Exploring the limits of localisation through the UK’s contestation of R2P’s peaceful measures in Syria

Abstract

This article explores how the UK’s selective neglect in linking the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) to its peaceful responses to Syria reinforces the claim that R2P is predominantly understood as military humanitarian intervention, which is deleterious for building international consensus for atrocity prevention and response. It does this through an empirical case study of the UK’s responses to Syria during 2014-2016 when the UK’s peaceful responses expanded, providing rich data for examining their underlying motivations. The article provides a case study of the UK’s contestation of R2P’s peaceful measures that builds upon existing work around the limits of contestation and norm degeneration due to how it feeds back to the international level. The article also explores the intersection between contestation and localisation and how the UK’s particular localisation of R2P feeds into claims and fears of western imperialism, which obstructs effective atrocity prevention and response.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1 Libya was seen as R2P’s watershed moment when the UN Security Council authorised NATO’s use of force against Libya to protect the population from mass atrocities, but the Permanent Three were blamed for exceeding the mandate and effecting regime change. As a result, Russia and China have blocked subsequent resolutions that could provide any pathway to intervention in Syria (Zifcak 2012).

2 See, Sikkink (2013); Ralph and Gifkins (2017); Ralph, Holland, and Zhekova (2017); Brockmeier, Kurtz, and Junk (2014); Docherty, Mathieu, and Ralph (2020); Staunton (2018).

3 For a discussion of the difference between ‘norm makers’ and ‘norm takers’, see Checkel (1999) and Stefan (2017).

4 The misapplication can lead to further understanding of the norm. For example, the misuse of R2P to the situations of Cyclone Nargis in Burma and to South Ossetia during the conflict between Russia and Georgia clarified the appropriate context for using R2P (Stefan and Weiss 2010, 369). In these scenarios, the misapplication of R2P did not result in non-compliance because R2P did not fit the existing context and thus there was no need to comply. Such a distinction is paramount in order to avoid conflating misapplication of the norm with non-compliance of the norm. Misapplication in this sense equates to an attempt to apply the R2P framework to a context in which it was never meant to address, such as in the event of natural disasters. Such misapplication has not weakened R2P but strengthened when it does apply.

5 According to Acharya, subsidiarity is triggered by less powerful states’ ‘sense of exclusion or a perception of big power hypocrisy, or perception of dominance, neglect, violations, or abuse’ as discussed on the previous page (2011, 97–99).

6 For example, social actors are the MPs in Parliament or individual policymakers in the FCO and DFID.

7 Since the research, DFID was scaled down and merged within the FCO to become the FCDO.

8 Those interviewed included the small number of political elites leading policy (and some civil society advocates working directly with the government) on mass atrocity responses to Syria. To supplement the interviews, information was also gathered through statements and answers to questions provided by officials at several public and closed conferences during 2016–2018 under the Chatham House Rule.

9 This was a common argument made by the CSOs interviewed. However, this hypothesis could not be confirmed through formal interviews with agents within DFID.

10 The Home Office is not included since the interviews confirmed a complete lack of knowledge around R2P.

11 This is likely because R2P norm modification research has mostly focused on the contributions of the BRICS. For example, China’s ‘Responsible Protection’ and Brazil’s ‘Responsibility While Protecting’ initiatives did not progress internationally and thus had no effect on modifying R2P. In studies where the effects are examined, scholars tend to use ‘pragmatic constructivism’ rather than localisation (Ralph 2018).

12 Human rights violations are monitored at the international level by Treaty bodies and UN Charter bodies, including the Universal Periodic Review. Allowing a pathway for intervention via R2P for such violations would fundamentally change the international system, which only allows prosecution of, or intervention for, violations rising to the level of atrocities.

13 For example, had the UK localised R2P as solely diplomacy while contesting the other peaceful measures, this would not have the same impact. It is the existing fears around R2P’s coercive aspect that must be considered. This shows how contestation and localisation relate in certain contexts.

14 All internet sources accessed 31 December 2022 unless indicated.

Additional information

Funding

The research and early drafts of this work were supported by the generosity of the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) through a White Rose PhD studentship followed by a post-doctoral fellowship [grant number ES/T007400/1] at York Law School, University of York.

Notes on contributors

Chloë M. Gilgan

Dr Gilgan is a Senior Lecturer in international human rights law at the University of Lincoln. She completed an ESRC-funded Post-doctoral Fellowship at the University of York Law School where she completed her ESRC-funded PhD in 2019 at the Centre for Applied Human Rights. She holds a JD from New York Law School and is a member of the New York State Bar and she holds a BA from Barnard College, Columbia University. Email: [email protected]