China’s military strategy for a ‘new era’: Some change, more continuity, and tantalizing hints

ABSTRACT

In 2019, China’s Central Military Commission adopted a new strategy for the People’s Liberation Army, titled the ‘military strategic guidelines for the new era.’ This was consistent with the past but framed by Xi’s political consolidation, growing threats from the United States and Taiwan, and a new military structure. This article documents the strategy and asks what would drive a more fundamental adjustment. It concludes that the strategy reflected a determination to focus the PLA on the necessary and the achievable, but a new direction could be influenced by changes in the strategic landscape, rapid modernization, or new operational concepts.

KEYWORDS:

• China
• strategy
• People’s Liberation Army
• joint operations
• Taiwan

Acknowledgements

For helpful comments on previous drafts, the authors thank David M. Finkelstein, Phillip C. Saunders, and an anonymous reviewer. Elliot Shuwei Ji provided valuable research assistance.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

¹ Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2020), pp. 26–7; Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2021), pp. 32–3. The latter document cited references to implementing the new strategy following the 5^th Plenum of the 19^th Central Committee in October 2020.

² ‘Xi Jinping chairs a CMC work meeting and delivers an important speech’ [习近平出席中央军委军事工作会议并发表重要讲话], Xinhua, 4 January 2019 http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2019-01/04/content_5354931.htm

³ Cai Zhijun [蔡志军], ‘Guidance for China’s national defense in the new era is implementing the Military Strategic Guideline for the New Era’ [新时代中国国防的战略指导是贯彻落实新时代军事战略方针], State Council Information Office, 24 July 2019 http://www.scio.gov.cn/xwfbh/xwbfbh/wqfbh/39595/41105/zy41109/Document/1660290/1660290.htm. Also, see Chen Zhou [陈舟], ‘Historical Evolution and Characteristics of the Defensive National Defense Policy Over the Past 70 Years Since the Founding of the PRC’ [新中国70年防御性国防政策的历史演变及特点], China Military Science [中国军事科学] No. 4 (2019), p. 13.

⁴ We avoided reliance on popular commentary, such as articles in the Global Times, unless when authored by a noted, active-duty PLA expert or officer. For discussions of authoritativeness in Chinese sources, see Michael D. Swaine, ‘Chinese views of U.S. decline,’ China Leadership Monitor, 1 September 2021 https://www.prcleader.org/swaine-2; and Michael D. Swaine, ‘Chinese leadership and elite responses to the U.S. pacific pivot,’ China Leadership Monitor, 12 July 2012 https://carnegieendowment.org/2012/07/17/chinese-leadership-and-elite-responses-to-u.s.-pacific-pivot-pub-48871; and Paul H.B. Godwin and Alice L. Miller, China’s Forbearance Has Its Limits: Chinese Threat and Retaliation Signaling and Its Implications for a Sino-American Military Confrontation (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2013), pp. 29–34.

⁵ Academy of Military Sciences All-Military Terminology Management Committee [军事科学院在全军军事术语管理委员会], Military Terminology of the People’s Liberation Army [中国人民解放军军语] (Beijing: Military Sciences Press, 2011), p. 50.

⁶ This section builds on M. Taylor Fravel, Active Defense: China’s Military Strategy Since 1949 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2019).

⁷ Ibid, pp. 39–71.

⁸ Ibid, p. 27.

⁹ Guo Xiangjie, ed., Biography of Zhang Wannian, Part Two [张万年传, 下] (Beijing: People’s Liberation Army Press, 2011), p. 60.

¹⁰ For discussions of the components of the strategic guidelines, see Wang Wenrong [王文荣], ed., Science of Military Strategy [战略学] (Beijing: National Defense University Press, 1999), pp. 136–139; Gao Rui [高锐], ed., Science of Military Strategy [战略学] (Beijing: Military Sciences Press, 1987), pp. 81–85; Peng Guangqian [彭光谦] and Yao Youzhi [姚有志], eds., Science of Military Strategy [战略学] (Beijing: Military Sciences Press, 2001), pp. 182–186; and Fan Zhenjiang [范震江] and Ma Bao’an [马保安], eds., On Military Strategy [军事战略论] (Beijing: National Defense University Press, 2007), pp. 149–150.

¹¹ Chen Zhou [陈舟], ‘Expert Unpacks the White Paper on China’s Military Strategy’ [专家解读中国的军事战略白皮书], National Defense [国防] No. 6 (2015), p. 18.

¹² Fravel, Active Defense, pp. 107–138.

¹³ Ibid, p. 103.

¹⁴ Ibid, pp. 230–234.

¹⁵ Luo Derong [骆德荣], ‘Guidelines for Armed Forces Building and Preparations for Military Struggle – Understanding of the Military Strategic Guideline in the New Situation’ [军队建设与军事斗争准备的行动纲领 – 对新形势下军事战略方针的几点认识], China Military Science [中国军事科学] No. 1 (2017), p. 95; and China’s Military Strategy, Xinhua, 27 May 2015 http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2015/05/27/content_281475115610833.htm

¹⁶ Luo, ‘Guidelines for Armed Forces Building and Preparations for Military Struggle’.

¹⁷ Wang Hongguang [王洪光], ‘Looking at China’s Strategic Directions Today from a Historical Perspective’ [从历史看今日中国的战略方向], Tongzhou Gongjin [同舟共进], No. 3 (March 2015), p. 48.

¹⁸ Wen Bin [温冰], ‘Pinpointing the basis of preparations for military struggle’ [定准军事斗争基点], Study Times [学习时报], 1 June 2015 p. A7. See also: Guo Yuandan [郭媛丹], ‘Fight a war at sea? China should prepare for maritime military struggle’ [要打海上战争? 中国应作海上军事斗争准备], Huanqiu Shibao [环球时报], 26 May 2015 https://mil.huanqiu.com/article/9CaKrnJLnPo

¹⁹ China’s Military Strategy.

²⁰ ‘Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on some major issues concerning comprehensively deepening reform’ [中共中央关于全面深化改革若干重大问题的决定], Government of the People’s Republic of China, 13 November 2013 http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2013-11/15/content_2528179.htm

²¹ Xi Jinping [习近平], Compendium of Xi Jinping’s Important Expositions on National Defense and Military Building [习近平国防和军队建设重要论述选编] (Beijing: People’s Liberation Army Press, 2016), p. 220.

²² China’s Military Strategy.

²³ ‘A new era exhibits a new atmosphere, new missions call for new actions’ [新时代呈现新气象, 新使命呼唤新作为], PLA Daily [解放军报], 8 March 2018 http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2018-03/08/content_201156.htm

²⁴ ‘Xi Jinping chairs a CMC work meeting and delivers an important speech’.

²⁵ Cai, ‘Guidance for China’s National Defense in the New Era Is Implementing the Military Strategic Guideline for the New Era’.

²⁶ Xiao Tianliang [肖天亮], ed., Science of Military Strategy [战略学] (Beijing: Military Sciences Press, 2020), p. 3.

²⁷ Fravel, Active Defense, p. 232.

²⁸ China’s National Defense in the New Era [新时代的中国国防], State Council Information Office, 24 July 2019 http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/2019-07/24/content_5414325.htm

²⁹ Author’s interaction with a PLA delegation, 2019.

³⁰ The 2015 defense white paper noted that informatized local wars would ‘highlight maritime military struggle and maritime preparations for military struggle’. China’s Military Strategy. The emphasis on the maritime stretched back to the Hu era. See Michael McDevitt, Becoming a Great ‘Maritime Power’: A Chinese Dream (Arlington, VA: CNA, 2016).

³¹ Xiao, Science of Military Strategy; ‘Revision of the Military Service Law: Consolidate a Strong Force That Loves National Defense and Supports the Military’ [兵役法修订: 凝聚热爱国防, 支持军队的强大合力], National People’s Congress Magazine [中国人大杂志] No. 17 (2021), http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/c30834/202109/dd6ec8fc9889438ea00b58af7dcee8dc.shtml

³² Cheng Ronggui [程荣贵], ‘Strong army forum: Set up iron rules for joint operations’ [强军论坛: 立起联合作战的铁规矩], PLA Daily [解放军报], 29 November 2020 http://www.mod.gov.cn/jmsd/2020-11/29/content_4874776.htm. On ‘integrated joint operations’, see Edmund J. Burke et al., People’s Liberation Army Operational Concepts (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2020), pp. 6–8.

³³ ‘“PLA Joint Operations Outline (Trial)” promotes the liberation and development of the PLA’s joint combat capabilities’ [‘中国人民解放军联合作战纲要(试行)’ 推动解放和发展我军联合作战能力], PLA Daily [解放军报], 26 November 2020 http://www.mod.gov.cn/jzhzt/2020-11/26/content_4874624.htm; ‘PLA Daily commentator: Designing future wars, innovating policies for victory’ [解放军报评论员: 设计未来战争, 创新制胜之策], PLA Daily [解放军报], 14 November 2020 https://81.cn/yw/2020-11/14/content_9936409.htm. For an analysis, see David M. Finkelstein, The PLA’s New Joint Doctrine: The Capstone of the New Era Operations Regulation System (Arlington, VA: CNA, 2021).

³⁴ This judgment is more tentative. The phrase was not repeated in the 2019 white paper but is still in use in PLA Daily. See Hu Yushan [胡玉山], ‘To educate people for war, value is in the teacher’ [为战育人贵在得师], PLA Daily [解放军报], 25 February 2020 p. 7.

³⁵ For instance, the 2015 defense white paper confirmed that the ‘basis of preparations for military struggle’ had shifted from ‘local wars under informatized conditions’ to ‘informatized local wars’. China’s Military Strategy. The 2010 defense white paper confirmed that ‘integrated joint operations’ had become the ‘basic form of operations’, though this revelation lagged the 2004 military strategic guideline by several years. China’s National Defense in 2010, State Council Information Office, 31 March 2011 http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/node_7114675.htm

³⁶ Cai, ‘Guidance for China’s national defense in the new era is implementing the Military Strategic Guideline for the New Era’. Using slightly different verbiage, the 2020 Science of Military Strategy stated that ‘the Central Military Commission clarified that Xi Jinping Military Strategic Thought has become the fundamental (根本) guiding thought of the Military Strategy for the New Era’. Xiao, Science of Military Strategy, p. 3.

³⁷ There were also no indications that China’s nuclear strategy, which has historically been treated as separate from the strategic guidelines, had been revised as part of this process.

³⁸ In November 2021, the CCP declared that the ‘new era’ began with the conclusion of the 18^th Party Congress in 2012, which heralded Xi’s ascendance to power, even though the terminology did not become popularized for about five years. See ‘Full text: Resolution of the CPC Central Committee on the major achievements and historical experience of the party over the past century,’ Xinhua, 16 November 2021 https://english.www.gov.cn/policies/latestreleases/202111/16/content_WS6193a935c6d0df57f98e50b0.html

³⁹ Susan L. Shirk, ‘China in Xi’s “New Era”: The Return to Personalistic Rule’, Journal of Democracy 29/2 (2018), pp. 22–36; Daniel Tobin, ‘How Xi Jinping’s “new era” should have ended U.S. debate on Beijing’s ambitions’, CSIS, 8 May 2020 https://www.csis.org/analysis/how-xi-jinpings-new-era-should-have-ended-us-debate-beijings-ambitions

⁴⁰ See, e.g., Yang Jiechi [杨洁篪], ‘Based on Xi Jinping’s Foreign Affairs Thought, Deeply Implement Foreign Affairs Work in the New Era’ [以习近平外交思想为指导, 深入推进新时代对外工作], Qiushi [求实] No. 15 (2018), http://www.qstheory.cn/dukan/qs/2018-08/01/c_1123209510.htm

⁴¹ This followed other attempts to position Xi as more influential within the PLA than Jiang or especially Hu. Phillip C. Saunders and Joel Wuthnow, ‘Large and In Charge: Civil-Military Relations under Xi Jinping’, in Phillip C. Saunders et al., eds., Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2019), pp. 519–555.

⁴² Cai, ‘Guidance for China’s National Defense in the New Era Is Implementing the Military Strategic Guideline for the New Era’.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ ‘Persist in promoting the innovative development of military strategic guidance’ [持续推进军事战略指导创新发展], PLA Daily [解放军报], 1 October 2019 p. 9.

⁴⁵ On the 1993 strategy, see David M. Finkelstein, ‘China’s National Military Strategy: An Overview of the “Military Strategic Guidelines”’, in Andrew Scobell and Roy Kamphausen, eds., Right Sizing the People’s Liberation Army: Exploring the Contours of China’s Military (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2007), pp. 95–127; and Fravel, Active Defense, pp. 182–216.

⁴⁶ Joel Wuthnow, ‘China’s Belt and Road: One Initiative, Three Strategies’, in Ashley J. Tellis, Alison Szlwinski, and Michael Wills, eds., Strategic Asia 2019: China’s Expanding Strategic Ambitions (Washington, DC: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2019), pp. 213–218.

⁴⁷ On infrastructure projects predating Xi, see Nadège Rolland, China’s Eurasian Century?: Political and Strategic Implications of the Belt and Road Initiative (Washington, DC: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2017), 7–42.

⁴⁸ On the 1960 and 1977 strategies, see Fravel, Active Defense, pp. 107–181.

⁴⁹ On the ‘strategic assessment’, see Finkelstein, ‘China’s National Military Strategy’, pp. 97–103.

⁵⁰ A senior Joint Staff Department officer specifically related the ‘military strategic guideline for the new era’ with the release of the 2019 defense white paper. See Cai, ‘Guidance for China’s national defense in the new era is implementing the Military Strategic Guideline for the New Era’.

⁵¹ The 2015 white paper noted ‘positive trends’ under then-president Ma Ying-jeou. China’s Military Strategy.

⁵² Chris Buckley and Chris Horton, ‘Xi Jinping warns Taiwan that unification is the goal and force is an option’, New York Times, 1 January 2019 https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/01/world/asia/xi-jinping-taiwan-china.html

⁵³ China’s Military Strategy.

⁵⁴ See, e.g., Fu Qiang [付强] and Chen Hanghui [陈航辉], ‘America’s new strategy is full of old thinking’ [美国新战略充斥旧思维], PLA Daily [解放军报], 25 January 2018 p. 11; and Senior Colonel Zhao Xiaozhuo [赵小卓], ‘Outdated thinking and wrong actions’ [过时的思维, 错误的举动], PLA Daily [解放军报], 23 January 2018 p. 4.

⁵⁵ As evidence of such concerns, PLA Daily reminded service members in 2020 that ‘the more critical the period, the more it is necessary to take advantage of the momentum. If you relax a little bit, you may lose all your previous efforts and lose your success.’ ‘Strengthen confidence and face difficulties – Resolutely achieve the 2020 national defense and army building target tasks series talks’ [坚定信心 迎难而上 – 坚决实现国防和军队建设 2020 年目标任务系列谈)], PLA Daily [解放军报], 10 June 2020 p. 6.

⁵⁶ Fravel, Active Defense; Joel Wuthnow and Phillip C. Saunders, Chinese Military Reform in the Age of Xi Jinping (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2017). A few major changes, including the creation of the Joint Logistic Support Force and reforms to the People’s Armed Police and reserves, came later.

⁵⁷ Chen, ‘Historical Evolution and Characteristics of the Defensive National Defense Policy over the Past 70 Years Since the Founding of the PRC’, p. 14.

⁵⁸ 2027 appears to have replaced 2020 as the new ‘first step’ in an updated three-step development strategy. The new goal includes ‘accelerating the integrated development of mechanization, informatization, and intelligentization’, among other targets. See Brian Hart, Bonnie Glaser, and Matthew P. Funaiole, ‘China’s 2027 goal marks the PLA’s centennial, not an expedited military modernization’, China Brief, 26 March 2021 https://jamestown.org/program/chinas-2027-goal-marks-the-plas-centennial-not-an-expedited-military-modernization/

⁵⁹ Chen, ‘Historical Evolution and Characteristics of the Defense National Defense Policy over the Past 70 Years Since the Founding of the PRC’, p. 14. For analysis on PLA ‘world-class military’ discourse, see M. Taylor Fravel, ‘China’s “World-Class Military” Ambitions: Origins and Implications’, The Washington Quarterly 43/1 (2020), pp. 85–99. On the new timetable, see Xi Jinping, ‘Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era’, Work Report to the 19^th Party Congress, 18 October 2017, pp. 47–8.

⁶⁰ ‘Do a good job in starting the work of national defense and army construction during the 14^th Five-Year Plan and greet the 100^th anniversary of the Communist Party of China with outstanding achievements’ [做好 ‘十四五’ 时期国防和军队建设开局起步工作, 以优异成绩迎接中国共产党建党100周年], PLA Daily [解放军报], 10 March 2021 http://www.mod.gov.cn/topnews/2021-03/10/content_4880715.htm

⁶¹ ‘Interpreting Article 41 on the Outline of the 14^th Five-Year Plan: Accelerating national defense and army modernization’ [‘十四五’ 规划纲要解读文章之41, 加快国防和军队现代化], National Development and Reform Commission Planning Bureau, 25 December 2021 https://www.ndrc.gov.cn/fggz/fzzlgh/gjfzgh/202,112/t20211225_1309729.html?code = &state = 123

⁶² The PLA has long carried out amphibious exercises but greater publicity for them in late 2020 appeared to be intended to send a stronger political signal to Taiwan and the Trump administration, which had relaxed restrictions on higher-level engagements. See Joshua Arostegui, ‘PLA Army and Marine Corps Amphibious Brigades in a Post-Reform Military’, in Joel Wuthnow et al., eds., Crossing the Strait: China’s Military Prepares for War with Taiwan (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2022).

⁶³ For an order of battle and description of recent Eastern Theater Command activities, see Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China (2021), pp. 98–101.

⁶⁴ On ‘national assets’, see Mark Stokes, ‘Employment of National-Level PLA Assets in a Contingency: A Cross-Strait Conflict as a Case Study’, in Andrew Scobell et al. eds., The People’s Liberation Army and Contingency Planning in China (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2015), 35–58.

⁶⁵ These regions have sometimes been called ‘secondary’ (次要) or ‘important’ (重要) strategic directions. See: M. Taylor Fravel, ‘Stability in a Secondary Strategic Direction: China and the Border Dispute with India After 1962’, in Kanti Bajpai, Selina Ho, and Manjari Chatterjee Miller, eds., Routledge Handbook of China-India Relations (New York: Routledge, 2020), chapter 9; Dennis J. Blasko, The Chinese Army Today: Tradition and Transformation for the 21^st Century (New York: Routledge, 2012), p. 82.

⁶⁶ John Chen, ‘Choosing the “Least Bad Option”: Organizational Interests and Change in the PLA Ground Forces’, in Saunders et al., eds., Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA, pp. 85–124.

⁶⁷ ‘Xi Jinping: Strengthening clear guidance for preparing for war and comprehensively improving to win in the new era’ [习近平: 强化备战打仗的鲜明导向 全面提高新时代打赢能力], Xinhua, 3 November 2017 http://www.xinhuanet.com//politics/leaders/2017-11/03/c_1121903813.htm

⁶⁸ Timothy Heath, ‘The “Holistic Security Concept”: The securitization of policy and increasing risk of militarized conflict’, China Brief, 27 June 2015 https://www.rand.org/blog/2015/06/the-holistic-security-concept-the-securitization.html

⁶⁹ M. Taylor Fravel, ‘Securing Borders: China’s Doctrine and Force Structure for Frontier Defense’, Journal of Strategic Studies 30/4-5 (2007), p. 716; Joel Wuthnow, System Overload: Can China’s Military Be Distracted in a War Over Taiwan? (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2020), pp. 9–10.

⁷⁰ Director of Central Intelligence, Soviet Strategy and Capabilities for Multitheater War, National Intelligence Estimate, June 1985, declassified 1999.

⁷¹ Roger Cliff et al., Entering the Dragon’s Lair: Chinese Antiaccess Strategies and Their Implications for the United States (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2007). The 2020 Science of Military Strategy discusses a ‘strategic strike’ (战略突击), including strikes against enemy command and control systems, airports, ports, and military bases, as useful primarily early in a conflict (战争开始时). Offensive strikes could be carried out in the ‘main strategic direction’ (主要战略方向) (currently defined as China’s southeast coast) while implementing ‘strategic defense’ (战略防御) in other theaters. Xiao, Science of Military Strategy, pp. 224–6.

⁷² For a PLAN perspective, see Senior Captain Liang Fang [梁芳], On Maritime Strategic Access [海上战略通道论] (Beijing: Current Affairs Press, 2011). The 2015 defense white paper added ‘far seas protection’ as a key navy mission.

⁷³ David M. Finkelstein, China Reconsiders Its National Security: ‘The Great Peace and Development Debate of 1999’, (Arlington, VA: CNA, 2000).

⁷⁴ One scenario would involve an escalating U.S.-China competition that took place after a failed Chinese invasion of Taiwan.

⁷⁵ For a view of an ambitious naval development plan, see James E. Fannell, ‘China’s Global Navy – Today’s Challenge for the United States and the U.S. Navy’, Naval War College Review 73/4 (2020), pp. 1–32.

⁷⁶ In recent years, defense spending growth has dipped below 10% and declined as a percentage of public budget expenditures, reflecting other CCP priorities. See Phillip C. Saunders, ‘Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission’, 20 June 2019, pp. 4–5.

⁷⁷ China’s National Defense in 2006, State Council Information Office, December 2006, http://en.people.cn/whitepaper/defense2006/defense2006.html

⁷⁸ China’s National Defense in the New Era.

⁷⁹ Elsa B. Kania, Battlefield Singularity: Artificial Intelligence, Military Revolution, and China’s Future Military Power (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, 2017).

⁸⁰ China’s National Defense in the New Era; ‘Regular press conference of the Ministry of National Defense on November 26,’ China Military Online, 29 November 2020 http://eng.mod.gov.cn/news/2020-11/29/content_4874839.htm. This theme is also present in the 2020 Science of Military Strategy. For a discussion, see Marcus Clay and Roderick Lee, ‘Unmasking the Devil in the Chinese Details: A Study Note on the Science of Military Strategy 2020’, China Aerospace Studies Institute, 24 January 2022, pp. 13–14.

⁸¹ He Lei [何雷], ‘Intelligentized wars are not far off’ [智能化战争并不遥远], PLA Daily [解放军报], 8 August 2019 http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2019-08/08/content_240321.htm

⁸² ‘100 questions on military party affairs knowledge’ [军队党务知识100 题], PLA Daily [解放军报], 10 May 2021 p. 10. The phrase appeared 13 times in PLA Daily in 2021, often adding ‘to win’ (打赢) at the beginning, seeming to mirror terminology used in previous military strategic guidelines. However, there was no authoritative confirmation that this new phrase had replaced ‘informatized local wars’.

⁸³ Joel Wuthnow, ‘What I learned from the PLA’s latest strategy textbook’, China Brief, 25 May 2021 https://jamestown.org/program/what-i-learned-from-the-plas-latest-strategy-textbook/

⁸⁴ Xiao, Science of Military Strategy, pp. 264–7. The volume also contains a modified description of the ‘basic guiding thought’ that inserts ‘multi-domain and integrated’ (信息主导, 精打要害, 多域-体, 联合制胜) (p. 264).

⁸⁵ ‘Multi-domain’ and ‘all-domain’ are both used in recent PLA discussions of advanced joint operations. For discussions of the link between U.S. and Chinese doctrinal concepts, see Derek Solen, Chinese Views of All-Domain Operations (Washington, DC: China Aerospace Studies Institute, 2020); and Greg Graff and Jacqueline Leahy, ‘How Does the PLA Assess the Future Character of War?’ Paper presented at the 2021 CAPS-RAND-NDU Conference on the PLA, 20 November 2021. On U.S. Army ‘Multi-Domain Operations’, see ‘Defense Primer: Army Multi-Domain Operations (MDO)’, In Focus, Congressional Research Service, 22 October 2021.

⁸⁶ ‘On the new officer system reform, authoritative answers are here’ [关于新的军官制度改革, 权威解答来了], China Veteran [中国退役军人], 12 January 2021

http://tyjr.sh.gov.cn/shtyjrswj/xxyd/20210112/ec2d4b5d36eb483ebaa8c343f0f9924f.html

⁸⁷ Joel Wuthnow, ‘Who Does What? Chinese Command and Control in a Taiwan Scenario’, in Joel Wuthnow et al., eds., Crossing the Strait: China Prepares for War with Taiwan (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2022).

⁸⁸ Andrew Scobell, ‘Is There a Civil-Military Gap in China’s Peaceful Rise?’ Parameters 39/2 (2009), pp. 4–22.

⁸⁹ ‘Interpreting Article 41 on the Outline of the 14th Five-Year Plan’.

⁹⁰ Finkelstein, The PLA’s New Joint Doctrine.

⁹¹ Ibid. On slowing growth of PLA budgets, see Saunders, Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. Double digit increases ended in 2015; the 2021 budget included a 6.8% increase from 2020.

⁹² ‘Interpreting Article 41 on the Outline of the 14th Five-Year Plan’.

⁹³ ‘Regular press conference of the Ministry of National Defense on August 26’, China Ministry of National Defense, 26 August 2021 http://eng.mod.gov.cn/news/2021-08/30/content_4893499.htm

⁹⁴ ‘Interpreting Article 41 on the Outline of the 14th Five-Year Plan’.

⁹⁵ For descriptions, see Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China (2021); Ronald O’Rourke, China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, October 2021); and Mike Yeo, ‘Chinese airshow offers glimpse at military’s new drones’, Defense News, 30 September 2021 https://www.defensenews.com/unmanned/2021/09/30/chinese-airshow-offers-glimpse-at-militarys-new-drones/

⁹⁶ Michael Dahm and Conor M. Kennedy, ‘Civilian shipping: Ferrying the People’s Liberation Army ashore’, CIMSEC, 9 September 2021 https://cimsec.org/civilian-shipping-ferrying-the-peoples-liberation-army-ashore/

⁹⁷ ‘Regular press conference of the Ministry of National Defense on November 26’.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Joel Wuthnow

Joel Wuthnow is a senior research fellow in the Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs at the U.S. National Defense University and an adjunct professor in the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. His recent books and monographs, all from NDU Press, include Crossing the Strait: China's Military Prepares for War with Taiwan (2022, editor), The PLA Beyond Borders: Chinese Military Operations in Regional and Global Context (2021, editor), and System Overload: Can China's Military Be Distracted in a War over Taiwan? (2020). Previously, Dr. Wuthnow was a China analyst at CNA, a postdoctoral fellow in the China and the World Program at Princeton University, and a pre-doctoral fellow at The Brookings Institution. His degrees are from Princeton University (A.B., summa cum laude, in Public and International Affairs), Oxford University (M.Phil. in Modern Chinese Studies), and Columbia University (Ph.D. in Political Science).

M. Taylor Fravel

M. Taylor Fravel is the Arthur and Ruth Sloan Professor of Political Science and Director of the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Taylor studies international relations, with a focus on international security, China, and East Asia. His books include Strong Borders, Secure Nation: Cooperation and Conflict in China’s Territorial Disputes, (Princeton University Press, 2008) and Active Defense: China's Military Strategy Since 1949 (Princeton University Press, 2019). His other publications have appeared in International Security, Foreign Affairs, Security Studies, International Studies Review, The China Quarterly, The Washington Quarterly, Journal of Strategic Studies, Armed Forces & Society, Current History, Asian Survey, Asian Security, China Leadership Monitor, and Contemporary Southeast Asia. Taylor is a graduate of Middlebury College and Stanford University, where he received his PhD. He also has graduate degrees from the London School of Economics and Oxford University, where he was a Rhodes Scholar. In 2016, he was named an Andrew Carnegie Fellow by the Carnegie Corporation. Taylor has been a member of the board of directors of the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations and serves as the Principal Investigator for the Maritime Awareness Project.