China’s contestation of the liberal international order

Abstract

The concept of ‘revisionism’ has caught the attention of international relations scholars amid intensifying rivalry between the United States and China. It is a trademark of rising powers, and China was likewise expected to become a revisionist power, intent on changing the status quo. However, history tells us that not all rising powers necessarily become revolutionary states, seeking to overturn the prevailing order and replace it with another through hegemonic wars. This paper presents a novel understanding of revisionism by distinguishing between strategic ‘contestation’ and ‘challenge’. In the context of declining unipolarity, a dissatisfied rising power will contest the rules and principles of issue-specific regimes and demand legitimate adjustments that better reflect the new distribution of power. A challenge emerges when demands are rejected, and a contestation leads to ‘deconcentration’ and ‘delegitimation’ of the established order. The establishment of the AIIB can be examined as an example of contested multilateralism that falls short of a challenge. This paper concludes that China is ‘contesting’, not ‘challenging’ the liberal international order and suggests a set of countermeasures that the U.S. can think of: selective accommodation, reinforcement of alliances and partnerships, and overcoming domestic challenges such as populism that undermine the liberal values, constitutive of the liberal international order.

Keywords:

• Revisionism
• contestation
• challenge
• liberal international order
• AIIB

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes

1 Here, we equate Westphalian norms, values, and principles with the concept of ‘sovereignty’ defined as ‘the exclusion of external actors from domestic authority configurations’ (Krasner,1999, p. 9). Also see, Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized hypocrisy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999); Andreas Osiander, ‘Sovereignty, international relations, and the Westphalian Myth’, International Organization, 55(2) (Spring 2001); and Ayse Zarakol, After defeat: How the East learned to live with the West (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011) (especially pp. 45-46).

2 Here, ‘great powers’ are defined as states that have the capacity to establish and maintain international orders. The definition of ‘secondary powers’ closely aligns with that of Lobell, Jesse, and Williams (2015, p. 148) as states in the second position next to great powers that can ‘disrupt the system, but not change it, through unilateral action’.

3 See, Dingding Chen and Jianwei Wang, ‘Lying low no more? China’s new thinking on the Tao Guang Yang Hui strategy’, China: An International Journal 9(2) (September 2011).

4 The ‘clean’ and ‘green’ principles refer to zero-tolerance for corruption and the importance of adhering to environmental standards.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Sung-han Kim

Sung-han Kim is a Professor of International Relations at Korea University, Graduate School of International Studies and Director of the Ilmin International Relations Institute (IIRI). He served as Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade of the Republic of Korea and on numerous presidential commissions, councils, and committees related to foreign affairs and national security issues. He received his Ph.D. from the University of Texas at Austin. Email: [email protected]

Sanghoon Kim

Sanghoon Kim is an Associate Researcher at the Korea Institute for Maritime Strategy (KIMS). He received his M.A. at Korea University, Graduate School of International Studies and had served in the Republic of Korea Navy as an officer for three years. His articles appeared in the National Interest, and the Pacific Forum Issues & Insights, among others. His research interests include international relations, security studies, and maritime security. [email protected]