Explaining China’s large-scale land reclamation in the South China Sea: Timing and rationale

ABSTRACT

Since 2013, China has undertaken extensive reclamation and construction on several reefs in the Spratly Island chain in the South China Sea. China has since been adding new construction and fortifications to the land features that had undergone reclamation between late 2013 and 2015, but none of the new projects rivalled the large-scale reclamation from 2014–15, and nor has China reclaimed any new land features. Land reclamation has theoretical and empirical implications. The literature regarding maritime disputes in the South China Sea is rich and plenty. Many studies, however, focus on China’s bilateral assertive or coercive behaviour as well as China’s general strategy in the South China Sea, not land reclamation per se. What explains the timing of China’s large-scale land reclamation in the South China Sea? Why did China decide to initiate large-scale land reclamation in the first place? This paper, therefore, conducts a comprehensive case study analysing China’s land reclamation decisions. I argue that China’s land reclamation is a result of capability, rationale, and opportunities which include a calculation of U.S. resolve. This study has implications for understanding Chinese foreign policy decision-making and contributes to the credibility debate in the coercion literature.

KEYWORDS:

• China
• maritime
• security
• credibility
• resolve

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

¹ Ben Dolven et al., ‘Chinese Land Reclamation in the South China Sea: Implications and Policy Options’, Congressional Research Service Report R44072, 18 June 2015 https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R44072.pdf

² Ibid.

³ Ralph Jennings, ‘Beijing Done, for Now, Acquiring Land in South China Sea’, VOA, 15 March 2019 https://www.voanews.com/east-asia-pacific/beijing-done-now-acquiring-land-south-china-sea; Zachary Haver, ‘China Reclaims Land, Fortifies Coast of South China Sea Island Base to Prevent Erosion’, Radio Free Asia, 21 January 2021 https://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/southchinasea-woody-01212021155023.html; Drake Long, ‘Small China Islets in South China Sea Show Signs of New Construction’, Radio Free Asia, 5 November 2020 https://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/southchinasea-artificial-11052020175409.html

⁴ Editorial commission of the book, Guangdong haifang shi [History of Guangdong’s Maritime Defense] (Guangzhou, China: Sun Yat-san UP, 2010). This book was written by the South China Sea bureau of China’s State Oceanic Administration.

⁵ See Ketian Zhang, ‘Cautious Bully: Reputation, Resolve, and Beijing’s use of coercion in the South China Sea’, International Security 44/1 (Summer 2019) 117–159.

⁶ Ben Dolven et al., ‘Chinese Land Reclamation in the South China Sea: Implications and Policy Options’.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ See CSIS Maritime Transparency Initiative, https://amti.csis.org/island-tracker

⁹ See, for example, Zhaoyin Feng, ‘South China Sea dispute: China’s pursuit of resources “unlawful”, says US’, BBC, 14 July 2020 https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-53397673

¹⁰ Editorial, ‘G7 sails into South China Sea’s troubled waters’, The Manila Times, 7 May 2021, https://www.manilatimes.net/2021/05/07/opinion/editorial/g7-sails-into-south-china-seas-troubled-waters/871010/

¹¹ Mira Rapp-Hooper and Harry Krejsa, ‘Reefs, Rocks, and the Rule of Law: After the Arbitration in the South China Sea’, CNAS Report, 2016–04.

¹² Brahma Chellaney, ‘China’s expansionism enters dangerous phase’, The Hill, 25 August 2020 https://thehill.com/opinion/international/513574-chinas-expansionism-enters-dangerous-phase

¹³ James Jay Carafano, ‘China Is an Expansionist Threat to the Free World’, The Heritage Foundation, 17 September 2020 https://www.heritage.org/asia/commentary/china-expansionist-threat-the-free-world

¹⁴ For an overview, see, David B. Carter, ‘The Strategy of Territorial Conflict’, American Journal of Political Science 54/4 (2010–10) 969–987.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Ketian Zhang, ‘Cautious Bully’.

¹⁷ Andrew Chubb, ‘PRC Assertiveness in the South China Sea Measuring Continuity and Change, 1970–2015’, International Security 45/3 (Winter 2020/21) 79–121.

¹⁸ See, for example, Feng Zhang, ‘China’s long march at sea: explaining Beijing’s South China Sea strategy, 2009–16’, The Pacific Review 33/5, (2020) 757–787; Zhou Fangyin, ‘Between assertiveness and self-restraint: understanding China’s South China Sea policy’, International Affairs 92/4 (2016), 869–890; Katherine Morton, ‘China’s ambition in the South China Sea: is a legitimate maritime order possible?’, International Affairs 92/4 (2016) 909–940.

¹⁹ See also, Yves-Heng Lim and Jiye Kim, ‘Determining the Determinants: Factors of Change in China’s South China Sea Strategy, 1995–2015’, Pacific Focus 35/2 (2020–08), 200–228; Feng Zhang, ‘Chinese Thinking on the South China Sea and the Future of Regional Security’, Political Science Quarterly 132/3 (2017) 435; Andrew Scobell, ‘The South China Sea and U.S.-China Rivalry’, Political Science Quarterly 133/2 (2018) 199.

²⁰ For example, Xue Gong, ‘The Role of Chinese Corporate Players in China’s South China Sea Policy’, Contemporary Southeast Asia 40/2 (2018) 301–326.

²¹ Bush, The Perils of Proximity (Washington, DC, USA: Brookings Institution Press, 2013), 134.

²² Unless otherwise noted, source and satellite images are from CSIS: https://amti.csis.org/island-tracker/china/; DOD, ‘Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2016’.

²³ ‘Woody Island increased its size by 40% in 16 months’ [Yongxing dao mianji shiliugeyue kuoda 40%], Sina News, 25 December 2014 http://mil.news.sina.com.cn/2014-12-25/1118816135.html; Li Xueshan and Duan Xinyi, ‘Sanshashi shoufu yongxingdao liangqulianglu jianshe guihua huopi’ [Sansha city approves the plan to build two districts and two roads on Woody Island], People.cn, 17 July 2013 http://politics.people.com.cn/n/2013/0801/c1001-22411622.html

²⁴ ‘Yongshu jiao shengge wei yongshudao qudai taipingdao chengwei nansha diyidadao’ [Woody Island became the largest Island in the Spratlys], Phoenix News, 20 October 2014 http://www.nanhai.org.cn/info-detail/22/201.html

²⁵ Wu Jiaoying, ‘Dapi haishang shenqi liangxiang haibohui’ [Many new designs debuted at the China Maritime Expo], Xin Jing Bao, 16 October 2019 http://www.mnr.gov.cn/zt/hy/2019zghyjjblh/mtsy_34145/201910/t20191017_2471936.html

²⁶ See the official SJTU website: https://ship.sjtu.edu.cn/news_1.asp?id=162.

²⁷ For links of the information regarding the specific projects, please see Appendix.

²⁸ Christine Wong, ‘The Fiscal Stimulus Programme and Public Governance Issues in China’, OECD Journal on Budgeting 11/3 (2011) 1–21.

³¹ CIMA, Haiyang fazhan baogao 2012 [China’s Ocean Development Report 2012] (Beijing: Haiyang chubanshe [Ocean Press], 2012), 99, the rest of the reports are published in subsequent years are titled the same; China’s Ocean Development Report 2013, 91

²⁹ Ibid. 6.

³⁰ Author’s interview-#112, Beijing, China, 27 December 2016.

³² CIMA, China’s Ocean Development Report 2013, 121, 322, 328.

³³ See Dr. Wang Xinzhi’s research bio. Dr. Wang is at the Chinese Academy of Science’s Institute of Rock and Soil Mechanics, http://sourcedb.whrsm.cas.cn/zw/zjrck/fyjy/201307/t20130708_3894849.html; See also Wang Xinzhi et al., ‘Research on characteristics of coral reef calcareous rock in Nansha Islands’, Chinese Journal of Rock Mechanics and Engineering No. 11 (2008) 2221–2226.

³⁴ Wang Ren and Wu Wenjuan, ‘Exploration and research on engineering geological properties of coral reefs – engaged in coral reef research for 30 years’, Journal of Engineering Geology, 104–9665/2019/27(1)-0202-06.

³⁵ Author’s interview-#90, Guangzhou, China, 25 May 2016.

³⁶ Specific word combinations searched were: nanhai daojiao jian she, nanhai daojiao chuitian, and nanhai daojiao jianshe, with the time frame being 1 January 2008 to 1 January 2014.

³⁷ CIMA, China’s Ocean Development Report 2013, 307.

³⁸ SOA’s official news, as released by Sina News, ‘Guojia haiyangju tongyi hainan zai xisha jiqing dao jianmatou’ [The SOA approved the Hainan government to construct a port on the Drummon Island], 26 April 2012 http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2012-04-26/134524334441.shtml

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ CIMA, China’s Ocean Development Report 2013, 307.

⁴¹ Ibid., 306.

⁴² ‘2013nian Hainan renmin zhengfu gongzuo baogao’ [Hainan government work report in 2013], Hainan Government, 27 January 2013 www.gov.cn/test/2013-02/20/content_2336438.htm

⁴³ CIMA, China’s Ocean Development Report 2013, 95.

⁴⁴ Hainan People’s Congress, ‘Guanyu zai Jinqingdao jianshe zonghe buji baozhang jidi de jianyi’ [Suggestion regarding the construction of a comprehensive logistical support base on Drummond Island], 15 March 2013 http://www.hainanpc.net/hainanpc/hyzl/qgrdhhndbtzt24/sejqgrdychyhndbtzt/yajy1/77171/index.html

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Standing Committee of Hainan People’s Congress, ‘Guanyu jiang Sanshashi houxu gexiang jianyi naru guojiajihua he caizheng yusuan jixu jiyu zhichi de jianyi’ [The suggestion of keeping Sansha city’s subsequent development within the national plan and fiscal plan], 18 March 2013 https://www.hainanpc.net/hainanpc/dbyd/yajy/2021110423500654425/index.html.

⁴⁷ ‘Sanshashi diyijie renmin daibiao dahui diyici huiyi ceji’ [Report on the first meeting of the Sanshi city People’s Congress], 24 July 2012 https://www.hainanpc.net/hainanpc/xwzx/szyw/2021110601262962969/index.html

⁴⁸ Author’s interview-#106, Washington, D.C., USA, 22 September 2016.

⁴⁹ Xu Quanlong and Li Hong, ‘Nanhai zhengduan xianzhuang yu qushi’ [The current status and trend in the South China Sea disputes], in Lu Jianren and Fan Zhajun eds., Zhongguo-dongmeng hezuo fazhan baogao [Report on the Development of Sino-ASEAN Cooperation 2014–15] (Beijing, China: China Social Sciences Press, 2015), 247; Author’s interview-#90, Guangzhou, China, 25 May 2016.

⁵⁰ Author’s interview-#57, Haikou, China, 14 April 2016.

⁵¹ Hainan People’s Congress, ‘Guanyu zai Jinqingdao jianshe zonghe buji baozhang jidi de jianyi’ [Suggestion regarding the construction of a comprehensive logistical support base on Drummond Island].

⁵² Author’s interview-#12, Beijing, China, 21 October 2015.

⁵³ Author’s interview-#4, Beijing, China, 15 September 2015; Author’s interview-#57, Haikou, China, 14 April 2016.

⁵⁴ Author’s interview-#57, Haikou, China, 14 April 2016.

⁵⁵ Author’s interview-#85, Guangzhou, China, 23 May 2016.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ See also Hainan Province’s 2013 government work report, 27 January 2013 www.gov.cn/test/2013-02/20/content_2336438.htm.

⁵⁸ Author’s interview-#55, Haikou, China, 12 April 2016.

⁵⁹ Author’s interview-#6, Beijing, China, 28 September 2015.

⁶⁰ Li Xiaomei, ‘Hainan daibiao tuan: jianyi guojia zhichi hainan zai nansha jianshe yugang’ [Hainan delegation: a suggestion asking national support on the construction of fishery ports in the South China Sea], Hainan Wang [Hainan Net], 7 March 2012 https://www.hainanpc.net/hainanpc/xwzx/szyw/2021110601243742356/index.html

⁶¹ Wang Xinli and Wang Xiyi, ‘Hainan zhengxie weiyuan jianyi kaizhan Sansha tese huanbao lvyou’ [Hainan People’s PCC members suggested the development of tourism in Sansha city], Zhongxin Wang [China News Website], 28 January 2013 https://www.chinanews.com.cn/gn/2013/01-28/4527031.shtml

⁶² Hainan Provincial People’s Congress, ‘Yigaige chuangxin jingshen tuijin Sanshashi jianshe zhuanti diaoyan baogao’ [Report on the development of Sansha city], Hainan People’s Congress, 8 November 2012 https://www.hainanpc.net/hainanpc/zywk/hnrdyk/wqyk/2012nd10q/2021110512124276552/index.html

⁶³ Standing Committee of Hainan People’s Congress, ‘Guanyu jiang Sanshashi houxu gexiang jianyi naru guojiajihua he caizheng yusuan jixu jiyu zhichi de jianyi’ [The suggestion of keeping Sansha city’s subsequent development within the national plan and fiscal plan].

⁶⁴ Liu Cao, ‘Kan Sansha baixing zui dianji sha’ [A probe into what Sansha residents care the most], Hainan Ribao [Hainan Daily], 31 March 2015 https://www.hainanpc.net/hainanpc/xwzx/snyw/2021110500384224392/index.html

⁶⁵ Shi Wei et al., ‘Nansha daojiao ji zhoubian gangkou kedaxing pingjia moxing yanjiu’ [A model-based evaluation of the accessibility of South China Sea Islands], Acta Geographica Sinica 69/10 (2014–10).

⁶⁶ Wang Yecheng et al., ‘Jiyu changqiang moxingde nansha daojiao zhanlue diwei pingjia’ [A model-based evaluation of the strategic status of Spratly Islands], Geographical Research 32/12 (Dec 2013).

⁶⁷ Fan Nanhong and Guo Hongyan, ‘Nanhai cun yuanzhi shigan xing Sansha’ [Ambitions and development of Sansha], Hainan Ribao [Hainan Daily], 28 May 2013 https://www.hainanpc.net/hainanpc/xwzx/snyw/2021110500294785836/index.html

⁶⁸ MFA Press Conference, 25 May 2016, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/ceph/chn/zgxw/t1366341.htm

⁶⁹ See M. Taylor Fravel, ‘Threading the Needle: The South China Sea Disputes and U.S.-China Relations,’ in Robert S. Ross and Øystein Tunsjø eds., Strategic Adjustment and the Rise of China: Power and Politics in East Asia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2017), 233–260.

⁷⁰ Author’s interview-#69, Shanghai, China, 5 May 2016; Author’s interview-#57, Haikou, China, 14 April 2016.

⁷¹ Author’s interview-#112, Beijing, China, 27 December 2016; cross-checked with another government policy analyst, Author’s interview-#113, Beijing, China, 29 December 2016.

⁷² Scholars examine and debate whether or when states gain resolve. See Daryl Press, Calculating Credibility: How Leaders Assess Military Threats (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2007); Roseanne W. McManus, Statements of Resolve: Achieving Coercive Credibility in International Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017); and Timothy M. Peterson, ‘Sending a Message: The Reputation Effect of U.S. Sanction Threat Behavior’, International Studies Quarterly, 57:4 (2013–12) 672–682, doi.org/10.1111/isqu.12017.

⁷³ Zhang Jie and Zhong Feiteng eds., 2013nian Zhongguo zhoubian anquan xingshi pinggu [The 2013 Assessment of China’s Regional Security Environment] (Beijing, China: Social Sciences Academic Press, 2013), 19.

⁷⁴ Ibid., 95.

⁷⁵ Cao Yunhua and Ju Hailong, Nanhai diqu xingshi baogao 2012–2013 [The situation in the South China Sea] (Beijing: Shishi Press, 2013), 139.

⁷⁶ Zhao Minghao, ‘Meiguo yatai zaipingheng zhanlue “shisu” lema?’ [Has the U.S. rebalancing strategy lost its momentum?], The Chinese Journal of American Studies 28/3 (2014–06) 109; CICIR, Guoji zhanlue yu anquan xingshi pinggu 2013–2014 [Strategic and security review] (Beijing: Shishi Press, 2014), 328.

⁷⁷ Ibid., 113.

⁷⁸ Zhang Jie ed., 2014nian Zhongguo zhoubian anquan xingshi pinggu [The 2014 Assessment of China’s Regional Security Environment] (Beijing, China: Social Sciences Academic Press, 2014), 17.

⁷⁹ Remarks by the President to the White House Press Corps, The White House, 20 August 2012 https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2012/08/20/remarks-president-white-house-press-corps

⁸⁰ ‘Timeline of Syrian Chemical Weapons Activity 2012–2021,’ Arms Control Association, 2021–05, https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Timeline-of-Syrian-Chemical-Weapons-Activity.

⁸¹ Ji Xiang, ‘Aobama de xuliya zhikun: ganga de hongxian jinshen de biaotai’ [Obama’s Syria dilemma: an embarrassing redline and a cautious statement], People’s Daily Overseas Edition, 4 May 2013 www.chinanews.com/gj/2013/05-04/4786349.shtml

⁸² Wang Wei, ‘Xuliya jushi yu daguo boyi yanjiuhui songshu’ [Seminar on the Syria situation and great power politics], The Chinese Journal of American Studies, 3 (2013), ias.cass.cn/cbw/mgyjjj/2013/dsq_118960/201,506/t20150616_2687656.shtml

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ CIIS, Guoji xingshi he zhongguo waijiao lanpishu 2013–14 [Bluebook of International Situation and China’s Foreign Affairs 2013–2014] (Beijing, China: World Affairs Press, 2014) 5–6; CICIR, Guoji zhanlue yu anquan xingshi pinggu 2013–2014 [Strategic and security review] (Beijing: Shishi Press, 2014), 128–133, published in 2014–02.

⁸⁵ CICIR, Guoji zhanlue yu anquan xingshi pinggu 2013–2014 [Strategic and security review], 312–313, 320.

⁸⁶ Liu Hui et al., ‘Dangqian meiguo neizheng waijiao zhengce zouxiang yu zhongmeiguanxi qianjing yantaohui’ [Seminar on U.S. politics and U.S.-China relations], The Chinese Journal of American Studies 5/28 (2014) 127

⁸⁷ Huang Ping and Zheng Bingwen eds., Meiguo yanjiu baogao [2014 Report on the United States] (Beijing, China: Social Sciences Academic Press, 2014), 1, 11.

⁸⁸ Li Yongquan, ‘Wukelan weiji zheshe chude daguo boyi [Great power game in the Ukraine crisis]’, Academic Journal of E’luosi xuekan [Russian Studies], 3 (2014), 9; Zhou Fangyin, ‘Xianshi zhuyi de shengmingli [The power of realism]’, Guoji guanxi yanjiu [Journal of International Relations], 3 (2014), 10; Ding Yuanhong, ‘Wukelan weiji de lishi jingwei yu xianshi qishi [The history behind the Ukraine crisis and its lessons]’, Heping yu fazhan [Peace and Development], 2 (2014), 4–6; Feng Yujun, ‘Wukelan weiji: duowei shiye xia de shenceng toushi [A multi-layer analysis of the Ukraine crisis]’, Guoji wenti yanjiu [International Studies], 3 (2014), 54.

⁸⁹ Han Kedi, ‘Meiguo xuejie zhengjie dui wukelan weiji de fanying yu sikao’ [Reactions from the U.S. academic and policy communities on the Ukraine crisis], The Chinese Journal of American Studies 4/28 (2014) 52.

⁹⁰ Chu Maoming, ‘Wukelan weiji yu zhongguo de xuanze [The Ukraine crisis and China’s choices]’, Zhanlue juece yanjiu [Journal of Strategy and Decision-Making], 3 (2014), 10.

⁹¹ Author’s interview-#16, Guangzhou, China, 30 November 2015.

⁹² Ibid.

⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁴ Author’s interview-#90, Guangzhou, China, 25 May 2016.

⁹⁵ Author’s interview-#35, Beijing, China, 18 January 2016; confirmed by one U.S. policy analyst, Author’s interview-#109, Washington D.C., USA, 5 December 2016.

⁹⁶ Author’s interview-#32, Haikou, China, 7 January 2016; Author’s interview-#57, Haikou, China, 14 April 2016; Author’s interview-#69, Shanghai, China, 5 May 2016; Author’s interview-#64, Beijing, China, 27 April 2016.

⁹⁷ See Zhang, ‘Cautious Bully’.

⁹⁸ Liu Hui and Zhao Xiaochun eds., Zhongguo guojia anquan yanjiu baogao 2014 [Report on China’s national security 2014] (Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press, 2014), 216.

⁹⁹ Zhang Jie and Zhong Feiteng eds., 2013nian Zhongguo zhoubian anquan xingshi pinggu [The 2013 Assessment of China’s Regional Security Environment], 93.

¹⁰⁰ CICIR, Guoji zhanlue yu anquan xingshi pinggu 2013–2014 [Strategic and security review], 320.

¹⁰¹ Author’s interview-#90, Guangzhou, China, 25 May 2016.

¹⁰² Edward Wong and Jonathan Ansfield, ‘China, trying to bolster its claims, plants Islands in disputed waters’, The New York Times, 17 June 2014 https://www.cnbc.com/2014/06/17/china-trying-to-bolster-its-claims-plants-islands-in-disputed-waters.html

¹⁰³ Shannon Tiezzi, ‘Why China Is Stopping Its South China Sea Island-Building (For Now)’, The Diplomat, 16 June 2015.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵ Liu Zaorong, ‘Meiguo nanhai zhengce xin dongxiang [New Moves in U.S. South China Sea Policy]’, 232, presented at the Academic Seminar Commemorating the 70th Anniversary of the Victory of China’s War of Resistance Against Japan, which was held in Beijing by the Collaborative Innovation Centre of South China Sea Studies from 15 to 16 August 2015. This is a print copy of the conference materials, seemingly internally circulated and available in the library of the China Institute of Boundary and Ocean Studies (CIBOS) of Wuhan University in Wuhan, China.

¹⁰⁶ Author’s interview-#4, Beijing, China, 15 September 2015; Author’s interview-#113, Beijing, China, 29 December 2016.

¹⁰⁷ Hainan People’s Congress, ‘Guanyu zai Jinqingdao jianshe zonghe buji baozhang jidi de jianyi’ [Suggestion regarding the construction of a comprehensive logistical support base on Drummond Island].

¹⁰⁸ Ketian Zhang, ‘A View from the United States’, Asan Forum 7/3 (2019).

¹⁰⁹ Lu Shengjun, Shenlan jinglue, 156.

¹¹⁰ See, for example, Elizabeth Saunders, ‘No Substitute for Experience: Presidents, Advisers, and Information in Group Decision Making’, International Organization 71/S1 (2017–04): S219–47; Daniel L. Byman and Kenneth M. Pollack, ‘Let Us Now Praise Great Men: Bringing the Statesman Back In’, International Security, 25/4 (Spring, 2001), 107–146.

¹¹¹ Author’s interview-#90, Guangzhou, China, 25 May 2016.

¹¹² Ibid.

¹¹³ Author’s interview-#91, Beijing, China, 7 June 2016.

¹¹⁴ Author’s interview-#28, Haikou, China, 5 January 2016.

¹¹⁵ Author’s interview-#69, Shanghai, China, 5 May 2016; Wen Siyong and Ren Zhichu, Talingdao zhongguo: Hu Jintao xinzhuan [He Leads China: a New Biography of Hu Jintao] (New York, USA: Mirror, 2010); and Gao Xiao, Tajiang lingdao zhongguo: Xi Jinping zhuan [He Will Lead China: Biography of Xi Jinping] (New York, USA: Mirror, 2010).

¹¹⁶ See Chubb, ‘PRC Assertiveness in the South China Sea Measuring Continuity and Change, 1970–2015’.

¹¹⁷ Hu Jintao, Hu Jintao wenxuan dierjuan [Hu Jintao’s Selected Works Vol. 2] (Beijing, China: People’s Publishing House, 2016), 518. Hu’s speech during this conference was previously not made public.

¹¹⁸ Liang Jian, Xi Jinping xinzhuan [New biography of Xi Jinping] (New York, USA: Mirror Books, 2012), 498.

¹¹⁹ Author’s interview-#103, Philadelphia, USA, 2 September 2016.

¹²⁰ Ibid.

¹²¹ See, for example, Kenneth Lieberthal, ‘Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy,’ in Harry Harding, ed., Chinese Foreign Relations in the 1980s (New Haven, USA: Yale UP, 1986), 43–70; Barry Posen, Sources of Military Doctrine (Ithaca, USA: Cornell UP, 1984) Ch. 1, 13–33; Ch. 2, 34–41, 59–80; Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca, USA: Cornell UP, 1993).

¹²² Gong, Xue, ‘The Role of Chinese Corporate Players in China’s South China Sea Policy’.

¹²³ Author’s interview-#113, Beijing, China, 29 December 2016.

¹²⁴ Author’s interview-#26, Nanjing, China, 30 December 2015.

¹²⁵ Author’s interview-#103, Philadelphia, USA, 2 September 2016; Author’s interview-#4, Beijing, China, 15 September 2015.

¹²⁶ Author’s interview-#91, Beijing, China, 7 June 2016.

¹²⁷ Ibid.

¹²⁸ Author’s interview-#112, Beijing, China, 27 December 2016; cross-checked with one government policy analyst, Author’s interview-#113, Beijing, China, 29 December 2016.

¹²⁹ Author’s interview-#35, Beijing, China, 18 January 2016.

¹³⁰ Ibid.

¹³¹ Jiang Xiaojuan, ‘Gaoceng zenme juece? Yiwei guowuyuan fumishuzhang de xierenhou sikao’ [How do the high-level make decisions? Some thoughts from a retired deputy secretariat from the State Council], Wenhua Zongheng [Across Culture], 2021–04, https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/VIeXC2q4kt4VV3_ZaNkopQ

¹³² John J. Mearsheimer, ‘Can China Rise Peacefully?’, The National Interest, 25 October 2014 http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/can-china-rise-peacefully-10204.

¹³³ Daryl Press, Calculating Credibility: How Leaders Assess Military Threats (Ithaca, USA: Cornell UP, 2005).

¹³⁴ Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, USA: Harvard UP, 1980), 34. Similarly, in the realm of deterrence, Snyder indicates that ‘force demonstrations’ have more deterrent potency in some situations than declaratory threats partially due to the accretion of custom and precedent. See Snyder, Deterrence and Defense: Toward a Theory of National Security (Princeton, USA: Princeton UP, 1961), 254.

¹³⁵ Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 147.

¹³⁶ Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, USA: Yale UP, 1966) 150.

¹³⁷ See Ketian Zhang, ‘Bringing the Economy Back In Economic Development and China’s Grand Strategy,’ Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs January 2022.

¹³⁸ For an overview, see Nina Silove, ‘Beyond the Buzzword: The Three Meanings of “Grand Strategy”’, Security Studies 27/1 (2017) 1–31.

Additional information

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Ketian Zhang

Ketian Zhang is an Assistant Professor of International Security in the Schar School of Policy and Government at George Mason University. Ketian examines rising powers, coercion, economic statecraft, and maritime disputes. with a regional focus on China and East Asia. Part of this research has appeared in International Security. She would like to thank the reviewers, Josh Shifrinson, Andrew Taffer, and her RAs, Yulin Wu and Abdallah Ali.