Everyday sentiment among unionists and nationalists in a Northern Irish town

ABSTRACT

Unionists and nationalists remain polarized in their political choices, increasingly so since Brexit. Does this signal increasing and dangerous division? Or have the decades of peace and agreed institutions changed the tenor of discussion in Northern Ireland? In this article, we examine the ways community relations, political division and contention are discussed by focusing on the expression of everyday sentiment among unionists and nationalists in a mixed Northern Irish town. Theoretically, it has been argued that positive sentiment raises hopes for compromise and leaves room for discussion, while negative sentiment closes off deliberation and compromise. Based on interviews, we first conduct a sentiment analysis that identifies positive versus negative sentiment expressed by the respondents, focusing on themes addressing Irish unity, unionism, Brexit, as well as personal and community life. The analysis shows that, on average, interviewees talk more positively than negatively about each theme. We then conduct a qualitative discourse analysis to investigate how positive and negative sentiment are expressed by unionist and nationalist respondents. We find that respondents name and elaborate on the political issues in contention while lowering the emotional valence of discussion. This suggests much more room for deliberation and compromise than is usually assumed.

KEYWORDS:

• Sentiment analysis
• unionist
• nationalist
• Northern Ireland
• positive sentiment
• compromise
• avoidance
• Brexit
• united Ireland

Acknowledgements

Acknowledgements to Sarah Curristan for excellent research assistance, and to DFAT Reconciliation Fund for a grant that permitted interviewing, transcription and coding.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1 See Todd (2018, pp. 59–61); and Northern Ireland Life and Times, Politics Module, FUTURE1 https://www.ark.ac.uk/nilt/results/polatt.html#conpref; accessed 02/06/2019.

2 For comparative discussion of categorization and stigmatization and how cultural disrespect is expressed and is overcome, see Lamont et al. (2016); Todd (2018); for discussion in the Northern Ireland case, see Brewer (1998); Millar (2006); McManus (2017).

3 In the 2019 local elections, residents voted overwhelmingly for Sinn Féin and Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) councillors, with minority Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) representation.

4 Also see Northern Ireland Life and Times, CULTRAD5 and CULTRAD6 https://www.ark.ac.uk/nilt/results/comrel.html#rel; accessed 02/06/2019.

5 On exposure to violence, see Lowe and Muldoon (2010); for recent work on contact, trust and emotion, with specific Northern Irish references, see Hughes, Furey, and Jenkins (2011); Kenworthy et al. (2016).

6 Rose (1971, pp. 315–316); Rupert Neate (2018).

7 This is the argument put forward by Robin Wilson (2010), following Brubaker (2002) and Brubaker, Fleishschmidt, Fox, and Grancea (2006). It is also consistent with the views of those who see sectarianism as a product of structure not culture (Gilligan, 2017), and who emphasise the everyday capacity to compromise (Irwin, 2002).

8 This argument is put forward in many studies of sectarianism, including Leichty and Clegg (2001); Brewer (1998); Ganiel (2008); Millar (2006); McKay (2000).

9 This argument is put forward by Todd (2018, pp. 191–193).

10 This means that comparison with other interviews, conducted at other times, according to different schedules, and for other purposes, is possible, since affect is compared across themes rather than across whole interviews.

11 Appendix 2 provides examples of statements for each theme.

12 Other towns mentioned included London, Dublin, and other Irish, European and American as well as Northern Irish towns.

13 The two respondents who on average expressed more negative than positive emotion were both Protestant and over 60; neither was politically hard-line. Qualitative assessment suggests different reasons for the scores in each case: one respondent was explicitly worried about current politics and unsure about their future choices; in the other case, age may well have been a factor because they spoke very directly without evident concern – as seen in most of the other respondents – to monitor their discourse and choose their words carefully.

14 JM2PWC13.

15 JM2PWP12.

16 In 2014, the last time the question was asked in the Northern Ireland Life and Times survey, 40% of those Protestants who support the union said they would be able to live with a united Ireland even if they did not like it and a further quarter would positively welcome a united Ireland achieved democratically. https://www.ark.ac.uk/nilt/2014/Political_Attitudes/FUTURE1.html.

17 Respectively JM1FWC11 and JM2PWC13.

18 The poppy is a British national symbol commemorating the war dead. The Easter lily is an Irish republican symbol commemorating those who fought and died in the 1916 rebellion.

19 Respectively JM1FWP08 and JM2PWP12.

20 It is primarily but not exclusively Catholics and nationalists who participate in the GAA (Gaelic Athletic Association), while Rangers is a Scottish soccer team supported by Protestants and strong loyalists in Northern Ireland and often associated with sectarian behaviour among supporters.

21 The quotes are from Seamus Heaney’s poem ‘Whatever you say, say nothing’ (Heaney, 1975).

22 On avoidance of contentious issues in cross-community discussion, see Harris (1972, 146–148).

23 Table constructed by Sarah Curristan.

24 A code was given to each, for example SF1WWC04, to ensure easy identification of the interviewer (Stephanie), gender (F), generation (1 or eldest), locality (West of the Bann), economic sector (Working class) religion (Catholic) of the respondent, and a number representing each of this set of respondents (also used in Figure 4).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Stephanie Dornschneider

Stephanie Dornschneider, Assistant Professor in the School of Politics and International Relations at University College Dublin, writes on violent and nonviolent resistance, belief systems, and ethnographic interviews. Her recent articles include High-stakes decision-making within complex social environments: A computational model of belief systems in the Arab Spring (Cognitive Science, 2019) and Analyzing ethnographic interviews: Three studies on terrorism and nonviolent resistance (International Political Science Review, 2019).

Jennifer Todd

Professor Jennifer Todd, MRIA is presently Research Director, Institute for British Irish Studies, UCD, and writes on ethnicity, identity, conflict with special expertise on Northern Ireland. Her recent books include Identity change after conflict (2018, Springer/Palgrave), and, with John Coakley, Negotiating a settlement in Northern Ireland (Oxford UP, 2020).