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Abstract
The Byzantine invasion of Crete in AD 960 provides a good opportunity to re-examine questions about the relative ease of supplying pre-modern armies by water in the Mediterranean basin. A combination of documentary, historical, and archaeological evidence suggests that the logistics behind supply by sea is more difficult than previously supposed. The army of Nikephoros Phokas besieged Chandax from July 960 to March 961 and had trouble supplying themselves with resources from the island. This paper creates a simple logistical model to get a sense of what the expedition required in terms of victuals and examines how they reached the army. The model suggests that previous work done on military supply in the classical period cannot be applied wholesale to the medieval Mediterranean.
Acknowledgements
Many thanks to the attendees of the Late Antique, Medieval, and Byzantine (LAMB) workshop who commented on an earlier draft of this paper, and especially David Gyllenhaal, Anna Gehler-Rachůnek, and Joanita Vroom.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes
1. For the conquest: Christides, The Conquest of Crete, 81–95; Signes Codoñer, Theophilos and the East, 200–8. For the expeditions, Makrypoulias, “Byzantine Expeditions”, 347–62, but note that the 910/911 campaign is now considered to have been directed against Syria: Haldon, “Theory and Practice”, 240–3. The material pertaining to the naval expeditions in De Ceremoniis will subsequently be cited from Haldon’s study. While the Emirate of Crete operated largely autonomously, at times it appears to have campaigned in coordination with the Abbasids: Picard, Sea of the Caliphs, 220–3.
2. Jones, Later Roman Empire, 841–6; Adams, Land Transport, 4–8. Nonetheless, Adams raises a cautionary note that the capacity of pre-modern peoples to move goods over land should not be underestimated.
3. Kaegi, “Byzantine Logistics”, 40.
4. For the suggestion that Byzantine naval operations in the Black Sea were mainly logistical in nature, Kostova, “West Black Sea Coast”, 595. Traditionally considered a symptom of a moribund empire, the navy of the Komnenoi is now seen as the logistical backbone of the army: Lau, “Naval Reform”, 115–38. A recent handbook on the military and warfare in Byzantium has no chapter dedicated to logistics, although Cosentino’s paper gives some attention to the topic: Stouraitis, Byzantine Culture of War; Cosentino, “Naval Warfare”, 340–6. The most complete study on pre-modern military supply by sea is Lambert, Shipping the Medieval Military.
5. Engels, Logistics, 31 (Ionia), 60, 62, 64, 66 (Levant and Egypt), 70 (the Tigris), 93 (the Helmand), 111–18 (Gedrosia). For medieval logistics, the first point of departure is now Bachrach and Bachrach, Warfare in Medieval Europe, 154–212.
6. For Engels, the practical limit of food that could be carried was 10 days’ rations: Engels, Logistics, 19–22. This has been revised upwards to 24 days’ rations for the Byzantine army: Haldon, “Expeditionary Force”, 132. As these figures are based on marching armies, note Lau, “Naval Reform”, n. 60, for the need to factor shipping into the study of Byzantine logistics.
7. Engels, Logistics, 26, citing Thucydides, Peloponnesian War, 7.25.6. The implication of the passage of Thucydides is that this was a very large vessel, but how typical such ships were requires further work. Thucydides claims it possessed the capacity to carry 10,000 talents. The imprecision of the talent does not help to clarify matters, but as a measure of mass in fourth-century Athens it was 28.81 kg (New Pauly, s.v. “Talent”), so the ship would have a capacity of about 290 metric tonnes. Larger vessels existed in Antiquity but were employed only for specialized voyages: Duncan-Jones, “Giant Cargo-Ships”, 331–2.
8. Bachrach, “Success of the First Crusade”, 91–5. Bachrach also argues that the magazine which supplied the crusaders at Ikonion could have been filled from ships landing at Attaleia or Side, which would still have necessitated several hundred kilometres of overland transport: Bachrach, “Crusader March from Dorylaion”, 243. The degree to which the southern coast of Asia Minor would have been able to supply the crusaders is unclear. The Translation of the Relics of St Nicholas (I.19; IV.1–5) points to significant disruption well into the 1080s on account of the Turkish invasions, and the pirates from Bari are unlikely to have improved the situation: Translation of the Relics of St Nicholas in Istoria della S. Niccolo, ed. Putignani, 553, 555.
9. The study of logistics has been primarily an Anglophone endeavour. Bachrach, “Crusader March from Dorylaion”, 231–54; Bachrach, “Siege of Nicaea”, 249–77; Bachrach, “The Fortification of Gaul”, 38–64; Pryor, “Byzantium and the Sea”, 88–94; Haldon, Theodoropoulos, and Murgatroyd, “Marching across Anatolia”, 209–35. See Haldon, “Why Model Logistical Systems?”, 8–18 for an earlier effort at modelling the Manzikert campaign. Koder, Gemüse in Byzanz: English summary: Koder, “Vegetables for the Capital”, 49–56; Koder, “Food Supply for Constantinople”, 109–24; Rose, “Maritime Logistics”, 388–97; Jones, The Maritime Landscape; Pryor, “Bohemond's march to Thessalonikē”, 1–24.
10. Leo the Deacon, History, 1.3–9 (7–16), 2.6–8 (24–9). Theophanes Continuatus, Chronographia, 473–78; Theodosios the Deacon, La prise de la Crète. For references to Leo the Deacon, the figure in parentheses is the page number in Hase’s edition.
11. Kaldellis, “Byzantine Conquest of Crete”, 302–11.
12. This “final version” probably dates to sometime after the death of Romanos (15 March 963) and before the proclamation of Nikephoros (2 July 963), as Nikephoros is referred to as the “sun of the magistroi and defender of Rome” and the poem itself remains dedicated to Romanos. Theodosios was likely attempting to exult Nikephoros while honouring Romanos’ memory during spring 963 while the regime change process was still in flux. See Theodosios the Deacon, La prise de la Crète, 3–6; Andriollo, “Teodosio Diacono”, 31–4.
13. Theodosios’ poem is imprecise in chronology and space but nonetheless remains sufficiently detailed to be a major source of the campaign: Andriollo, “Teodosio Diacono”, 37–40. Other sources in Greek: Skylitzes (Synopsis, 249–50); Zonaras (Annales 16.23; 135 cols. 108–9); Attaleiates (History 28.1–7). In Arabic, Yaḥyā ibn Sa‛īd, Histoire de Yaḥyā ibn Sa‛īd d’Antioche, 782. A non-historiographical perspective appears in a Hebrew Geniza document, with the author of the letter expressing both concern and interest in Crete now that it was under a new regime: Holo, “Genizah Letter from Rhodes”, 1–12.
14. The names of a number of the emirs are known only from coins. Byzantine texts mainly mention raids, but the Emirate appears to have been a place of some order and prosperity: Miles, “Relations in Crete”, 10–17. The circumstances and dating of the conquest have attracted attention amongst Byzantinists: Signes Codoñer, Theophilos and the East, 200–8; Tsougarakis, Byzantine Crete, 30–9.
15. On Skirmishing, 20.14–44.
16. Naval Warfare, ed. and trans. Jeffreys, in Jeffreys and Pryor, The Age of the ΔΡΟΜΩΝ, 22. The text was probably written between November 958 and November 959: Jeffreys and Pryor, ΔΡΟΜΩΝ, 184.
17. Brokkaar, “Basil Lecapenus”, 217.
18. Theophanes Continuatus, Chronographia, 475; Ringrose, The Perfect Servant, 130–1.
19. Leo the Deacon, History, 1.3; Pryor, “Transportation of Horses”, 10.
20. Attaleiates, History, 28.4, 7. The harbour was rebuilt in the Venetian period, but it is possible that the mole had been constructed during the Emirate of Crete: Gertwagen, “Venetian Port of Candia”, 141–7.
21. Leo the Deacon, History, 1.3 (7–9).
22. Leo the Deacon, History, 1.4 (9–10); Theodosios the Deacon, La prise de la Crète, 817–89.
23. Theodosios the Deacon, La prise de la Crète, 613–69.
24. Theodosios the Deacon, La prise de la Crète, 780–2; Theophanes Continuatus, Chronicle, 479.
25. Dain, “Les stratégistes byzantins”, 347–73. For work done since Dain: McGeer, “Military Texts”, 907–14 and Cosentino, “Writing about War”, 86–90. These texts have been the subject of scholarly attention and the process of producing modern editions is far advanced.
26. Haldon, Taktika, 39–55; Haldon, “Allocation and Redistribution”, 145–8. For the idea that the fundamental difference between Roman and Byzantine logistics was one of scale: Kaegi, “Byzantine Logistics”, 42–3.
27. See, in particular, Haldon, “Theory and Practice”, 241–70. Zuckerman, “On the Byzantine Dromon”, 72–81. Cf. Makrypoulias, “Works of Constantine Porphyrogenitus”, 152–71.
28. Kaegi, “Byzantine Logistics”, 45 notes that further archaeological evidence of ships or warehouses would be important for the study of Byzantine logistics.
29. Bass and van Doorninck, Yassı Ada. For a recent re-evaluation, see the papers in Carlson, Leidwanger, and Kampbell, Maritime Studies.
30. Bass, Matthews, Steffy, and van Doorninck, Serçe Limanı.
31. The study of these vessels remains ongoing, but in general see Kocabaş, “Yenikapı Byzantine-Era Shipwrecks”, 5–38; Pulak, Ingram, and Jones, “Eight Byzantine Shipwrecks”, 39–73; Pulak, Ingram, and Jones, “The Shipwrecks at Yenikapı”, 102–15; Ingram, “Yenikapı Shipwreck YK 11”, 1–18; Jones, “Construction of Yenikapı 14”, 253–83; Özsait-Kocabaş, “The Yenikapı 12 Shipwreck”, 357–90.
32. Theodosios the Deacon, La prise de la Crète, 845–54. Theophanes Continuatus instead notes that at first the army kept close to Chandax, but later was able to seize the enemy’s flocks and produce before encountering severe hardship during the winter. Theophanes Continuatus does not include the story of the defeat of the Thrakesion troops: Theophanes Continuatus, Chronographia, 476–78, 480.
33. Aegean wind patterns were largely the same as the present: Leidwanger, “Modeling Distance with Time”, 3303–4.
34. Pryor, “Medieval Mediterranean Maritime Revolution”, 174–88.
35. Theodosios the Deacon, La prise de la Crète, 183–249.
36. Theophanes Continuatus, Chronographia, 475.18–20. This figure is accepted by Ahrweiler, Byzance et la mer, 114–15.
37. Pseudo-Symeon, Romanos II 2. Cited in Sullivan, Nikephoros II Phokas, 118–20.
38. Text in Lampsides, “Landung auf Chandax (Kreta)”, 11. The reference to triremes is a classicism and these vessels had not been used by the Roman state since Antiquity: Pitassi, Roman Navy, 42. Leo the Deacon explains that the contemporary terms are γαλέα and μονέριον: Leo the Deacon, History, 8.1 (129.15–17).
39. The sizes of crews and what a given medieval Greek name for a class of vessel means has been a subject of debate, based largely on the reading of the documents pertaining to the two expeditions of 910/911 and 949. See Haldon, “Theory and Practice”, 336–7.
40. Tibi, “Sources on Arab Crete”, 121–2.
41. Haldon, “Theory and Practice”, 309–12
42. Sylloge Tacticorum, ed. Dain, §47.2 (trans. Harris and Chatzelis, Military Manual, 75).
43. Kaldellis, Rivers of Blood, 36, 38.
44. Haldon, “Theory and Practice”, 308–9.
45. Haldon, “Theory and Practice”, 308.
46. The nature of Leo’s victory over the Magyars is problematic, and his presence is only mentioned in the pro-Phokas Life of St Athanasios of Athos, version B: 20.1, 180–1. Magyar raids are known to have taken place in 959 and 961, but the defence was led by Romanos Argyros and Pothos Argyros, respectively. Leo either participated in one of those campaigns or fought the Magyars in an otherwise-unknown campaign in 960. See Balogh, “Nicephorus Phocas”, 14–17. Regardless, ongoing Magyar pressure required a Byzantine military presence in the Balkans, although one wonders about Magyar military capacity given their recent defeat at Lechfeld in 955. Antonopoulos, “Magyar Raids”, 261–3 for the 959 and 961 raids in the historical texts: Theophanes Continuatus, Chronographia, 462.19, 463.7, 480.13–17. In a number of cases tenth and eleventh-century Byzantine historical writing has a notable pro-Phokas interest: Markopoulos, “New Trends”, 703–5.
47. Leo’s victory over the Hamdanids was significant: Yaḥyā ibn Sa‛īd, Histoire de Yaḥyā ibn Sa‛īd d’Antioche, 781–2; Leo the Deacon, History, 2.1–5 (17–24).
48. Leo the Deacon noted that the advance forces in John’s army had 13,000 cavalry and 15,000 infantry, while an unspecified number made their way along more slowly with the siege train: Leo the Deacon, History, 8.4 (132.19–20).
49. Leo the Deacon, History, 1.3 (8.14–20). Theophanes Continuatus, Chronographia, 476.6–9. The late eleventh-century account of Michael Attaleiates mentions the construction of a church by Phokas’s army during the siege of Chandax: Attaleiates, History, 28.4, 7.
50. Jeffreys and Pryor, The Age of the ΔΡΟΜΩΝ, 352–73. Sea trials for the reconstructed Greek trireme Olympias indicated that an oarsman required some 8 litres of water a day. Thus a dromon with a double ousia (crew) of some 220 men would need 1760 litres of water a day, and this figure excludes marines.
51. Pryor, Geography, Technology, and War, 33–6.
52. Haldon, “Theory and Practice”, 308–9; Zuckerman, “Byzantine Dromon”, 72–81. The larger figure is from Haldon. Contemporaries noted a large number of ships in connection to the 960 expedition: Theophanes Continuatus, Chronographia, 475.18–20; Vita Sancti Athanasii Athonitae in Lampsides “Landung auf Chandax (Kreta)”, 11; Tibi, “Sources on Arab Crete”, 121–2.
53. Haldon, “Theory and Practice”, 306, 337–8.
54. Haldon, “Theory and Practice”, 335.
55. Zuckerman, “Byzantine Dromon”, 80–2. The complement of a dromon has been a subject of some debate, but Zuckerman’s argument that during the 910 expedition each was given two ousia (crews) and that this became standard in the subsequent decades is supported by the available evidence. For the sake of simplicity, no marines are assigned here to these vessels and it is assumed that if needed, troops from the land army would be embarked. For the terminology more generally, Ahrweiler, Byzance et la mer, 408–18.
56. The larger pamphyloi were only about a metre longer: Zuckerman, “Byzantine Dromon”, 82–90.
57. The recommended number of remounts is difficult to assess, but some tenth-century evidence suggests maintaining a spare horse for every five: Haldon, Warfare, State, and Society, 142–3. Alternatively, the cavalry may have been intentionally limited for supply reasons: the Sylloge Tacticorum, a Byzantine military manual from the second quarter of the tenth century, specifically notes that pasturage is dry from July and can thus be easily burned: Sylloge Tacticorum, ed. Dain, §55.4.
58. Theodosios the Deacon, La prise de la Crète (960/961), ed. Bondoux and Grélois, 139–42.
59. The assumption made here is that the chelandia were being rowed only from the upper bank of oars, whereas a dromon with twice the crew would use both. The chelandia could then seal the lower oar ports, which permitted better operation in inclement weather as well as further use of the sail.
60. Haldon, “Theory and Practice”, 262.
61. Nomos Rhodion Nautikos, 2.16.
62. Pulak, Ingram, and Jones, “The Shipwrecks at Yenikapı”, 107–10.
63. McCormick, “Movements and Markets”, 95.
64. Pryor, Geography, Technology, and War, 85–6.
65. Miracula S. Demetrii, 213.
66. Amatus, Storia, 5.27.
67. William of Apulia, La geste, 3.113.
68. References in written sources to unfavourable winds stranding transport ships abound. Procopius credits Justinian with the construction of a granary in Tenedos to keep the cargoes of Alexandrian grain ships from rotting when conditions prevented them from sailing to Constantinople: de Aedificiis, 5.1.5–16. The miraculous appearance of St John the Evangelist held up a vessel near Patmos for a time: Eirene of Chrysobalanton, §18 (The Life of St Eirene, ed. Rosenqvist, 82). Centuries later Leontios, the Byzantine patriarch of Jerusalem in absentia, was also stuck near Patmos on account of the winds, Goudeles, Life of Patriarch Leontios, §17. The eleventh-century Persian traveller Nâsir-i-Khusrau was unable to make his journey from Palestine to Egypt by sea for similar reasons: Diary, 61.
69. For efforts at solving the problem, Jeffreys and Pryor, The Age of the ΔΡΟΜΩΝ, 352–73. For further work on the difficulties inherent in getting fresh water onto warships in an environment with few navigable rivers or port facilities, Pryor, “Byzantium and the Sea”, 88–94.
70. Jeffreys and Pryor, The Age of the ΔΡΟΜΩΝ, 343–51. Rowing tests performed on the reconstructed navis lusoria fell short of estimated speeds, with an upriver cruising speed of only 4 km/h: Schäfer, Lusoria, 113–22. However, the crew does not seem to have been particularly experienced.
71. Jeffreys and Pryor, The Age of the ΔΡΟΜΩΝ, 360.
72. Jeffreys and Pryor, The Age of the ΔΡΟΜΩΝ, 205, 263.
73. Leo the Deacon, History, 1.3 (8.18–20).
74. Theophanes Continuatus, Chronographia, 479. Cf. Treadgold, Middle Byzantine Historians, 216 n. 71, who suggests that the shortage took place a year later.
75. Theophanes Continuatus, Libri I–IV, 118.
76. Leo the Deacon, History, 4.7 (65.19–21).
77. Actes de Lavra I, #55, 67ff.
78. Morris, Monks and Laymen, 220, 233; Harvey, Economic Expansion, 239–41. See also Thomas and Constantides Hero, Byzantine Monastic Foundation Documents, 582, 829. The sekreton of the sea in the twelfth century may have maintained a register of vessels: Makris, “Ships”, 94. In the late eleventh century, Lavra had seven ships with a combined carrying capacity of 16,000 modioi, but in the 1102 document they had only two or three. Alexios’ exkousseia from military duty might be related to his regime having seized and then failed to return the other vessels. The 1090s were particularly pressing, with crusader fleets in the Aegean and Adriatic, crusader armies that had to be ferried across the Bosporos, and operations against the emir of Smyrna in the Aegean and the Pechenegs and Cumans in the Black Sea.
79. Actes de Lavra I, #55, 50–60.
80. Horden and Purcell, The Corrupting Sea, 123–72. The table of eleventh- and twelfth-century exemptions prepared by Antoniadis-Bibicou indicates that many of these vessels were quite small, with very few exceeding 1000 modioi and most being half that: Antoniadis-Bibicou, Études d’histoire maritime, 132–3.
81. The high prices in Constantinople cannot be definitively linked to the expedition to Crete, but the lack of sufficient transportation on the 949 expedition should be noted: Haldon, “Theory and Practice”, 305–6. Liudprand of Cremona complains about high food prices in August 968 immediately prior to Nikephoros’ departure for an eastern campaign: Legatione Constantinopolitana, 201.
82. Schilbach, Byzantinische Metrologie, 95; Makris, “Ships”, 94. An earlier effort to calculate Byzantine nautical tonnage: Antoniadis-Bibicou, Études d’histoire maritime, 129–37.
83. This leads to inconsistency: Parker’s catalogue notably measures the ships by amphora capacity, but his amphoras have weight capacities varying from 37–66 kg: Koder, “Maritime Trade”, 120–4.
84. Jézégou, “Saint-Gervais”, 343–51. Why so few grain hauliers have been found is unclear, but McCormick proposes that the grain may have been insufficiently heavy to sink the ships to the bottom: McCormick, “Movements and Markets”, 97.
85. Jacoby, “Byzantine Maritime Trade”, 635, but follows Schilbach. It also equals 40 Byzantine litrai and 17.084 litres.
86. Bachrach, “Crusader March”, 236–8. Engels did not consider the pack animals as a source of food.
87. Parker, Ancient Shipwrecks, Dhia B, C: #360–1, Uluburun: #1194. Four Byzantine ships of tenth to twelfth-century date were noted in Vasiliko Bay by the Greek–Norwegian Deep-Water Archaeological Survey: Delaporta, Jasinski, and Søreide, “Deep-Water Archaeological Survey”, 82–3. However, only one of those has any sort of dimensions, and that is of the amphora mound. Near Serçe Limanı Çomlek Burun was found, an eleventh- or twelfth-century wreck: Royal, “Remote-sensing Survey”, 107–10. A range of wrecks that have yet to be investigated were discovered in the 1990s: Günsenin, “Récentes découvertes”, 309–16.
88. Harvey, Economic Expansion, 239. The YK12 boat fits comfortably in this range. This boat was excavated at Yenikapı and subsequently reconstructed. The reconstruction estimates a cargo capacity of 3.26 tonnes, which is about 250 thalassioi modioi. See Özsait-Kocabaş, “The Yenikapı 12 Shipwreck”, 386–67. For documentary evidence of a number of ships of approximately this size, see Antoniadis-Bibicou, Études d’histoire maritime, 132–3.
89. Günsenin, “Récentes découvertes”, 309–15.
90. Kampbell, “Pantano Longarini”, 92–9.
91. van Doorninck, “Final Voyage”, 205–16. On the basis of coins of Herakleios dating to the middle of the 620s and the LRA (Late Roman Amphora) type amphoras found on board, van Doorninck proposes that the Yassıada ship was engaged in supplying Herakleios’s army.
92. Kralj, Beltrame, Miholjek, and Ferri, “Shipwreck from Cape Stoba”, 55.
93. Steffy, “Construction and Analysis”, 168–9.
94. Steffy, “Construction and Analysis”, 168–9.
95. Waksman, “Fatimid Pottery Production in Beirut”, 201–12. The vessel and its remains are eclectic. The balances and coin weights found in the wreck are based on the Fatimid dinar standard, and so the vessel’s home port may have been in Fatimid territory. Christian symbols on the net weights have been taken to suggest that the crew was Christian: van Doorninck, “Fatimid-Byzantine Commercial Voyage”, 50–1. However, Christian symbols were also widely used by Muslims: Tannous, Medieval Middle East, 355–64. Greek letters mark the amphoras, while the ship’s tools match others found in Bulgaria but have Greek names on them: van Doorninck, “Small-scale Maritime Commerce”, 139–40.
96. De Ceremoniis 658, 659.7–12. For the Byzantine diet in general, see Vroom, “Ceramics”, and Zuckerman, “Bountiful Harvest”.
97. Procopius, Wars, 3.13.12–17.
98. Sylloge Tacticorum, ed. Dain, §57.2.
99. Haldon, Warfare, State, and Society, 284.
100. Zuckerman, “Bountiful Harvest”, 746; Junkelmann, Ernährung des römischen Soldaten, 112–13.
101. Cod. Theod. 7.4.6. Cod. Jus. 12.37.1. Sylloge Tacticorum, ed. Dain, §57.1.
102. Procopius, Buildings, 4.10.23.
103. Evagrios, The Life of Pankratios, 308.
104. De Velitatione, 8.12–14.
105. De Ceremoniis, 658.
106. The materiel would add a significant quantity of mass to the overall expedition. For example, assuming that the caltrop specimen preserved in the Georgian National Museum is indeed both Byzantine and representative of Byzantine caltrops more broadly, the 500,000 to be taken on the 949 expedition would collectively weigh some 11.5 tonnes, a figure that does not include the material used to join the caltrops on lines. For the Georgian example: Tsurtsumia, “ΤΡΙΒΟΛΟΣ: A Byzantine Landmine”, 415. For the caltrops on strings for easier collection: Maurice, Strategikon, 12.B.6; Leo VI, Taktika 14§41; Haldon Critical Commentary, 181; Sylloge Tacticorum, ed. Dain, §22.5, 38.12. For an examination of the production logistics of some of the materiel in De Ceremoniis, see Dills, “Logistical Considerations”, 220–43.
107. Steffy, “Construction and Analysis”, 167–8.
108. Gifford, “Ballast Stones”, 321.
109. Evagrios, The Life of Pankratios, 440.
110. In addition, Leo the Deacon twice mentions the ballasting of warships: Leo the Deacon, History, 4.7 (65.19); 7.9 (126.23–25; 127.1). The second explicitly mentions that the dromones were ballasted (τὰς ἐμπύρους τριήρεις ἑρματίζειν), while supply ships (τῶν σιτηγῶν πλοίων) were filled with soldiers and weapons.
111. Saburra refers to both sand and ballast: Parker, “Cargoes, Containers, and Stowage” , 90–2.
112. Kahanov, Yaacov, and Jabour. “Passage of Ibn Jubayr”, 84. The ship that Ibn Jubayr took from Acre seems to have been particularly large and this likely explains the lengthy loading time.
113. Harpster, “Codex Palatinus Graecus 367”, 8–20.
114. Votruba, “Did Vessels Beach?”, 7–29. Small vessels such as YK12 would have been able to beach easily: Özsait-Kocabaş, “The Yenikapı 12 Shipwreck”, 387. For the reconstructed hulls: Harpster, “9th-Century-AD Vessel” and “11th-Century-AD Vessel”.
115. McCormick, “Movements and Markets”, 474–6; Jeffreys and Pryor, The Age of the ΔΡΟΜΩΝ, 362–3.
116. Constantine VII, Three Treatises, 102.
117. Maurice, Strategikon, 10.4. Largely repeated in Leo VI, Taktika, 15§63.2.
118. Jézégou, “Saint-Gervais 2”, 345.
119. Gautier, Le Typikon, 1108–9; Jordan, “Pantokrator”, 761. By the fourteenth century the evidence for wooden barrels and casks becomes abundant: Jacoby, “Long Distance Trade” , 142. The reference to shipping wine in barrels in the Farmer’s Law may be a late medieval interpolation: Koder, “Food Supply for Constantinople”, 117–19.
120. Parker, “Cargoes, Containers, and Stowage”, 94. Grain was “not normally” packed in amphoras for transport: Parker, “Cargoes, Containers, and Stowage”, 92. Flour could be stored in ceramics, though: Peter of Argos §8.1 (trans. Kaldellis and Polemis, Saints of Ninth- and Tenth-Century Greece, 139).
121. Procopius, Wars, 3.13.17. The manual measures the volume in baskets (kouphia), and states that one basket equalled six modioi, and a modios equalled 40 litrai of wheat: Harpster and Coureas, “Codex Palatinus Graecus 367”, 14.
122. Sylloge Tacticorum, ed. Dain, §39.3 (trans. Harris and Chatzelis, Sylloge, 55). For the revised dating of the manual: Chatzelis, Practical Handbooks, 40–53.
123. Arthur, “Globular Amphorae”, 281–5.
124. van Alfen, “The LRA1 Amphoras”, 191–201. Note that Constantine VII, “Text C”, 132, envisions the imperial household on campaign carrying wine in bags, but this refers to a hypothetical overland expedition.
125. van Alfen, “The LRA1 Amphoras”, 208–9. The Serçe Limanı amphoras show a high degree of standardization, differing in approximately 2.5 litrai increments: van Doorninck, “Amphoras from the Shipwreck”, 183–5. Since these amphoras are chronologically closer to Phokas’s Crete campaign it would be desirable to use them in the model, but unfortunately the final publications have yet to appear and so the full study of their metrology is unavailable. Some preliminary results of the Serçe Limanı ceramics are available, but without the empty weight of the amphoras it cannot be employed in the model: van Doorninck, “Piriform Amphoras”, 36–42. Late antique evidence points to a great range of goods transported in amphoras: Decker, Tilling the Hateful Earth, 238–41. At least some LRA1 amphoras on Crete and Chios have been dated to the eighth century, but whether they were in use in the middle of the tenth is unknown: Zavagno, Cyprus, 161.
126. Vroom, “Enigma Amphora”, 77–8.
127. Drieu, Carver, and Craig, “Commodities Carried in Amphorae”, 269–71.
129. A law from 398 mentions the supply of soldiers with new wine by November: Cod. Theod. 7.4.25.
130. Cod. Theod. 7.4.6; Cod. Jus. 12.37.1. Both laws were issued from the Mediterranean region to the same praetorian prefect, so local variations are not likely to have applied.
131. Zuckerman, “Legio V Macedonica”, 279–80, 286–7; Roth, Roman Army at War, 39–40 adopts this figure as well.
132. Cod. Theod. 7.4.4, 7.4.6.
133. Roth, Roman Army at War, 35–40.
134. Le Roux, “Ravitaillement des armées romaines”, 409. Cf. Roth, Roman Army at War, 35, who prefers a lower figure for the imperial-era army.
135. van Doorninck, “Final Voyage”, 212–13.
136. Gambash, “Maritime Logistics in Antiquity”, 22–4.
137. See, for example, the losses incurred during the 1294 English seaborne campaign against Philip IV in Gascony. Loss rates of eggs and cheese were around 25%: Vaughn, “Gascon Campaign of 1294”, 101–2. Koder estimates similar loss ratios for the transport of grain: Koder, “Regional Networks”, 174.
138. Haldon, “Expeditionary Force”, 121–7.
139. Beresford, The Ancient Sailing Season, 86–90, 125–30, 134–57, 181–3.
140. Note also, for example, the contemporary miracle of St Athanasios. The ship overturned in foul weather and the cargo was lost, but the holy man and his retinue were able to scramble on the upturned keel until it drifted near land: The Life of St Athanasios of Athos, version B: 54.1–3, 278–88. Even sunken ships could be re-floated, such as Leo of Tripoli did to the dromones that were deliberately sunk to block the harbour of Thessaloniki in 904: Kaminiates, De expugnatione Thessalonicae, 61.3, 58. However, this was easier with relatively light warships than with laden cargo vessels.
141. Yaḥyā ibn Sa‛īd, Histoire de Yaḥyā ibn Sa‛īd d’Antioche, 782. Note that Skylitzes dates the capture of Chandax to 7 March: Synopsis, 4.39, 249.
142. Stathakopoulos, “Field and the Plate”, 33.
143. Koder, “Salt for Constantinople”, 97–8.
144. Cavalry made up a large portion of Byzantine campaigning armies in this period and specialized transport ships were even constructed to bring them to Crete. Phokas’s soldiers landed on Crete in special ships that allowed them to charge out on the beach already mounted: Leo the Deacon, History, 1.3 (7.19–24). Hippotoxotai were employed on Crete: Theophanes Continuatus, Chronographia, 476.14. John I Tzimiskes brought cavalry nearly equal to his infantry on the 971 Balkan campaign: Leo the Deacon, History, 8.4 (132.19–20). For the transportation of horses, Pryor, “Transportation of Horses”, 10–12; Jeffreys and Pryor, The Age of the ΔΡΟΜΩΝ, 304–33, cf. Zuckerman, “Byzantine Dromon”, 83–91. However, including cavalry in the model creates complications that cannot be adequately addressed here. Matters of equine diet, packaging of fodder, and winter forage ranges introduce a host of issues that require dedicated treatment elsewhere. Future work could employ land-cover data in a GIS to consider animal forage more accurately.
145. The Soviet Antonov An-124 has a cargo capacity of 150,000 kg, requiring 63 loads to supply Nikephoros’ army. The Lockheed Martin C-5 Galaxy has a cargo capacity of 118,000 kg, requiring 80 loads. See Jackson, Jane’s 2004–2005, 504 for the Antonov and Taylor, Jane’s 1984–1985, 439 for the Galaxy.
146. Byzantium lacked effective credit mechanisms: Hendy, Monetary Economy, 221. The previous expeditions involved the payment of cash to soldiers. The documents for the 949 expedition tally around 130,000 nomismata for the campaign. Since the 960 expedition is here around a third larger, an estimate in the realm of 175,000 nomismata could be put forth. Giving any sort of meaning to this number is difficult, however. We do not even have much of an idea about the state budget for the middle of the tenth century, and nor do we know the precise mechanisms by which the state acquired such a sum in cash. Moreover, the 949 documents indicate that different units were paid at different rates, and which formations were deployed to Crete in 960 is entirely unknown. How much of the sum would be coming out of the existing military budget is unclear, as is the amount that might never have existed as cash at all, but rather was collected in kind and reckoned in coin against taxes or other assessments.
147. Haldon, “Theory and Practice”, 299–302.
148. Cf. Zuckerman, “Campaign Blueprints”, 353 who is rightly sceptical of the claim in Constantine VII, “Text C”, that the thema of Longobardia would be shipping mules right across the empire for their contribution to a campaign.
149. Bourbou, Health and Disease, 156–8, 168–71.
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Lucas McMahon
Lucas McMahon is a PhD candidate at Princeton University. His dissertation examines the flow and control of information of political interest in the Byzantine world.