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ABSTRACT
Conventional thinking frames battlefield coalitions as collections of national armies fighting together as multinational coalitions. However, wars also include rebel groups fighting together as coalitions, and rebel groups fighting alongside states in hybrid coalitions. This paper seeks to better understand rebel and hybrid battlefield coalitions, focusing on command and operational military effectiveness. The paper first presents basic ideas about coalition command and military effectiveness from conventional wisdom on multinational coalitions. It then builds on these ideas to explore potential similarities and differences between multinational coalitions on one hand and rebel and hybrid coalitions on the other. In particular, the paper focuses on the nature of different command structures, the varying operational military effectiveness advantages for unified coalition command, and the political motivations for coalition members to resist creating unified command, despite potential effectiveness benefits. The paper concludes by providing policy recommendations to states who lead hybrid coalitions.
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This article has been republished with minor changes. These changes do not impact the academic content of the article.
Notes
1 Rosella Cappella Zielinski and Ryan Grauer, ‘A Century of Coalitions: Incidence, Composition, and Performance, 1900-2003,’ this issue.
2 For a broad discussion of such phenomena see Dan Reiter, ‘Should We Leave Behind the Subfield of International Relations?’ Annual Review of Political Science 18 (2015).
3 Allan C. Stam III, Win, Lose, or Draw: Domestic Politics and the Crucible of War (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press 1996); Stathis N. Kalyvas and Laia Balcells, ‘International System and Technologies of Rebellion: How the End of the Cold War Shaped Internal Conflict’, American Political Science Review 104/3 (August 2010) 415–429; Jason Lyall, Divided Armies: Inequality and Battlefield Performance in Modern War (Princeton: Princeton UP 2020).; Stephen Biddle, Nonstate Warfare: The Military Methods of Guerrillas, Warlords, and Militias (Princeton: Princeton UP 2021).
4 Dan Reiter, How Wars End (Princeton: Princeton UP 2009).
5 Reiter, 'Should We Leave'
6 See Moller, ‘Learning from Losing,’ this issue.
7 Cappella Zielinski and Grauer, ‘A Century of Coalitions,’ this issue; Scott Wolford, The Politics of Military Coalitions (Cambridge: Cambridge UP 2016).
8 Joshua C. Fjelstul and Dan Reiter, ‘Explaining Incompleteness and Conditionality in Alliance Agreements’, International Interactions 45/6 (2019) 976–1002; Paul Poast, Arguing About Alliances: The Art of Agreement in Military Pact Negotiations (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2019).
9 Anthony J. Rice, ‘The Essence of Coalition Warfare’, Parameters 27 (Spring 1997): 152–167; Moller, ‘Learning from Losing,’ this issue.
10 The focus in this paper is on the operational level of military effectiveness, coordination within a single theater or campaign, but some also argue for the advantages of unified coalition command at the strategic level, or the coordination of coalition members across operations and theaters, as well as at the political level, or coordination across coalition members of economic production. Rosella Cappella Zielinski and Paul Poast, ‘Supplying Allies: The Political Economy of Coalition Warfare’, Journal of Global Security Studies 6/1 (March 2021). On operational, strategic, and political levels of military effectiveness, see Allan R. Millett and Williamson Murray, eds., Military Effectiveness, three vols (Cambridge: Cambridge UP 2010). For further discussion of military effectiveness, see Dan Reiter, ed., The Sword’s Other Edge: Tradeoffs in the Pursuit of Military Effectiveness (Cambridge: Cambridge UP 2017).
11 Patricia A. Weitsman, Waging War: Alliances, Coalitions, and Institutions of Interstate Violence (Stanford: Stanford UP 2014); Poast, Arguing.
12 Nora Bensehel, ‘International Alliances and Military Effectiveness: Fighting Alongside Allies and Partners’, in Risa Brooks and Elizabeth Stanley, eds, Creating Military Power: The Sources of Military Effectiveness (Stanford: Stanford UP 2007), 186–206.
13 Rosella Cappella Zielinski and Ryan Grauer, ‘Organizing for Performance: Coalition Effectiveness on the Battlefield’, European Journal of International Relations 26/4 (2020) 953–978.
14 Daniel S. Morey, ‘Centralized Command and Coalition Victory’, Conflict Management and Peace Science 37/6 (2020) 716–734.
15 Glenn Baek, ‘A Perspective on Korea’s Participation in the Vietnam War’, Asian Institute for Policy Studies, Issue Brief no. 53, 2013; Neil Sheehan, A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam (New York: Vintage 1989), 776.
16 Dan Reiter and Paul Poast, ‘Tripwires are Not Enough: Forward Troop Deployments and the Prevention of War’, Texas National Security Review 4/3 (Summer 2021).
17 Moller, ‘Learning From Losing.”
18 Mark Bowden, Black Hawk Down: A Story of Modern War (New York: Grove 2010).
19 Rice, ‘Essence’.
20 Cappella Zielinski and Grauer, ‘Organizing for Performance’.
21 Morey, ‘Centralized Command’ supplemental appendix classifies Italy–Germany in World War II as being a joint coalition.
22 Richard Carrier, ‘Some Reflections on the Fighting Power of the Italian Army in North Africa, 1940–1943ʹ,War in History 22/4 (Nov. 2015) 503–528; Cappella and Zielinski and Grauer, ‘Organizing for Performance’.
23 Jeffrey K. Staton and Will H. Moore, ‘Judicial Power in Domestic and International Politics’, International Organization 65/3 (Summer 2011) 553–87.
24 David A. Lake, Hierarchy in International Relations (Ithaca: Cornell UP 2009).
25 Morey, ‘Centralized Command’, 724.
26 Stephen Biddle, Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle (Princeton: Princeton UP 2004).
28 Insurgences and Countering Insurgencies, FM 3–24 (Washington: Department of the Army 2014), 6–3.
29 Lyall, Divided Armies.
30 Jack Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision Making and the Disasters of 1914 (Ithaca: Cornell UP 1984).
31 Ernest R. May, Strange Victory: Hitler’s Conquest of France (New York: Hill and Wang 1999).
32 Biddle, Military Power.
33 Robert A. Pape, Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War (Ithaca: Cornell UP 1996).
34 Thomas E. Ricks, The Gamble: General Petraeus and the Untold Story of the Surge in Iraq (New York: Penguin 2010).
35 Ian McNeill, ‘The Australian Army and the Vietnam War’, in Australia’s Vietnam War, Jeff Doyle, Jeffrey Grey, and Peter Pierce, eds. (College Station, TX: Texas A&M UP 2002), 16–54.
36 For a review of theories predicting to intra-coalition politics, see Thomas Stow Wilkins, ‘Analysing Coalition Warfare from an Intra-Alliance Politics Perspective: The Normandy Campaign 1944ʹ, Journal of Strategic Studies 29/6 (December 2006) 1121–1150. For discussion of whether or not coalitions involving democracies are more likely to experience deeper coordination including possibly unified command during war, see Dan Reiter and Allan C. Stam, Democracies at War (Princeton: Princeton UP 2002), chapter 4. Power balances within the coalition can also matter, as when one member is more powerful that others the command structure is likely to reflect that powerful member’s preferences. Marina E. Henke, Constructing Allied Cooperation: Diplomacy, Payments, and Power in Multilateral Military Coalitions (Ithaca: Cornell UP 2019; Cappella Zielinski and Grauer, ‘Organizing for Performance’.
37 Moller, ‘Learning from Losing,’ this issue.
38 Moller, Learning from Losing,’ this issue. There is a more general argument that states sometimes refuse to join alliances in order to maintain autonomy. For a summary, see James D. Morrow, ‘Alliances: Why Write Them Down?’ Annual Review of Political Science 3 (2000) 63–83.
40 William Philpott, ‘Britain and France Go to War: Anglo-French Relations on the Western Front 1914–1918, War in History 2/1 (March 1995) 43–64.
41 Reiter and Poast, ‘Tripwires’; May, Strange Victory; Dan Reiter, Crucible of Beliefs: Learning, Alliances, and World Wars (Ithaca: Cornell UP 1996).
42 Moller, ‘Learning from Losing,’ this issue.
43 David E. Cunningham, Barriers to Peace in Civil War (Cambridge: Cambridge UP 2009).
44 For data on variation in rebel command, see David E. Cunningham, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, and Idean Saleyhan, ‘Non-state Actors in Civil Wars: A New Dataset’, Conflict Management and Peace Science 30/5 (2013) 516–531.
45 Barbara Elias, ‘Why Rebels Rely on Terrorists: The Persistence of the Taliban-al-Qaeda Battlefield Coalition in Afghanistan,’ this issue.
46 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: Addison Wesley 1979).
47 Fotini Christia, Alliance Formation in Civil Wars (Cambridge: Cambridge UP 2012). See also Costantino Pischedda, Conflict Among Rebels: Why Insurgents Fight Each Other (New York: Columbia 2020).
48 Brian Lai and Dan Reiter, ‘Democracy, Political Similarity, and International Alliances, 1816–1992ʹ, Journal of Conflict Resolution 44/2 (April 2000) 203–227; Reiter and Stam, Democracies at War.
49 Emily Kalah Gade, Mohammed M. Hafez, and Michael Gabbay, ‘Fratricide in Rebel Movements: A Network Analysis of Syrian Militant Infighting’, Journal of Peace Research 56/3 (2012): 321–335; Victor H. Asal, Hyun Hee Park, R. Karl Rethemeyer, and Gary Ackerman, ‘With Friends Like These … Why Terrorist Organizations Ally’, Journal of Peace Research 19/1 (2016) 1–30.
50 Seden Akcinaroglu, ‘Rebel Interdependencies and Civil War Outcomes’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 56/5 (October 2012): 879–903. See alsoWhy Rebels Rely on Terrorists,’ this issue.
51 Kristin Bakke, Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham, and Lee J. M. Seymour, ‘A Plague of Initials: Fragmentation, Cohesion, and Infighting in Civil Wars’, Perspectives on Politics 10/2 (June 2012) 270.
52 Michael C. Horowitz and Phillip Potter, ‘Allying to Kill: Terrorist Intergroup Cooperation and the Consequences for Lethality’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 58/2 (March 2014) 199–225; Brian J. Phillips, ‘Terrorist Group Cooperation and Longevity’, International Studies Quarterly 58/2 (June 2014) 336–347. A caveat is that these studies analyze data including some ties between terrorist groups that are not fighting the same adversary, such as the IRA and the ETA, meaning they are not coalitions as defined here.
53 John Young, Peasant Revolution in Ethiopia: The Tigray People’s Liberation Front, 1975–1991 (Cambridge: Cambridge UP 1997), 157, 164.
54 Danielle Paquette and Joby Warrick, ‘Isis and Al Qaeda Join Forces in West Africa,’ The Independent, 23 Feb. 2020. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/isis-al-qaeda-terror-west-africa-Mali-Burkina-Faso-Niger-a9353126.html
55 Dan Reiter, ‘Gulliver Unleashed? International Order, Restraint, and The Case of Ancient Athens’, International Studies Quarterly 65/3 (September 2021) 582-593.
56 Pischedda, Conflict Among Rebels; Navin A. Bapat and Kanisha D. Bond, ‘Alliances between Militant Groups’, British Journal of Political Science 42/4 (October 2012) 793–824.
57 Hanne Fjelde and Desirée Nilsson, ‘Rebels Against Rebels: Explaining Violence Among Rebel Groups’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 56/4 (Aug. 2012) 604–628; Pischedda, Conflict Among Rebels.
58 Terrence Lyons, ‘The Importance of Winning: Victorious Insurgent Groups and Authoritarian Politics’, Comparative Politics 48/2 (Jan. 2016) 167–184.
59 Reiter, How Wars End.
60 The classic realist statement of the inevitably of anarchy in international relations is Waltz, Theory of International Politics. For claims that there are areas of hierarchy in international relations, see Lake, Hierarchy; Staton and Moore, Judicial Power.
61 Lake, Hierarchy.
62 Christia, Alliance Formation.
63 Sameer Lalwani, ‘India’s Approach to Counterinsurgency and the Naxalite Problem’, CTC Sentinel 4 (Oct. 2011) 6.
64 Lindsay Heger, Danielle Jung, and Wendy H. Wong, ‘Organizing for Resistance: How Group Structure Impacts the Character of Violence’, Terrorism and Political Violence 24/5 (2012) 746–768; Paul Staniland, Networks of Rebellion: Explaining Insurgent Cohesion and Collapse (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2014); Austin C. Doctor, ‘A Motion of No Confidence: Leadership and Rebel Fragmentation’, Journal of Global Security Studies 5/4 (Oct. 2020) 598–616.
65 Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr., The Army and Vietnam (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP 1986).
66 Jacob M. Shapiro, The Terrorist’s Dilemma: Managing Violent Covert Organizations (Princeton: Princeton UP 2013).
67 Stathis N. Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War (Cambridge: Cambridge UP 2006).
68 Austin C. Doctor and John D. Willingham, ‘Foreign Fighters, Rebel Command Structure, and Targeting Civilians in Civil War’, Terrorism and Political Violence (forthcoming).
69 Cappella Zielinski and Grauer, ‘A Century of Coalitions,’ this issue.
70 Anthony M. Schinella, Bombs Without Boots: The Limits of Airpower (RAND: Washington 2019), 18.
71 Don Chipman, ‘Air Power and the Battle for Mazar e Sharif’, Air Power History 50/1 (Spring 2003) 34–45; Walter L. Perry and David Kassing, Toppling the Taliban: Air-Ground Operations in Afghanistan, October 2001-June 2002 (Washington: RAND 2015).
72 Austin Carson, Secret Wars: Covert Conflict in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton UP 2018).
73 Jeremy Weinstein, Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence (Cambridge: Cambridge UP 2006).
74 Jim Rasenberger, The Brilliant Disaster: JFK, Castro, and America’s Doomed Invasion of Cuba’s Bay of Pigs (New York: Scribner 2011).
75 Reiter and Stam, Democracies at War.
76 Barbara F. Walter, Committing to Peace (Princeton: Princeton UP 2002).
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Dan Reiter
Dan Reiter is Samuel Candler Dobbs professor of political science at Emory University. He is the award-winning author, coauthor, or editor of several books, including Crucible of Beliefs: Learning, Alliances, and World Wars (Cornell, 1996), Democracies at War (with Allan C. Stam, Princeton, 2002); How Wars End (Princeton: 2009); The Sword’s Other Edge: Tradeoffs in the Pursuit of Military Effectiveness (Cambridge, 2017), as well as dozens of scholarly articles. His research interests include military effectiveness, civil–military relations, gender and war, war causes and outcomes, and others.