Abstract
Sexual orientation change efforts (SOCE) have received well-founded criticism from multiple fronts for their discriminatory effects and variegated harmful consequences on LGBTQ + people. International human rights institutions had voiced their concern over extreme forms and coercive SOCE, labeling them as torture. However, the legal status of “soft” non-coercive practices (i.e., psychological interventions willingly sought by consumers) is less clear. This article argues that a proper understanding of the prohibition on torture and other forms of ill-treatment, and of the positive obligations attached to the right to equality requires banning SOCE in all its forms, even when pursued by consenting consumers.
DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
No potential competing interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
1 Other empirical studies are Ford and Beach (Citation1951), Marmor (Citation1965, Citation1980), Bell et al. (Citation1981), and Gonsiorek (Citation1991). Pierce (Citation1973) researched the difference between active and situational homosexuality in a study among inmates whose homosexual behavior was present before incarceration or, occasionally, after it. On their part, DeCecco and Parker (Citation1995) curated a collection of essays examining state of the art research at the time about whether homosexuality is determined by heredity, hormones or by the structure of the brain.
2 Other researchers have carried out reviews of particular studies, with similar conclusions (Cramer et al., Citation2008; Gonsiorek, Citation1981; Haldeman, Citation1991, Citation1994; Morrow & Beckstead, Citation2004; Sandfort, Citation2003; Tozer & McClanahan, Citation1999); a telling example is Spitzer (Citation2012), who debunks his own 2003 study.
3 These prohibitions are found, inter-alia, in Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (COU, Citation1956); Article 5.2 of the American Convention on Human Rights (UN, Citation1969); and Article 5 of the African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (OAU, Citation1981).
4 For example, the prohibition on CIDT was applied to racial discrimination (see, e.g. ECtHR, Citation2001a) and house demolitions (see CAT, Citation2002).
5 See e.g. Opuz v. Turkey (ECtHR, Citation2009), Talpis v. Italy (ECtHR, Citation2017), E.M. v. Romania (ECtHR, Citation2012, §§ 41 and 43), Valiulienė v. Lithuania (ECtHR, Citation2013).