An Indefinite Alliance? Article 13 and the North Atlantic Treaty

ABSTRACT

This article examines the background to the provisions in the North Atlantic Treaty for the alliance’s duration and member state withdrawal (Article 13). Studies of the Treaty have generally ignored Article 13 despite it being intensely debated during the treaty negotiations in 1948–1949. Addressing the views on duration and withdrawal that featured during these negotiations fills important gaps in the historical literature on the Alliance. In particular, understanding how consensus was reached on these clauses highlights the important role played by both strategic and domestic political considerations. In particular, the wording of the clause was directly linked with deterrence of military aggression and reassurance of Allies. It was also linked with the American preference for a treaty of relatively short duration, which was perceived to be a necessity in winning Senate ratification. In addition, this article traces a number of subsequent diplomatic controversies associated with Article 13, including the 1966 French withdrawal from the Alliance’s integrated military structure and, more recently, President Donald Trump´s reported interest in a US withdrawal.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

^1. The Treaty text is available at: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_17120.htm.

^2. Despite no NATO member state withdrawing from the Alliance, this was not the case with other Western security pacts nor with the Warsaw Pact. For example, Iraq exited the Baghdad Pact in 1959 which led to its replacement by the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), Iran and Pakistan left CENTO in 1979 prior to its formal disbandment that year, and Pakistan exited the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization in 1973 prior to its formal disbandment in 1977. In 1961, Albania had de facto withdrawn from the Warsaw Pact and withdrew de jure in 1968 following the Pact’s intervention in Czechoslovakia. Despite Hungary announcing its intent to leave in 1956, the Soviet intervention that year and the replacement of the Hungarian leadership led to the country remaining in the Pact until it dissolved in 1991. There have also been defections from the 1947 Inter American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty): Bolivia (2012), Ecuador (2014), Mexico (2002), Nicaragua (2012), Venezuela (2013), Peru (1990 but withdrew its denunciation in 1991) and Uruguay (2019 but withdrew its denunciation in 2020). See: Behçet Kemal Yeşilbursa, ‘CENTO: the forgotten alliance in the Middle East (1959–1979)’, Middle Eastern Studies, 56, no. 6 (2020) 854–877; ‘Pakistan Formally Pulls Out of SEATO’, The Washington Post, November 9, 1972; John N. Washburn, ‘The Current Legal Status of Warsaw Pact Membership’, The International Lawyer 5, no. 1 (1971): 129–134; Csaba Békés, ‘The 1956 Hungarian Revolution and the Declaration of Neutrality’, Cold War History 6, no. 4 (2006): 477–500. Details for the Rio Pact denunciations can be found at: http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/sigs/b-29.html.

^3. Several examples include: John M. Schuessler and Joshua R. Shifrinson, “The Shadow of Exit from NATO,” Strategic Studies Quarterly 13, no. 3 (2019): 38–51; Stanley R. Sloan, Permanent Alliance?: NATO and the Transatlantic Bargain from Truman to Obama (Bloomsbury Academic & Professional, 2010); Wallace Thies, Why NATO Endures (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

^4. Joe Lieberman and Mark D. Wallace, “Does Erdogan’s Turkey Belong in NATO?,” Wall Street Journal, (2022).

^5. Throughout this article, unless otherwise stated, the terms ‘withdrawal’ and ‘denunciation’ are used interchangeably to refer to the act by which a state can quit its membership in a treaty pursuant to the terms of the relevant treaty clause. This limited interpretation is distinct from one in which withdrawal occurs in the absence of a specific provision to this effect. Similarly, ‘duration clause’, as discussed here, often found in treaties in the same Article as the withdrawal clause, refers to the period the treaty is expected to last, which can either be fixed or indefinite.

^6. Despite the enormous number of volumes covering NATO’s early history, relatively few engage with the treaty negotiations, and those that do mostly avoid discussion of Article 13. Among these works are: James Sperling and Mark Webber, ed. NATO Handbook (Oxford, Oxford University Press, Forthcoming); Timothy Sayle, Enduring Alliance: A History of NATO and the Postwar Global Order (Ithaca: Cornell UP 2019); Gustav Schmidt, ed. A History of NATO: The First Fifty Years (NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001), and John W. Young, Britain, France and the Unity of Europe, 1945–1951 (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1984). Those works that examine the drafting of specific clauses have mostly avoided discussion of Article 13, apart from the odd mention in several sentences, for instance: Lawrence S. Kaplan, NATO 1948: The Birth of the Transatlantic Alliance (Plymouth, UK: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2007). Nor does this author’s article for a Special Issue on the Treaty pay more than a passing reference to it. See: Lawrence S. Kaplan, “Origins of NATO: 1948–1949,” Emory International Law Review 34, (2019): 11–28. Notably, this special issue included contributions on the Treaty’s Preamble and Principles, and Articles 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9 and 10, although these contributions were principally focused on their role in Alliance history after 1949, rather than including any significant historical commentary on their drafting. Another recent work dealing with the negotiations also does not address it: Paul Poast, Arguing about alliances: the art of agreement in military-pact negotiations (New York: Oxford University Press, 2020): 136–69. Though not an academic text, Canadian diplomat Escott Reid’s Time of Fear and Hope (Toronto, ON: McClelland and Stewart Ltd., 1977) provides the most substantive treatment of the negotiations, albeit reference to Article 13 amounts to less than three pages of discussion. British diplomat Nicholas Henderson’s memoir, The Birth of NATO (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1982) also briefly addresses the European preference for a longer duration but avoids any substantive discussion.

^7. Article 12: ‘After the Treaty has been in force for ten years, or at any time thereafter, the Parties shall, if any of them so requests, consult together for the purpose of reviewing the Treaty, having regard for the factors then affecting peace and security in the North Atlantic area, including the development of universal as well as regional arrangements under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security’. The Treaty text is available at: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_17120.htm.

^8. The original signatories were limited to: Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.

^9. The original draft of the Brussels Treaty drawn up by the British Foreign Office was only a slightly altered version of the 1947 Dunkirk Treaty. The duration clause that appeared in the earlier treaty and had thus already been agreed to by the UK and France was automatically transferred to the new document, without any objection from Belgium, Luxembourg or the Netherlands. Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin originally chose the 50-year period, in his own words, because ‘I recently made a public offer to extend the life of the Anglo-Soviet Treaty to 50 years and it seems appropriate that the Anglo-French Alliance should run for the same period’. No. 53 Memorandum by Mr Bevin for the Cabinet on the Anglo-French Alliance, 26 February 1947. Documents on British Policy Overseas (DBPO), Ser. 1, Vol. 11, CAB 129/17. At the treaty signing ceremony in Dunkirk on 5 March 1947, French Foreign Minister Georges Bidault stated, ‘This treaty was concluded for 50 years. This means for France a treaty for eternity – for always’. Bevin similarly referred to a ‘pledge for all times’. Both are cited in ‘Alliance Signed with France’, The Times, March 5, 1947.

^10. “Inter-American Reciprocal Assistance and Solidarity (Act of Chapultepec)”; 6 March 1945. The text is available at: https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/chapul.asp.

^11. Report of the United States Delegation to the conference at Rio de Janeiro, The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, 80th Congress, First Session, Executive Report No. 11. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 5 December 1947, 40.

^12. Alan K. Henrikson, “The Creation of the North Atlantic Alliance, 1948–1952,” Naval War College Review 33, no. 2 (1980): 9. As one US negotiator put it: ‘Acrimonious debate over the Treaty or serious objections to certain of its provisions by leaders in Congress would … serve to jeopardize the security of Western Europe. Since the Rio Treaty has already been approved by leaders in the Senate, it would be advisable to adopt similar language for a North Atlantic Treaty’. Memorandum of the Tenth Meeting of the Working Group Participating in the Washington Exploratory Talks on Security, August 12, 1948, Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1948, Western Europe, Vol. III.

^13. Reid, Time of Fear and Hope: 46–47.

^14. Ibid., 187–88.

^15. Minutes of the Sixth Meeting of the United States – United Kingdom – Canada Security Conversations, Held at Washington, 1 April 1948, FRUS, 1948, Western Europe, Vol. III.

^16. Proposed North Atlantic Defence Treaty, 26 June 1948, Washington Exploratory Talks on Security, 23 June 1948 to 31 December 1948, Volume #14–355, Documents on Canadian External Relations (DCER)

^17. Ambassador in United States to Secretary of State for External Affairs, 15 October 1948, Washington Exploratory Talks on Security: 23 June 1948–31 December 1948, Volume #14–407, DCER.

^18. Brussels Treaty Permanent Commission, Report of the Permanent Commission on the Draft North Atlantic Pact, 19 November 1948, Bevin papers, UK National Archives (UKNA).

^19. Memorandum by Ambassador in United States, 23 October 1948, Washington Exploratory Talks on Security: 23 June 1948 to 31 December 1948, DCER.

^20. Acting Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Secretary of State for External Affairs, November 6th, 1948, Washington Exploratory Talks on Security: 23 June 1948–31 December 1948, DCER.

^21. Ibid.

^22. Commentary on the Washington Paper of 9 September 1948, December 6, 1948, Washington Exploratory Talks on Security: 23 June 1948 to 31 December 1948, Volume #14–453, DCER. For instance, the negotiator from Luxembourg linked the duration of the pact with the influence it would have on Soviet foreign policy to include strengthening the position of Politburo members who might be opposed to war. Minutes of the Tenth Meeting of the Washington Exploratory Talks, 22 December 1948, FRUS, Western Europe, Vol. III.

^23. Minutes of Meeting of Working Group, December 17th, 1948, Washington Exploratory Talks on Security: 23 June 1948–31 December 1948, Volume #14–470, DCER.

^24. Ibid.

^25. Ibid.

^26. Report of the International Working Group to the Ambassadors’ Committee, 24 December 1948, FRUS, 1948, Western Europe, Vol. III.

^27. Ambassador in United States to Secretary of State for External Affairs, 24 December 1948, Washington Exploratory Talks on Security: 23 June 1948 to 31 December 1948, Volume #14–483, DCER.

^28. “Enclosure: Executive Report No. 8”, 6 June 1949. Legislative History of the North Atlantic Treaty: Executive L: Ratified by the Senate, 21 July 1949. Washington, Covington & Burling. Obtained via HeinOnline. (Accessed April 20, 2022).

^29. Memo from Bevin to PM, PM/48/122 December 31, 1948, Private Papers of FM Ernest Bevin, North Atlantic Pact 1948–1950, FO 800/483, UKNA; Mr. Bevin to Sir O. Franks (Washington), 4 January 1949, 11.30 am, DBPO, Ser. 1, Vol. 10, Ref: FO371/79218,Z77/1074/72/G; Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of European Affairs ;(Hickerson), December 31, 1948, FRUS, 1948, Western Europe, Vol. III; Ambassador in United States to Secretary of State for External Affairs, 4 January 1949, Negotiation of the North Atlantic Treaty, Volume #15–264, DCER; The Ambassador in Belgium;(Kirk) to the Acting Secretary of State, 7 January 1949, FRUS, 1949, Western Europe, Vol. IV; Ambassador in United States to Acting Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, 8 January 1949, Negotiation of the North Atlantic Treaty, Volume #15–267, DCER; Reid. Time of Fear and Hope. 188–189.

^30. Ambassador in United States to Secretary of State for External Affairs, 12 January 1949, Negotiation of the North Atlantic Treaty, Volume #15–268, DCER.

^31. Sir O. Franks (Washington) to Mr. Bevin, 1949, 10.10pm. DBPO, Ser. 1, Vol. 10, Ref: FO371/79221, Z422/1074/72/G.

^32. Minutes of the Eleventh Meeting of the Washington Exploratory Talks on Security, 14 January 1949, FRUS, 1949, Western Europe, Vol. IV, Doc. 23.

^33. Ambassador in United States to Secretary of State for External Affairs, 15 January 1949, North Atlantic Security, Vol. # 15–274, DCER.

^34. Mr. Bevin to Sir O. Franks (Washington), 17 January 1949, 9.30pm DBPO, Ser. 1, Vol. 10, Ref: FO371/79221, Z422/1074/72/G.

^35. Oral History Interview, Theodore Achilles, Washington DC, 13 November 1972, Richard D. McKinzie, Truman Library.

^36. Oral History Interview, John D. Hickerson, Washington DC 26 January 1973, Richard D. McKinzie, Truman Library.

^37. Letter from Mr Henderson (Washington) to Mr. Russell, 29 January 1949, DBPO, Ser. 1, Vol. 10, Ref: FO371/79223, Z1023/1074/72/G; Ambassador in United States to Secretary of State for External Affairs, 2 February 1949, Negotiation of the North Atlantic Treaty, Volume # 15–280, DCER.

^38. Letter from Mr. Henderson (Washington) to Mr. Russell, 2 February 1949, DBPO, Ser. 1, Vol. 10, Ref: FO371/79224, Z1138/1074/72/G.

^39. Ambassador in United States to Secretary of State for External Affairs, 25 February 1949, Negotiation of the North Atlantic Treaty, Volume #15–301, DCER.

^40. Oral History Interview, John D. Hickerson, Washington DC January 26, 1973, Richard D. McKinzie, Truman Library.

^41. Minute from Mr. Shuckburgh to Sir G. Jebb, 2 March 1949, DBPO, Ser. 1, Vol. 10, Ref: FO371/79232, Z2042/1074/72/G.

^42. Reid, Time of Fear and Hope: 187.

^43. Enclosure: Executive Report No. 8, 6 June 1949.

^44. Sir N. Ronald (Lisbon) to Mr. Bevin, 18 March 1949, 5.35 pm. DBPO, Ser. 1, Vol. 10, Ref: FO371/79238, Z2452/1074/72/G.

^45. The Ambassador in Portugal; (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State, 9 March 1949, FRUS, 1949, Western Europe, Vol. IV.

^46. Ibid.

^47. Mr. Bevin to Sir N. Ronald (Lisbon), 18 March 1949, 1.35pm DBPO, Ser. 1, Vol. 10, Ref: FO371/79237, Z2387/1074/72/G.

^48. Ibid.

^49. Sir O. Franks (Washington) to Mr. Bevin, 22 March 1949, 10.02 pm, DBPO, Ser. 1, Vol. 10, Ref: FO371/79239, Z2559/1074/72/G.

^50. North Atlantic Treaty: Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Eighty-First Congress, First Session 1, 1949.

^51. Report of Committee on Foreign Relations on the North Atlantic Treaty 81st Congress, 1st Session: Executive Report No. 8, June 6, 1949.

^52. Ibid.

^53. Harold Callender, ‘France will seek 50-year NATO Life’, The New York Times, December 11, 1953.

^54. Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs; (Bonbright) to the Secretary of State, 4 March 1953, FRUS, 1952–1954, Western European Security, Vol. V, Part 1, Doc. 393.

^55. Statement by Dwight D. Eisenhower on the EDC (16 April 1954). Available online at: https://www.cvce.eu/en/obj/statement_by_dwight_d_eisenhower_on_the_edc_16_april_1954-en-01c38068-da2e-4abb-a04e-aab59ffa6290.html; Statement by the British Government on the European Defence Community (14 April 1954). Available online at: https://www.cvce.eu/en/obj/statement_by_the_british_government_on_the_european_defence_community_14_april_1954-en-38f12f44-2d34-40c2-b6b9-42af40198c39.html.

^56. The Conference of the Nine Powers included: Belgium, Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States. See: https://www.nato.int/archives/1st5years/appendices/1b.htm.

^57. See for instance: Telegraphic Summary by the United States Delegation, 30 September 1954, FRUS, 1952–1954, Western European Security, Vol. 5, Part 2, Doc. 109.

^58. Verbatim Record of the Eighteenth Meeting of the Council, April 23, 1954, C -VR (54) 18, Accessed at NATO Archives Online, 26 April 2022.

^59. Telegram From the Ambassador in Germany (Bruce) to the Department of State, November 19, 1957, FRUS, 1955–1957, Western European Security and Integration, Vol. IV.

^60. Ibid.

^61. Memorandum of Conversation, February 8, 1959, FRUS, 1958–1960, Berlin Crisis, 1958–1959, Vol. VIII, Doc. 167.

^62. ‘Withdrawal from the North Atlantic Treaty’, June 11, 1965, Department of State, US Declassified Documents Online (DDO). See also: ‘Legal Possibilities of French Harassment of NATO; France’s Right to Withdraw from the North Atlantic Treaty and Related Agreements, August 6, 1965’, DDO.

^63. Cited in: “North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Exchanges of Notes on Withdrawal of French Forces,” International Legal Materials 5, no. 3 (1966): 426.

^64. Cited in Ibid., 432.

^65. West German Note to France of May 3, cited in ‘North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Exchanges of Notes on Withdrawal of French Forces’, International Legal Materials 5, no. 4 (1966): 681.

^66. Francis A. Beer (ed.) Integration and Disintegration in NATO: Processes of Alliance Cohesion and Prospects for Atlantic Community (Ohio State University Press, Ohio, 1969): 124.

^67. NATO Communiqué, 15–16 November 1968 in: NATO. Texts of Final Communiqués 1949–1974 (Brussels, NATO Information Service).

^68. Manlio Brosio, ‘Past and Future Tasks of the Alliance’, NATO Letter 17, no. 3 (March 1968): 10.

^69. For US deliberations and discussions with the Greek government, other Alliance members and the NATO Secretary General on this matter, see, for instance: Paper Prepared by the National Security Council Staff, March 21, 1975, FRUS, 1969–1976, Vol. XXX, Greece; Cyprus; Turkey, 1973–1976; Cable from US Mission to NATO to SECSTATE, Subject: Cyprus: 16 August NAC Meeting, 161755ZAUG74; Cable from SECSTATE to US Delegation to NATO, Subject: Greece and NATO, 180035ZSEP74; Cable from AMEMBASSY ATHENS to SECSTATE, Subject: DEFMIN Averoff’s Current Views on NATO Withdrawal Decision as Expressed to CODEL, 121455ZSEP74. These documents are available online at: https://aad.archives.gov.

^70. For example, see: Cable from SECSTATE to US Delegation to NATO, Action Memorandum: Portugal and NATO, 030128ZSEP75ZFF4, US National Archives. Available online at: https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=319872&dt=2476&dl=1345.

^71. A useful discussion of NATO’s role in the ‘Cod Wars’ can be found in: Sverrir Steinsson, ‘Do liberal ties pacify? A study of the Cod Wars’, Cooperation and Conflict 53, no. 3 (2018): 339–355. For a US appraisal of Iceland’s threats to leave NATO, see: AMEMBASSY Reykjavik to SECSTATE, Subject: Iceland-UK Fisheries Dispute: Report on Today’s Session of Icelandic Cabinet, 121423Z JAN 76. https://aad.archives.gov. See also, CIA, National Intelligence Bulletin, December 4, 1975. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP79T00975A028400010008-8.pdf.

^72. Text of the Statement by Molotov at Meeting of United Nations General Assembly: “Molotov Remarks Before U. N.”, New York Times, September 24, 1955.

^73. According to Article 11: ‘The present Treaty shall remain in force for twenty years. For such Contracting Parties as do not at least one year before the expiration of this period present to the Government of the Polish People’s Republic a statement of denunciation of the Treaty, it shall remain in force for the next ten years. Should a system of collective security be established in Europe, and a General European Treaty of Collective Security concluded for this purpose, for which the Contracting Parties will unswervingly strive, the present Treaty shall cease to be operative from the day the General European Treaty enters into force’. Text can be accessed at: https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/warsaw.asp.

^74. “The Bucharest Declaration,” Current History 53, no. 314 (1967): 236–37.

^75. Statement by the European Communist and Workers’ Parties on Security in Europe (Karlovy Vary, 26 April 1967).

https://www.cvce.eu/en/obj/statement_by_the_european_communist_and_workers_parties_on_security_in_europe_karlovy_vary_26_april_1967-en-e8fe5ae4-27cc-4e0f-a48a-c8c82cb548e6.html.

^76. The bill was introduced by Congressman Jimmy Panetta (D) and Congressman Steve Knight (R-CA).

^77. H.R. 6530, 115th Cong., § 3 (2018).

^78. Sections 101–104, S. 3336, 115th Cong. (2018).

^79. S.J.Res.4 — 116th Congress (2019–2020).

^80. Ibid.

^81. Julian E. Barnes and Helene Cooper, “Trump Discussed Pulling US From NATO, Aides Say Amid New Concerns Over Russia,” The New York Times, January 14, 2019.

^82. Rebecca Kheel, “Senators reintroduce bill to block NATO withdrawal,” The Hill, April 15, 2021; “Rubio, Kaine Applaud Committee Passage of Joint Resolution to Prevent Any U.S. President from Leaving NATO Without Congressional Approval, Press Release,” March 29, 2022: https://www.rubio.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2022/3/rubio-kaine-applaud-committee-passage-of-joint-resolution-to-prevent-any-u-s-president-from-leaving-nato-without-congressional-approval.

^83. I will not attempt to summarise this vast literature here. However, a useful discussion on presidential termination of the North Atlantic Treaty can be found in: Curtis Bradley and Jack Goldsmith. ‘Constitutional Issues Relating to the NATO Support Act’, Lawfare Blog, January 28, 2019.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Jeffrey H. Michaels

Jeffrey H. Michaels is the IEN Senior Fellow in American Foreign Policy and International Security at the Institut Barcelona d’Estudis Internacionals. Earlier experience included working as a Senior Lecturer in Defence Studies at King’s College London, as well as serving as an official with NATO and the US Defense Department. He also holds Visiting Fellowships with the Department of War Studies at King’s and the Changing Character of War Centre, Pembroke College, Oxford.