Insurgents’ intelligence network and practices during the Greek Civil War

ABSTRACT

John N. Gentry argues that Violent Non-State Actors, such as insurgencies or terrorist groups, use intelligence in three ways. First and foremost, they employ intelligence to plan physical military attacks and to protect themselves from penetration and attack by government forces. Secondly, they use counterintelligence in order to ensure the survival of the insurgency and preserve the faith of their members by enforcing ideological discipline. Finally, they use information operations to shape their operational environments. This article seeks to determine what type of intelligence the Greek insurgents employed during the civil war and whether this insurgency fits Gentry’s model.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1. Sims, ‘Defending Adaptive Realism,’ 143.

2. Gentry, ‘Toward a Theory,’ 472.

3. Warner, ‘Intelligence as Risk Shifting’ in Intelligence Theory, 24-9.

4. Gentry, ‘Toward a Theory,’ 473.

5. For EAM see Vlavianos, Greece, 1941-1949, 24; and Woodhouse, The struggle for Greece, 25-26.

6. See Fleischer, Stemma kai Swastika, 233; and Hart, Empowerment and Political Opportunity, 160-70.

7. Kalyvas and Marantzidis, Emfylia Pathi, 271-295.

8. For more on the ‘White Terror’ period and its representatives Carabott and Sfikas, The Greek Civil War, 143.

9. Resis, ‘The Churchill-Stalin Secret “Percentages”,’ 368.

10. For the British stance see Sfikas, ‘The People at the Top Can Do These Things,’ 320-322.

11. AKSI, O Ellinikos Emfylios, accessed on 10 January 2017, http://62.103.28.111/ds/ds_archive.asp.

12. KKE, Dimokratikos Stratos Elladas, 329.

13. Chandrinos, OPLA, 57.

14. For the debate on the OPLA see Stinas, EAM-ELAS-OPLA; Karagiorgas, H OPLA; Charalampidis, H Empeiria tis Katochis; Chandrinos, OPLA; and Katsaros, Mia Apofasi.

15. Iliadou-Tachou, Meres tis OPLA, 131; and See. Karagiorgas, H OPLA, 12.

16. KKE, Episima Keimena, vol. 5, 96.

17. Chatzis, H Nikifora Epanastasi, 335.

18. See note 13 above.

19. Rousos, H Megali Pentaetia, vol. I, 517. In the case of Thessaloniki, Modis notes with an amount of irony that the head of the intelligence network was a barber who managed to develop close relationship with one of his clients who was a Gendarmerie senior officer, Modis, Tessares Dikes, 15, 19.

20. Karagiorgas, H OPLA, 106.

21. Chandrinos, OPLA, 58-59.

22. Katsaros, Mia Apofasi, 45.

23. Karagiorgas, H OPLA, 127.

24. Yafka, from the Russian word ‘javka’.

25. Chandrinos, OPLA, 59-60.

26. Ibid., 61.

27. Ibid., 60-61.

28. Ibid., 61.

29. Keimena tis Ethnikis Antistasis, vol. 2, 60.

30. Karagiorgas, H OPLA, 25.

31. Chandrinos, OPLA, 66-67.

32. ASKI, Archeio KKE, F 23/5/208.

33. Keimena tis Ethinis Antistasis, vol. 2, 63.

34. Skalidakis, Politiki Epitropi, 511-512.

35. ASKI, Archeio KKE, F 23/1/62.

36. Skalidakis, Politiki Epitropi, 515-516.

37. ASKI, Archeio KKE, F 23/1/82.

38. Skalidakis, Politiki Epitropi, 522.

39. The Varkiza Agreement was signed in 12 February 1945 by the Greek government and the EAM after the truce of 11 January 1945 that ended the December Events.

40. Close, The Origins, 244-245.

41. KKE, Episima Keimena, vol. 5, 34.

42. Ibid., 81, 87.

43. MLA is the Greek acronym of People’s Mass Self-Defence.

44. Rizospastis, 11/12/1945.

45. Modis, Tessares Dikes, 47-48, 55-56.

46. ASKI, O Ellinikos Emfylios, accessed on 17 January 2017, http://62.103.28.111/ds/rec.asp?id=80863, 3; http://62.103.28.111/ds/rec.asp?id=80872, 2.

47. ASKI, O Ellinikos Emfylios, accessed on 17 January 2017, http://62.103.28.111/ds/rec.asp?id=73293, 8-9.

48. ASKI, O Ellinikos Emfylios, accessed 18 January 2017, http://62.103.28.111/ds/rec.asp?id=80424, 11. Explicit reference that the People’s Militia was responsible for establishing its own intelligence networks is also made in the Greek Army General Staff archives. GES/DIS, Archeia Emfyliou Polemou, vol. 11, 247.

49. KKE, Episima Keimena, vol. 6, 257.

50. ASKI, O Ellinikos Emfylios, accessed on 22 January 2017, http://62.103.28.111/ds/rec.asp?id=80255, 13; http://62.103.28.111/ds/rec.asp?id=80424, 16; http://62.103.28.111/ds/rec.asp?id=80257, 9; http://62.103.28.111/ds/rec.asp?id=80265, 12.

51. Kyritsis, Dimokratikos Stratos Elladas, 238.

52. ASKI, O Ellinikos Emfylios, accessed on 17 January 2017, http://62.103.28.111/ds/rec.asp?id=73313, 17.

53. ASKI, O Ellinikos Emfylios, accessed on 19 January 2017, http://62.103.28.111/ds/rec.asp?id=74608, 2; http://62.103.28.111/ds/rec.asp?id=80581, 6; http://62.103.28.111/ds/rec.asp?id=81085, 20; http://62.103.28.111/ds/rec.asp?id=85175, 2. Also see Ferfelis, Martiria Machiti tou DSE, accessed on 21 January 2017, http://emfilios.blogspot.gr/2013/05/blog-post_21.html, par. 7.

54. ASKI, O Ellinikos Emfylios, accessed on 18 January 2017, http://62.103.28.111/ds/rec.asp?id=85045, 5.

55. ASKI, O Ellinikos Emfylios, accessed on 18 January 2017, http://62.103.28.111/ds/rec.asp?id=74169, 1.

56. ASKI, O Ellinikos Emfylios, accessed on 18 January 2017, http://62.103.28.111/ds/rec.asp?id=75312, 3.

57. Kyritsis, Dimokratikos Stratos Elladas, 275.

58. ASKI, O Ellinikos Emfylios, accessed 18 January 2017, http://62.103.28.111/ds/rec.asp?id=80255, 4; http://62.103.28.111/ds/rec.asp?id=80474, 11; http://62.103.28.111/ds/rec.asp?id=80527, 14; http://62.103.28.111/ds/rec.asp?id=80960, 9.

59. ASKI, O Ellinikos Emfylios, accessed on 20 January 2017, http://62.103.28.111/ds/rec.asp?id=87309, 21-23; and Also see GES/DIS, Archeia Emfyliou Polemou, vol. 11, 263.

60. Kallianiotis, H Prostasia, accessed on 21 January 2017, http://blogs.sch.gr/thankall/?p=923, par. 7.

61. For the reorganization of the DAG General Headquarters see Kyritsis, Dimokratikos Stratos Elladas, 317-318.

62. KKE, Dimokratikos Stratos Elladas, 347-351.

63. KKE, Dimokratikos Stratos Elladas, 347-351.

64. Ibid., 253.

65. GES/DIS, Archeia Emfyliou Polemou, vol. 11, 245-246.

66. Ibid., 246.

67. Kyritsis, Dimokratikos Stratos Elladas, 319-320.

68. The Greek translation for intelligence centres is Kentra Pliroforion. The word kapapites comes from the initials of this service.

69. Kanellopoulos, Dioikitikoi Thesmoi, 63.

70. Karantzas, To Imerologio enos Kapapiti, 8; and Also see Kallianiotis, Oi Kapapites tou Mpourinou, accessed on 22 January 2017, http://blogs.sch.gr/thankall/?p=981, par. 3.

71. GES/DIS, Archeia Emfyliou Polemou, vol. 11, 247.

72. Svolos, Antartis, 45.

73. Karantzas, To Imerologio enos Kapapiti, 112.

74. Karantzas, To Imerologio enos Kapapiti, 38, 54.; and Svolos, Antartis, 46.

75. Karantzas, To Imerologio enos Kapapiti, 75.

76. Lefas, O Dimokratikos Stratos Peloponnisou, vol. 1, 275.

77. Apostolopoulos, Epi Xirou Akmis, 121.

78. For the issue of equipping all the Intelligence Centres with radios due to the lack of available liaisons see Alexandrou, To Imerologio, 30.

79. Lefas, O Dimokratikos Stratos Peloponnisou, vol. 1, 273-274.

80. Kallianiotis, Oi Kapapites tou Mpourinou, accessed on 21 January 2017, http://blogs.sch.gr/thankall/?p=981, par. 26.

81. Extensive reference to hidden food supplies and military equipment in scattered yafkes is made both in Karantzas’ diary and Apostolopoulos’ pilgrimage.

82. As Apostolopoulos marks ‘in the years of DAG, the value of information was great because we did not have enough radios’, Epi Xirou Akmis, 121.

83. Sourlas, Enas Gnostos mou, accessed on 23 January 2017, http://www.istorikathemata.com/2014/06/A-greek-unknown-soldier-known-to-mw.html, par. 8.

84. Alexandrou, To Imerologio, 76, 83.

85. Lefas, O Dimokratikos Stratos Peloponnisou, vol. 2, 40.

86. Papadogiannis, H Polinekri Maxi, accessed on 23 January 2017, http://www.leonidion.gr/2011/02/22-1949.html, par. 9.

87. Lefas, O Dimokratikos Stratos Peloponnisou, vol. 2, 57.

88. ASKI, O Ellinikos Emfylios, accessed on 28 August 2019, http://62.103.28.111/ds/ds_archive.asp.

89. Voglis, H Adinati Epanastasi, 227.

90. ASKI, O Ellinikos Emfylios, accessed on 28 August 2019, http://62.103.28.111/ds/rec.asp?id=87293, 22.

91. Voglis, H Adinati, 231.

92. ASKI, O Ellinikos Emfylios, accessed on 28 August 2019, http://62.103.28.111/ds/rec.asp?id=87471, 52-57.

93. Ibid., 53-57.

94. ASKI, O Ellinikos Emfylios, accessed on 28 August 2019, http://62.103.28.111/ds/rec.asp?id=87495, 47-50.

95. Ibid., 47-50.

96. Zafeiropoulos, O Antisimmoriakos Agon, 430.

97. GES/DIS, O Ellinikos Stratos, 18.

98. Ibid., 59-60.

99. Ibid., 60.

100. GES/DIS, O Ellinikos Stratos, 7.

101. Marantzidis, Dimokratikos Stratos Elladas, 52.

102. US Army, History of JUSMAPG Greece, 126-127.

103. GES/DIS, O Ellinikos Stratos, 224-225.

104. Birtle, US Army Counterinsurgency, 51; and Dougherty, The United States Military, 21.

105. Laiou, ‘Populations Removal,’ 75.

106. GES/DIS, Archeia Emfyliou Polemou, vol. 9, 87-88.

107. GES/DIS, Archeia Emfyliou Polemou, vol. 11, 281-282, 291, 308.

108. Ibid., 11, 315.

109. Gentry and Spencer, ‘Colombia’s FARC,’ 465-466.

110. Ilardi, ‘IRA Operational Intelligence,’ 335.

111. Jackson, ‘Intelligence in a Modern,’ 5.

112. Gentry and Spencer, ‘Colombia’s FARC,’ 460-461.

113. Charters, ‘Eyes of the Underground,’ 166.

114. Goscha, ‘Intelligence in a Time,’ 121-122.; and Charters, ‘Eyes of the Underground,’ 169-170.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Evripidis Tantalakis

Evripidis Tantalakis is a PhD student at the University of Leicester, currently working on his thesis entitled ‘Defending ‘free peoples’: Intelligence and the US advisory role in the Greek civil war, 1946-1949’. The focus of his research is the role of intelligence in the Greek Civil War and the extent to which the Greek COIN influenced the under-formation, post-war US COIN doctrine. He holds a BA degree in History from the University of Thessaly and an MA in International Relations and World Order from the University of Leicester. His teaching experience includes working as an Associate Tutor on the MA DL in Intelligence and Security at the University of Leicester.