What’s in it for us? Armed drone strikes and the security of Somalia’s Federal Government

ABSTRACT

Strikes conducted by the US using armed unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) against the terrorist group al-Shabaab have received widespread attention documenting the number of strikes, the reactions of the local Somalis, and the disparity between AFRICOM and local reporting. Using interview data from individuals in Mogadishu, Nairobi and elsewhere in the region, this article provides a counterpoint to previous studies by measuring the Federal Government of Somalia’s (FGS) reliance on the US drone campaign in Somalia in order to maintain its tenuous hold on power. It measures the extent to which the drone campaigns of external parties are able to insulate weak host governments from the threat of an internal foe. It finds that US drone strikes offer the occasional but only reliable check on al-Shabaab thereby allowing the FGS to continue functioning in Mogadishu. Yet strikes should not be construed as a sign of overt US support for the FGS. Rather, the US government, deeply suspicious of a highly corrupt and incapable FGS, continues to prosecute drone strikes against al-Shabaab because Washington considers the group poses a national security threat to the US.

KEYWORDS:

• Drone strikes
• insurgency
• al-Shabaab
• Somalia
• state collapse
• armed unmanned aerial vehicle

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank my good friend and colleague, Miguel Alejandro Híjar-Chiapa, for taking the time and effort to create a number of the tables and maps seen in this article. The author would like to thank Abdirazak Fartaag, former Head of Public Finance Management Unit, Office of the Prime Minister (Somalia) and founder of Fartaag Research and Consulting for his information, comments and suggestions. This research project would not have come to fruition without his assistance. The author would also like to thank his many friends in Hargeisa, Mogadishu and Nairobi who chose to remain anonymous but have helped him greatly with this and other endeavors.

Disclosure Statement

The author has no conflicts of interest to report.

Notes

1. The United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM, U.S. AFRICOM, and AFRICOM), headquartered at Kelley Barracks, Stuttgart, Germany, is one of the eleven unified combatant commands of the United States Armed Forces.

2. An increase in the use of drones and other lethal strikes has occurred during the Trump administration, not only in Somalia but also in Yemen and Pakistan. Drone strikes numbered 238 between 2017 and the end of 2018, for example. This is compared with 186 strikes at the height of the Obama administration’s drone use in 2009 and 2010. Pratt, US Killing. In addition, President Trump reportedly weakened the rules governing drone strikes outside declared war zones, to include throwing out the requirement that a target pose an ‘imminent threat.’ Savage, Will Congress Ever.

3. Rossiter, ‘Drone usage by militant,’ 116–119.

4. Troops from various African states including Burundi, Uganda, Kenya and Ethiopia form AMISOM, a UN-sanctioned, African Union (AU)-operated force that has borne the brunt of fighting, capturing and holding territory since its inception in 2007. The actions of AMISOM as well as US drone strikes and other related security operations are largely responsible for limiting al-Shabaab’s power and territorial acquisitions.

5. Milan and Tabrizi, ‘The Need for UCAVs.’

6. Johnston and Sarbahi, ‘The impact of US’; Price, ‘Targeting Top Terrorists’; Reeder and Smith, ‘US Strikes in Somalia’; and Jordan, ‘When Heads Roll.’

7. Wilner, ‘Targeted killings in Afghanistan’; and Dear, ‘Beheading the Hydra’.

8. Johnston and Sarbahi, ‘The impact of US.’

9. Abrahms and Mierau, ‘Leadership Matters’; Walsh and Smith, ‘Do Drone Strikes Degrade’; Lehrke and Schomaker, ‘Kill, Capture, or Defend?’.

10. Shah, ‘Do U.S. Drone Strikes Cause Blowback?’; Ahmed, Jenkins, and Iftikhar,”Perception of Foreign Drone Strikes by Citizens”; Jordan, ‘Attacking the Leader’; and Mahmood, ‘The Efficacy of US Drone Strikes in Pakistan.’

11. Rinehart, Drones and Targeted; Macdonald and Schneider, ‘Presidential risk.’

12. Cockburn, Kill Chain; Carvin, ‘Getting Drones Wrong’; and Cronin, ‘Why Drones Fail.’

13. Strawser, ‘Moral Predators’; and Aloyo, ‘Just Assassinations.’

14. McNeal, ‘Are Targeting Killings Unlawful?’; and Etizioni, ‘The Great Drone Debate.’

15. Renic, ‘Justified Killing,’ 425.

16. Johnston and Sarbahi, ‘The impact of US’; Aslam, “‘A critical evaluation’; Franke, ‘Drones, drone strikes’; and Mazhar, ‘Do remotely piloted.’

17. Downes, ‘Targeted Killings’; Eastin and Glade, ‘Beheading the Hydra’; Pashakhanlou, ‘Air Power’; and Barry ‘Harsh Lessons.’

18. Guido, ‘The American Way.’

19. One of the few exceptions beyond media stories or scholarly articles with passing references to Somalia is Reeder and Smith, ‘US Strikes in Somalia.’

20. Arguments about the erosion (or not) of state sovereignty figure more prominently in the literature. But this research often presupposes a unitary and relatively robust state such as Pakistan, not a failed state like Somalia. Ali and Khan, ‘Drone Strikes.’

21. Recent reports also claim drones and drone strikes in Somalia are operated by the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). However, given the nature of these claims and the opacity that generally characterizes CIA operations they do not figure in this article.

22. Hansen, Somalia drone strikes; and Byrne ‘Consent and the use of force.’

23. There are currently 500 US troops reportedly deployed to Somalia. Morgan, U.S. Military Builds Up; and Purkiss and Fielding-Smith, Somalia: Reported US Actions.

24. In 2017, President Trump authorized the US military to conduct offensive strikes in Somalia against al-Shabaab fighters as well those affiliated with the Islamic State (IS), also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).

25. Reeder and Smith, 591.

26. Australian National Security, ‘Al-Shabaab.’

27. Cannon and Iyekekpolo, ‘Explaining Transborder Terrorist Attacks.’

28. Cannon and Pkalya, ‘Why al-Shabaab Attacks.’

29. For example, three Americans were killed when al-Shabaab fighters stormed a Kenyan air base used by the US military in Lamu county in early January 2020.

30. U.S. Africa Command Public Affairs, U.S. Conducts Airstrike in Support.

31. Hansen.

32. Ibid.

33. Bergen, Drone Strikes: Somalia.

34. BBC, ‘Somalia Al-Shabaab.’

35. Purkiss and Fielding-Smith.

36. Ibid.

37. Ibid.

38. These seem to be couched in ethical or moral terms rather than based on an evaluation of the results of the strike in hampering the capabilities of al-Shabaab. In other words, the reports and related arguments maintain a focus on the lethal nature of drone attacks resulting in civilian casualties and collateral damage and generally ignore the lethality of al-Shabaab and what the group would do if left unhampered. See Amnesty International, ‘The Hidden War in Somalia.’ See also Sperber, Inside the Secretive.

39. For an excellent article documenting the stability, abuse and so-called ‘golden age’ of CIC rule in Mogadishu, see Barnes and Hassan, ‘The Rise and Fall of Mogadishu’s Islamic Courts.’

40. Goldbaum, A Trumpian War.

41. Ibid.; and Dörrie, ‘Why Territorial.’

42. In January 2019, al-Shabaab attacked the upscale Dusit D2 hotel complex in the heart of Nairobi, Kenya’s capital city, killing at least 21 people and injuring at least 28.

43. The adage ‘Somalia has turned a corner’ dates back well over a decade, but is supported by little evidence. Kachroo and Simmons, ‘After Decades’; Kenyan, ‘How Somalia’s Government’; The Economist, ‘Pushing It Across’; and Xinhua, ‘AMISOM commits.’ For a soberer analysis detailing the weakness and potentially imminent collapse of the FGS as compared with the continued power of al-Shabaab, see Ingiriis, ‘Building Peace.’

44. The Transitional Federal Government (TFG) was the internationally recognized government of the Republic of Somalia from 2004 until 2012, when its tenure officially ended and the FGS was inaugurated.

45. Jamal, Identifying Causes.

46. Funding from external states and organizations has been and continues to be the lifeblood of the FGS. The US, for example, has spent a combined total of $2.9 billion since 2012. In 2016 alone, the US Department of Defense (DoD) spent over $67million under Section 1206, which allows for the training and equipping of foreign military forces to perform counterterrorism operations and to participate in or to support military and stability operations in which US Armed Forces are participating. Security Assistance Monitor, Somalia.

47. Transparency International, 2018 Corruptions Perceptions.

48. Fartaag, Interview by Author.

49. Marqaati, Somalia State of.

50. Ibid.

51. Fartaag, Interview by Author; and Marqaati.

52. Fartaag, Their Own Worst; and Fartaag, Breaking Point.

53. Herbst, States and power; and Samatar, Africa’s First Democrats.

54. The FGS exercises little to no control over vast swathes of Somalia. For example, the breakaway Republic of Somaliland – de-facto independent but internationally unrecognized since 1991 – signed a deal to develop the port of Berbera on the Gulf of Yemen with Ethiopia and the UAE’s DP World in early 2016. Many in the FGS were incensed and subsequently passed laws that banned DP World from operating in Somalia. These made no difference and the port expansion continues as planned. See Cannon and Rossiter, ‘Ethiopia, Berbera port.’

55. For examples of humanitarian aid path dependency, see Cannon and Fujibayashi, ‘Security, structural factors.’

56. Much of the aid money from external states ends up being returned to contractors and subcontractors from those same states. They feel little to no pressure to complete projects or ensure their success because that would mean an end to the contracts. Other abuses of aid have been documented such as the UN World Food Programme (WFP)’s work with Somali cartels. Together they divided the lucrative profit derived from selling UN food aid. Jones, ‘Half of all food’; and Mogadishu-based businessperson, Interview by Author.

57. Samatar, Somaliland’s Stakes.

58. Keohane and Nye, ‘Power and Interdependence’; Waltz, Theory of International; and Barnett and Duvall, Power in Global.

59. Cannon, ‘Foreign State Influence’; and Hills, ‘Security sector’; and Cannon and Donelli, ‘Asymmetric Alliances.’

60. Reno, ‘The politics of security,’ 505.

61. Menkhaus, ‘Managing risk.’

62. Mogadishu-based businessperson, Interview by Author. For an excellent analysis documenting the weakness and very real possibility of collapse of the FGS juxtaposed with the continued strength of al-Shabaab, see Ingiriis, ‘Building peace.’

63. Prime Minister of Somalia from August 2009 until September 2010 and again from December 2014 until March 2017.

64. Balthasar, State-making, 131.

65. U.S. Department of State, ‘Country Reports.’ 2.

66. For example, after a diplomatic spat resulting from the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) crisis, at least 600 weapons were stolen from a former UAE-run training center Mogadishu. The training facility and arsenal were looted and the weapons were reportedly sold throughout the city. Sheikh and Omar, Exclusive: Weapons stolen.

67. Rossiter and Cannon, ‘Re-examining the “Base”,’181.

68. Crisiswatch, Tracking Conflict.

69. START, Global Terrorism.

70. Byrne; and Sperber, Inside the Secretive.

71. International Bar Association, ‘The Legality of,’ 13.

72. Byrne ‘Consent and the Use of Force,’ 120.

73. See note 35 above.

74. Mogadishu-based official, Interview by Author; and Fartaag, Interview by Author.

75. Mogadishu-based official, Interview by Author.

76. For example, an elite commando force known as ‘Danab’, or the lighting force, is reportedly one such unit that provides intelligence. Originally conceived as a battalion-sized element, AFRICOM reported that the effort has been expanded to build a 3,000-troop brigade deployed across six Somali army sectors. Vandiver, US helps Somali; and Reno, ‘The politics of security,’ 508.

77. Somali intelligence officials reportedly warned Kenya in November 2018 about a plot to attack an unknown target involving five men – the same number who attacked the Dusit D2 hotel in Nairobi in January 2019. However, Kenya reportedly decided not to pay for more information because of the vague nature of the information as well as the sheer number of threats of attack by al-Shabaab routinely reported to Kenyan intelligence. Yet without payment, according to one Somali official, it was impossible to solicit further details from sources within al-Shabaab. Akwiri and Houreld, ‘Kenya bomber’s journey.’

78. For example, in 2013, attackers were able to infiltrate and attack both the heavily guarded and fortified prime minister’s residence as well as Villa Somalia, the presidential palace. The wearing of badges and security service uniforms by al-Shabaab attackers is also indicative of major security lapses and infiltration. After their role came to light after a string of hotel bombings in Mogadishu, a scathing UN monitoring group report highlighted al-Shabaab infiltration of NISA, built and funded in part by the CIA, as well as the police force. Reno, ‘The Dilemmas of Security,’ 62; and United Nations, 64.

79. See note 62 above.

Additional information

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Brendon J. Cannon

Brendon J. Cannon is Assistant Professor of International Security at the Institute of International & Civil Security, Khalifa University of Science & Technology (Abu Dhabi, UAE). He earned a PhD in political science with an emphasis on international relations and comparative politics at the University of Utah, USA (2009). Dr. Cannon was previously the director of the Gollis University Research Institute in Hargeisa, Somaliland and Assistant Professor of International Relations at Kisii University in Nairobi, Kenya. His research interests include contextualizing domestic, regional and international relations in eastern Africa; regional security in the Arabian Gulf and western Indian Ocean region; the political economy of ports, bases and airports; and the Indo-Pacific strategies of India, Japan, the US and Australia in contrast with China’s BRI in the western Indian Ocean region. He is the author of multiple articles and books, with publications appearing in African Security, Terrorism and Political Violence, Defence Studies, African Security Review and Third World Quarterly.