ISR versus ISTAR: A Conceptual Crisis in British Military Intelligence

Abstract

Between 2009 and 2011, there was an intense debate in UK, Canadian, and Australian military intelligence circles regarding two putatively competing doctrinal concepts, the U.S.-originated “intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance” and the United Kingdom’s “intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance.” The inclusion, or not, of target acquisition proved a flashpoint for a wider and deeper range of existing concerns about the organizational and doctrinal relationships between intelligence and operations in a military command staff. These, in turn, reflected a more fundamental and ongoing transformation in that relationship arising from “revolution in military affairs” during the 1990s. The article traces the debate up to its premature termination by fiat in 2011 and concludes that these issues remain to be properly addressed in UK and allied intelligence doctrine.

Notes

1 See, for example, Development Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC), Joint Doctrine Note 1/10: Intelligence and Understanding (Shrivenham, UK: DCDC 2010), pp. 3–11.

2 Ibid., pp. 3-11–3-12. The definition of ISR employed in Australia differed significantly, while the Canadian definition of ISTAR also deviated substantially. See, for example, N.A., “What is ISR: Clarifying ISR and ISTAR in Air Power Terms,” Issue 117 (2009), p. 1, downloadable pdf: http://airpower.airforce.gov.au/APDC/media/PDF-Files/Pathfinder/PF117-What-is-ISR-Clarifying-ISR-and-ISTAR-in-Air-Power-Terms.pdf, p. 2 and J. A. E. K. Dowell, Intelligence for the Canadian Army in the 21st Century: JADEX Papers 5 (Ottawa: Directorate of Land Operations and Designs, 2011), passim.

3 The concept of “wicked problems” was a particularly formative idea during the production of the current UK Joint Intelligence Doctrine. See DCDC, Strategic Trends Programme: The Future Character of Conflict (Shrivenham, UK: DCDC, 2010), p. 38.

4 See, for example, John Ferris’ seminal “Netcentric Warfare, C4ISR and Information Operations: Towards a Revolution in Military Intelligence?” Intelligence and National Security 19, no. 2 (2004), pp. 199–225.

5 The “5 Eyes” intelligence alliance draws together the intelligence communities of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States. While it has its roots in the UKUSA network of bilateral signals intelligence (SIGINT) cooperation treaties, the relationship extends well beyond SIGINT and the national agencies and includes, for example, U.S.–UK military intelligence cooperation covered by the Burns-Templer Agreements. See, for example, James Cox, Canada and the Five Eyes Intelligence Community (Ottawa: Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute and Canadian International Council, 2012), esp. pp. 4–6, and on Burns-Templer, Philip H. J. Davies, “Justice for JARIC,” The Medmenham Association Newsletter (Autumn 2016), p. 15.

6 See, for example, NATO Standardization Office (NSO), AJP 3.09 Allied Joint Doctrine for Joint Targeting (Brussels: NSO, 2016), pp. 1-4–1-11.

7 Ibid, p. 2-2.

8 N.A., “What is ISR,” passim.

9 Writing about ISR rather than ISTAR, Ferris notes in warning one senior U.S. officer’s reduction of the role of intelligence to no more than a sophisticated “gun director”; “Net-Centric Warfare,” p. 204, infra. On ISTAR, see Dowell, Intelligence for the Canadian Army, passim.

10 Philip H. J. Davies and Kristian Gustafson, “Intelligence and Military Doctrine: Paradox or Oxymoron?” Defence Studies 19, no. 1 (2019), p. 21. The present author was part of the main intelligence doctrine drafting team, and the following discussion draws in a large part on that firsthand experience in the drafting process, and consequently, the associated discussions of the role and merits of the concepts of ISR and ISTAR.

11 In practical terms, this meant more than just career intelligence-trade specialists in the Royal Navy, British Army, and Royal Air Force (RAF), who were likely to be J2 cell secondees, and their operational commanders. A significant number of central Ministry of Defence (MoD) entities, mostly but not entirely under the authority of the chief of Defence Intelligence and civilian intelligence MoD practitioners were also included, plus interagency joint fusion bodies housed in the United Kingdom’s national Security and Intelligence Agencies were expected to have an interest in the final product.

12 DCDC, Joint Doctrine Publication 2-00: Intelligence and Understanding Support to Joint Operations (Shrivenham, UK: DCDC, 2011).

13 See, for example, UK MoD, “MoD Signs £65-Million Contract for Protector Aircraft,” https://www.gov.uk/government/news/mod-signs-65-million-contract-for-protector-aircraft; NSO, AJP-2 Allied Joint Doctrine for Intelligence, Counterintelligence and Security (Brussels: NSO, 2016), passim.

14 Eugene O. Porter, “The Evolution of the General Staff,” The Historian 8, no.1 (1945), esp. pp. 32–33 (on the Prussian General Staff) and pp. 34–35 (for the French).

15 Porter, “The Evolution of the General Staff,” pp. 41–43.

16 Exact designations and titles vary somewhat between service branches, specific headquarters, and different national militaries. These designations are taken from the contemporaneous DCDC, Joint Doctrine Publication 3-00 Campaign Execution (3rd ed.) (Shrivenham, UK: DCDC, 2009), pp. 1-9–1-11. Note that (1) the Civil Secretariat would subsume legal and compliance matter as well as interagency and external links, and (2) J8/J9 would often be combined. Please also note that the United Kingdom has since replaced its sovereign campaigning doctrine with the equivalent NATO Allied Joint Doctrine.

17 More properly, the Deuxième Bureau de l’Etat-Major General, Second Department of General Staff. See, for example, Sebastien Laurent, “The Free French Secret Services: Intelligence and the Politics of Republican Legitimacy,” Intelligence and National Security 15, no. 4 (2000) pp. 19–41, passim.

18 Michael I. Handel, “Intelligence and Military Operations,” in Intelligence and Military Operations, edited by Michael I. Handel (London: Frank Cass, 1990), pp. 21–32.

19 Ibid., p. 24.

20 Ibid., p. 26.

21 Ibid., p. 27, emphasis added.

22 Ibid., p. 31.

23 Stephen Marrin, “At Arm’s Length or At the Elbow?: Explaining the Distance between Analysts and Decisionmakers,” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 20, no. 3 (2007), pp. 401–414.

24 Arthur Hulnick, “The Intelligence Producer-Policy Consumer Linkage: A Theoretical Approach,” Intelligence and National Security 1, no. 2 (1986), pp. 212–214, passim.

25 Mark Lowenthal has described the relationship as “a semi-permeable membrane” in Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2000), p. 90, while erstwhile Joint Intelligence Committee chair Sir Percy Cradock has famously likened it to rooms “in a cheap hotel … with communicating doors and thin partition walls.” Know Your Enemy: How the Joint Intelligence Committee Saw the World (London: John Murray 2002), p. 296. The quintessential statement of the “trade-off” approach remains. Marrin, “At Arm’s Length or at the Elbow?”

26 Interestingly, Handel’s account of the “two cultures” of intelligence and operations made no reference to the intelligence–policy literature but rested instead on the postwar recollections of British Naval Intelligence officer Donald McLachlan from his memoire Room 39: Naval Intelligence in Action 1939–45 (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1968) and his subsequent essay “Intelligence: The Common Denominator” in Michael Elliott-Bateman, The Fourth Dimension of Warfare Volume 1: Intelligence, Subversion, Resistance (New York: Praeger, 1970) pp. 52–82.

27 Heralded in the United Kingdom in the MoD White Paper, Delivering Security in a Changing World, Volume 1, Cm 6041-I (London: The Stationery Office, 2003), pp. 3, 19.

28 The term was initially popularized by Winn Schwartau, Information Warfare: Cyberterrorism: Protecting Your Personal Security in the Electronic Age (New York: Thunder’s Mouth Press, 1994), but was quickly taken up by the defense community. See, for example, the essays compiled by John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt in their In Athena’s Camp: Preparing for Conflict in the Information Age (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1997). On ISR, see Ferris, “Netcentric Warfare, C4ISR and Information Operations,” pp. 200–201.

29 See, for example, David A. Deptula and Greg Brown, “A House Divided: The Indivisibility of Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance,” Air & Space Power Journal 22, no. 2 (2008), pp. 9, 14. In the United Kingdom, the notion of EBO or EBOA was similarly central but appeared less in doctrine by name but in the form of a central and recurrent concern with “effects” and especially “joint effects.” See, for example, the United Kingdom’s operations doctrine at the time of the ISR–ISTAR debate. JDCC, Joint Warfare Publication 3-00: Joint Operations Execution, 2nd ed. (Shrivenham, UK: JDCC, 2004), p. 2E-1 and passim.

30 Handel, “Intelligence and Military Operations,” pp. 26–27.

31 Department of National Defence (DND), Joint Doctrine Manual: Joint Intelligence Doctrine, B-GJ-005-200/FP-000 (Ottawa: DND, 2003), p. 5-4. The doctrine in question was articulating a notion of ISR, although, by the end of the decade (as we will see below), ISTAR was the preferred concept.

32 See, for example, William A. Owens, “JROC: Harnessing the Revolution in Military Affairs,” Joint Force Quarterly, no. 5 (1994), pp. 55–57 and “The US System of Systems,” Strategic Forum, no. 63 (Washington DC: National Defence University, 1996).

33 Deptula and Brown, “A House Divided,” p. 6.

34 See, for example, John Ferris, “A New American Way of War? C4ISR, Intelligence and Information Operations in Operation ‘Iraqi Freedom’: A Provisional Assessment,” Intelligence and National Security 18, no. 4 (2003), pp. 155–174.

35 Ferris, “Netcentric Warfare, C4ISR and Information Operations,” pp. 199–225, passim.

36 House of Commons Defence Select Committee (hereafter Commons Defence Committee), Seventh Report, Session 1994–1995: Reconnaissance, Intelligence, Surveillance and Target Acquisition (London: HMSO, 1995), pp. v, 19.

37 Ibid., passim.

38 J. A. E. K. Dowell, Intelligence for the Canadian Army in the 21^st Century, pp. 17, 52 (n. 72).

39 Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre (JDCC), Joint Warfare Publication 2-00: Joint Operational Intelligence, 1st ed. (Shrivenham, UK: JDCC, 1999), passim. Released at RESTRICTED, this and its 2003 successor were released by DCDC in 2018. See Davies and Gustafson, “Intelligence and Military Doctrine,” p. 33.

40 N.A., “What is ISR,” p. 1; Geraint Evans, “Rethinking Military Intelligence Failure: Putting the Wheels Back on the Intelligence Cycle,” Defence Studies 9, no. 1 (2009), p. 30.

41 Michael Herman has, of course, provided the quintessential expression of this view in his Intelligence Power in Peace and War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 278.

42 Commons Defence Committee, Thirteenth Report of Session 2007–08: The Contribution of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles to ISTAR Capability, HC 535 (London: The Stationery Office [hereafter TSO], 2008), pp. 6–8.

43 Commons Defence Committee, The Contribution of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles to ISTAR Capability, passim. By 2014, the term “Unmanned Air Systems” (UAS) had supplanted UAV, but for consistency and because UAS was not adopted until after the main developments of the ISR–ISTAR debate, UAV will be retained throughout the article. On the use of UAS, see House of Commons Select Committee on Defence, Tenth Report of Session 2013–14: Remote Control: Remotely Piloted Air Systems, HC 772 (London: The Stationery Office, 2014), p. 1 and passim.

44 Commons Defence Committee, Eighth Report of Session 2009-10: The Contribution of ISTAR to Operations, HC 225 (London: TSO, 2010).

45 Commons Defence Committee The Contribution of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles to ISTAR, pp. 7, 14. For an overview of the development of Sentinel ASTOR, see, for example, Philip H. J. Davies, Intelligence and Government in Britain and the United States: Volume 2: Evolution of the UK Intelligence Community (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger Security International, 2012), pp. 252–253, 303, 308. After only 15 years of operation, Sentinel was retired in 2021 and its role covered by RC 135 Rivet Joint (see note 50), E7 Wedgetail, and Shadow R1—all incidentally branded ISTAR when Sentinel’s last flight was announced in early 2021: Royal Air Force, “RAF Sentinel R1 aircraft conducts last operational flight,” https://www.raf.mod.uk/news/articles/raf-sentinel-r1-aircraft-conducts-last-operational-flight/

46 Defence Information Infrastructure (DII) became the subject of running concerns about delays in its eventual delivery in the middle of the 2010s. See, for example, National Audit Office, Ministry of Defence: The Defence Information Infrastructure, HC 788 (London: TSO, 2008) and House of Commons Public Accounts Committee, First Report of Session 2008–09: Defence Information Infrastructure, HC 100 (London: TSO, 2009).

47 Commons Defence Committee, The Contribution of ISTAR to Operations, p. 13. Despite its appearance, DABINETT was a codename rather than an acronym (a dabinett is a variety of apple used in cider making). It was described as an “incremental” component of the more comprehensive DII project. See, variously, Commons Defence Committee, The Contribution of UAVs to ISTAR, pp. 3, 7–9, 20–21; The Contribution of ISTAR to Operations, pp. 3, 12–13, and passim. DABINETT was subsequently rechristened, and delivered as SOLOMON; Commons Defence Committee, Second Special Report of Session 2010-11: The Contribution of ISTAR to Operations: Government Response to the Committee’s Eight Report of Session 2009–2010, pp. 3–4.

48 Commons Defence Committee, The Contribution of ISTAR to Operations, pp. 9–11, see also Government Response to the Committee’s Eighth Report, p. 2.

49 Commons Defence Committee, The Contribution of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles to ISTAR, pp. 5, 6.

50 Commons Defence Committee, The Contribution of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles to ISTAR, p. 8. Nimrod was, of course, scrapped under the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review. The three Nimrod R1s undertaking strategic SIGINT were replaced with three RC-135W Rivet Joints and then, slightly later, the remainder of the fleet (initially intended for conversion from MR 2 to MRA 4 maritime reconnaissance standard) was scrapped in favor of a force P8 Poseidon. See, variously, Andy Evans, The Nimrod: Mighty Hunter (Stamford, UK: Dalrymple & Verdun, 2007), pp. 28–31, 43–46; Her Majesty’s Government, Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review, CM 7948 (London: The Stationery Office, 2010), p. 26 and A Secure and Prosperous United Kingdom: National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence Review 2015, CM 9161 (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 2015), pp. 32, 51. The UK Rivet Joints operate their U.S. counterparts as part of an integrated RC-135W fleet. George Allison, “British RC-135 Rivet Joint Surveillance Aircraft Operational after Upgrades,” UK Defence Journal https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/british-rc-135-rivet-joint-surveillance-aircraft-operational-after-upgrades/

51 NATO Standardization Agency (NSA), NATO Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Interoperability Architecture Volume 4: NIIA Terms and Definitions. (Brussels: NSA, 2005), p. A-92. This definition remains in current use and is attributed to the 1971 NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions; see NSO, Allied Administrative Publication 006 NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions (English and French) (Brussels: NSO, 2019), p. 126.

52 Directorate General of Development and Doctrine (British Army), Field Army Manual Volume 1: Combined Arms Operations Part 3: Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) (Shrivenham, UK: DGD&D, 2003), pp. 1–3, downloadable pdf: https://wikileaks.org/wiki/UK_Intelligence,_Surveillance,_Target_Acquisition_and_Recon_ISTAR_handbook_2007. Emphasis added.

53 Directorate General of Development and Doctrine, Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance, pp. 1–3, infra.

54 Ibid., pp. 4–6, emphasis added.

55 Evans, “Rethinking Military Intelligence Failure,” pp. 33–34. It is important to stress, for those unfamiliar with military conventions, that the operations function of targeting is a separate concept and process from target acquisition. For a detailed explanation, see for example, JDCC, Joint Operations Execution, p. 2E1-1.

56 The link between TA and the traditional forward observer frequently appears in evidence given to the Commons Defence Committee on UAVs and their role in ISTAR. See The Contribution of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles to ISTAR, pp. 30, 31, Ev. 57, Ev. 83.

57 For an overview of the longue durée of the intelligence cycle debate, see Mark Phythian, Understanding the Intelligence Cycle (London: Routlege, 2013).

58 It is important to stress that this was confined to the ISTAR discourse as it was shaping up in mid-decade. Both the 1999 and 2003 versions of the Joint Intelligence Doctrine relied on the NATO version of the intelligence cycle. JDCC, JWP 2-00 Joint Operational Intelligence pp. 2-1–2-14; JDCC JWP 2-00 Intelligence Support to Joint Operations, pp. 2-1–2-19.

59 Commons Defence Committee, The Contribution of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles to ISTAR Capability, p. 9. The concept of the “kill chain” is generally attributed, directly or indirectly, to USAF General John Jumper circa 1996. See, for example, Mike Benitez, “It’s About Time: The Pressing Need to Evolve the Kill Chain,” War on the Rocks blog, 17 May 2017, https://warontherocks.com/2017/05/its-about-time-the-pressing-need-to-evolve-the-kill-chain/

60 To a very real degree, Evans’ “Rethinking Military Intelligence Failure” can be read as a response, and challenge, to the idea of an ISTAR chain supplanting the intelligence cycle.

61 Compare DND, Joint Doctrine Manual: Joint Intelligence Doctrine, pp. 4-8–4-9 and passim in 2003 with Dowell’s 2011 Intelligence for the Canadian Army, pp. 17–18 and passim.

62 Besides employing ISTAR in doctrine, a range of dedicated intelligence units were branded as ISTAR. For example, the Royal Netherlands Army established an ISTAR battalion in the early 2000s: Matthijs Moorkamp Operating under High-Risk Conditions in Temporary Organizations (London: Routlege, 2019); the Norwegian Army established an ISTAR unit: Norwegian Ministry of Defence, Norwegian Defence 2008 (Oslo: Norwegian Ministry of Defence, 2008), p. 19; and Belgium established an ISTAR battalion, the ISTAR-Bataljon Jagers te Paard: see, for example, Cis Spook, “Brussels MPs Get the Most Out of Their Assignment Here,” 10 April 2017, https://www.army.mil/article/185543/brussels_mps_get_the_most_out_of_their_assignment_here

63 For examples, see NSA, Allied Engineering Documentation Publication 2: NATO Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Interoperability Architecture (NIIA) (Brussels: NSA, 2005) p. A-50; Multi-Sensor Aerospace-Ground Joint ISR Interoperability Coalition (MAJIIC) Operations Working Group (OWG), Coalition Interoperable ISTAR System: Concept of Employment (The Hague: NATO Consultation, Command and Control Agency 2007). Note that the latter was produced by the MAJIIC/OWG even though MAJIIC itself employed ISR as its core concept.

64 This is particularly notable in, for example, MAJIIC/OWG, Coalition Interoperable ISTAR System.

65 JDCC, Joint War Publication 2-00: Intelligence Support to Joint Operations, 2nd ed. (Shrivenham, UK: JDCC, 2003), p. 2-10.

66 The third edition was published at UNCLASSIFIED and the two earlier editions were eventually declassified and released by DCDC in 2013. Davies and Gustafson, “Intelligence and Military Doctrine,” p. 33.

67 The first two editions of the UK Joint Intelligence Doctrine were produced at RESTRICTED (equivalent to today’s OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE classification), with much of the detailed conceptual and doctrinal work taking place at SECRET.

68 The author was party to a number of discussions on this matter, with similar sentiments expressed during the production of JDP 2-00.

69 N.A., “What is ISR?,” p. 2.

70 Ibid., p. 1, emphasis added.

71 This was particularly striking in MoD evidence to the Parliamentary Defence Committee, which described ISTAR as “the co-ordinated direction, collection, processing and dissemination of timely, accurate, relevant and reliable information and intelligence.” See Commons Defence Committee, The Contribution of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles to ISTAR, p. 6.

72 N.A., “What is ISR?,” p. 1 and passim.

73 Ibid., p. 1; Pave Tac, also often given as Pave Tack, was an electro-optical reconnaissance pod carried by the F-111. See, for example, Carlo Copp, “Pave Tack and the GBU-15 Greatly Expand RAAF Strike Capabilities, Australian Aviation (June 1984), currently archived at Air Power Australia, https://www.ausairpower.net/TE-AVQ-26-GBU-15.html

74 N.A., “What is ISR,” p. 1, emphasis added.

75 Ibid., p. 1.

76 JDCC, Joint Warfare Publication 3-00 Joint Operations Execution, 2nd ed. (Shrivenhan, UK: JDCC 2004), p. 2-14 and DCDC, Joint Doctrine Publication 3-00 Campaign Execution, 3rd ed., p. 3B-5.

77 Australian Department of Defence, Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 3.14 Targeting, 2nd ed. (Canberra: Defence Publishing Service 2009). The United Kingdom has since abandoned a sovereign operational doctrine in favor of NATO doctrine and has consequently moved to an approach largely similar to Australia’s.

78 See, for example, NSO, Allied Joint Publication 3.9 Allied Joint Doctrine for Targeting (Brussels: NSO, 2016), p. 2-5.

79 Ibid., p. 1.

80 Ibid., p. 2.

81 Ibid., p. 2.

82 Ibid., p. 2.

83 Ibid., p. 2.

84 Evans, “Rethinking Military Intelligence Failure,” p. 31. It is also worth noting that Evans is not writing specifically as an ISR advocate.

85 Ibid., p. 32.

86 Dowell, Intelligence for the Canadian Army, p. 12.

87 Ibid., p. 19. It should be noted that, like Evans, Dowell was not writing specifically as an ISR advocate but, rather, expressing concern about doctrinal syncretism among militaries navigating their way between British and American influence.

88 It is also worth noting that Dowell, like Evans, wrote as a critic of ISTAR but not explicitly as an advocate of ISR.

89 Davies and Gustafson, “Intelligence and Military Doctrine,” p. 20.

90 Ibid., p. 29. The UK doctrine-writing convention distinguishes between joint doctrine publications, which are authoritative statements of current concepts and practice, and joint doctrine notes, which serve a more diverse range of tasks, such as scoping reports on a specific doctrine issue, or guidance and background statements about structures and processes relevant to military practice but not actually expressions of doctrine as such.

91 See, for example, David T. Moore and Lisa Krizan, “Core Competencies for Intelligence Analysis at the National Security Agency,” in Bringing Intelligence About: Practitioners Reflect on Best Practice, edited by Russel G. Swenson (Washington, DC: Joint Military Intelligence College Press, 2003), pp. 95–132.

 92 DCDC, Joint Doctrine Publication 04: Understanding, 1st ed. (Shrivenham, UK: DCDC 2010). See also Christian Tripodi’s slightly confused account of the origins of JDP 04, “The British Army, ‘Understanding’ and the Illusion of Control,” Journal of Strategic Studies 41, no. 5 (2018), pp. 632–658. JDP 04 has since been substantially revised, and much of the emphasis on understanding of adversaries, allies, and nonbelligerents reduced in favor of an emphasis on commanders’ decisionmaking processes. DCDC, Joint Doctrine Publication 04: Understanding and Decision-Making, 2nd ed. (Shrivenham: DCDC, 2016).

 93 Davies and Gustafson, “Intelligence and Military Doctrine,” p. 29 and passim.

 94 Ibid., p. 21.

 95 Philip H. J. Davies and Kristian C. Gustafson, BCISS-JDP-2 Note Number 2: The ISR-ISTAR Debate: Rethinking the Problem, 30 March 2010, pp. 2, 4. Distributed unclassified. From the author’s papers. Emphasis in the original.

  96 Ibid., pp. 2, 4 infra.

 97 JDP 2-00 was drafted on an interagency as well as joint, quad-service approach following the precedent of DCDC’s influential doctrine on stabilization and reconstruction; Davies and Gustafson, “Intelligence and Military Doctrine,” p. 20.

 98 The author was in the room on the occasion that this missive arrived.

 99 Her Majesty’s Government, Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty, esp. p. 16 and passim.

100 UK Government, A Secure and Prosperous United Kingdom, pp. 38, 51.

101 Peter W. Gray, “Air Power and Joint Doctrine: An RAF Perspective,” Air Power Review 3, no. 4 (2000), pp. 6–8.

102 Stuart Evans, “Combat ISTAR,” Air Power Review 14, no. 2 (2011), pp. 2–3; see also Evans, “Combat-ISTAR: A New Philosophy on the Battle for Information in the Future Operating Environment,” Air Power Review 14, no. 3 (2011), pp. 1–10.

103 Evans, “Combat ISTAR,” p. 3 and “Combat-ISTAR: A New Philosophy,” passim.

104 See, for example, N.A., “ISTAR Firmament: The Future of the RAF’s Combat Air Reconnaissance Assets,” extracted from Jane’s Defence Weekly, 28 June 2017, https://www.janes.com/images/assets/332/72332/ISTAR_firmament_the_future_of_the_RAFs_combat_air_reconnaissance_assets.pdf. The RAF continues, as of May 2020, to brand its intelligence platforms as “ISTAR” on its public website. See “Aircraft” and “ISTAR” at https://www.raf.mod.uk/aircraft/

105 Commons Defence Committee, Tenth Report of Session 2013–14: Remote Control: Remotely Piloted Air Systems (London: The Stationery Office, 2014), pp. 29–33 and passim.

106 See, for example, N.A., “Tag: Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) missions.” N.D., but internal evidence indicates publication post-2015, https://www.contracts.mod.uk/tag/target-acquisition-and-reconnaissance-istar-missions/

107 N.A., “Royal Artillery: 47 Regiment Royal Artillery,” https://www.army.mod.uk/who-we-are/corps-regiments-and-units/royal-artillery/47-regiment-royal-artillery/; the newly acquired fleet of Ajax armored reconnaissance vehicles are also being branded ISTAR, even as many of the Army’s principal intelligence units have been amalgamated into a new 1st Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Brigade. See, variously, Commons Defence Committee, Eighth Report of Session 2015-16: SDSR 2015 and the British Army, HC 108 (London: HMSO 2017), pp. 20, 42 and British Army, Force Troops Command: Overview and Brigades, p. 10, https://britisharmedforcesreview.files.wordpress.com/2013/11/force-troops-command-overview-and-brigades.pdf

108 Davies and Gustafson, “Intelligence and Military Doctrine,” pp. 31–32.

109 See NSO, Allied Joint Publication 2: Allied Joint Doctrine for Intelligence, Counterintelligence and Security, Edition A, Version 2 (Brussels: NSO, 2016), p. 3-8, and the subsequent, most recent edition, NSO, Allied Joint Publication 2: Allied Joint Doctrine for Intelligence, Counterintelligence and Security, Edition A, Version 2 (Brussels: NSO, 2020).

110 Ministry of Defence, Defence in a Competitive Age (London: HMSO, 2021), pp. 9, 30, 67.

111 James Bosbotinis, “Hypersonic Missiles to Make Surface Ships Extinct?” Warships: International Fleet Review (February 2018), pp. 11–12. Bosbotinis even-handedly opted for ISR instead in a subsequent article, specifically on Chinese systems. “China Gears Up for a Hypersonic Future,” Warships: International Fleet Review (October 2019), p. 10.

112 This was a recurrent witticism from several quarters during the production of JDP 2-00. A minor point made by Pathfinder is the assertion that, unlike ISTAR, “ISR has become a word—not an acronym” in a manner “much like RADAR” (N.A., “What is ISR,” p. 2). To the contrary, ISTAR was clearly “a word” exactly like RADAR from the day it was coined in the mid-1990s. A popular quip in response to RAF pronouncements on C-ISTAR during the production of JDP 2-00 was: “But what would non-combat ISTAR look like?”

113 NSA, NIIA Terms and Definitions, A-92 infra.

114 Ferris’ seminal “Netcentric Warfare, C4ISR and Information Operations,” p. 204.

115 On the evolution and increasingly significance, see, for example, David E. Johnson, Military Capabilities for Hybrid War Insights from the Israel Defense Forces in Lebanon and Gaza (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2010) and Kier Giles, Russia’s “New” Tools for Confronting the West Continuity and Innovation in Moscow’s Exercise of Power (London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2016). The assumption of a prevalence of hybrid or full-spectrum conflict has formally been made the cornerstone of UK defense thinking under the 2021 Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy; see Ministry of Defence, Defence in a Competitive Age, especially pp. 9–10.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Philip H. J. Davies

Philip H. J. Davies is Director of the Brunel Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies, Brunel University, in London. Between 2010 and 2012 he was on the team that produced the current UK joint intelligence doctrine and a number of its supporting subdoctrines. He is the author of numerous publications on the intelligence communities of the United Kingdom, United States, Malaysia, and India, employing a diverse range of theoretical and thematic approaches, including organizational analysis, governance and accountability, national intelligence cultures, and comparative analysis. From 2013 to 2019 he led an analyst training program for the European Union’s Intelligence and Situation Centre. The author can be contacted at [email protected].