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ABSTRACT
After succeeding the Qin, the Former Han reverted to the earlier practice of discrete localized authority. This resulted in an intermixed system of directly administered entities in the Wei River Valley, where the capital of Chang’an was located, and individual kingdoms east of the mountains that isolate the Guanzhong area. This hybrid system inherently nurtured a tendency to rebellion. When the Han suppressed the Revolt of the Seven Kingdoms in 154 BCE, it ensured China would remain on a unified trajectory. However, the revolt was a precursor to coups and putsches that imperial relatives, powerful generals, and entrenched provincial officials would mount over the centuries. Even though not the only form of insurgency China would witness before the modern era, often being undertaken by charismatic individuals with dedicated followers, considerable material resources and military forces, they proved particuarly devastating. Populist revolts and religiously based movements might threaten the established order, but were never marked by the same invidious nature.
Notes
1. China suffered four significant eras of fragmentation: the Spring and Autumn (722–481) and Warring States (403–221) periods, the Six Dynasties (222–589), including the Three Kingdoms period, and the Five Dynasties (907–959).
2. The Shang supposedly fell within the highly abstract concentric rings of Xia subject states. However, the paucity of archaeological evidence makes confirmation of the event, however likely, impossible. In fact, considerable controversy persists over the Xia’s very existence and the probable date of the rebellion, traditionally held to be 1521 BCE, despite the extensive efforts of the recent Xia-Shang-Zhou project. Accordingly, the Cambridge History of Ancient China edited by Michael Loewe and Edward L. Shaughnessy, the definitive English language study of antiquity, essentially begins its account with the Shang. (Hereafter, the Cambridge History of Ancient China is to be considered fundamental, obviating the need for repetitive citing. For a consideration of all the evidence and an outline of the campaign see Ralph Sawyer, Ancient Chinese Warfare, 106–116.)
3. David Keightley’s chapter, ‘The Shang: China’s First Historical Dynasty,’ in the Cambridge History of Ancient China (232–291) provides a basic overview of the Shang. A more detailed account of Shang warfare may be found in Sawyer, Ancient Chinese Warfare, especially 155–202, and volume 1, Xia Shang XiZhou Junshishi, of the comprehensive military history of China, Zhongguo Junshi Tongshi, which is similarly fundamental to any consideration of China’s martial history. (Apart from particularly crucial studies, in view of the journal’s readership, preference herein is given to readily accessible English language materials.)
4. Extended studies of the rebellion and the Zhou’s battles with external peoples may be found in Sawyer, Conquest and Domination in Early China: Rise and Demise of the Western Chou, pp. 129–174 and 185–260 respectively, as well as Xia Shang XiZhou Junshishi.
5. The Western Han is so named because the capital was quickly relocated to Chang’an in the west rather than more central Loyang, which would serve the same function for the Eastern or Later Han. (The only comprehensive study of the Qin and Han in English, hereafter assumed to be essential background, remains The Cambridge History of China: The Ch’in and Han Empires, 221 B.C.–A.D. 220, edited by Denis Twitchett and Michael Loewe. The most extensive military study of the Qin is still the focal volume Qindai Junshishi in the Zhongguo Junshi Tongshi, but the populist revolt that resulted in the Qin’s overthrow is covered in the initial section of vol 5, XiHan Junshishi.)
6. For the intensity of this conviction see Loewe, ‘China’s Sense of Unity as Seen in the Early Empire,’ 6–26.
7. The Liutao, a Warring States military text that purports to be a record of early Zhou military thought and strategic concepts, reflects the need for parties planning a revolt to employ every conceivable practice. (For a complete translation of the Liutao attributed to the great semi-legendary strategist Lü Shang, better known as the Tai Gong, see Sawyer, Six Secret Teachings. For a discussion of the Qin’s use of systematic subversion coupled with military measures, see Sawyer, The Tao of Spycraft: Intelligence Theory and Practice in Traditional China, ‘Covert Activities.’) .
8. This somewhat controversial event is discussed in Sawyer, Conquest and Domination, 170–173. Interestingly, King Wu seems to have decided Loyang would be too vulnerable to enemy incursions and opted for another location.
9. An objective noted in the Shihji, zhuan 16.
10. This is the system that would, in essence, prevail from the Later Han onward even though imperial relatives were often given titles and virtual fiefs. (The dramatic changes in Qin administration due to the conceptual efforts of Shang Yang, Shen Buhai, Han Feizi, and others have been the subject of many specialist studies. However, for an overview see The Ch’in and Han Empires, 221 B.C.–A.D. 220, 34–71 and 520–545, as well as Zhou Qun, ‘Qindai Zhijun Kaoshu,’ Zhongguoshi Yanjiu 2016:4, 29–44.)
11. Although the mountains were immutable, by the Han an extensive system of roadways facilitated communication and movement around the realm. However, they only ameliorated the problems of isolation and remoteness, never eliminated them, because it could still take a month or more for mandates to reach distant sites, even longer for reports of difficulties and unrest to be forwarded to Chang’an and a response received. (The Shiji contains a treatise on canals and the Hanshu two chapters on geography that preserve basic material. Works such as Wang Zijin’s Qin Han Jiaotongshi Gao and Wang Wenchu’s Gudai Jiaotong Dili Congkao, especially pp. 1–31, chart developments in the Qin and Han, while Wang Yumin’s Zhongguo Lidai Dili Gailun provides an extensive overview of logistical issues in vol. 1, pp. 241–63 and 396–404.)
12. Although the question of whether these kingdoms (and those in the preceding Zhou) were fiefs comparable in nature to their European counterparts has occasioned considerable scholarly debate, discussion of their exact character lies beyond the scope of this study. (For an overview, see The Ch’in and Han Empires, 119–139; Lin Jianming, ‘XiHan Wangchao de Dansheng he Hanchu de Tongzhi’ in Qin Han Shi, 261–321; or Li Ting and Wu Jiankuo, Zhongguo Gudai Tudi Guoyou Zhishi, 76–102.)
13. For characterizations of Chang’an and Loyang see Wang Yumin, Zhongguo Lishi Dili Gaillun, vol. 1, 482–502. Recent archaeological reports that give a sense of Chang’an’s splendor and outline its fortifications include Xu Longguo and Xu Jianwei, ‘Han Chang’an Cheng de Xingcheng yu “Kaogongji, Jiangren Yingguo” de Xieding,’ Wenwu 2017:10, 56–62, 85; Liu Zhendong, ‘Han Chang’an Cheng Zonglu,’ Kaogu 2017:1, 9–16; and Zhongguo Shehui Kexueyuan, ‘Xianshi Fenghuqu Sanmincun XiHan Daxing Jianzhu Yizhi Fajue Jianbao,’ Kaogu 2017:1, 17–28.
14. A historic issue of considerable import, the measures employed to keep field commanders from becoming too strong coupled with fear, slander, and jealousy sometimes resulted in the government undermining itself when it had to confront external threats. Fear also contributed to the disparagement of military solutions and contributed to the factionalism that would plague many eras.
15. To use Edward Luttwak’s term, as discussed in his early Coup d’Etat: A Practical Handbook.
16. Unlike earlier and later periods, knowledge of Han developments derives almost exclusively from China’s first comprehensive history, the remarkable Shihji compiled by Sima Qian about 100 BCE. Thereafter the Hanshu, composed in the Later Han by Pan Gu, shadows it, as well as expands the coverage to include the remaining years of the Former Han. Both are based upon court records that include memorials to the throne, investigations, and other key reports, as well as statistics and population information. However, as virtually all knowledge of important developments and rebellious activity, including purported dialogue among the participants, totally depends upon these accounts, no matter how augmented by archaeological discoveries, subsequent historical studies have been unable to escape being highly similar in content, not to mention perspective. In fact, most of them, including Sima Guang’s famous Sung dynasty Zizhi Tongjian and the volume on Former Han warfare included in the largely definitive Zhongguo Junshi Tongshi, Xi Han Junshishi, as well as in the earlier Zhongguo Lidai Zhanzhengshi, incorporate large portions from the Shihji verbatim.
Over the centuries Chinese scholars have pondered the Shihji’s accuracy and prejudices, as well as compared the accounts in the two works’ common chapters, including Pu Zaiyu, ‘Shiji’ ‘Hanshu’ Bijiao Yanjiu. Contemporary studies continue in English, Japanese, and other European languages, such as Michael Nylan’s ‘Sima Qian: A True Historian?’ and Trevor McKay’s recent overview, ‘Identifying the Textual Sources of Shih Ji: Reviewing Past Research for a More Encompassing Methodology.’
Many of the Shiji’s chapters, including the so-called ‘basic annals’ compiled for each emperor, have been separately translated by Burton Watson (Records of the Grand Historian of China) and a number of scholars under William Nienhauser’s general editorship (The Grand Scribe’s Records), with the objective of providing the complete text in a highly annotated and footnoted edition. (The latter’s individual volumes include extensive introductory comments on the Shiji and Hanshu’s different emphases and perspectives, as well detailed comparisons for common chapters.) Watson has also translated selected chapters from the Hanshu (Courtier and Commoner in Ancient China), while Homer Dubs earlier provided all the annals in three volumes, History of the Former Han Dynasty.
17. Noting the disorder, familiarity, and lack of respect, Lu Jia famously counseled Gaozu that although he had conquered the realm on horseback, he couldn’t rule it that way (Shiji, zhuan 97). Shusun Tong developed court rituals (Shiji, zhuan 99) and Xiao He built extravagant palaces in Chang’an, both to manifest imperial awesomeness. (Shiji, zhuan 8, ‘Gaozu’s Annals,’ 8th year.)
18. For a discussion of the early origins of the ‘Son of Heaven’ concept see Sarah Allan, ‘On the Identity of Shang Di 上 帝 and the Origin of the Concept of a Celestial Mandate (Tian Ming 天 命).’ Early China 31 (2007), 1–46. For their evolution and impact, see Wang Zhenzhong, ‘Zhongguo Wangquan de Dansheng,’ Zhongguo Shehui Kexue 2016:6, 186–203; Li Zhenhong, ‘Cong Zhengzhi Tizhi Jiaodu Kan Qin zhi Qing Shehui de Huangquan Zhuanzhi Shuxing,’ Zhongguoshi Yanjiu, 2016:3, 11–20; and Qiu Jingjia, ‘’Pu Tian zhi Xia’: Chuantong Tianwen Fenyeshuozhong de Shijie Tujing yu Zhengzhi Hanyi.’ Zhongguoshi Yanjiu, 2017:3, 175–194. And for Gaozu’s role in the process, see ‘Liu Bang Jituan Shiwei Zuzhi de Zucheng Jiegou, Zhanshi Zhineng yu Wangchaohua Licheng.’ Zhonghua Wenshi Luncong, 2015:4, 267–314.
19. As their Shiji biographies (zhuan 57) show, even earlier, under Wenti and Jingti respectively, the great border commander Zhou Po and his son, Zhou Yafu, were marginalized and suffered ignominious ends despite their surpassing service to the realm.
20. Numerous, often divisive intellectual issues came to the fore during the Former Han, some continuations of Warring States philosophical and political ideas, others new impulses that sought to understand the cosmos and man’s place in it, especially the emperor’s. Rather than idle arguments, debates over the form and activity of government, the ruler’s character and responsibility, and Heaven and Earth were vigorously fought in the court with a dangerous intensity. (Michael Loewe’s two chapters, ‘The Religious and Intellectual Background’ and ‘The Concept of Sovereignty,’ together with “The Pattern of Political History (103–110), all in The Cambridge History of China: The Ch’in and Han Empires, 221 B.C.–A.D. 220, provide concise overviews while Xu Fuguan’s classic Liang Han Sixiangshi also remains valuable).
21. Their disquiet is visible in court discussions and efforts recorded under Gaozu’s sixth year in the Shihji.
22. Recorded in Gaozu’s ‘Annals’ in both the Shiji and Hanshu for his 11th year.
23. According to ‘Gaozu’s Annals’ in the Shiji and Chen Ping’s biography, this was said to be his greatness in contrast to Xiang Yü, yet he obviously begrudged awarding kingships, showing the falsity of the analysis, and was always known to be rude and insulting.
24. His contemptuous treatment of his son-in-law, the king of Zhao, so infuriated the latter’s supporters that they undertook an assassination attempt that ultimately resulted in Zhang Ao’s demotion to marquis in 198 BCE. Summarized in ‘Gaozu’s Annals’ for his seventh to ninth years in the Hanshu and mentioned under his ninth year in the Shiji account.
25. The precariousness of successful commanders after the resolution of difficulties was widely known, with the famous example of Fan Li disappearing after King Goujian conquered Wu being among the examples often cited.
26. Han Xin’s brilliant career is well documented in Shihji, zhuan 92, and Hanshu, zhuan 34, and his actions receive mention in many other contexts, including Gaozu’s own annals, while his unorthodox tactics uniformly draw praise in all of China’s military writings. (The chapter is translated in both Records of the Grand Historian, vol I, and The Grand Scribes Records, vol. VIII. For a discussion of Han Xin’s unorthodox strategies, see Sawyer, Tao of Deception, especially 110–123.)
27. Cang Du’s revolt is recorded in Gaozu’s ‘Annals’ in both the Shiji and Hanshu.
28. The incident appears in Gaozu’s Annals, Shihji, zhuan 8, under the emperor’s fifth year.
29. Shihji, zhuan 93, and Hanshu, zhuan 34. (The chapter is translated in both Records of the Grand Historian, vol I, and The Grand Scribes Records, vol. VIII.)
30. Gaozu had shifted the old kingdom of Han northward to Shanxi to serve as a buffer against steppe incursions. (Han Wang Xin’s biography appears in Shihji, zhuan 93, and Hanshu, zhuan 43, and he is also mentioned in Gaozu’s ‘Annals.’ Gaozu’s predicament and Chen Ping’s resolution of it are discussed in Sawyer, Tao of Deception, 103–110, as well as Chen Ping’s biography, Shiji, zhuan 56, and Hanshu, zhuan 40.)
31. Recorded in Gaozu’s ‘Annals’ in both the Shiji and Hanshu for his 11th and 12th years.
32. Key sources are Peng Yue’s biographies, Shihji, zhuan 90 and Hanshu, zhuan 34, and Gaozu’s ‘Annals’ in the Shihji and Hanshu. (All the chapter are translated in both Records of the Grand Historian, vol I, and The Grand Scribes Records, vol. VIII and II.)
33. Shihji, zhuan 91; Hanshu, zhuan 34. (The chapter is translated in both Records of the Grand Historian, vol I, and The Grand Scribes Records, vol. VIII.) Ching Bu, whose surname was actually Ying, acquired the name of Ching after being tattooed – literally ching – for a minor crime. (Additional information is found in Gaozu’s ‘Annals’ in both the Shihji and Hanshu.)
34. Reconstructing the revolt depends upon the Shiji and Hanshu biographies of the individual participants, especially Liu Pi’s and Zhou Yafu’s, both of which are translated by Watson and Nienhauser’s group, and Jingti’s imperial annals. Unfortunately, The Cambridge History of China, Vol 1: The Ch’in and Han Empires, 221 B.C.-A.D. 220, merely notes the revolution, pp. 140–3, though it provides a useful map of the kingdoms on page 142. Despite its overtly Marxist bent, the best Chinese analysis of the rebellion remains Xi Han Junshishi, 142–159, with other useful studies being found in Zhongguo Lidai Zhanzhengshi, vol. 3, 137–148, and Wu Guoqing, Zhongguo Zhanzhengshi, vol. 2, 248–262. Although the military histories include basic maps that show the territories of the participants and course of battle, the Zhongguo Lishi Dituchi’s volume on the Qin and Han still provides the greatest detail.
35. The incident is only mentioned in the Cambridge History of Ancient China, 310–11. (For an extended study see Sawyer, Conquest and Domination, 142–159.)
36. For an analysis of the erosion and eventual collapse of central Zhou authority, see Sawyer, Conquest and Domination, 295–300.
37. Although many questions remain, it appears the population doubled in the first seventy years of the Former Han, a period of deliberately fostered recovery, from eighteen to thirty-six million. (Wang Yumin, Zhongguo Lishi Dili Gailun, p. 22. The period’s definitive population study remains Ge Jianxiong, Zhongguo Renkou Shi, vol. 1.)
38. Sima Qian dedicated a chapter to the so-called ‘yu xia’ or ‘wandering officers,’ bravados who brooked no insults and acted expeditiously irrespective of inimical circumstances, and Ban Gu included a similar chapter in the Hanshu. Some of them amassed thousands of followers, allowing them to claim a certain grudging respect and overawe the local officials. (A translation of the Shihji’s ‘Yuxia’ chapter may be found in Watson’s Records of the Grand Historian of China, vol. II, 452–61, and of the corresponding Hanshu chapter in his Courtiers and Commoners in Ancient China, 222–246.)
39. The minting of coins, presumably an imperial prerogative, facilitated commercial activities and the accumulation of wealth. Locally produced copper and iron were also employed for tools and farm implements, increasing agricultural and craft production, and salt, often monopolized by the central government, was a hugely valuable commodity.
40. For Chia Yi’s biography see Hanshu, zhuan 48.
41. An old opponent of Chao’s, Yuan Ang, persuaded Jingti that Chao’s execution would mollify the rebels. Whether Chao was a troublemaker or a loyal visionary trying to centralize authority over the realm depends upon perspective. (Ironically, Yuan and Chao have a joint biography in the Shiji, zhuan 101 and Hanshu, zhuan 49. Translations of the former appear in both Records of the Grand Historian of China and The Grand Scribe’s Records.)
42. Liu Pi’s biography appears in zhuan 106 of the Shiji and zhuan 35 of the Hanshu. (A full translation of the former may be found in Records of the Grand Historian of China, Vol I. and volume IX of The Grand Scribe’s Records).
43. The term in the text is xiang, which means to physiognomize someone. At this time physiognomy wasn’t just popular, it was employed to choose people for positions, and was believed to accurately foretell greatness for some, disaster for others, including Zhou Ya-fu whose glorious ascension and ignominious demise over the next twenty years were accurately foretold long before the Revolt of the Seven. (The prognostication appears in Yafu’s Shihji biography.)
44. See Liu Pi’s biography, Shihji, zhuan 106, and Hanshu, zhuan 35.
45. Liu Mou has a brief biography in Shiji, zhuan 50 and Hanshu, zhuan 36.
46. A liubo game and other esoteric artifacts were recently discovered in a Han dynasty tomb dating to Wuti’s era. (See Hubeisheng Wenwu Kaogu Yanjiusuo, ‘Hubei Suizhoushi Zhoujiazhai Muti M8 Fajue Jianbao,’ Kaogu 2017:8, 3–21.)
47. Even though the Han supposedly ameliorated the harshness of the Qin’s extreme measures, capriciously imposed punishments still ranged from exile through the execution of immediate family and household members, the offender’s staff and assistants, and even five or nine degrees of relatives, often totaling hundreds or more.
48. Qi’s capital was Linzi, Jibei’s Boyang, Zichuan’s Shouguang, Jiaodong’s the famous city of Jimo, Jiaoxi’s Gaoyuan, and Jinan’s Dongping.
49. Shiji, zhuan 52. (Liu Pi’s own biography inexplicably fails to include Jinan in the list of participants.) Although much reduced in size, still powerful Qi ‘s martial heritage dated back into the Spring and Autumn period when Duke Huan initially proclaimed hegemony over the realm. Being identified with the Tai Gong, Sunzi, and Sun Bin, it had long been regarded as an incubator of incisive military thought.
50. The heroism of his sacrifice would be subsequently extolled and the incident cited as an example of successful disinformation intended to manipulate the qi (combat spirit) of the troops.
51. The dynamics of siege warfare are discussed in two chapters of the Wei Liaozi, a Warring States text, ‘Tactical Balance of Power in Attacks’ and ‘Tactical Balance of Power in Defense.’ (For a translation see Sawyer, Seven Military Classics of Ancient China, 250–4).
52. Shiji, zhuan 52.
53. The difficulty encountered in trying to overcome Handan shouldn’t have been totally unexpected, the city having famously survived an earlier Warring States siege. Even though the nature of siege warfare had continued to evolve with the era’s weapons and tactics, if they possessed minimal resources, the defenders in a well fortified city could still enjoy a considerable advantage over besiegers who would quickly become moribund and face the threat of being attacked from both within and without. (For a study of the effectiveness of flooding as a weapon in traditional Chinese warfare see Sawyer, Fire and Water).
54. Shiji, zhuan 58.
55. Wei’s conquest having come at the end of the Warring States period, Liang either rebuilt the walls or they were never destroyed under Qin mandate.
56. Shiji, zhuan 58.
57. The power and numerical strength of the imperial standing forces at this time are open to question because Qiang incursions managed to penetrate deep into Guanzhong, right to Chang’an.
58. Space precludes discussing the nature and organization of Chinese military forces in the early Han. However, for a synopsis see Ch’in and Han Empires, 479–82, and for a more extensive overview ‘Hanchu de Junzhi’ in XiHan Junshishi, 86–112, or the relevant portions of Chen Gaohua’s six volume study, Zhongguo Junshi Zhidushi, especially Wuguan Zhidu and Junshi Zuzhi Tizhi Bianzhi, or volume 3 of Zhongguo Junshishi, Bingzhi, 80–109.
59. The degree to which Chinese assessments of strength should be reduced has long been the subject of debate. Vestiges in the historical writings and military manuals suggest discounting purported strength by thirty to forty percent might be appropriate, though not in every case, nor as extensively as Delbruck might argue for. (In recounting the clash between Liu Bang and Xiang Yu, the former’s Shihji biography notes Xiang claimed to have a million troops but only commanded 400,000, with Gaozu’s purported strength being 200,000, but actually 100,000).
60. Even though Pi speaks confidently about Nan Yue in his missive.
61. Emperor Wen had been compelled to observe military constraints when he suddenly visited Yafu’s forward camp during a campaign to suppress the Xiongnu. (These and other incidents are recorded in Yafu’s Shihji and Hanshu biographies.)
62. Just like the famous Sima Rangju centuries earlier and Sunzi’s (probably apocryphal) execution of the palace women who disobeyed his commands during a demonstration for King Helu, as recorded in his Shiji biography.
63. A view current in the Han, its realization never precluded subsequent retribution. In speaking about the ‘three ways the ruler causes difficulty for the army,’ the Art of War notes the first is “he does not know that the Three Armies should not advance but instructs them to advance, or does not know that the Three Armies should not withdraw and orders a retreat. This is termed ‘entangling the army.’ (‘Planning Offensives.’) Elsewhere, the text asserts, ‘If the Dao of warfare indicates you will not be victorious, even though the ruler instructs you to engage in battle, not fighting is permissible.’ (‘Configurations of Terrain.’) The Six Secret Teachings adds, ‘Military matters are not determined by the ruler’s commands; they all proceed from the commanding general.’ (‘Appointing the General.’) The general’s necessary independence in the field is made even more explicit in the commissioning ceremony for commanding generals found as early as the Six Secret Teachings’ ‘Appointing the General’ but often repeated thereafter, such asin Li Quan’s Taibai Yinjing, ‘Bestowing the Yue [Axe].’ (A translation of ‘Appointing the General’ may be found in Sawyer, Seven Military Classics of Ancient China, 64–65, and of ‘Bestowing the Yue [Axe]’ in Sawyer, Strategies for the Human Realm, 179–184.)
64. Shihji, zhuan 106.
65. Contrary to some accounts emphasizing Chu’s fierceness.
66. For a recounting of the incident which led to the famous clash at Guiling in 354 BCE, see Sawyer, Sun Pin Military Methods, 31–47; for an extensive study of the role and concept of qi in military contexts see Sawyer, ‘Martial Qi in China: Courage and Spirit in Thought and Military Practice.’
67. Famously, in a passage for Duke Zhuang’s tenth year, 684 BCE. (The passage is also adopted as the historical illustration for the chapter on ‘spirit’ in the Baizhan Qilue.)
68. ‘Military Combat,’ Art of War.
69. ‘Military Combat.’ In ‘Initial Estimations,’ the Art of War’s first chapter, Sunzi even more pointedly asserts, ‘if they are strong, avoid them.’
70. ‘Initial Estimations,’ Art of War.
71. Military Methods, ‘Military Combat.’ The Wuzi expresses similar ideas in ‘Evaluating the Enemy.’
72. Shiji, zhuan 57.
73. Including the somewhat infamous Thirty-six Stratagems, Baizhan Qilue (which features a complete reprisal under the topic of ‘defense’), and the Sung dynasty Wujing Zongyao. (A translation of the compressed account found in the Baizhan Qilue may be found in Sawyer, One Hundred Unorthodox Strategies: Battle and Tactics of Chinese Warfare, 113–114, and further discussion in the Tao of Deception, 123–126.)
74. Zhou Qiu’s accomplishments are recorded in Liu Pi’s biography.
75. The missive reportedly persuaded Jingti to take action.
76. Preserved in Liu Pi’s biographies.
77. Following the text in the Hanshu which identifies Chao Cuo as the cause of their problems rather than just perverse Han ministers.
78. Found in the Shiji, zhuan 52.
79. Million being used here in a general sense even though Qin reportedly fielded an army of 600,000 when vanquishing Chu at the end of the Warring States period.
80. A somewhat less dramatic analogy for strategic power than the Art of War’s onrush of pent up (river) water in ‘Strategic Military Power.’
81. The analysis is part of Tian Ken’s praise for the emperor’s wisdom in having neutralized Han Xin’s purported threat. (Preserved in Gaozu’s annals for his sixth year [201 BCE] in both the Shihji and Hanshu.) Slightly earlier Liu Jing offered a similar appraisal of Guanzhong, pointing out the area could furnish a million troops by itself, while trying to persuade Gaozu to relocate the capital to Chang’an. (Shiji, zhuan 8 and 99.)
82. The prevalent belief in omens such as comets and plagues of insects should be noted.
83. For example, ‘The Army’s Strategic Power’ in the Liutao states: ‘One who excels in warfare will not lose an advantage when he perceives it or be doubtful when he meets the moment. One who loses an advantage or lags behind the time for action will, on the contrary, suffer from disaster.’
84. According to Liu Pi’s biographies.
85. For a comprehensive assessment see Wang Zijin, Qin Han Jiaotong Shigao, 319–324.
86. The value of the protective wall is much noted in the later military writings. However, Gaozu’s ‘Annals’ in both the Shihji and Hanshu state that Xiang Yu managed to cut the supply route several times, resulting in Gaozu’s troops starving in 204 BCE. However, in a later persuasion Li Yiji notes Gaozu had taken possession of the granaries (Shiji, zhuan 97.)
87. Specifically, the ‘Son of Heaven’ according to the Hanshu version.
88. This is somewhat surprising since Liu Pi rejected a similar suggestion by Tian Lubo. (Early in the rebellion against the Qin, while Liu Bang and Xiang Yü were still allies, they agreed the first to reach Chang’an, then called Xianyang, would become emperor.)
89. Shiji, zhuan 106, and Hanshu, zhuan 35.
90. Shiji, zhuan 106, and Hanshu, zhuan 35.
91. ‘Waging War,’ the Art of War. In the same section Sunzi adds, ‘In military campaigns I have heard of awkward speed but have never seen any skill in lengthy campaigns. No country has ever profited from protracted warfare.’ (Whether or not someone named Sunzi actually authored the Art of War, a matter of sometime acrimonious debate despite Sima Qian’s biography of Sun Wu in the Shihji, is irrelevant to Han military history because the book was already regarded as an important military text and was even cited by emperor Wuti.) Works such as the Liu-tao (Six Secret Teachings) also discuss the danger of being fatally held up by siege warfare.
92. The passage has generally been regarded as a fragment from the Art of War. Sun Bin’s Military Methods also contains a discussion provisionally titled ‘Male and Female Cities’ that shows the advanced state of tactical analysis employed when considering whether to attack a city or not in the Warring States period.
93. Ju was either prominent or powerful enough to be included in the Shihji’s (and Hanshu’s) chapters on yuxia, already cited above.
94. Liutao, ‘Equivalent Forces.’ These claims are somewhat surprising. In comparison, according to Questions and Replies, in the early Tang Li Jing asserted ‘one cavalryman is equal to three infantrymen’. (For a discussion of the effectiveness and limitations of chariots in early combat, see Sawyer, Ancient Chinese Warfare, 359–89.)
95. The first systematic considerations are found in ‘Configurations of Terrain’ and ‘Nine Terrains’ in the Art of War.
96. ‘Battle Chariots’ and ‘Cavalry in Battle.’
97. ‘Martial Chariot Warriors’ and ‘Martial Cavalry Warriors.’
98. Han Wuti’s extensive campaigns out into the steppe and even Li Jing’s expeditions against the Turks in the Tang’s first decade relied upon them. In Questions and Replies Li Jing states, ‘Narrow chariots and deer horn chariots are essential to the army. They allow controlling the expenditure of energy, provide a defense to the fore, and constrain the regiments and squads of five.’
99. Liutao, ‘Battle Chariots.’
100. Liutao, ‘Equivalent Forces.’
101. ‘Strategic Military Power.’ The Liutao also includes a chapter titled ‘The Unorthodox Army’ that outlines roughly twenty-five tactical measures of relevance. Despite this heritage, the famous Three Kingdoms strategist Zhuge Liang similarly rejected a suggestion that they mount an unorthodox strike on Chang’an, but he did target the warehouses in Chancang while battling to preserve the Han kingdom in exile located in Shu (Sichuan). (For the campaigns, see Sawyer, Zhuge Liang: Strategy, Achievements, and Writings, 70–123.)
102. ‘Military Disposition,’ Art of War.
103. Throughout subsequent history commanders such as Shih Le always tried to secure control of Changgao. (For further discussion see ‘Defending Ravines’ in the Ming dynasty Caolu Jinglue.)
104. Unlike the situation at the beginning of the Han, the realm wasn’t populated by experienced, battle hardened soldiers.
105. An interesting chapter in the Liutao, ‘Agricultural Implements,’ describes how farm tools and other items can be adopted to the needs of combat. (In contrast, another chapter, ‘The Army’s Equipment,’ describes the extensive array of weapons, chariots, and other devices a well equipped army should possess.) However, at this time, although swords were becoming more common and sabers were being used by the cavalry, the primary weapon remained the ji or dagger-axe, essentially a spear with a daggerlike blade perpendicularly affixed near the top, with bows and crossbows continuing to provide effect at a distance.
106. Art of War, ‘Vacuity and Substance.’ Similarly, Sun Bin regarded seizing provisions the first means for ‘compelling the enemy to run about.’ (Military Methods, ‘Five Criteria, Nine Seizings’).
107. While the figure of 400,000 is no doubt seriously exaggerated, archaeological evidence confirms a massive number were slain at this site, contrary to the practice of sparing troops that surrendered.
108. For the most part China’s emperors tended to implement strict laws and harshly repress dissent even when their policies caused dire economic conditions.
109. Not to mention the Taiping, White Lotus, and Sun Eh rebellions.
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Ralph D. Sawyer
Ralph D. Sawyer is an independent historical scholar who specializes in Chinese military and intelligence issues. His latest book is Lever of Power: Military Deception in China and the West.