An Analysis of the Historical Roots of Partisan Governance within the ANC: Understanding the Road to State Capture

ABSTRACT

Despite constitutional aspirations for good (impartial) governance since 1996, partisan governance nearly brought South Africa to the brink of economic, social, and political implosion. For the duration of his tenure (2009–2018), President Zuma spent public funds for private ends with impunity and enabled the creation of a shadow state, which effectively siphoned millions out of the public purse into private hands and hollowed out the country's state-owned enterprises. The question posed here is: How did the Zuma administration manage to ‘capture the state' in a context where the 1996 Constitution enshrines impartial governance? Using the analytical framework of good governance, this article aims to understand the governance approach of the African National Congress (ANC) in terms of its overarching national plan, the National Democratic Revolution (NDR) and its strategy of cadre deployment. Using document and conceptual content analysis of ANC policy documents it is noted that the ANC’s governance approach is inherently partisan, with historical roots. In line with the Marxist tradition, governance based on partisanship was established together with the blurring of lines between party, government and state. This framework of partisanship, justified with the language of transformation, allowed for repurposing the state for private ends.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1 Zuma spent R210 millions of public funds on his private homestead and then had cabinet ministers defend the expenses as security upgrades. Amongst the most absurd of these ‘security upgrades’ was the swimming pool redefined, to an incredulous public, as a ‘fire-pool’.

2 The main reason given for the down-grading in April 2017 by the two credit agencies was former president Zuma’s late-night cabinet reshuffle on March 31 effectively ousting the respected Minister of Finance, Pravin Gordhan, and his deputy, Mcebisi Jonas. Amongst other reasons included the long-standing skills shortage.

3 See details of the https://www.sastatecapture.org.za/

4 At the time of the 2007 Zuma/Mbeki succession struggle, Zuma had been battling two court cases. These included: the 1999 arms deal in which Zuma was implicated during the trial of his financial advisor at the time, Schabir Shaik, in using his position to protect the arms company- Thint Holdings- which had been handling the Strategic Defence Package, a multi-billion-rand military acquisition arms deal. Within this deal it was alleged that, Thint Holdings paid Zuma via his advisor R500 000 a year to prevent investigations of corruption relating to the agreement (Basset and Clarke 2008, 789). In the second case, Zuma was charged in 2005 at the Johannesburg High Court with the rape of a 31-year old woman; however, by 2006 the court dismissed the charges on the basis that the sexual act in question was consensual.

5 The Guptas (Atul, Ajay, and Rajesh) are a wealthy Indian-born family who owned a business empire spanning the technology, mining, and media industries (Basson and du Toit 2017, 57). The Gupta’s and their various companies were closely linked to the Zuma administration via Zuma’s son, Duduzane Zuma, who owned shares in many of the Gupta-owned businesses.

6 Salim Essa owned multiple shares in Gupta-owned enterprises including Trillian Holdings and VR Laser – each of which were involved in the capturing of Prasa and Transnet.