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Abstract
Building on empirical qualitative material, this article argues that the international promotion of democracy is crucial to account for Tunisia’s positive transitional outcome. Specifically, the study sheds new light on the capacity of international democracy promoters (IDPs) to enhance competitive politics and contribute to the professionalization of political parties and civil society groups during Tunisia’s post-revolutionary path. The article also offers two research avenues for reviewing the negative standing on international democratic promotion in the MENA region. First it argues that promotion of democracy in transitions away from authoritarianism is more likely to succeed when a wide spectrum of transitional elites agrees upon the political system to establish and they do not enter into conflicts on how to collaborate with the IDPs. Second, it emphasizes that during a transitional period, structured and strategic partnerships between IDPs and transitional elites enable fragile societies to sustain their democratic process if internal and external anti-systemic interventions do not place obstacles in the path of this interplay.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes on Contributor
Pietro Marzo is PhD candidate in Political Science at Laval University (Québec, Canada). He is a Research Associate to the Canada Research Chair in Public Diplomacy and a Research Associate to the Interdisciplinary Research Centre on Africa and Middle East (CIRAM). His research interests focus on the International Relations of the Middle East. His PhD dissertation focuses on the international dimension of the Tunisian transition to democracy. His publications have appeared on the Journal of North African Studies and the Middle Eastern Studies. Email: [email protected].
Notes
1 See the Freedom House report: <https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/policybrief_democratic_backsliding_in_tunisia.pdf>
2 With the exception of Salafists who, however, were outlawed in 2013.
3 For more information on this topic see Marzo 2018, Foreign Actors in Post-revolutionary Tunisia: Enhancing Democratization and Lowering Political Tensions, Middle Eastern Institute <https://www.mei.edu/publications/foreign-actors-post-revolutionary-tunisia-enhancing-democratization-and-lowering>
4 The European Union used the European Instrument for Human Rights and Democracy (EIHRD) in Tunisia for the first time in 2009. This instrument allowed to assist foreign civil partners bypassing the state control.
5 Interview with an International Republic Institute official, Washington, DC 2018.
6 Interview with a Freedom House official, Washington, DC 2018.
7 Despite the foundations not releasing details on the budget, most of the officials interviewed have stated that the allocation of money was three times bigger after 2011.
8 The Tunisian President of the League of the Human Right confirmed this, by saying Westerwelle was the ‘first visitor of the revolution’ (Abderrahim et al 2017, 136).
9 The United States, the European Union, and the World Bank are the largest donors supporting Tunisia’s democratic development. As soon as the Constituent Assembly passed the 2014 constitution, US democracy funding for Tunisia peaked the $20.89 million in FY 2016. The EU’s democracy funding to Tunisia was non-existent before the revolution, but by 2015, it accounted for 18 percent of the bloc’s €356 million aid package to the country. The World Bank has allocated $430 million to its ‘Urban Development and Local Governance’ project to support Tunisia’s decentralization.
10 IRI and NDI applauded the capacity of the new-born ISIE to successfully registered nearly one million new voters, approved tens of thousands of candidates, hired over 50,000 poll workers, prepared and distributed election material for nearly 11,000 polling stations. Likewise, they hailed the HAICA’s role in ensuring equal coverage of all candidates in the media and warned all contents to avoid personal attack and to lower negative rhetoric during the run-off. Carter Centre concluded that the 2014 ‘elections were particularly important in consolidating the country’s democratic gains since the 2011 revolution including registration procedure, transparency and election day. Indeed, figures from 2011 highlighted high abstention rates among the younger generations. International foundation for electoral system (IFES) stated that “the three rounds of elections were credible and highlight considerable progress from the 2011 elections, particularly in capacity of ISIE to collaborate both with domestic NGOs and international partners in the deliverance of more transparent and accurate process”. European Union for its part also remarks relevant improvement. The United Nations through his agency UNDAF acknowledged the internal capacity of Tunisian authorities to organize elections and civil society ensuring its fairness, planning new measures of assistance in years ahead.
11 Eighteen national public opinion polls are available online. <https://www.iri.org/country/tunisia>
12 Interview with Hanns Seidel officials, Tunis 2017. To have an idea of the activities HSS led in Tunisia see for instance <http://www.hssma.org/activities.cfm>
13 Interview with a National Democratic Institute Official, Washington, DC, 2018.
14 Interview with an International Republican Institute Official, Washington, DC, 2018.
15 Although US NGOs are now delivering mostly single party training, in 2018 IRI has collaborated with several political parties on how to talk in front of a camera and convey your messages.
16 Interviews with Konrad Adenauer director and with Friedrich Neumann Director, Tunis 2017.
17 Interview with a member of Nida Tounes, Tunis 2018.
18 Interview with a member of al-Nahda, Tunis 2018. Author’s translation by French.
19 Interview with a member of Front Populaire and a member of al-Johmouri, Tunis, March 2018. Author’s translation by French.
20 For more information see: <https://nawaat.org/portail/2016/02/01/tunisia-a-booming-civil-society-a-fragile-democracy-and-endless-challenges-ahead/>
21 For an updated chart of the number of civic associations in Tunisia, see <http://www.ifeda.org.tn/stats/francais.pdf>
22 Interview with an official of Freedom House, Washington, DC, April 2018. For more information in 2017 report of Freedom House see <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2017/tunisia>
23 During interviews with the German Political Foundations Directors and with officers from NDI and IRI, it came out that offices in Tunisia hold regular meetings to cooperate and deliver a more effective strategy.
24 Floridi M, Costantini, G, Evaluation du Programme d’appui à la société civil, Rapport final Demande de prestation: 2016/380-154 V1, Avril 2016, accessed by the author with the permission of EU officials in Tunisia Avril 2017.
Smaller and more specific program had also been launched to bridge EU and Tunisia partners such as the Reseau Euro-Mediterranean des Droits de l’Homme (REMDH).
25 Floridi M., Constantini G., Weiss P, Pozo J.O, Programme de L’Union européenne pour la Tunisie, Rapport sur le focus group et les ateliers, Demande de prestation: 2016/380-154 V1, juin 2017. Accessed by the author with the permission of EU officials in Tunisia.
26 European Union consulted 202 national partners, located in 23 of the 24 country governorates asking for feedback on the partnership through semi-structured interviews.
27 Although the author was unable to obtain precise data of funding, this assumption is confirmed by an interview with an EU official.
28 Other Institution targeted by EU assistance are L’Instance Nationale de Prévention contre la Torture (INPT) , L’Instance Nationale de lutte contre la traite des personnes (ILCTP), L’Instance Nationale de protection des données personnelles (INPDP). For more information see Weiss Pierre, Evaluation du Programme d’appui à la société civil, Rapport instance Constitutionnelles independantes Rapport Lettre de contrat N°2016/380154 Avril 2017.
29 Interview with a member of I-Watch, Tunis 2018.
30 Interview with a European Union officer, Tunis, 2017.
31 Interview with a member of ATIDE, Tunis 2018.
32 Interview with a member of Mouraikboun, Tunis 2018. Author’s translation by French.
33 Interview with a member of Jeunesse Sans Frontiers, Tunis 2018.