![Sample our Politics & International Relations journals, sign in here to start your FREE access for 14 days]({"type":"image" , "src" : "/sda/5947/TOC-Subject-Sample-2021-Politics-International-Relations.jpg"})
ABSTRACT
Over the summer of 2019 a number of maroon banners appeared across towns and cities in Northern Ireland, declaring that the local population ‘stands with Soldier F’. Soldier F was a member of the Parachute Regiment who, in March of 2019, was charged with the murders of James Wray and William McKinney and five additional attempted murders as a result of his actions on Bloody Sunday, 30 January 1972. These charges were announced at a time when it was reported that up to 200 former members of the British Army could face official investigation for their conduct in Northern Ireland. These cases sit at the centre of the sensitive and divisive issue of the legacy dimension of the Northern Ireland conflict, posing a challenge to the continuing success of the Northern Ireland peace process. Engaging a developing literature on post conflict reconciliation processes, this article will analyse the issue of legacy prosecutions from Operation Banner.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
1. Belfast Telegraph, 29/1/2008.
2. HM Inspectorate of Constabulary, “Inspection of the Police Service of Northern Ireland Historical Enquiries Team.”
3. Police Service of Northern Ireland “Legacy Investigation Branch.”
4. Statement of the Honorable Richard N. Haass.
5. The Panel of Parties in the NI Executive “Terms of Reference.”
6. The Panel of Parties in the NI Executive ‘Factsheet on the Draft Agreement of 31 December 2013’.
7. The Stormont House Agreement
8. Forces.net “Service History: How Many MPs Have Military Experience?”
9. Hansard, Stormont House Agreement: Legacy.
10. Hansard, Point of Order.
11. O’Carroll, Bowcott, and Walker “Karen Bradley Facing Continued Resignation Calls Despite apology.”
12. McDonald, Bowcott, and Mulholland, “Bloody Sunday Report.”
13. Lederach, Building Peace.
14. Kaufman, “Escaping the Symbolic Politics Trap.”
15. Hampson, “Impunity and Accountability,” 7–12.
16. Herbert, “Reconciliation as Identity Change,” 123.
17. Davidovic, “Finding Space for Criminal Prosecutions Post-Conflict.”
18. Kaye, “The Role of Truth Commissions in the Search for Justice, Reconciliation and Democratisation.”
19. Mendez, “National Reconciliation, Transnational Justice, and the International Criminal Court,” 28–29.
20. Mukherjee, “Achieving Reconciliation through Prosecution in the Courts.”
21. Bell Jared, “Reconciling After Transitional Justice.”
22. Iyer, “Of Prosecutions and Amnesties,’ 43.
23. Braithwaite, ‘Restorative Justice”; and Lucia Zedner, “Reparation and Retribution.”
24. Clark, “The Three Rs: Retributive Justice, Restorative Justice, and Reconciliation.”
25. Ame, and Alidu, “Truth and Reconciliation Commissions, Restorative Justice, Peacemaking Criminology, and Development.”
26. Stanley, “Evaluating the Truth and Reconciliation Commission,” 543.
27. Pankhurst, “Issues of Justice and Reconciliation in Complex Political Emergencies.”
28. O’Malley, “Respecting Revenge.”
29. Lenta, “Transitional Justice and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission,” 53.
30. Noor, Masi, Brown, and Prentice, “Precursors and Mediators of Intergroup Reconciliation in Northern Ireland,” 493.
31. White, et al., “Extending Peace to the Grassroots,” 250
32. Clegg, “Embracing a Threatening Other,” 91.
33. McGrattan, “Ideology, Reconciliation and Nationalism in Northern Ireland,” 61.
34. Morrow, “The Rise (and Fall?) of Reconciliation in Northern Ireland,” 7.
35. Bennett, “Minimum force in British counterinsurgency,” 465–466; Thornton, “The British Army and the origins of its minimum force philosophy”, ‘“Minimum Force”: a reply to Huw Bennett’; and ‘Getting it Wrong: The Crucial Mistakes Made in the Early Stages of the British Army’s Deployment to Northern Ireland (August 1969 to March 1972), p. 77; Bennett, Huw ‘The Other Side of the COIN: Minimum and Exemplary Force in British Army Counterinsurgency in Kenya’, p. 640, ‘The Mau Mau Emergency as Part of the British Army’s Post-War Counter- Insurgency Experience’, p.145, and ‘From Direct Rule to Motorman: Adjusting British Military Strategy for Northern Ireland in 1972ʹ; Newsinger, John, ‘Minimum force, British Counter-insurgency and the Mau Mau rebellion’; Dandeker, Christopher and James Gow, ‘Military Culture and Strategic Peacekeeping’, p. 58; Morgan, B.W., and M.L.R. Smith ‘Northern Ireland and minimum force: the refutation of a concept?’ p. 91; Tuck, Christopher ‘Northern Ireland and the British Approach to Counter-Insurgency’; Mockaitis, Thomas R. ‘Low-Intensity Conflict: The British Experience’, p. 14; Cassidy, Robert M., Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror, p. 88; and Also relevant is M.L.R. Smith and Peter Neumann’s ‘Motorman’s Long Journey: Changing the Strategic Setting in Northern Ireland.’
36. Instructions by the Director of Operations for Opening Fire in Northern Ireland, Restricted Document, November 1971, Army Cuttings, Box 2, Linen Hall Library Political Collection (LHLPC) Belfast, United Kingdom.
37. Mills, and Torrance, Briefing Paper CBP 8352 “Investigation of Former Armed Forces Personnel Who Served in Northern Ireland.”
38. Bennett, “Smoke Without Fire”? 288.
39. Ibid., p. 295. See also Edward Burke’s An Army of Tribes: British Army Cohesion, Deviancy and Murder in Northern Ireland, pp. 112–115. In this book, Burke also details the infamous ‘pitchfork murders’ which saw two former solders jailed for murder.
40. Lord Saville of Newdigate “Principal Conclusions and Overall Assessment of the Bloody Sunday Inquiry”, Vol. IX, Para 194:15. Hereafter “Saville Report.”
41. Irish Independent, 25/5/1988.
42. McKinney, “Only four military convictions for Troubles’ murders.”
43. McKittrick, et al., Lost Lives, 459.
44. McDonald, “Former soldier Dennis Hutchings pleads not guilty over John Pat Cunningham killing.”
45. Timms, “Former Cornish Soldier Dennis Hutchings Loses Bid for High Court challenge,” Plymouth Herald; and Hutchings, “Stop the Discrimination Against British Army Veterans.”
46. Blewett, “Dennis Hutchings Joins Troubles inquiry protest.”
47. BBC News, “HET report says Joe McCann shooting was Unjustified.”
48. Cited in Rogan, “Ex-Soldiers Face Trial for Killing Republican.”
49. Saville Report, 57.
50. Bloody Sunday Inquiry Testimony of Soldier F, Day 376, http://report.bloody-sunday-inquiry.org/transcripts/Archive/Ts376.htm.
51. Saville Report “Principal Conclusions,” 34–35, 45.
52. Saville Report “Principal Conclusions,” 45.
53. Coyle, “Bloody Sunday Families ‘Denied Justice’.”
54. O’Neill, “Daniel Hegarty.”
55. Haugh, “Soldier Charged With Murder Over Derry Shooting of Daniel Hegarty, 15.”
56. Young, “Inquest Plea by Soldier Who Shot and Killed Londonderry Teenager.”
57. Ferguson, “Ex-British soldier to be Prosecuted for Aidan McAnespie killing”; and BBC News “Aidan McAnespie.”
58. Rogan, “Sir Henry Bellingham calls trial of Dennis Hutchings for 1974 Troubles killing “a travesty of justice”.”
59. Cockroft, “Soldier F Protests.”
60. Greenslade, “The DUP’s support for Soldier F protests shows how extreme it is.”
61. Ward, “Dying Former Soldier Given Guard of Honour as He Pleads Not Guilty to Killing Northern Irish man during the Troubles.”
62. British Veteran, “Picket and Protest Opportunities Feb 2020 Onwards.”
63. Rogan, “David Jonathan Holden to be prosecuted for Aidan McAnespie shooting.”
64. See note 41 above.
65. Irish Independent, 2/3/1988.
66. McKittrick, “Clegg Case has the Irish Bemused.”
67. Belfast Telegraph, 24/2/1988.
68. Ibid., 24/2/1988.
69. McKittrick et al, Lost Lives, p. 945
70. Belfast Telegraph, 7/11/1984.
71. Ibid., 14/3/1988.
72. Irish Independent, 25/5/1988; Irish Press, 27/9/1988.
73. See note 66 above.
74. The Irish Times, 12/11/1998.
75. Mullin, “Grudging Verdict After Judge Says Defence a Farrago of Deceit and Lies.”
76. Burrell, “Lee Clegg gets Four Years but Walks Free.”
77. Gibb, and Ford, “Life Sentence for Murder Must be Axed, Law Chief Says.”
78. Williams, “Four Year Road That Led to Justice.”
79. Harkin, “‘Lee Clegg Campaigners Have Destroyed My Family’.”
80. Ibid.
81. Hennessy, “Freeing of Clegg Greeted with Alarm.”
82. McLaughlin, “Bell Tolls for Jailed Squaddies.”
83. Sutton, “Don’t Sacrifice Our Sons for Peace.”
84. Peterkin, “Free our sons BEFORE the Terror Killers; Mums plead for justice for Scots.”
85. News Letter, 25/5/1998.
86. Thompson, “Hague Joins Fight to Free Squaddies”; and Daily Record, 10/6/1998.
87. Evening Times, 2/9/1998; Evening News, 3/11/1998.
88. Russell, “Scots Killers Allowed to stay in Army.”
89. O’Carroll, and Grierson “Irish Deputy PM criticizes Tory pledge on Troubles inquiries.”
90. Jones, and Petre, “Bloody Sunday.”
91. See note 89 above.
92. Conservative and Unionist Party Manifesto 2019, 45.
93. Lewis, Addressing Northern Ireland Legacy Issues.
94. Representative Dana Rohrabacher comment, “The Northern Ireland Peace Process,” 21.
95. Duffy, “A Truth Commission for Northern Ireland?” 45; and Consultative Group on the Past, “Report of the Consultative Group on the Past,” published January 2009.
96. Lundy, and McGovern, “Attitudes Towards a Truth Commission for Northern Ireland in Relation to Party Political Affiliation.”
97. Lawther, “Denial, Silence and the Politics of the Past.”
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Andrew Sanders
Andrew Sanders is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Texas A&M University San Antonio.