How negotiation delays affect policy decisions: evidence from the budgetary process

ABSTRACT

Intensified by today’s increasingly contentious political environment, delays often occur in the policy-making process. This paper applies the time pressure theory to study how budget deadlines and delays affect appropriation outcomes. Using a panel dataset comprising 108 appropriation bills from New York State in the USA for the period 1984–2012, the authors found that, while having deadlines is procedural and symbolic, the extent of lateness matters, and delays generally increase incrementalism in appropriation outcomes. Compared with proposed appropriations, a delayed budget shows a more concentrated allocation pattern that favours funding for capital projects and aid for localities.

IMPACT

Delays in policy negotiations are common. Yet the impact of delays on policy negotiation outcomes are much less commonly known. This paper shows that delays increase the tendency to gravitate toward average policy changes—a sign of enhanced incrementalism. In addition, delays might be used as a negotiation tactic for legislators to achieve their preferred outcomes. Although the authors use appropriations data from New York State, USA, their results have implications for policy-making in other countries. When decisions are delayed, policy-makers should be cautious about the potential impacts on the policy decisions.

KEYWORDS:

• Appropriation
• late budget
• negotiation
• policy process
• time pressure

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).