Operational Disinformation of Soviet Counterintelligence during the Cold War

Abstract

During the Cold War, the USSR (Soviet Union) and the United States were in a state of permanent political and thus information and psychological competition, conducted using various methods and forms of military and nonmilitary influence. This article analyzes doctrinal and textbook models of operational disinformation application from the counterintelligence service standpoint. Disinformation as a technique and tool of operational work was used in the area of intelligence influence within the operations and games conducted by the special services of the USSR. Still, it was also used in active operational combinations carried out by the State Committee for Security under the Council of Ministers of the USSR counterintelligence. The author’s thesis is that operational disinformation had a significant impact on the activity and effectiveness of the Soviet defensive services, and these methodologies are still in the arsenal of the Russian Federal Security Service, Foreign Intelligence Service, and Main Intelligence Directorate.

Notes

1 Mikołaj J. Wachowicz, “Theoretical Approach to the Concept of Disinformation,” Defense Knowledge, Vol. 266–267, No. 1–2 (2019), p. 227; For another view, see Martin J. Manning and Herb Romerstein, Historical Dictionary of American Propaganda (Westport, CT and London: Greenwood Press, 2004), pp. 82–83. This source states: “The KGB coined the Russian word dezin-formatsiya [sic: it should be dez-informatsiya]; it came into the English language as disinformation. One of the classic disinformation campaigns, and a notorious forgery, was Protocols for the Learned Elders of Zion, which was distributed by the carist secret police in 1905, but the techniques of disinformation increased after World War I. Disinformation as a KGB weapon began in 1923 when I. S. Unshlikht, Deputy Chairman of the GPU, then the name of the KGB, proposed the establishment of a ‘special disinformation office to conduct active intelligence operations…’ It is an important element of Soviet active measures.”

2 Tomasz Kacała, “Disinformation and Propaganda in the Context of Threats to State Security,” Constitutional Law Review, Vol. 24, No. 2 (2015), p. 51.

3 Marek Wrzosek, Disinformation as a Component of Information Operations (Warsaw: National Defence Academy Publishing House [Wydawnictwo Akademia Obrony Narodowej], 2005), p. 8.

4 Jan Larecki, Great Lexicon of World Special Services: Organizations of Intelligence, Counterintelligence and Political Police, Professional Terminology and Operational Jargon (Warsaw: Book & Knowledge [Książka i Wiedza]), pp. 159–160.

5 “Дезинформация. Увеличивает и обеспечивает успех компании: Документы российских архивов о первых шагах работы по советской дезинформации. 1922–1925 гг.,” Архив Александра Н. Яковлева, Альманах Росси XX век, [“Disinformation. Increases and Ensures Company Success: Documents from Russian Archives on the First Steps of Soviet Disinformation Work. 1922–1925,” Alexander N. Yakovlev Archive, Russia Twentieth Century Almanac]. https://www.alexanderyakovlev.org/almanah/inside/almanah-intro/1000406 (accessed 12 January 2019); под ред. акад. Александра Н. Яковлева; сост. Владимир Н. Хаустов, Виктор.П. Наумов, and Надежда С. Плотникова, Лубянка. Сталин и ВЧК-ГПУ-ОГПУ-НКВД. Архив Сталина. Документы высших органов партийной и государственной власти. Январь 1922—декабрь 1936 (Мocквa: Международный фонд «Демократия», 2003) [Alexander N. Yakovlev (Ed.), Vladimir N. Haustov, Victor P. Naumov, and Nadezhda S. Plotnikova (Co-Eds.), Lubyanka. Stalin and the VChK-GPU-OGPU-NKVD. Stalin’s Archive. Documents of the Higher Bodies of Party and State Power. January 1922— December 1936 (Moscow 2003, International Foundation for Democracy], pp. 72–73.

6 Andrzej Krzak, The “MOCR-Trust” Affair 1921–1927 (Toruń, Poland: Adam Marszałek, 2020), pp. 227–228.

7 Васи́лий С. Христофоров, История советских органов госбезопасности 1917–1991 гг., Москва: Росси́йский госуда́рственный гуманита́рный университе́т, 2020), p. 286 [Vasily S. Khristoforov, History of the Soviet State Security Agencies 1917–1991 (Moscow: Russian State Humanitarian University, 2020)]; Дмитрий Тарасов, Большая игра (Москва: Жизнь, 1997), pp. 8, 12, 16–17 [Dmitriy Tarasov, Big Game (Moscow: Life, 1997)]; Владимир Макаров and Андрей Тюрин, СМЕРШ. Гвардия Сталина (Москва: Яуза: Эксмо, 2009), pp. 10, 171–172; [Vladimir Makarov and Andrey Tyurin, SMERSH. Stalin’s Guards (Moscow: Yauza: Eksmo, 2009)].

8 The collected documents concern both the interwar period and the Cold War era.

9 Basic Problems of Counterintelligence Operation of the State Security Organs of the USSR. Part I, Directions, Methods and Forms of Counter-Intelligence Activity (Warsaw: Academy of Internal Affairs, 1974), p. 19.

10 Ibid., p. 19.

11 Ibid., pp. 18–19.

12 Ibid., p. 53.

13 Operational modeling—a method of studying so-called hostile subversive activity by artificially constructing or selecting models of this activity, conducting model experiments, and using the information thus obtained to develop and implement plans for counterintelligence activities and operations. There are two types of operational simulation: mental (ideal) and physical (object). Ibid., pp. 164–165. Operational experiment—a method of operational activity in which the KGB secretly investigates the activity of a specific person or a fact, event, or phenomenon concerning them under specially prepared conditions. The subject of an operational experiment may include: human activity, especially the behavior of a person being investigated or other people who are of interest to the KGB authorities, as well as various circumstances that are important for establishing the facts when verifying preliminary signals in the course of conducting operational cases (operational control, investigation), Контрразведывательный словарь КГБ, под ред. Виталий Ф. Никитченко и др. (Мocквa: Научно-издательский отдел, 1972), pp. 362–364 [Vitaliy F. Nikitchenko et al. (Eds.), KGB Counterintelligence Dictionary (Moscow: Scientific-Publishing Department, 1972)].

14 None of the known sources state of what the deprivation was supposed to consist.

15 Basic Problems of Counterintelligence Operation of the State Security Organs of the USSR. Part I, pp. 55–56.

16 Russian experts mention as an example of operational combination, among others, operations under the code names Syndicate-1 and Syndicate-2, aimed at neutralizing and discrediting Russian white emigration circles and Petlura opposition organizations. Krzak, The “MOCR-Trust” Affair 1921–1927, pp. 200–210.

17 An operational game is a long-term, offensive operational undertaking of an inspirational or disinformational nature. Larecki, Great Lexicon of World Special Services, pp. 239–240.

18 Nikitchenko et al., KGB Counterintelligence Dictionary, p. 80.

19 Basic Problems of Counterintelligence Operation of the State Security Organs of the USSR. Part I, p. 242.

20 Ibid., p. 242.

21 Ibid., p. 243.

22 Ibid., p. 244.

23 Ibid., p. 244.

24 Such was the case of Colonel Peter Popow, who was unmasked in 1959 by KGB counterintelligence and persuaded to take part in an operational combination based on the use of disinformation techniques in order to discredit the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) residence in Moscow. In view of numerous mistakes made by CIA staff officers, the operation was partially successful, as Russell Langell, Popow’s handler, despite warnings from him, met with his source and was detained and later expelled from the USSR. Khristoforov, History of the Soviet State Security Agencies 1917–1991, pp. 410–411; Игорь Атаманенко, “Первый крот в Главном разведывательном управлении,” НезƮвисимое Военное Обозрение, №. 9 (2012) [Igor Atamanenko, “The First Mole in the Main Intelligence Directorate,” Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, No. 9 (2012).

25 It is extremely important to use the correct lexical terminology adopted by the institution and the agent.

26 Basic Problems of Counterintelligence Operation of the State Security Organs of the USSR. Part II, Directions, Methods and Forms of Counter-Intelligence Activity (Warsaw: Academy of Internal Affairs, 1974), pp. 264–265.

27 A similar classification of disinformation with regard to the criterion of the veracity of information provided can be found in the Security Service Guide, published by the Institute of National Remembrance, which, among others, discusses various aspects of operational work by the Polska Rzeczpospolita Ludowa (PRL; Polish People's Republic) Security Service. It should be noted that the doctrinal part relating to operational activities contained in the methodology of operational work applied by the Polish Security Service is identical to the described theory of counterintelligence activity of the KGB. Rather unsurprisingly, see Filip Musiał, Security Service Guide: Theory of Operational Work of the Security Service in the Light of Departmental Publications of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the People’s Republic of Poland (1970–1989) (Cracow–Warszawa: Institute of National Remembrance Publishing [Wydawnictwo Instytut Pamięci Narodowej], 2019), p. 223.

28 Basic Problems of Counterintelligence Operation of the State Security Organs of the USSR. Part II, p. 246.

29 Ibid., p. 248.

30 Ibid., pp. 248–249; Identical to disinformation apagogic, in theoretical documents of the Polish SB; Musiał, Security Service Guide, p. 223.

31 Basic Problems of Counterintelligence Operation of the State Security Organs of the USSR. Part II, pp. 248–249.

32 Ibid., p. 253.

33 Ibid., p. 253.

34 Ibid., pp. 255–256.

35 Ibid., p. 256.

36 A person in the interest of the special services/figurant—a person suspected of illegal activity, covered by active operational activities of intelligence or counterintelligence services. This may be a person with regard to whom undercover operations are carried out in relation to espionage activities, as well as selected for acquisition (recruitment). Larecki, Great Lexicon of World Special Services, pp. 210, 476–477.

37 The case of Popov, Tolkachev, and others.

38 In a favorable situation, it would be enough for a foreign intelligence to provide preliminary data (send a signal) about a fact that interests it, in order to pay attention to it. Obviously, it will try to verify the information received. Therefore, in this case, it is necessary to provide analogous data, confirming the already received, but with the proviso that the confirming information is obtained with some difficulty. Then the credibility of the received material will be confirmed.

39 Basic Problems of Counterintelligence Operation of the State Security Organs of the USSR. Part II, pp. 262–263.

40 Legend (cover story)—any false, fabricated, partially true information. Also, a collection of true and fictional or only fictional data necessary for a cadre employee or agent to conspire intelligence activities. Nikitchenko et al., KGB Counterintelligence Dictionary, pp. 152–153; Larecki, Great Lexicon of World Special Services, p. 332.

41 Basic Problems of Counterintelligence Operation of the State Security Organs of the USSR. Part II, p. 264.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Andrzej Krzak

Andrzej Krzak is a Professor at the Jan Dlugosz University in Czestochowa, Poland. He is a member of the Commission of Balkan Studies, the Polish Academy of Sciences, and the International Scientific Council of the Journal of Slavic Military Studies (USA). He is the author of several intelligence books on Polish and Soviet operations from 1921 to 1939. The author can be contacted at [email protected]