A frame analysis of political-media discourse on the Belt and Road Initiative: evidence from China, Australia, India, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States

Abstract

The article seeks to unpack the increasingly polarised discussion on the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and provide a holistic understanding of it by identifying the diverging interpretations in the form of frames and analysing the competing framing practices of actors figuring prominently in the debate. To that end, this study leverages conceptual insights from cultural framing and content-analyses a purpose-built corpus of political and media communications on the BRI gathered from China, India, the US, Japan, the UK and Australia. It first identifies, reconstructs and juxtaposes 14 culturally-embedded frames along five dimensions: China’s intensions (Ploy, Zero-sum game, Equality), the BRI’s implications for other countries (Bane, Lopsided, Boon), compliance with high standards (Below par, Qualified yes, Up to par), outcomes (Bumpy ride, Catchall, Off with a bang), and linkage to the past (Old wine in new bottles, Historical legacy). A subsequent deductive analysis, along the lines of the 14 frames, sheds light on the core claims constituting China’s discursive legitimation of the BRI, the salient difference between Chinese officials and foreign political-media elites, the continuity or change in the position on the BRI taken by foreign governments and their justifications, and the increasing critical coverage by foreign elite media.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Appendix A. Description of the sample

Appendix B. Frame table

Notes

1 ‘Elite media’ refer to media outlets that shape the agenda of other mass media. It is used here interchangeably with ‘quality press’. The reason for focusing on elite media is twofold. First, they are generally more influential internationally. Second, elite media, as against other mass media that are fixated on national affairs, had more coverage of BRI events worldwide.

2 The focus on Chinese official rhetoric and the selection of countries are explained later.

3 While competing visions, interests and preferences existed in the Chinese officialdom as noted in Jones and Zeng (2019), inter-ministerial disagreement did not really translate into notable differences in the major talking points of the BRI (e.g., benefits, progress, guiding principles) at the level of official rhetoric. As such, MFA communications on the BRI are treated as representative of Chinese official rhetoric on the initiative.

4 Sri Lanka accepted a debt-for-equity swap and gave China Merchants (a Chinese state-owned company) a majority stake in the Hambantota port for 99 years.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Hai Yang

Hai Yang is an assistant professor at the School of International Relations, Sun Yat-sen University. He has an eclectic mix of research interests, with a focus on the role of language and discourse in international politics, framing practices, legitimacy and legitimation of regional and international institutions, and structures parallel to the global institutional establishment spearheaded by China and other emerging powers. His research output has appeared or is forthcoming in Global Governance, Journal of Contemporary China, Pacific Review, and Asia Europe Journal, among others.

Baldwin Van Gorp

Baldwin Van Gorp is a professor of journalism and communications at the Institute for Media Studies, KU Leuven. His research interests straddle framing conceptualisations and methodologies, framing effects, framing and counter-framing, strategic communications, and news production. He has applied framing to a variety of topics, including refugees, Europe, dementia, and poverty. He has published in, among others, Journal of Communication, European Journal of Communication, and Journalism.