A Lack of Form in Hegel’s Logic? Hegel and the Trans-classical Logic of Gotthard Günther

Abstract

Gotthard Günther's early work is inspired by Hegel's logic. Both share the view that the forms of ‘classical logic’ are insufficient to capture essential aspects of thought. However, while Hegel rules out formalization for his dialectical logic, Günther attributes this to the fact that Hegel's thought itself is still bound to the forms of a classical logic. Günther thus develops a trans-classical logic, with which he believes he can formally capture some of Hegel's insights. The paper presents Günther’s critical engagement with Hegel and outlines some basic assumptions arising from his critique.

KEYWORDS:

• Hegel
• Günther
• polyvalence
• trans-classical logic
• dialectics

Notes

1 Shortly after Hegel's death in 1831, his works were published by an ‘association of friends of the eternalized’ [Verein von Freunden des Verewigten] (Hegel 1832–1845). This editorially not unproblematic edition served as the basis for the works [Werke] later edited by E. Moldenhauer and K. M. Michel (Hegel 1969–1971).

2 Modal logics or multi-valued logics were not discussed at that time.

3 A bibliography as well as some of Günther's texts can be found here: www.vordenker.de/ggphilosophy/gg_bibliographie.htm; 26.03.23.

4 What Günther understands by classical logic is explained in 2.1. Günther also uses this term, which is adopted here, when discussing Hegel, even though it would be more correct to speak of traditional or Aristotelian logic in this case.

5 See Günther 1976c, 147. For the sake of simplicity, we will deal exclusively with propositional logic, although Günther points out the relevance of the development of predicate logic, not only for his logic, but also for the assessment of Hegelian logic.

6 Within Günther’s trans-classical calculus, this phenomenon will later be understood as ‘transjunction’.

7 In response to Steffen Heise’s work showing that trans-classical formalism can be transformed into a classical one, defenders of the irreducibility of a specifically trans-classical logic point precisely to this fact (see Heise 1993, 137 and Mahler and Kaehr 1993, 39).