The fragility of general deterrence: The United States and China in maritime East Asia

Abstract

The last decade has witnessed the gradual erosion of the maritime status quo in East Asia, as the United States proved unable to curb Chinese challenges in the East and South China seas. This article argues that this phenomenon is linked to the erosion of US general deterrence posture in the region. It examines the three main factors that have contributed to this erosion: an enduring imbalance of interests between Beijing and Washington, a rapidly evolving local balance of power, and the employment by China of strategies that have allowed it to efficiently circumvent US weak red lines.

Disclosure statement

The author declares that he has no conflict of interest.

Notes

1 Raissa Robles, “Philippines sends navy on ‘sovereignty patrols’ to South China Sea amid fears Whitsun Reef is ‘Scarborough Shoal 2.0’,” South China Morning Post, 25 March 2021, https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3126997/philippines-sends-navy-sovereignty-patrols-south-china-sea-amid; Jim Gomez, “US backs Philippines in standoff over South China Sea reef,” The Washington Post, 23 March 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/us-backs-philippines-in-standoff-over-south-china-sea-reef/2021/03/23/970560b6-8bab-11eb-a33e-da28941cb9ac_story.html

2 Kinling Lo, “South China Sea: US, Japan and Indonesia ramp up pressure on Beijing,” South China Morning Post, 29 March 2021, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3127415/south-china-sea-us-japan-and-indonesia-ramp-pressure-beijing

3 James Kraska, “The Trump Administration Aligns U.S. Policy with the 2016 South China Sea Ruling,” Asia-Pacific Journal of Ocean Law and Policy, 5(2), 410–412.

4 Jeff M. Smith, “Biden Must Keep Challenging China on Freedom of Navigation,” Foreign Policy, 16 February 2021, https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/02/16/biden-south-china-sea-spratlys/

5 Joel Wuthnow, “Beyond Imposing Costs: Recalibrating U.S. Strategy in the South China Sea,” Asia Policy, 24, 2017, 132.

6 Green and al., Countering Coercion, 278.

7 Patrick Morgan, Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1977), p. 28.

8 Patrick Morgan, Deterrence Now (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 82.

9 Lawrence Freedman, “General Deterrence and the Balance of Power,” Review of International Studies 15, no. 2 (1989), p. 204.

10 Paul K. Huth and Bruce Russett, “General Deterrence Between Enduring Rivals: Testing Three Competing Models,” American Political Science Review, 87, no. 1 (1993: 62.

11 Stephen L. Quackenbush, Understanding General Deterrence: Theory and Application (New York: Palgrave, 2011), 14.

12 Vesna Danilovic, “Conceptual and Selection Bias Issues in Deterrence,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 45, no. 1 (2001), pp. 97–125; Vesna Danilovic, When the Stakes are High: Deterrence and Conflict among Major Powers (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2002).

13 Morgan, Deterrence Now, p. 80.

14 Ibid.

15 Danilovic, “Conceptual and Selection Bias Issues in Deterrence”; Danilovic, When the Stakes are High.

16 Freedman, “General Deterrence and the Balance of Power,” p. 204.

17 Morgan, Deterrence Now, 84.

18 Huth and Russett, “General Deterrence Between Enduring Rivals”; Paul K. Huth and Bruce Russett, “What Makes Deterrence Work? Cases from 1900 to 1980,” World Politics 36, no. 4 (1984), pp. 496–526; Gerald L. Sorokin, “Alliance Formation and General Deterrence: A Game-Theoretic Model and the Case of Israel,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 38, no. 2 (1994), pp. 298–325.

19 Morgan, Deterrence Now, p. 114.

20 Ibid., p. 83.

21 Danilovic, “Conceptual and Selection Bias Issues in Deterrence”; Danilovic, When the Stakes are High; Paul K. Huth, “General Deterrence and International Conflict: Empirical Findings and Theoretical Debates,” Annual Review of Political Science 2, no. 1 (1999): 25–48

22 Huth, “Deterrence and International Conflict”; Morgan, Deterrence Now.

23 Huth and Russett, “General Deterrence,” 62.

24 Huth, “Extended deterrence”, 424.

25 For early analysis and statements, see for instance Douglas T. Stuart and William T. Tow, A US Strategy for the Asia-Pacific (London: IISS/Routledge, 1995). A comprehensive overview of this enduring commitment is beyond the scope of this paper. For significant statements of these objectives over the last twenty five years, see Department of Defense. 1996. United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region, https://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/003052174; George W. Bush. 2002. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America. https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/63562.pdf; Department of Defense. 2015. Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy. https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/NDAA%20A-P_Maritime_SecuritY_Strategy-08142015-1300-FINALFORMAT.PDF; Department of Defense, Summary of the National Defense Strategy: Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge, 2018, https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf; The White House, US Strategic Framework for the Indo-Pacific, https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/IPS-Final-Declass.pdf.

26 Michael J. Green, By more than Providence: Grand Strategy and American Power in the Asia Pacific Since 1783 (New York: Columbia University Press).

27 M. Talyor Fravel, U.S. Policy Towards the Disputes in the South China Sea Since 1995, RSIS Policy Report, March 2014, https://taylorfravel.com/documents/research/fravel.2014.RSIS.us.policy.scs.pdf

28 Ankit Panda, “It’s Official: Xi Jinping Breaks His Non-Militarization Pledge in the Spratlys,” The Diplomat, 16 December 2016, https://thediplomat.com/2016/12/its-official-xi-jinping-breaks-his-non-militarization-pledge-in-the-spratlys/

29 Shahryar Pasandideh, “Do China’s New Islands allow it to militarily dominate the South China Sea?,” Asian Security, 17(1). 2021: 1–24.

30 “Comparing Aerial and Satellite Images of China’s Spratly Outposts,” AMTI-CSIS, 16 February 2018, https://amti.csis.org/comparing-aerial-satellite-images-chinas-spratly-outposts/; Gabriel Dominguez, “Image shows ground-launched variant of China’s YJ-12 anti-ship missile,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 7 November 2018, https://customer.janes.com/Janes/Display/FG_1244781-JDW; Steven Stashwick, “China Deploys Long-Range Anti-Ship and Anti-Air Missiles to Spratly Islands For First Time,” The Diplomat, 5 May 2018, https://thediplomat.com/2018/05/china-deploys-long-range-anti-ship-and-anti-air-missiles-to-spratly-islands-for-first-time/

31 Davidson, Philip. 2018. Advance Policy Questions for Admiral Philip Davidson, USN Expected Nominee for Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, 17 April, https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Davidson_APQs_04-17-18.pdfs

32 For an analysis of the different crisis, see Michael Green and al., Countering Coercion in Maritime Asia: The Theory and Practice of Gray Zone Deterrence (Washington: CSIS, 2017).

33 Green and al., Countering Coercion, 123.

34 Ibid.

35 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Trends in Chinese Government and Other Vessels in the Waters Surrounding the Senkaku Islands, and Japan’s Response,” 12 February 2021, https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/page23e_000021.html. For a comprehensive analysis, see Adam P. Liff, “China’s Maritime Gray Zone Operations in the East china Sea and Japan’s Response” in Andrew S. Erickson and Ryan D. Martinson (eds), China’s Maritime Gray Zone Operations (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2019), 207–232.

36 For a comprehensive analysis of the features of the Chinese ADIZ, see Edmund J. Burke and Astrid Stuth Cevallos, In Line or Out of Order? China’s Approach to ADIZ in Theory and Practice (Santa Monica: RAND, 2017).

37 Andrew D. Taffer, “Threat and opportunity: Chinese wedging in the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute,” Asian Security, 16(2), 2019, 170.

38 Morgan, Deterrence Now, 83.

39 Wuthnow, “Beyond Imposing Costs”; Green et al., Countering Coercion.

40 Glenn H. Snyder, Deterrence and Defense (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), 12.

41 Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), 67.; Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980).

42 Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), 560.

43 Paul K. Huth, and Bruce Russett, “What Makes Deterrence Work? Cases from 1900 to 1980,” World Politics 36(4), 1984, 496–526; Paul K. Huth, and Bruce Russett, “Deterrence Failure and Crisis Escalation,” International Studies Quarterly 32(1), 1988, 29–45.

44 Danilovic, When the Stakes are High; Press, Calculating Credibility; Vesna Danilovic, “The Sources of Threat Credibility in Extended Deterrence,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 45(3), 2001, 341–69.

45 Press, Calculating Credibility, 26.

46 Ibid.

47 Snyder, Deterrence and Defense.

48 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2001).

49 Press, Calculating Credibility, 26.

50 Huth and Russett, “Deterrence Failure,” 36.

51 Danilovic, When the Stakes are High, Ch. 5. Vesna Danilovic argues that factors of salience vary from one period to another, with colonial possession and diplomatic exchanges playing a major role in earlier periods (p. 114).

52 Danilovic, When the Stakes are High.

53 See for instance M. Taylor Fravel, “China’s Strategy in the South China Sea,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 33(3), 2011, 292–319; Toshi Yoshihara and JamesR. Holmes, “Can China Defend a ‘Core Interest’ in the South China Sea?,” The Washington Quarterly, 34(2), 2011, 45–59; Zeng Jinghan, Xiao Yuefan and Shaun Breslin, “Securing China’s core interests: the state of the debate in China,” International Affairs 91(2), 2015, 245–266.

54 Among many of such declarations, see for instance State Council Information Office. 2012. Diaoyu Dao, an Inherent Territory of China. http://english.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2014/08/23/content_281474983043212.htm; Foreign Ministry of the People’s Republic of China. 2014. Summary of the Position Paper of the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Matter of Jurisdiction in the South China Sea Arbitration Initiated by the Republic of the Philippines. 7 December. http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/nanhai/eng/snhwtlcwj_1/t1368898.htm

55 See for instance . State Council Information Office. 2011. China’s Peaceful Development. http://english.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2014/09/09/content_281474986284646.htm.

56 Shou, Xiaosong and al., The Science of Military Strategy, Zhanluexue (Beijing Academy of Military Science, 2013), 209.

57 Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes, “China’s New Undersea Nuclear Deterrent: Strategy, Doctrine and Capabilities,” Joint Force Quarterly, 50(3), 2008, 31–38.

58 Press, Calculating Credibility, 26.

59 Department of Defense. 2015. Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy. https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/NDAA%20A-P_Maritime_SecuritY_Strategy-08142015-1300-FINALFORMAT.PDF

60 Huth and Russett, “Deterrence Failure”.

61 China Power Team. 2017. How much trade transits the South China Sea?. China Power/CSIS. 2 August. https://chinapower.csis.org/much-trade-transits-south-china-sea/

62 US Census Bureau, “Top Trading Partners - December 2020,” https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/statistics/highlights/top/index.html#2019

63 Renato Cruz de Castro, “The Duterte Administration’s appeasement policy on China and the crisis in the Philippine-US alliance,” Philippine Political Science Journal, 38(3), 2017, 159–181; Tomohiko Taniguchi, “Japan: A Stabilizer for the U.S.-Led System in a New Era,” Asia Policy, 14(1), 2019, 172–176.

64 Huth, “Extended deterrence”.

65 Danilovic, When the Stakes are High.

66 United States Census Bureau, “U.S. Trade in Goods by Country”, https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/index.html

67 Press, Calculating Credibility, 26.

68 Colin S. Gray, “Deterrence Resurrected: Revisiting Some Fundamentals,” Parameters 40(4), 2010–11, 101 (initially published in 1991).

69 Morgan, Deterrence, 35; my emphasis.

70 Press, Calculating Credibility.

71 Huth, “General Deterrence”; Huth and Russett, “Deterrence Failure”; Huth and Russett, “What Makes Deterrence Work?”; Press, Calculating Credibility; Michael Gerson, “Conventional Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age,” Parameters, 39(3), 2009, 38.

72 Press, Calculating Credibility, 24.

73 Eric Heginbotham and Jacob L. Heim, “Deterring without Dominance: Discouraging Chinese Adventurism under Austerity,” The Washington Quarterly 38(1), 2015, 185–199. See also Abram N. Shulsky, Deterrence Theory and Chinese Behavior (Santa Monica: RAND, 2000).

74 Barry R. Posen, “Command of the Commons: The Military Foundation of U.S. Hegemony,” International Security 28(1), 2003, 5–46.

75 Ross, “Navigating the Taiwan Strait”; David A. Shlapak, David T. Orletsky and Barry A. Wilson, Dire Strait? Military Aspects of the China-Taiwan Confrontation and Options for U.S. Policy (Santa Monica: RAND, 2000).

76 Department of Defense. 2017. Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2017. https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2017_China_Military_Power_Report.PDF

77 M. Taylor Fravel and Christopher P. Twomey, “Projecting Strategy: The Myth of Chinese Counter-intervention,” The Washington Quarterly 37(4), 2015, 171–187.

78 Timothy Heath and Andrew S. Erickson, “Is China Pursuing Counter-Intervention?,” The Washington Quarterly 38(3), 2015, 150.

79 Andrew S. Erickson, “Raining down: Assessing the emergent ASBM threat,” Jane’s Navy International, 16 March 2016, https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/jni77556-jni-2016.

80 Office of Naval Intelligence. 2015. The PLA Navy: New Capabilities and Missions for the 21st Century. http://www.oni.navy.mil/Intelligence-Community/China/; Xu Luming. 2013. ‘Zhe jiu shi Changjian-10 Xunhang Daodan Zhenrong?’ [So this is what the CJ-10 really looks like?]. Huanqiu. 18 March, http://mil.huanqiu.com/photo_china/2013-03/2686083.html.

81 IISS, The Military Balance 2021 (London: IISS/Routledge, 2021).

82 Ibid.

83 AMTI/CSIS, “A look at China’s SAM shelters in the Spratelys,” AMTI/CSIS, 23 February 2017, https://amti.csis.org/chinas-sam-shelters-spratlys/

84 Ronald O’Rourke, China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities –Background and Issues for Congress (Washington: Congressional Research Service, 2018), https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=814003.

85 Ibid.

86 Ibid.

87 IISS, The Military Balance 2000 (London: IISS/Routledge, 2000).

88 Robert S. Ross, “Keeping Up with China’s PLAN,” The National Interest, 15 April 2018, http://nationalinterest.org/print/feature/keeping-chinas-plan-25383

89 Eric Heginbotham et al., The U.S.-China military scorecard : forces, geography, and the evolving balance of power, 1996-2017 (Santa Monica: RAND, 2015).

90 Daniel W. Altman, Red Lines and Faits Accomplis in Interstate Coercion and Crisis (PhD dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2015), available at: https://dspace.mit.edu/bitstream/handle/1721.1/99775/927329080-MIT.pdf

91 Morgan, Deterrence Now, 82.

92 Ibid., 84.

93 Stephen L. Quackenbush, “General Deterrence and International Conflict: Testing Perfect Deterrence Theory,” International Interactions, 36(1), 2010, 60-85.

94 See for instance Michael J. Mazarr, Mastering the Gray Zone: Understanding a Changing Era of Conflict (Carlisle: US Army War College Press, 2015); Van Jackson, “Tactics of Strategic Competition,” Naval War College Review 70(3), 2017, 39–61; and James J. Wirtz, “Life in the ‘Gray Zone’: observations for contemporary strategists,” Defence & Security Analysis 33(2), 2017, 106–114.

95 James J. Wirtz “Life in the ‘Gray Zone’: observations for contemporary strategists,” Defense & Security Analysis, 33(2), 2017, 106.

96 Jackson, “Tactics”; Wirtz, “Life in the ‘Gray Zone’”.

97 Altman, Red Lines.

98 Jackson, “Tactics”.

99 George and Smoke, Deterrence, 537.

100 Jackson, “Tactics”.

101 Michael J. Mazarr, Mastering the Gray Zone: Understanding a Changing Era of Conflict (Carlisle: US Army War College Press, 2015).

102 Cited in . Brunnstrom, David and Martina, Michael. 2015. Xi denies China turning artificial islands into military bases. Reuters, 26 September. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-china-pacific/xi-denies-china-turning-artificial-islands-into-military-bases-idUSKCN0RP1ZH20150925

103 Li Keqiang, “Remarks by H.E. Li Keqiang Premier of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China At the 10th East Asia Summit”, 22 November. 2015, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1317927.shtml

104 Ministry of Defense of the PRC. 2018. China has every right to deploy necessary military equipment on Nansha Islands. 10 April. http://eng.mod.gov.cn/news/2018-04/10/content_4809127.htm

105 AMTI/CSIS. 2017. Updated: China’s Big Three Near Completion. Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, 29 June, https://amti.csis.org/chinas-big-three-near-completion/

106 Jackson, “Tactics”.

107 Cooper, “Flashpoint”.

108 Adam P. Liff, “China’s Maritime Gray Zone Operations in the East China Sea and Japan’s Response” in Ryan D. Martinson and Andrew S. Erickson (eds.), China’s Maritime Gray Zone Operations (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press 2018)

109 Adam P. Liff, “China, Japan and the East China Sea: Beijing’s ‘Gray Zone’ coercion and Tokyo’s response,” Global Asia, December 2019, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/FP_20191202_east_china_sea_liff.pdf. A recent law gives Coast Guards more leeway to use force in “jurisdictional waters” (Shin Kawashima, “China’s Worrying New Coast Guard Law,” The Diplomat, 17 March 2021, https://thediplomat.com/2021/03/chinas-worrying-new-coast-guard-law/).

110 June Teufel Dreyer, “External Smiles, Internal Angst,” Comparative Connections, 21(2), 2019, 100.

111 Green et al., Countering Coercion, 252.

112 Jackson, “Tactics”, 54.

113 Richard K. Betts, “The Lost Logic of Deterrence: What the Strategy That Won the Cold War Can—and Can’t—Do Now,” Foreign Affairs 92(2), 2013, 87–99.

114 Quoted in Craig Whitlock, “Panetta to urge China and Japan to tone down dispute,” Washington Post, 16 September 2012, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/panetta-to-urge-china-and-japan-to-tone-down-dispute-over-islands/2012/09/16/9b6832c0-fff3-11e1-b916-7b5c8ce012c8_story.html

115 Altman, Red Lines.

116 AMTI/CSIS, “Updated: China’s Big Three Near Completion,” AMTI/CSIS, 29 June 2017, https://amti.csis.org/chinas-big-three-near-completion/

117 Mark E. Manyin, The Senkakus (Diaoyu/Diaoyutai) Dispute: U.S. Treaty Obligations, CRS Report R42761, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42761.pdf

118 Schelling, Strategy.

119 Andrew S. Erickson, “Numbers Matter: China’s Three ‘Navies’ Each Have the World’s Most Ships,” National Interest, 26 February 2018, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/numbers-matter-chinas-three-navies-each-have-the-worlds-most-24653

120 Liff, “China, Japan and the East China Sea”

121 Morgan, Deterrence Now, 83.

122 President Joseph R. Biden Jr., Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, March 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/NSC-1v2.pdf

123 US Department of State, “Secretary Blinken’s Call with Philippine Secretary of Foreign Affairs Locsin,” 8 April 2021, https://www.state.gov/secretary-blinkens-call-with-philippine-secretary-of-foreign-affairs-locsin-2/; The White House, “U.S.-Japan Joint Leaders’ Statement,” 16 April 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/04/16/u-s-japan-joint-leaders-statement-u-s-japan-global-partnership-for-a-new-era/

124 Anthony J. Blinken, “A Free and Open Indo-Pacific,” US Department of State, 14 December 2021, https://www.state.gov/a-free-and-open-indo-pacific/

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Yves-Heng Lim

Yves-Heng Lim (yves-[email protected]) is a Senior Lecturer at the Department of Security Studies, Macquarie University, Sydney. His research focuses on East Asian security, naval strategy as well as international relations theory (offensive realism and power transition theory). He is the author of China’s Naval Power: An Offensive Realist Approach (Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate Publishing, 2014). His other works have been published the Journal of Strategic Studies, Asian Security, and the Journal of Contemporary China as well as a number of edited volumes.