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Abstract
Research shows that the inclusion of women in negotiations and conflict resolution efforts contributes to peaceful solutions to disputes and armed conflict. Yet we know little about how women contribute to peacebuilding. What, specifically, are women doing to help produce more peaceful outcomes? We present evidence from an international bargaining experiment showing that women contribute to peace by seeking more equitable and symmetrical solutions, even if these provide lower material payoffs. Critically, however, women are willing to give up on asymmetric advantage only when they negotiate with other women. The gender composition of negotiation dyads also significantly influences the duration of negotiations. Statistical analysis of historical territorial disputes probes the external validity of these results, offering suggestive complementary evidence. The main policy implication of our findings is that bilateral disputes will be settled more efficiently and equitably when both sides are represented by women. Our findings should encourage scholars to develop dyadic, not monadic, models of how gender affects international negotiations.
La investigación demuestra que la inclusión de las mujeres en las negociaciones y en los esfuerzos de resolución de conflictos contribuye a conseguir soluciones pacíficas a las disputas y los conflictos armados. Sin embargo, sabemos poco sobre cómo contribuyen las mujeres a la construcción de la paz. ¿Qué hacen en concreto las mujeres para ayudar a conseguir resultados más pacíficos? Presentamos pruebas de un experimento de negociación internacional que demuestran que las mujeres contribuyen a la paz al buscar soluciones más equitativas y simétricas, aunque estas proporcionen menores beneficios materiales. No obstante, las mujeres están dispuestas a renunciar a la ventaja asimétrica solo cuando negocian con otras mujeres. La composición de género de las díadas de negociación también influye de modo considerable en la duración de las negociaciones. El análisis estadístico de las disputas territoriales históricas examina la validez externa de estos resultados, ofreciendo pruebas complementarias sugerentes. La principal implicación política de nuestras conclusiones es que las disputas bilaterales se resolverán de forma más eficaz y equitativa cuando ambas partes estén representadas por mujeres. Nuestras conclusiones deberían animar a los investigadores a desarrollar modelos diádicos, no monádicos, sobre cómo el género afecta a las negociaciones internacionales.
La recherche a démontré que l’inclusion de femmes dans les processus de négociations et les initiatives de résolution des conflits contribue à déboucher sur des solutions pacifiques aux désaccords et aux conflits armés. Pourtant, nous disposons de peu d’informations sur la manière dont les femmes participent au maintien de la paix. Que font précisément les femmes pour produire des résultats davantage orientés vers une résolution pacifique? Nous nous appuyons sur une expérience de négociations internationales démontrant que les femmes contribuent à la paix par la recherche de solutions plus équitables et symétriques, y compris lorsque ces dernières impliquent des gains matériels moindres. Il convient cependant de noter que les femmes sont enclines à abandonner un avantage asymétrique uniquement lorsqu’elles négocient avec d’autres femmes. Par ailleurs, la composition des dyades de négociation en termes de genres a une influence considérable sur la durée des négociations en question. Une analyse statistique de conflits territoriaux historiques démontre la validité externe de ces résultats et constitue une preuve supplémentaire significative. La principale implication politique de nos conclusions est que les conflits bilatéraux sont résolus de manière plus efficace et plus équitable lorsque les deux parties sont représentées par des femmes. Nos travaux ont donc vocation à encourager les chercheur·euses à développer des modèles dyadiques, et non monadiques, pour comprendre la manière dont le genre affecte les négociations internationales.
Notes
2 We recognize the differences between sex and gender as well as the inability of our study to speak to the sociological, psychological, and cultural aspects of gender. On the differences between gender and sex, see Butler (Citation2011).
3 For stylistic reasons we use the terms equitable and symmetrical interchangeably.
4 See Reiter (Citation2015) for a comprehensive review of this work.
5 We return to this matter in the conclusion when discussing directions for future research. For a useful starting point on the development of masculinity/femininity, see Stoller (Citation2020) and Eagly (Citation2013). Nevertheless, we do not anticipate that results will substantially change if we take into account masculinity/femininity. The driving force behind our results is not masculinity/femininity per se but the cooperation approach adopted by women in same-gender dyads, as we demonstrate below.
6 We recognize that negotiation frames only marginally account for the broader strategic context of negotiations, an issue to take up in the robustness checks and in the conclusion.
7 Note that this debate is in part driven by the lack of consensus on the definition of loss aversion (see Bouchouicha et al. Citation2019 and Schmidt and Zank Citation2005).
8 As a robustness check, we provide a more thorough comparison of same-gender dyads vs. WW dyads. This process was complicated given high collinearity between these measures, but our results indicate that WW dyads outperform aggregated same-gender dyads consistently in our models. On the other hand, MM dyads are no more likely (and in fact are less likely) to reach a symmetrical settlement than an aggregated measure of same-gender dyads. These results can be found in our online appendix.
9 More information on subject recruitment is available in the Supplementary Appendix.
10 The “gender” designation is used throughout this article because participants were asked their gender and response options included male, female, or other. As noted above, the current study is unable to separate the sociocultural aspects of gender from the physiological aspects of sex. However, we see this matter as an important inquiry that should be examined in future research.
11 Robustness checks are available in the Supplementary Appendix.
12 Also referred to as event history or duration models.
13 We also ran our models with binary interactions of gain and loss conditions. Our results were largely replicated but, given the limited observations, our hazard ratios were too large to yield robust conclusions. We therefore present the results of our ordinal variable and include these robustness checks in our Supplementary Appendix.
14 Our results largely remain unchanged by excluding this variable.
15 In the Supplementary Appendix, we present robustness checks with alternative measures for women’s representation (women’s rights from DeMeritt, Nichols, and Kelly (Citation2014), female national leadership from Bell, Besaw, and Frank Citation2021).
16 Rajaa, J.A. and Helga Schmidt. “Do Women Negotiate Differently?” Interviewed by Lea Frehse. The Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies, June 15, 2021. https://sanaacenter.org/publications/main-publications/14213
17 Libyan Political Dialogue Forum. United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL). November 7–15, 2020. https://unsmil.unmissions.org/libyan-political-dialogue-forum
18 Data from UN Women, see Council on Foreign Relations, “Women’s Participation in Peace Processes.”: https://www.cfr.org/womens-participation-in-peace-processes/