Categorization in international organizations

ABSTRACT

This paper explores why certain IOs officially categorize their member-states while others do not. It also examines the specific problems that categorization mechanisms are intended to solve. Building on theories of rational design, I argue that categorization is intended to provide a solution to cooperation problems in IOs and assist in preventing possible defections of participating member-states. I hypothesize that categorization is more likely to be incorporated and employed in IOs with heterogeneous membership in terms of capabilities and/or preferences; in IOs that deal with issues characterized by high levels of uncertainty about the state of the world; and in IOs that require deep cooperation and therefore are highly institutionalized. To test these hypotheses, I created a new dataset on categorization, encompassing information on 156 IOs established between 1868 and 2015 and ranging across 12 issue-areas. A multivariate logistic regression with robust standard errors is used to estimate the empirical relationships between the variables. This study finds that IOs may consider categorization as a proper alternative to other solutions, such as exclusion, for problems that stem from divergent power distributions; it assists in lowering states’ uncertainties about the consequences of cooperation, as it clarifies current and future distribution of possible costs and benefits; and, it assists in minimizing the compliance costs of less powerful participant-states.

Este artículo explora las razones por las que ciertas organizaciones internacionales (OI) categorizan de manera oficial a sus países miembro mientras que otras no lo hacen. También examina los problemas específicos que los mecanismos de categorización deben resolver. Basándome en las teorías de diseño racional, sostengo que la categorización tiene por objeto proporcionar una solución frente a los problemas de cooperación en las OI y asistir en la prevención de posibles deserciones de los estados miembro. Mi hipótesis es que la categorización tiene más probabilidades de ser incorporada y utilizada en OI con estados miembro heterogéneos en cuanto a capacidades o preferencias refiere; en OI que se ocupan de cuestiones relacionadas con los altos niveles de incertidumbre sobre el estado del mundo; y en OI que requieren de una profunda cooperación y, por ende, están fuertemente institucionalizadas. Para evaluar estas hipótesis, creé un nuevo conjunto de datos sobre categorización, que reúne información de 156 OI fundadas entre 1868 y 2015 y que abarca 12 áreas temáticas. Se utilizó una regresión logística multivariable con errores estándar robustos para calcular las relaciones empíricas entre las variables. En este estudio, se concluye que las OI pueden considerar a la categorización como una alternativa adecuada a otras soluciones, tales como la exclusión, frente a problemas que surgen de diversas distribuciones de poder. El estudio contribuye tambián a la reducción de la incertidumbre de los estados sobre las consecuencias de la cooperación, ya que explica la distribución actual y futura de posibles costos y beneficios. Además, contribuye a la reducción de los costos de conformidad de aquellos estados miembro con menos poder.

Cet article étudie le fait que certaines OI catégorisent officiellement leurs États membres alors que d’autres ne le font pas. Il examine également les problèmes spécifiques que les mécanismes de catégorisation sont supposés résoudre. Je m’appuie sur des théories de conception rationnelle pour soutenir que la catégorisation devrait apporter une solution aux problèmes de coopération dans les OI et aider dans la prévention d’éventuelles défections des États membres participants. J’émets l’hypothèse que la catégorisation est davantage susceptible d’être intégrée et employée dans les OI dont les membres sont hétérogènes en termes de capacités et/ou de préférences, dans celles qui traitent des problèmes caractérisés par de hauts niveaux d’incertitude concernant l’état du monde, et dans celles qui exigent une étroite coopération et qui sont donc très institutionnalisées. J’ai créé un nouveau jeu de données sur la catégorisation qui englobe des informations sur 156 OI établies entre 1868 et 2015 et couvre 12 domaines de problématiques afin de vérifier cette hypothèse. Une régression logistique multivariée comprenant des erreurs-types robustes est utilisée pour procéder à une estimation des relations empiriques entre les variables. Cette étude a permis de constater que les OI envisageaient éventuellement la catégorisation comme une alternative appropriée à d’autres solutions, telles que l’exclusion, pour les problèmes qui découlent de répartitions divergentes du pouvoir. Elle contribue en effet à la réduction des incertitudes des États quant aux conséquences de la coopération, car elle clarifie la répartition actuelle et future des éventuels coûts et avantages. Elle aide également à minimiser les coûts de mise en conformité des États participants moins puissants.

KEYWORDS:

• International organizations
• institutional design
• rational design
• categorization
• cooperation

Supplementary Material

Supplemental data for this article can be accessed on the publisher’s website.

Notes

¹ Some IOs categorize states according to regions. I term this type of categorization, which may affect the election of states’ representatives to various IOs’ government bodies, as nominal categorization. For further elaboration and modeling, see table A3 in the appendix.

² The sample of IOs chosen for this paper was taken from the Correlates of War IGO database (V2.3), which lists 495 IOs. In creating the sample I strived to give equal representation to IOs that deal with almost every issue that requires inter-state cooperation. Additionally, I strived to give equal representation to IOs operating in different regions, while including many of the global IOs. Yet, some IOs were excluded due to insufficient or missing information, either on their design or on their members in time of their establishment. I am aware that a certain exclusion bias is apparent, and a proper randomization in selecting IOs for the sample is not achieved. Yet, exclusion was necessary, either due to insufficient information, or due to research limitations.

³ For descriptive statistics, see table A5 in the appendix.

⁴ For an elaborate study on categorization in MDBs, see: (Ella 2020).

⁵ This measure was created by dividing output-side real GDP by population.

⁶ On policy diffusion, see: (Dobbin, Simmons, and Garrett 2007).

⁷ As mentioned before, large numbers are associated with members’ heterogeneity. Yet, here, the indicator for number of actors is only weakly correlated with the capabilities’ heterogeneity measure (0.1337) and its exclusion from the model doesn’t significantly change the results. See table A6 in the appendix for additional models testing the inclusion and exclusion of number of actors and multi-issue.

⁸ In accordance with the theoretical framework, I assume that capabilities and preference heterogeneity have similar negative effects on the prospects of inter-state cooperation in IOs, and both require similar design solutions. Therefore, I only include the indicator for preference heterogeneity in model 8 as a replacement for the indicator for capabilities heterogeneity. See table A1 in the appendix for Additional tests of preference heterogeneity.

⁹ Preference heterogeneity was also tested in four additional models which are replicas of models 4 through 7, with the preference heterogeneity indicator added. In all of these models, preference heterogeneity did not reach statistical significance (see table A1 in the appendix).

¹⁰ Also see: (Häge and Hug 2016).

¹¹ A possible alternative is suggested by Gray et al. (2017, 623–624), who define two concepts that could assist in operationalizing membership heterogeneity: dispersion and range.

¹² See model A2 in the appendix for two additional tests that partition the sample by uncertainty and depth of cooperation.