On the perceived objectivity of some moral beliefs

ABSTRACT

This paper presents research in moral psychology and draws on this research to offer an account of the cognitive systems and processes that generate the perceived objectivity of some moral beliefs. It presents empirical research on the perceived objectivity of moral beliefs, compares different algorithms employed by human cognition in the context of model-free and model-based reinforcement learning, and uses concepts drawn from dual-system and modular theories of cognition. The central claim of the account is that belief in the objectivity of some moral beliefs results from certain ‘modular’ features of cognitive systems.

KEYWORDS:

• Moral psychology
• metaethics
• dual-process theory
• modularity of mind
• perceived objectivity of moral beliefs

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No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Additional information

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Graham Wood

Graham Wood's research concerns the relationship between human values and a scientific understanding of the human condition. He examines this relationship within three realms: environmental philosophy, cognitive science of religion, and moral psychology. In his research environmental, religious, and moral values are examined using insights from philosophy of mind,cognitive science, and evolutionary psychology.