Paradiplomacy as a response to international isolation: the case of Taiwan

Abstract

Although the importance of non-state actors in international relations is now widely acknowledged, formal state-to-state ties remain an essential measure of a state’s strength in the international community. When traditional components of sovereignty are eroded, what options remain open to states seeking to forestall international isolation? Drawing on a case study of Taiwan, this paper explores the potential and the pitfalls of using paradiplomacy as a substitute for traditional diplomacy. I argue that Taiwan uses paradiplomacy for three primary purposes: as a ‘hedge’ against weakness in the central-level US-Taiwan relationship; as a tool for developing long-term relationships with rising political stars; and as a performative strategy for asserting Taiwan’s statehood by showing others that it acts like a state. While paradiplomacy enables Taiwan to strengthen ties to US policymakers, these efforts have become increasingly complicated as mainland Chinese influence on local US politics increases. This paper thus sheds light on paradiplomacy in the US-Taiwan relationship, but also on the ways in which American federalism can complicate US foreign policy toward East Asia.

Keywords:

• Republic of China (Taiwan)
• United States
• China
• diplomacy
• city and state politics
• US-Taiwan relations
• trade

Acknowledgents

I am grateful to members of and advisors to the US-Taiwan Next Generation Working Group for early feedback; to Devin Caughey, Steve Goldstein, John Chung-En Liu, T.J. Pempel, Yao-Yuan Yeh, and participants in the APSA 2021 Conference Group on Taiwan Studies for detailed comments; to Denielle Amparado, Emma Bennett, Evelyn Berry, Jackie Centeno, Sarangoo Chimgee, Halle Duckworth, Ari Jewell, Jiani Li, Courtney Lo, Morgan Peirce, Emily Paule, Annabel Stattelman-Scanlan, and Junru Wu for exemplary research assistance; and to Smith College for research support. All errors remain my own.

Disclosure statement

The author declares that there are no known conflicts of interest associated with this publication.

Notes

1 ‘Agreement for Establishment of Friendly Relations between Jiaxing, the People’s Republic of China and Rockville, Maryland, the United States of America’, September 14, 2009. http://rockvillesistercities.org/wp/GovDoc/Rockville_Jiaxing_2009_and_2010_Agreements.pdf. US and PRC policymakers interpreted the 1978 Joint Communiqué on the normalization of US-PRC relations differently. CCP Chairman Hua Guofeng’s statement accompanying the agreement stated that ‘the Government of the People’s Republic of China is the sole legal government of China and Taiwan is a part of China.’ By contrast, the English-language version of the Communiqué states that ‘the government of the United States of America acknowledges the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is a part of China’—in other words, the US government does not necessarily accept this position itself. The Joint Communiqué thus provides a somewhat shaky foundation for a rejection of city-level diplomacy between the US and Taiwan.

2 Indeed, in an atmosphere of growing tension between China and Australia, in April 2021 the Australian government cancelled a paradiplomatic agreement between the Victoria state government and the PRC on the grounds that the agreement was ‘inconsistent with Australia’s foreign policy or adverse to [its] foreign relations’ (Hurst, 2021). However, national government opposition to subnational diplomacy is certainly not universal. As this paper details, Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs is often quite supportive of local governments’ efforts to forge stronger ties with countries other than the PRC, for instance.

3 While early in his presidency Chen offered assurances that he would not seek to destabilize the cross-strait relationship, his weak position as a minority president and the growth of a sense of Taiwan identity among ROC citizens led Chen to pursue increasingly provocative policies that weakened the cross-strait relationship and angered policymakers in both Washington and Beijing. For a useful overview of this period, see Goldstein (2015), Chapter 5.

4 Evidence for the effectiveness of trade missions like this one is mixed; as of November 2021, several of the companies that participated in the Idaho trade mission report that they have not established any business opportunities in Taiwan as a result of the trade mission. However, the CEO of one participant company reports that the mission was ‘successful from a number of vantage points’ and that his company is actively working on market development in Taiwan and that there is interest in setting up a Taiwan office ‘in the near future.’ Personal communications, November 2021.

5 This is a longstanding practice. See, for instance, a 1979 photo of Arkansas governor Bill Clinton and a Taiwanese official signing a trade agreement. ‘The Bill Clinton Gubernatorial Audio Project’, CALS Bobby L. Roberts Library of Arkansas History & Art, https://robertslibrary.org/bill-clinton-gubernatorial-audio-project/audio/. Accessed March 2, 2021.

6 The degree to which voters actually care about paradiplomacy is an open question that future research might productively aim to answer. In local electoral contexts in which large numbers of candidates compete for a relatively small pool of votes, however, these interviews suggest that candidates see paradiplomacy as one way to distinguish themselves. I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for encouraging me to think more deeply about this point.

7 One typical example, the 2008 sister city agreement between Milpitas and Huizhou in which the two cities ‘acknowledge and affirm the 1972 Shanghai Communiqué in its entirety,’ can be viewed here: http://www.ci.milpitas.ca.gov/pdfs/commissions/scc/mouhuizhou.pdf. Accessed February 21, 2021.

8 Given the ambiguous language in the Joint Communiqués—the Chinese-language version of the Shanghai Communiqué states that Taiwan is a part of China, while the English-language version acknowledges that the Chinese position is that Taiwan is a part of China—it is possible to read references to the ‘spirit of the Shanghai Communiqué’ and other foundational documents of US-China normalization embedded in sister city agreements as a way to ‘dodge’ the question of Taiwan’s status (Steven Goldstein, personal communication, February 2021). However, my interviewees interpret their Chinese counterparts’ eagerness to include a clause referencing the Joint Communiqués, resistance to the removal of such a clause, and invocation of such a clause to oppose US-Taiwan city-level cooperation as evidence that inclusion of these clause in US-China sister city agreements is intended to stave off US-Taiwan cooperation.

9 Han is not the only mayor who has expressed interest in political or economic exchange across the Taiwan Strait, even though such exchanges may weaken the central government’s ability to unilaterally set cross-strait policy. Taipei mayor Ko Wen-je’s annual participation in the Shanghai-Taipei Forum beginning in 2016 raised Ko’s profile (and perhaps his popularity among with some voters tired of the major parties’ approaches to cross-strait relations), but has led some to criticize Ko for ‘knowingly or unknowingly allow[ing] himself to be used by China.’ Brian Hioe, ‘The Controversy over Ko Wen-Je’s Shanghai-Taipei Forum’, New Bloom Magazine, August 27, 2016. https://newbloommag.net/2016/08/27/controversy-shanghai-taipei/. Accessed March 2, 2021; Brian Hioe, ‘Increased City- Level Exchanges With China Possible in the Future, Even From DPP Mayors’, New Bloom Magazine, December 18, 2018. https://newbloommag.net/2018/12/18/city-exchanges-dpp/. Accessed March 2, 2021; Nick Aspinwall, ‘Taipei-Shanghai Forum Puts Ko Wen-Je’s China Views Into Focus’, The Diplomat, December 20, 2018. https://thediplomat.com/2018/12/taipei-shanghai-forum-puts-ko-wen-jes-china-views-into-focus/. Accessed March 2, 2021.