https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1195-0664
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ABSTRACT
Cultural assets are equally important for COIN effectiveness. Despite the significant impact of culture on COIN outcomes, the extant literature pays too much attention only to strategic culture, not the inherent roles for culture to play. This paper examines what made South Korean COIN forces successful in Vietnam. First, they benefitted from cultural harmony driven by the shared belief in communalism culture, a common ground between both societies. Second, their own Jeong culture, which is part of the communalism-oriented idea, motivated South Korean soldiers to develop creative remedies to win the hearts and minds of the local population.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
1. Ban, The Reliable Promise, 16–7.
2. For the discourse of the effectiveness of culture in COIN missions, see Clemis, “The ‘Cultural Turn’ in U.S.”; and Campbell and Murrey, ”Culture-centric Pre-emptive Counterinsurgency.”
3. The U.S. Joint Doctrine, Counterinsurgency, notes the importance of ‘culture proficiency’ to win COIN missions.
4. For analyses to focus more on local residents, see Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War; and Kahl, “In the Crossfire or in the Crosshairs?”
5. For the case of the minimum use of force by the British Army, see Bennett, Fighting the Mau. For the British Army’s failure to comply with the rule of law in North Ireland, see Bennett, ”’Smoke without Fires’?”
6. For an example of indigenous collaboration by the colonial power, see Bennett and Burke, “The Aden Protectorate Levies.”
7. For the psychological warfare led by the British Army, see Bennett, “’Words are Cheaper than Bullets’.”
8. Denysiuk argues that COIN operations are complex because its forces need to consider many factors such as ‘social, economic, cultural, political and many others.’ Denysiuk, “Irregular Warfare and Modern Defense,” 1.
9. Ban, The Reliable Promise, 20–6.
10. For a proponent of big weapons, see Dunlap, “We Still Need the Big Guns”. For proponents of small weapons, see Nawroz and Grau, “The Soviet War in Afghanistan.”
11. Cassidy, “The Long Small War: Indigenous Forces for Counterinsurgency”; and Gortzak, “Using Indigenous Forces in Counterinsurgency Operations.”
12. Abrahms, “What Terrorists Really Want: Terrorist Motives and Counterterrorism Strategy.”
13. Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla.
14. Markel, “Draining the Swamp.”
15. Newsinger, “British Counterinsurgency.”
16. Arreguin-Toft, “How the Weak Win Wars.”
17. Merom, How Democracies Lose Small Wars.
18. Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare.
19. The U.S. Army, FM 3–24/MCWP 3–33.5 Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies.
20. The HTT was developed and laid out by two scholars in 2005. See McFate and Jackson, “An Organizational Solution for DOD’s Cultural Knowledge Needs.”
21. U.S. Army, “Welcome to the HTS Home Page.”
22. McFate and Fondacaro, “Reflections on the Human Terrain System.”
23. Ndawana and Zevure, “Ignore Culture in Counterinsurgency.”
24. Cassidy, Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror.
25. Long, The Soul of Armies.
26. DeVore, “Institutions, Organizational Culture.”
27. Johnson, The Marines, Counterinsurgency, and Strategic Culture.
28. Porter, “Libera Individualism and Internet Policy.”
29. Lund, “Communitarian Politics and the Problem of Equality.’ For more on the debate on communitarianism versus individualism, see Etzioni, “The Responsive Community.”
30. McMurtry, “Has Play Changed?”
31. Adamsky, The Culture of Military Innovation.
32. Walzer, “The Communitarian Critique of Liberalism,” 16.
33. An individualistic American society has been leading to the collapse of the community. See Putnam, Bowling Alone.
34. For the study of cultural harmony, see Lee and Johnson, “Differentiation of self.”
35. Major COIN operations in the world occurred mostly in states under communal culture such as Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan, Algeria, India, and West Africa. Meanwhile, the Malayan insurgency serves as a rare case that happened in non-communal culture.
36. When it came to the ROK military’s COIN operations in Vietnam, The Saigon Post stated the impact of socio-cultural factors such as appearance and the minds of neighbours from a similar culture on its effectiveness. In particular, its editorial argued that they seemed to be just neighbours rather than remote foreigners. See Park, The ROK forces‟ psychological warfare; and Ban, The Reliable Promise, 151.
37. Tuck, “Northern Ireland and the British Approach to Counterinsurgency.”
38. Dixon, “Hearts and Minds.”
39. Honda, Vietnam War, 240.
40. Inskeep, “U.S.’s Cultural Ignorance.”
41. The Nation, “Editorials: The Horror of Abu Ghraib.”
42. Knowing Korea, “Culture: The uniquely Korean concept of Jeong.”
43. In 2007, one of the Iraqi residents mentioned that Korean Jeong culture motivated him or her to join the internship program provided by the ROK forces. See The Korea Defense Daily, November 14, 2007.
44. For the humanistic Kimchi making, see World Institute of Kimch.
45. The Korea Defense Daily, November 14, 2007, 4.
46. For the discourse of a ‘Total War’ in Vietnam, see Goscha, “A ‘Total War’ of Decolonization.”
47. Barnes, “Memorandum: Provincial and Regional Pacification in Vietnam,” 17.
48. U.S. Department of State, “Memorandum of Conversation,” 181–82.
49. The ROK Institute for Military History Compilation, The Vietnam War and the ROK forces through memoir 1, 894.
50. U.S. Department of the Army, Vietnam Studies, 143–44.
51. Randal, “Korean Fighters,” 8.
52. The ROK Institute for Military History Compilation, The Vietnam War and the ROK forces through memoir 1, 958.
53. Barnes, “Memorandum: Provincial and Regional Pacification in Vietnam,” 22–4.
54. Ban, “Making Counterinsurgency Work.”
55. U.S. Department of the Army, Vietnam Studies, 120.
56. For more on the size of dispatched South Korean troops, see Chae, The Vietnam War and Me, 129–35, 249–64; and Ban, “Making Counterinsurgency Work,” 146–147.
57. The U.S. Army, Vietnam Studies, 154.
58. Baek, “A Perspective on Korea’s Participation in the Vietnam War,” 3.
59. R.O.K. Marine Corps 341, “Dai Han who gained popularity from the Vietnamese.”
60. The U.S. Army, Vietnam Studies, 159.
61. Nag, “Vietnamese Culture.”
62. The shared culture between Korea and Vietnam encourages Vietnamese to be attached to the Korean Wave. See Minh, “Vietnam Catches the Korean Wave”. For the historical role of teachers in Korea, Bhang and Kwak, “The Public Role of School Teachers in Korea.”
63. For Saemaul Undong, visit Korea Saemaul Undong Center, https://www.saemaul.or.kr/eng/.
64. Choi, Statistics of the Vietnam War, 139.
65. Choi, Statistics of the Vietnam War, 138.
66. The ROK Institute for Military History Compilation, The Vietnam War and the ROK forces through memoir 3, 151.
67. The ROK Institute for Military History Compilation, The Vietnam War and the ROK forces through memoir 1, 127.
68. Chae, The Vietnam War and Me, 196.
69. Ban, The Reliable Promise, 93–8.
70. Chae, The Vietnam War and Me, 186.
71. Korean Veteran Homepage, http://www.vietnamwar.co.kr/home.htm.
72. The ROK Institute for Military History Compilation, The Vietnam War and the ROK forces through memoir 1, 84.
73. Alsbro, “The Battle for Hearts and Minds.”
74. Choi, Statistics of the Vietnam War, 140.
75. Honda, Vietnam War.
76. Kim, “Korean Participation in the Vietnam War,” 30.
77. See note 64 above.
78. The ROK Institute for Military History Compilation, The Vietnam War and the ROK forces through memoir 1, 239–40.
79. Honda, Vietnam War, 244–6.
80. The ROK Institute for Military History Compilation, The Vietnam War Study 1, 292.
81. The ROK Institute for Military History Compilation, The Vietnam War Study 1, 309.
82. The ROK Institute for Military History Compilation, The Vietnam War Study 1, 275–7.
83. Nagl, Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, 116.
84. U.S. Department of the Navy, Marine Corps Civil Affairs, 1.
85. The ROK Institute for Military History Compilation, The Vietnam War and the ROK forces through memoir 1, 905.
86. Murphy, Harvest of Fear.
87. Lowe, “Journalists and the Stirring of Australian Public Diplomacy.”
88. U.S. Department of the Army, Vietnam Studies, 88.
89. U.S. Department of the Army, Vietnam Studies, 25.
90. For an article on Thailand’s participation in the Vietnam War, see Ruth, “Why Thailand Takes Pride.”
91. U.S. Department of the Army, Vietnam Studies, 56.
92. For more on the Philippines’ pacification projects in Vietnam, see Historynet, “The Philippines.”
93. The inherent Arab-Kurd conflict also allowed the ROK forces to handle COIN missions with a different tactic. See Brennan, Ries, Hanauer, Connable, Kelly, McNerney, Young, Campbell, and McMahon, Ending the U.S. War in Iraq, 146–54.
94. For more detail on the expected COIN operations in North Korea, see Ban, ‘The ROK as a Middle Power.’
95. Chakraborty, ‘What is OPLAN 5029?’
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Kil Joo Ban
Dr. Kil Joo Ban is a senior research fellow at the Korea Institute for Maritime Strategy (KIMS). He has a Ph. D in Political Science from Arizona State University (2011). He has written three books and more than 30 papers, including ‘The Clash of Security and Sovereignty in Quasi-Alliance: More Security by the UNC or More Autonomy for South Korea?’ European Journal of East Asian Studies (forthcoming), ‘Two-Level Silence and Nuclearization of Small Powers: The Logic of Rendering North Korea Nuclear-Armed,’ Korea Observer (March 2021, forthcoming), ‘Maritime CBMs as Soft Deterrence in Northeast Asia: A Sea of Paradox that Conflict and Cooperation Coexist and Its Remedies,’ Pacific Focus (2020), ‘Jammed Allies: The Ironclad ROK–U.S. Alliance and China as a Gray Actor,’ Asian Politics & Policy (2020), ‘The Two-for-One Entity and a “For Whom” Puzzle: UNC Both a Peace Driver and the U.S. Hegemony Keeper in Asia,’ Asian Journal of Political Science (2020), and ‘Making Neutrality Credibly Work: The NNSC on the Korean Peninsula,’ East Asia (2020).