Form, Formality, Formalism in Hegel’s Dialectic-Speculative Logic

Abstract

This essay addresses the general systematic question underlying any project of ‘formalization’ of Hegel’s dialectic-speculative logic, namely, the question concerning the peculiar concept of logical ‘form’ and the connected type of ‘formalism’ at stake in a logic that is, programmatically and innovatively within the historical tradition, a ‘dialectic-speculative’ logic.

KEYWORDS:

• Form (absolute)
• formality
• formalism
• formalization
• dialectic
• transcendental logic
• Kant
• immanence

Notes

1 Henceforth I capitalize ‘Logic’ to designate the first part of the philosophical system, the book Science of Logic, and the first division of the Encyclopedia. With ‘logic’, instead, I indicate the general discipline of logic as such.

2 Notice that I say real ‘form’ not ‘content.’ While there are certainly contents qualified specifically as logical, natural, and spiritual, at stake in my discussion is the difference between logical and real ‘forms.’

3 As I have examined this issue elsewhere (Nuzzo 2016a), I shall here be brief. See also Ficara 2021, ch. 4.

4 This is famously the type of logic presented by traditional formal logic and Kant’s transcendental logic, intent in gathering categories, forms of judgment, and syllogism in convenient ‘tables.’

5 See this chapter also for Hegel’s closeness to Goethe.

6 See Kant’s ‘empty formalism’ in Philosophy of Right (in Hegel 1986, TW 7) § 135 Remark and Nuzzo 2013.

7 On the opposition of form and content is based, instead, Wolff’s critique to Kant’s distinction of general and transcendental logic (Wolff 1984; see Sedgwick 1996).

8 This is what I propose to designate ‘formalism’ given the analogy with the way in which the critique of formalism proceeds in the practical (moral) philosophy (see Philosophy of Right § 135 Remark with regard to Kant’s ‘Formalismus).

9 See also TW 5, 44: ‘Erschaffung der Natur und einer endlichen Geistes.’ It is important to underline that in both cases the image is employed in introductory contexts, not in the immanent development of the logical movement.

10 Goethe can be recall in this case; see Nuzzo 2018, ch. 3 on the relation between form and figure (Gestalt).