The Climate Change–Terrorism Nexus: A Critical Literature Review

ABSTRACT

A growing number of policymakers around the world have recognized climate change as an escalating security threat and increasingly point to the climate change—terrorism nexus in particular. This critical literature review provides an analysis of the current state of research on the causal and correlative links between climate change, intermediary factors—such as resource scarcity, loss of economic opportunities, and instability—and terrorism in sub-Saharan Africa. Moving beyond a review of substantive themes within the existing body of scholarly research examining this topic, this article critically evaluates the theories, assumptions, and methods behind the literature. In doing so, the review identifies noteworthy trends, as well as gaps and shortcomings in the current research. Our review finds that the majority of the literature has observed a positive correlation between climate change and terrorism. More precisely, the current body of research overwhelmingly assesses that climate change indirectly leads to terrorism via its impact on conditions often considered to be drivers of terrorism in sub-Saharan Africa. Still, gaps remain in empirically backing up these assertions and examining the relationship between climate change, intermediary factors, and terrorism in more depth. We use our critical review and analysis to guide recommendations for further research into this emerging and timely field of study.

KEYWORDS:

• Climate change—terrorism nexus
• climate change
• terrorism
• violent extremism
• sub-Saharan africa

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1. John O’Loughlin and Cullen Hendrix, “Will Climate Change Lead to More World Conflict?” Washington Post, July 11, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/07/11/how-does-climate-change-impact-conflict-world/.

2. “Implications of Climate Change Important When Climate Impacts Drive Conflict,” United Nations Security Council, July 20, 2011, https://www.un.org/press/en/2011/sc10332.doc.html.

3. Lukas Rüttinger, Dan Smith, Gerald Stang, Dennis Tänzler, and Janani Vivekananda, “A New Climate for Peace: Taking Action on Climate and Fragility Risks,” (Adelphi, International Alert; The Wilson Center; European Union Institute for Security Studies; Berlin, Germany, 2016), vii, https://www.newclimateforpeace.org.

4. “Gender, Climate & Security: Sustaining Inclusive Peace on the Frontlines of Climate Change” (United Nations Environment Programme, UN Women, UNDP, UNDPPA/PBSO, Nairobi, Kenya June 11, 2019), https://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/32638/GCS.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.

5. Fiscal Year 2021: Top DoD Management Challenges,” (U.S. Department of Defense, Arlington, VA, November 18, 2020, https://media.defense.gov/2020/Nov/18/2002537497/-1/-1/1/TOP%20DOD%20MANAGEMENT%20CHALLENGES%20FISCAL%20YEAR%202021.PDF; Jacob Poushter and Christine Huang, “Despite Pandemic, Many Europeans Still See Climate Change as Greatest Threat to Their Countries,” Pew Research Center, September 9, 2020, https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2020/09/09/despite-pandemic-many-europeans-still-see-climate-change-as-greatest-threat-to-their-countries/.

6. “United Nations Framework Convention for Climate Change,” (United Nations, 1992), https://unfccc.int/files/essential_background/background_publications_htmlpdf/application/pdf/conveng.pdf.

7. J. B. R. Matthews “Annex 1: Glossary”, in Global Warming of 1.5°C. An IPCC Special Report on the impacts of global warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas emission pathways, in the context of strengthening the global response to the threat of climate change, sustainable development, and efforts to eradicate poverty, IPCC, 2018, https://www.ipcc.ch/sr15/chapter/glossary/.

8. Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism. (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2017, p. 44).

9. T. Weber, A. Haensler, D. Rechid, S. Pfeifer, B. Eggert, and D. Jacob, “Analysing Regional Climate Change in Africa in a 1.5°C, 2°C and 3°C Global Warming World,” Earth’s Future 6, no. 4 (2018): 1–13, doi: 10.1002/2017EF000714.

10. Ibid.

11. Laura Freeman, “Environmental Change, Migration, and Conflict in Africa: A Critical Examination of the Interconnections,” The Journal of Environment and Development 26, no. 4 (2017): 351–374, doi: 10.1177/1,070,496,517,727,325.

12. I. Niang, O.C. Ruppel, M.A. Abdrabo, A. Essel, C. Lennard, J. Padgham, and P. Urquhart, “Africa,” in Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Part B: Regional Aspects. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA, 2014), p. 1205, https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/02/WGIIAR5-Chap22_FINAL.pdf.

13. “Global Terrorism Index 2019: Measuring the Impact of Terrorism” (Institute for Economics and Peace, Sydney, Australia, November 2019), http://visionofhumanity.org/reports.

14. Ibid.

15. “Mozambique: Protect Residents Fleeing Northern Town,” Human Rights Watch, March 26, 2021, https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/03/26/mozambique-protect-residents-fleeing-northern-town.

16. “Mocimboa da Praia: Key Mozambique Port ‘Seized by IS’” BBC News, August 12, 2020, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-53756692; “Militant Islamists ‘Behead More Than 50’ in Mozambique,” BBC News, November 2020, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-54877202.

17. “Grim Milestone as Sahel Violence Displaces 2 Million Inside Their Countries,” United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, January 22, 2021, https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/briefing/2021/1/600a92e4125/grim-milestone-sahel-violence-displaces-2-million-inside-countries.html.

18. Malin Mobjörk and Sebastian van Baalen, “Climate change and Violent Conflict in East Africa—Implications for Policy” (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Stockholm, Sweden, April 2016), https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/Policy-brief%2C-Climate-change-and-violent-conflict%2C-April-2016.pdf.

19. Mark Petticrew and Helen Roberts, Systematic Reviews in the Social Sciences: A Practical Guide, (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2006).

20. The various keyword combinations that yielded our results can be found in Appendix II.

21. One study that went even further and found a causal relationship is that by Claude Berrebi and Jordan Ostwald, “Earthquakes, Hurricanes, and Terrorism: Do Natural Disasters Incite Terror?” Public Choice 149, no. 3/4 (2011): 383–403, doi: 10.1007/s11127-001-9868-x, though it should be underlined that their finding pertains to the relationship between natural disasters and terrorism. Still, given that the article fit our inclusion criteria and that the scientific consensus suggests that climate change leads to an increase in the severity and frequency of weather extremes, we consider this finding pertinent to the present review.

22. Laurent A. Lambert and Lux Descroix, “Changements climatiques et essor djihadiste au Sahel: une approche critique pour des solutions plus adaptées.” (Conseil québécois d’études géopolitiques, Université Laval, Quebec City, Canada, 2018), https://cqegheiulaval.com/changements-climatiques-et-essor-djihadiste-au-sahel-une-approche-critique-pour-des-solutions-plus-adaptees/.

23. Idean Salehyan and Cullen S. Hendrix, “Climate Shocks and Political Violence,” Global Environmental Change 28 (September 2014): 239–250.

24. Salehyan and Hendrix, “Climate Shocks and Political Violence,” 247, find that droughts and other forms of resource scarcity impede terrorist activities by rendering the conduct of military operations more difficult for terrorist organisations. According to the authors, “dissidents will find it easier to stage violent attacks […] during periods of environmental plenty.”

25. Andrew Telford, “A Climate Terrorism Assemblage? Exploring the Politics of Climate Change-Terrorism-Radicalisation Relations,” Political Geography 79 (2020): 1–10, doi: 10.1016/j.polgeo.2020.102150; Thomas Renard, “Heated Terror: Exploration of the Possible Impacts of Climate Change on the Causes and the Targets of Terrorism,” Les Cahiers du RMES 5, no. 1 (Summer 2008): 15–53.

26. Rafael Reuveny, “Climate Change-Induced Migration and Violent Conflict” Political Geography 26, no. 6 (2007), doi: 10.1016/j.polgeo.2007.05.001; Roz Price, “Climate Change, Vulnerability to Violent Extremism and Conflict in Kenya” (Institute of Development Studies, K4D Research Helpdesk, Brighton, UK, 2019), https://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/handle/20.500.12413/14687; John Madeira, “Climate Change, Sub-Saharan Africa, and US National Security” (American Security Project, Washington, DC, August 2019), https://www.americansecurityproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/Ref-0227-Climate-Change-Sub-Saharan-Africa-US-Natsec.pdf; Courtney Plante, Johnie J. Allen, and Craig A. Anderson, “Effects of Rapid Climate Change on Violence and Conflict,” Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Climate Science, April 26, 2017, doi: 9,780,190,228,620.013.344; Katharina Nett and Lukas Rüttinger “Insurgency, Terrorism and Organised Crime in a Warming Climate—Analysing the Links Between Climate Change and Non-State Armed Groups,” (Adelphi, Berlin, Germany, October 2016), https://www.adelphi.de/en/publication/insurgency-terrorism-and-organised-crime-warming-climate; Tom Middendorp and Reinier Bergema, “The Warning Signs are Flashing Red: The Interplay Between Climate Change and Violent Extremism in the Western Sahel,” (International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, The Hague, Netherlands, 2019), https://icct.nl/app/uploads/2019/10/PB-The-Warning-Signs-are-flashing-red_2e-proef.pdf; Jennifer Cooke and Thomas Sanderson, “Militancy and the Arc of Instability: Violent Extremism in the Sahel” (Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington DC, September 2016), http://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/160922_Sanderson_MilitancyArcInstabilitySahel_Web.pdf; Marcus Arcanjo, “Risk and Resilience: Climate Change and Instability in the Sahel,” (Climate Institute, Washington, DC, October 2019), http://climate.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/Risk-and-Resilience-Climate-Change-and-Instability-in-the-Sahel.pdf; Johan Schaar, “The Relationship Between Climate Change and Violent Conflict” (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, International Organisations and Policy Support, Stockholm, Sweden, 2018), https://www.sida.se/contentassets/015e86e7df314c9aa2449cb5b678731a/working-paper—climate-change-and-conflict.pdf; Freeman, “Environmental Change, Migration, and Conflict”; Chukwuma Onyia, “Climate Change and Conflict in Nigeria: The Boko Haram Challenge,” American International Journal of Social Science 4, no. 2 (2015): 181–190; Nwokeoma Bonaventure and Amadi Kingsley Chinedu, “Climate Variability and Consequences for Crime, Insurgency in North East Nigeria,” Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences 8, no. 3, (2017): 171–182, doi: 10.5901/mjss.2017.v8n3p171; Marc Lavergne, “Le Lac Tchad, Entre L’assèchement et L’intrusion de Boko Haram: La Faute au Changement Climatique, ou à L’immobilité Politique?,” (Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique / French National Centre for Scientific Research, Paris, France, 2017), https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01494017/document; Alice Baillat, “What Link(s) Between the Fight Against Terrorism and Climate Change?” Les Champs De Mars 30, no. 1 (2018): 439 to 447; Telford, “A Climate Terrorism Assemblage? Exploring the Politics of Climate Change-Terrorism-Radicalisation Relations”; Renard, “Heated Terror.”

27. The term “threat multiplier” appears to have originated in a report published in 2007 by a group of former U.S. military leaders brought together by the CNA Corporation. The report notes that “climate change acts as a threat multiplier for instability in some of the most volatile regions of the world.” Since then, the term has been used by the U.S. Department of Defense and the United Nations and has become a widely accepted way of referring to the impact climate change has on international security. “National Security and the Threat of Climate Change” (CNA Corporation, Military Board of Advisors, Alexandria, VA, 2007), 44, https://www.cna.org/cna_files/pdf/national%20security%20and%20the%20threat%20of%20climate%20change.pdf; U.S. Department of Defense, “Quadrennial Defense Review” (U.S. Department of Defense, Arlington, VA, 2014), 8, https://archive.defense.gov/pubs/2014_Quadrennial_Defense_Review.pdf; “Implications of Climate Change Important When Climate Impacts Drive Conflict,” United Nations Security Council, July 20, 2011, https://www.un.org/press/en/2011/sc10332.doc.htm.

28. Middendorp and Bergema, “The Warning Signs are Flashing Red,” 7.

29. Cooke and Sanderson, “Militancy,” 5.

30. Freeman, “Environmental Change, Migration, and Conflict”; Reuveny, “Climate Change-Induced Migration and Violent Conflict.”

31. Bonaventure and Chinedu, “Climate Variability and Consequences for Crime.”

32. Onyia, “Climate Change and Conflict in Nigeria.”

33. Lavergne, “Le Lac Tchad, Entre L’assèchement et L’intrusion de Boko Haram.”

34. Middendorp and Bergema, “The Warning Signs are Flashing Red.”

35. Nett and Rüttinger, “Insurgency, Terrorism and Organised Crime,” Onyia, “Climate Change and Conflict in Nigeria,” Schaar, “Climate Change and Violent Conflict,” and Chikaodili Orakwue, “Peculiar Weather Variability and Terrorism in Nigeria,” (Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution, Aabuja, Nigeria, 2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2809753.

36. Madeira, “Climate Change, Sub-Saharan Africa, and US National Security.”

37. Nett and Rüttinger, “Insurgency, Terrorism and Organised Crime.”

38. Curtis Craig, Randy W. Overbeek, and Elizabeth M. Niedbala, “A Global Analysis of Temperature, Terrorist Attacks, and Fatalities,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism (January 2019): 1–13.

39. Gregory N. Price and Juliet U. Elu, “Climate Change and Cross-State Islamist Terrorism in Nigeria,” Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy 23, no. 3 (2017): 1, doi:10.1515/peps-2016-0047; Plante et al., “Rapid Climate Change,” endeavored to explore the direct and indirect impact of climate change on aggression, as well as evaluated the role of climate change in facilitating group-level aggression, they found that the relationship between climate change and aggression is too insignificant to be considered relevant to the field.

40. Arcanjo, “Risk and Resilience.”

41. Baillat, “What Link(s) Between the Fight.”

42. Onyia, “Climate Change and Conflict in Nigeria”; Nett and Rüttinger, “Insurgency, Terrorism and Organised Crime”; Cooke and Sanderson, “Militancy”; Madeira, “Climate Change, Sub-Saharan Africa, and US National Security”; Schaar, “Climate Change and Violent Conflict”; Bonaventure and Chinedu, “Climate Variability and Consequences for Crime”; Reuveny, “Climate Change-Induced Migration and Violent Conflict,” and Freeman, “Environmental Change, Migration, and Conflict.”

43. Bonaventure and Chinedu, “Climate Variability and Consequences for Crime,” 176.

44. Ibid.

45. Onyia, “Climate Change and Conflict in Nigeria,”; Middendorp and Bergema, “The Warning Signs are Flashing Red”; Bonaventure and Chinedu, “Climate Variability and Consequences for Crime”; Baillat, “What Link(s) Between the Fight.”

46. Baillat, “What Link(s) Between the Fight,” 1.

47. Bonaventure and Chinedu, “Climate Variability and Consequences for Crime,” 177.

48. Baillat, “What Link(s) Between the Fight.”

49. Craig et al., “A Global Analysis.”

50. Price and Elu, “Cross-State Islamist,” 7.

51. Bonaventure and Chinedu, “Climate Variability and Consequences for Crime,”; Isel van Zyl and Maram Mahdi, “Preventing Violent Extremism in East Africa: Lessons from Kenya, Somalia, Tanzania and Uganda,” (East Africa Report 26, Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, South Africa, 2019), https://media.africaportal.org/documents/preventing_violent_extremism.pdf.

52. Though we advocate for the inclusion of relevant control variables, it should be noted that, according to Salehyan and Hendrix (2014, p. 243), “The inclusion/exclusion of control variables is one of the more contested issues among those modeling the climate-conflict nexus.”

53. Craig et al., “A Global Analysis”; Price and Elu, “Cross-State Islamist.” It should be noted that Price and Elu, “Cross-State Islamist,” acknowledge that temperature and rainfall are not the sole drivers of terrorism and that they thus include some covariates, including adult literacy in Nigeria, unemployment rates, and whether a Nigerian state is governed by Sharia Law.

54. Berrebi and Ostwald, “Earthquakes, Hurricanes, and Terrorism.”

55. Madeira, “Climate Change, Sub-Saharan Africa, and US National Security.”

56. Salehyan and Hendrix, “Climate Shocks and Political Violence”; Freeman, “Environmental Change, Migration, and Conflict”; Nett and Rüttinger, “Insurgency, Terrorism and Organised Crime”; Arcanjo, “Risk and Resilience”; Johan Schaar, “The Relationship Between Climate Change and Violent Conflict” (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, International Organisations and Policy Support, Stockholm, Sweden, 2018), https://www.sida.se/contentassets/015e86e7df314c9aa2449cb5b678731a/working-paper—climate-change-and-conflict.pdf; Craig Anderson and Matt Delisi, “Implications of Global Climate Change for Violence in Developed and Developing Countries,” in The Psychology of Social Conflict and Aggression (New York, NY: Psychology Press, 2011): 249–265.

57. Craig et al., “A Global Analysis”; Price and Elu, “Cross-State Islamist”; Nett and Rüttinger, “Insurgency, Terrorism and Organised Crime”; Arcanjo, “Risk and Resilience”; Schaar, “Climate Change and Violent Conflict.”

58. Craig et al., “A Global Analysis”; Price and Elu, “Cross-State Islamist”; Plante et al., “Rapid Climate Change.”

59. Nett and Rüttinger, “Insurgency, Terrorism and Organised Crime”; Schaar, “Climate Change and Violent Conflict.”

60. Schaar, “Climate Change and Violent Conflict,” 4.

61. Price, “Climate Change, Vulnerability,” 4.

62. Alan Greene, “Defining Terrorism: One Size Fits All?” International and Comparative Law Quarterly 66, no. 2 (2017): 411–40, doi:10.1017/S0020589317000070.

63. Telford, “A Climate Terrorism Assemblage,” 1.

64. Renard, “Heated Terror.” Renard argues that climate change could affect terrorism by: (1) increase the instigating causes of terrorism by filling “the reservoir of deprived people,” (2) exacerbate the permissive factors of terrorism, (3) multiply the precipitant events (such as natural disasters), and (4) render potential targets of terrorism, including natural resources, increasingly vulnerable.

65. Caitriona Dowd and Clionadh Raleigh, “The Myth of Global Islamic Terrorism and Local Conflict in Mali and the Sahel” Africa Affairs 112, no. 448 (2013): 498–509, doi:10.1093/afraf/adt039.

66. Nett and Rüttinger, “Insurgency, Terrorism and Organised Crime”

67. It should be noted that our review did show that the literature itself is somewhat interdisciplinary, with contributing authors coming from fields such as mechanical engineering, economics, political science, psychology, and natural disaster studies. However, the individual studies themselves did not reflect this diversity of disciplines.

68. Plante et al., “Rapid Climate Change,” 1.

69. “Fiscal Year 2021: Top DoD Management Challenges.”

70. “Boko Haram Kills 92 Chadian Soldiers in Seven-Hour Attack,” Agence France-Presse, March 24, 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/24/boko-haram-kills-92-chadian-soldiers-in-seven-hour-attack.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Stefanie Mavrakou

Stefanie Mavrakou is Junior Policy Officer for Civilian Crisis Management at the European Centre of Excellence for Civilian Crisis Management. Stefanie is a Cambridge University alumna and Master of International Affairs from the Hertie School in Berlin. Her work focuses on civilian crisis management and the climate-security nexus.

Emelie Chace-Donahue

Emelie Chace-Donahue is an intelligence analyst at Valens Global, where she supports public sector clients on transnational threats related to terrorism and violent extremism.

Robin Oluanaigh

Robin O'Luanaigh is Research Lead for Digital Extremism at the Center on Terrorism, Extremism, and Counterterrorism. She recently graduated from Georgetown’s Security Studies Program, specializing in terrorism and sub-state violence.

Meghan Conroy

Meghan Conroy is an Investigator with the U.S. House of Representatives and the Chief of Staff of the Accelerationism Research Consortium (ARC). Previously, Meghan spent seven years researching and analyzing extremism, disinformation, and the media ecosystem for various organizations in Washington, DC and the U.K.