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Abstract
This article examines the pattern of engagement by China and India in terms of the G20 and BRICS. Both countries are torn between a self-identity as status-seeking ‘rising’ powers and as champions of solidarity with other countries of the Global South. In conceptual terms, primary reference is made to the notion of ambivalence inherent in the fundamental co-existence of the privileging of these two different identities. That these contrasting mindsets are held in tandem is highly salient for an examination of foreign policy in comparative perspective. Privileging ambivalence is different from ambiguity. Ambiguity conveys a lack of clarity, rather than the persistence of a dualistic mindset central to ambivalence. Although highlighting generalised commonalities, the means of managing ambivalence adopted by China and India are markedly differentiated. As illustrated by the pattern of engagement with the G20 and BRICS, what separates China from India is China’s ability make up its mind in an instrumental manner if and when needed. By way of contrast, the projection of Indian foreign policy on the G20 and the BRICS highlights a more fundamental contradiction between the exceptionalistic and universalistic sides of self-identity.
Acknowledgements
An early version of this article was presented as a Visiting Professor, International Relations and Governance Studies Department, Shiv Nadar University, India. I thank Professor Siddharth Mallavarapu as well as the Special Issue editors and four anonymous referees for their comments.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes
1 Kaur and Wahlberg, “Governing Difference in India and China.”
2 Chakrabarti, “Global South Rhetoric in India’s Policy Projection.”
3 Fung, “Global South Solidarity.”
4 A. Lee, “China Refuses to Give Up ‘Developing’ Status.”
5 C. J. Lee, Making a World After Empire.
6 Kahler, “Rising Powers and Alternative Modes of Global Governance.”
7 Zakaria, Post-American World; Alexandroff and Cooper, Rising States, Rising Institutions; Kupchan, No One’s World.
8 Beeson and Bell, “G-20 and International Economic Governance.”
9 Cooper and Thakur, Group of Twenty (G20); Kirton, G20 Governance for a Globalized World; Luckhurst, G20 since the Global Crisis; Cooper, “G20 as an Improvised Crisis Committee.”
10 Muhr, “Beyond ‘BRICS.’” See also Nayyar, “BRICS, Developing Countries and Global Governance.”
11 Cooper, BRICS: A Very Short Introduction; Stuenkel, BRICS and the Future of Global Order.
12 Cooper and Stolte, “Insider and Outsider Strategies of Influence.”
13 Acharya, End of American World Order; Alden, Morphet, and Vieira, South in World Politics.
14 Cooper and Bradford, G20 and the Post-Crisis Economic Order.
15 Acharya, End of American World Order.
16 Mohan, “Rising India”; Sidhu, Mehta, and Jones, “Hesitant Rule Shaper.”
17 Mirilovic, “India Foreign Policy Perspectives.”
18 Lampton, Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy.
19 Ekman, “China’s Two-Track Foreign Policy.”
20 Bhabha, Location of Culture.
21 Ibid., 91.
22 Saran, “India and China Take Different Roads.”
23 Thakur, “How Representative Are BRICS?,” 1793.
24 Grant, Russia, China and Global Governance.
25 H. Wang, “New Development Bank,” 234.
26 Bhabha, Location of Culture, 92.
27 Cooper and Antkiewicz, Emerging Powers in Global Governance.
28 Mohan, “Rising India.”
29 Gosovic, “Resurgence of South–South Cooperation,” 742.
30 Bhabha, Location of Culture, 199–200.
31 Shambaugh, China Goes Global; see also Cooper, “‘Rising’ States and Global Reach.”
32 Williamson, “Emerging Powers Flex Muscles.”
33 Quoted in Bidwai, “India’s Clumsy Balancing Act.”
34 Quoted in F. Chen, “G8 Not Platform for Exerting Pressure.”
35 Zakaria, The Post-American World and the Rise of the Rest.
36 Mohanty, “Bandung Spirit and the New Indian Regime.”
37 Quoted in Parameswaran, “India Needs a More Ambitious Foreign Policy.”
38 Li and Tu, “Impact of Chinese Characteristics.”
39 Y. Wang, “New Era Global Governance.”
40 Yu, “China’s Evolving Global Role,” 188.
41 Kirton and Koch, G20 Mexico Summit.
42 Y. He, China’s Historical Choice in Global Governance.
43 A. He, “China’s Goals in the G20.”
44 Cooper, “Group of Twenty.”
45 Q. Wang, “G20 Must Look Beyond.”
46 D. Chen, “China’s Perspective on Global Governance and G20.”
47 Singh, “At G20, PM Proposes.”
48 Mathur, “India Must Build the Capacity.”
49 Ibid.
50 Chaturvedi and Saha, “Competing Imperatives of Global Governance.”
51 The Hindu, “PM Arrives for G20 Summit.”
52 BRICS Academic Forum, “Recommendations to the 4th BRICS Leaders Summit.”
53 New Development Bank, “Agreement on the New Development Bank”; see also Cooper, “BRICS’ New Development Bank.” Chin, “BRICS-Led Development Bank.”
54 Sahu, “BRICS Nations Broadly Agree.”
55 Krishnan, “China Displays Economic Clout.”
56 Chand, BRICS Birth a New South–South Revolution.
57 Shanghai Forum, “Will the BRICS Development Bank Settle in Shanghai?”
58 Paul, Larson, and William, Status in World Politics; Cooper and Alexandroff, “Assessing the Variation of ‘Leader-Focused Status.’”
59 K. Vereycken, “Les BRICS font renaître.”
60 Destradi, “Reluctance in International Politics: A Conceptualization.”
61 Bhabha, Location of Culture, 12.
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Andrew F. Cooper
Andrew F. Cooper is University Research Chair, Department of Political Science, and Professor at the Balsillie School of International Affairs, University of Waterloo. From 2003 to 2010 he was Associate Director and Distinguished Fellow of the Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI). His most recent book is BRICS VSI (OUP, 2016). In 2019 he received the Distinguished Scholar Award from the Diplomacy Section of ISA.