a, 59.

130. MFA, ‘Présentation de la Mission de Défense’, French Embassy in Hanoi, 4 October 2018b; National Assembly, 2019a, 59; Senate, 2014, 176.

131. National Assembly, 2019a, 59.

132. The 2017 letter of intent subsequently stated the goal of increasing maritime security cooperation and of negotiating a defence cooperation agreement. See MFA, ‘Indonésie – relations bilatérales’, Country Factsheet, August 2019; Francis Striby, ‘L’Indonésie et la France prêts à signer un accord de coopération en matière de défense’, Portail de l’intelligence économique, 23 January 2020.

133. French threat perceptions and the demand pull from regional partners were two sides of the same coin. China’s rising assertiveness caused French threat perceptions to intensify which, in turn, led Paris to bolster and diversify its network of security partnerships in the region. Concomitantly, China’s muscular regional posture also caused the threat perceptions of French regional partners to intensify which, in turn, drove a ‘demand pull’, i.e. a growing demand by these partners for more French security cooperation and capability building efforts.

134. Interview, Paris, 21 March 2017.

135. Interview, Paris, 23 March 2017.

136. Interview, 10 May 2021.

137. Interviews with MFA and MoD officials, January-December 2017 and January-March 2020. Additional considerations that persuaded Paris to abandon the goal of lifting the embargo include the risk of transatlantic frictions that such move would entail and intra-European fragmentation on this issue. Meijer, ‘Transatlantic Perspectives on China’s Military Modernization’, 39–46.

138. In 2007, France became the first EU country to accede to ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in South-East Asia.

139. Regaud, ‘France and Security in the Asia-Pacific’, 7.

140. MoD, ‘FANC: bilan de l’exercice Croix du Sud’, 25 May 2018a.

141. Lippert then became US ambassador to South Korea (2014–2017). Interview, Seoul, 20 October 2016.

142. Interviews with MoD officials, Paris, December 2016 and January 2020.

143. MoD, ‘Mission Jeanne d’Arc: des manœuvres amphibies encore jamais réalisées’, 29 May 2015; ‘Japan, France and the United States Conducted a Joint Amphibious Exercise for the 1st Time’, DefesaNet, 1 June 2015.; MFA, France’s Partnerships in the Indo-Pacific, 2021c, p. 7, https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/en_a4_indopacifique_16p_2021_v4_cle4b8b46.pdf. Jean-Baptiste Vey and Michel Rose, ‘Macron Wants Strategic Paris-Delhi-Canberra Axis Amid Pacific Tension’, Reuters, 2 May 2018; Australian MFA, ‘Vision Statement on the Australia-France Relationship’, 2 May 2018.

144. Interviews with French MFA and MoD officials, December 2018 and January 2020. See also MFA, 2021c. France and Australia also cooperate trilaterally with New Zealand through the FRANZ arrangement and quadrilaterally with New Zealand and the US through the QUAD (see the Online Appendix).

145. ‘France Leads Naval Exercise with US, UK and Japan in American Territory of Guam in the Pacific’, South China Morning Post, 12 May 2017.

146. Tim Kelly, ‘U.S., France, Japan and Australia Hold First Combined Naval Drill in Asia’, Reuters, 16 May 2019.

147. Interviews with MoD officials, Paris, January–December 2017.

148. Interview, Paris, 27 March 2017.

149. Ibid.

150. Minister of Defence, 2016.

151. Minister of the Armed Forces, Sylvie Goulard, Speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue, Singapore, 3 June 2017; Minister of the Armed Forces, 2018.

152. MFA official, interview, 6 March 2020.

153. Senior MoD official, interview, 20 January 2020. One concrete example of such cooperation is the TF 473’s deployment in which American, Danish, British, Portuguese and Australian officers participated for part of the 2019 Clémenceau mission. MoD, Opération Clémenceau, Press Kit, 4 March 2019c.

154. Shogo Akagawa, ‘Germany to Send Naval frigate to Japan with Eye on China’, Nikkei Asia, 25 January 2020.

155. Interviews with senior MoD official, 20 January 2020, and MFA official, 6 March 2020. This point was also raised in interviews with a senior EU official, Brussels, 6 March 2020; with British diplomats, London, 24 November 2014; 15 January 2018; and 8 October 2018; and with a German MFA official, interview, 19 March 2020. See also Hugo Meijer, ‘The European Union’s China Policy: Convergences or Divergences?’, European University Institute, Robert Schuman Center Policy Brief, 2021.

156. Interviews with French, British and German diplomats, January-December 2020.

157. Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations, ‘Note verbale’ to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, no BF N° 2020–0343647, New York, 16 September 2020; MFA, ‘Déclaration conjointe de la France, de l’Allemagne et du Royaume-Uni – Situation en mer de Chine méridionale’, 30 August 2019b, https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/dossiers-pays/asie-oceanie/evenements/article/declaration-conjointe-de-la-france-de-l-allemagne-et-du-royaume-uni-situation.

158. Interviews with former French diplomats involved in these discussions, January-December 2020.

159. MFA, ‘Conseil des ministres franco-allemand: Feuille de route ministérielle “Affaires étrangères’”, 16 October 2019c.

160. EEAS, ‘EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific’, Factsheet, 19 April 2021.

161. Government official, interview, 30 March 2021.

162. President Emmanuel Macron, Speech at the Conference of Ambassadors, 27 August 2019.

163. President Emmanuel Macron, Speech on the Defence and Deterrence Strategy, 7 February 2020.

164. President Emmanuel Macron, Interview with the Atlantic Council, 5 February 2021, https://www.elysee.fr/en/emmanuel-macron/2021/02/05/emmanuel-macron-president-of-the-french-republic-gave-an-interview-to-the-american-think-tank-atlantic-council

165. Interview, 8 February 2021. President Macron made a similar point in an interview with the Atlantic Council (Macron, 2021). The relabelling of China as a ‘partner,’ an ‘economic competitor’ and a “systemic rival was in line with a common decision taken at the EU level (European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, ‘EU-China: A Strategic Outlook’, 12 March 2019).

166. Interview, 10 May 2021.

167. President Emmanuel Macron, Speech at the Conference of Ambassadors, 27 August 2018.

168. For an in-depth analysis of the three major European powers’ policies vis-à-vis China and the Asia-Pacific (i.e. France, Germany and the United Kingdom), see Hugo Meijer, Awakening to China’s Rise. European Foreign and Security Policies toward the People’s Republic of China (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming).

169. European Council, ‘EU Strategy on China’, Council conclusions, 18 July 2016, 8.

170. Although some countries have displayed disappointment with regard to the opportunities initially expected from the ‘16 + 1ʹ (previously labelled ‘17+1’), China’s economic influence in Central and Eastern European countries remains important. On China’s economic statecraft in Europe, see among others Sophie Meunier, ‘Divide and Conquer? China and the Cacophony of Foreign Investment Rules in the EU’, Journal of European Public Policy 21/7 (2014), 996–1016; Thomas Christiansen, Emil Kirchner and Uwe Wissenbach, The European Union and China (London: Red Globe Press, 2019), 139; François Godement and Abigaël Vasselier, China at the Gates: A New Power Audit of EU-China Relations (London: European Council on Foreign Relations, 2017), 64–74; and Andrea Kendall-Taylor, Statement Prepared for the Hearing ‘China’s Expanding Influence in Europe and Eurasia’, US House Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, Energy and the Environment, 9 May 2019. On the disillusionment with regards to the ‘16+1’mechanism, see Grzegorz Stec, ‘Central and Eastern Europe and Joint European China Policy: Threat or Opportunity?’, MERICS Short Analysis, 1 October 2020.

171. On the emphasis on the need to foster transatlantic cooperation in the Asia-Pacific during the Trump administration see for instance Randall Schriver, US Assistant Secretary of Defence for Asian and Pacific Security, Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 15 May 2018, 4; and US DoD, Indo-Pacific Strategy Report, 1 June 2019, 21. On the EU-US China Dialogue, see US Secretary of State Michael Pompeo, ‘A New Transatlantic Dialogue’, Speech at the German Marshall Fund’s Brussels Forum, Washington DC, 25 June 2020. Under the Biden administration, however, a growing convergence appears to be emerging in how the two sides of the Atlantic evaluate the rise of China. See US Department of State, ‘Secretary Antony J. Blinken and High Representative for Foreign Affairs Josep Borrell After Their Meeting’, Remarks to the Press, 24 March 2021, https://www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-and-high-representative-for-foreign-affairs-josep-borrell-after-their-meeting/.

172. Interview, Washington DC, 17 May 2017.

173. NATO, ‘London Declaration’, 4 December 2019, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_171584.htm. See also NATO 2030: United for a New Era: Analysis and Recommendations of the Reflection Group Appointed by the NATO Secretary General, 25 November 2020, 12, 16–19, and 27–28, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2020/12/pdf/201201-Reflection-Group-Final-Report-Uni.pdf; Meia Nouwens and Helena Legarda, ‘Chinas Rise as a Global Security Actor Implications for NATO’, IISS and MERICS, China Security Project Briefing, December 2020; and François Heisbourg, ‘NATO 4.0: The Atlantic Alliance and the Rise of China’, Survival 62/2 (2020), 83–102.

174. Interview, Brussels, 21 June 2017. See also Mark Webber, ‘The Perils of a NATO Rebalance to the Asia-Pacific’, in Alexander Moens and Brooke Smith-Windsor, eds., NATO and the Asia-Pacific (Rome: NATO Defense College, 2016), 83–100. So far, NATO has developed partnership agreements with Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Mongolia as well as, in South Asia, Afghanistan and Pakistan. See Joe Burton, ‘NATO’s “Global Partners” in Asia: Shifting Strategic Narratives’, Asian Security 14/1 (2017), 1–16; and Alexander Moens and Brooke Smith-Windsor, eds., NATO and the Asia-Pacific (Rome: NATO Defense College, 2016). See also NATO, ‘Relations with Partners across the Globe’, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49188.htm.

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by the Marie Skłodowska-Curie grant [No 752790].

Notes on contributors

Hugo Meijer

Hugo Meijer is CNRS Research Fellow at Sciences Po, Center for International Studies (CERI) and the Founding Director of The European Initiative for Security Studies (EISS), a multidisciplinary network of scholars that share the goal of consolidating security studies in Europe. He is also Honorary Researcher at the Centre for War and Diplomacy, Lancaster University. Previously, he was Marie Skłodowska-Curie Fellow at the European University Institute (EUI, Florence), Lecturer in Defence Studies at King’s College London and a Researcher at the Institute for Strategic Research (IRSEM, Paris).

His forthcoming book is titled Awakening to China’s Rise. European Foreign and Security Policies toward the People’s Republic of China (Oxford University Press, forthcoming). He has also published in such journals as International Security, Journal of Strategic Studies, Cooperation and Conflict, Survival, European Journal of International Security and the Journal of Cold War Studies.