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ABSTRACT
The intended purpose of this paper is to examine the viability of political resolution as a counterinsurgency strategy. We have selected numerous political negotiation processes between insurgents and government of India in general and Mizoram in particular. The political resolution with Mizo National Front is considered as the most successful counterinsurgency operation in India. Placing this as a model, the government of India employed the strategy of negotiation with various other insurgent groups. The degree of success in Mizoram was not replicated in other insurgency theatres. This was analyzed with the help of a comparative study with other insurgent groups in India, particularly within the state of Assam. It is found that the model of Mizo resolution has been influencing the peace process that came later. And also the strategy of negotiation has been evolving into incorporating civil society groups as signatories to the final peace settlement signed between insurgents and government. This analysis of the peace process is also based on the conceptualization developed from various authors.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
1. Kaul, Internationalisation of Kashmir Issue.
2. The TNV Accord of the Memorandum of Understanding with Tripura National Volunteers, 1988 can be accessed through https://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/tripura/documents/papers/memorandum_understanding_tnv_1988.htm.
3. MNF which spearheaded an armed separatist movement denounced violence and participated in the democratic politics in the state as a legitimate political organisation. This transformed the violent politics of MNF to a more electoral one where it contested elections and intermittently formed governments in the state alongside the Congress.
4. The South Asia Terrorism Portal and Centre for Development and Peace Studies have covered the insurgent conflict theatres of Northeast and the information are open in public domain.
5. Most of the data on the chronological set of events on various insurgent organisation has been analysed from the websites of Centre for Development and Peace Studies, South Asia Terrorism Portal and Government of Mizoram.
6. Das, North Eastern Insurgency: Problem of Assessment.
7. Goswami, Indian National Security and Counter-Insurgency: The Use of Force vs Non-Violent Response, 203.
8. Bhaumik, Troubled Periphery: Crisis of India’s North East, 7.
9. Rajagopalan, “Peace Accords in Northeast India: Journey over Milestones,” 5.
10. Baruah, Durable Disorder: Understanding the Politics of Northeast India.
11. Byman, “Talking with Insurgents: A Guide for the Perplexed.”
12. The MNF insurrection began in March 1966 with a surprise and violent attack on Indian security forces at Aizawl and other major towns in the Mizo Hill District of Assam. The formal talks between MNF and Government of India began on February 1976.
13. Bapat, “Insurgency and the Opening of Peace Processes.”
14. CDPS, “Chronology Mi.”
15. CDPS.
16. Bhaumik, “Tripura: Ethnic Conflict, Militancy and Counterinsurgency,” 12.
17. Duyvesteyn and Schuurman, “The Paradoxes of Negotiating with Terrorist and Insurgent Organisations.”
18. Mahanta, Confronting the State: ULFA”s Quest for Sovereignty, 253.
19. See note 14 above.
20. MaCartney, “From Armed Struggle to Political Negotiations: Why? When? How?.”
21. See note 14 above.
22. Mazumdar, “Left-Wing Extremism and Counterinsurgency in India: The Andhra Model,” 451.
23. SATP, “National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT) Terrorist Group, Tripura.”
24. SATP, “Dima Halim Daogah (DHD) Terrorist Group, Assam.”
25. SATP, “National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) Terrorist Group, Assam.”
26. See note 14 above.
27. See note 15 above.
28. Ghosh, “Ethnicity and Insurgency in Tripura,” 234.
29. Das, Political Violence in Assam.
30. See note 18 above.
31. Nath, “Whither Peace Process in Assam: A Commentary,” 64.
32. BLT declared a unilateral ceasefire in 1999 and the government responded it with a Suspension of Operation (SOP) agreement in 2000. Similarly NDFB declared unilateral ceasefire in 2004 and government signed the SOP in 2005.
33. Bhaumik, “Tripura: Ethnic Conflict, Militancy and Counterinsurgency.”
34. See note 28 above.
35. Purie and Singh, “People Will Fight as Long as Their Grievances Are Not Settled: Laldenga,” 12.
36. ULFA and AGP had both grown out of the Anti-Foreigners agitation in Assam. When AGP swept power after the elections in 1985, ULFA grew stronger by misappropriating its connections with government officials and political leaders. For sometimes ULFA acts as the armed wing of AGP and attacked persons from opposition parties.
37. See note 31 above.
38. A testimony by the former Chief of Intelligence Bureau during a credit course on “Intelligence and National Security” at Gujarat National Law University between 8–10 September 2017.
39. Satapathy, “Mediating Peace: The Role of Insider-Partials in Conflict Resolution in Mizoram.”
40. Hluna, “Peace Process in Mizoram with Special Reference to the Role of the Church,” 414.
41. Satapathy, “Constructing a Model for the Peace Process in Mizoram,” 453.
42. See note 6 above.
43. Waterman, “Third Bodo Accord and Insurgency in Western Assam.”
44. Pathak, “Looking at the Roots of Political Conflict of the Bodos and Their Negotiating for Peace,” 139.
45. Kanchan, “Negotiating Insurgencies: The Naga Imbroglio.”
46. Singh, “Naga Peace Talks at an Impasse.”
47. Mukhim, “Civil Society in India”s Northeast: Can It Still Help Resolve Conflict in the Region?,” 114.
48. See note 24 above.
49. Choudhury, “Peace in Sight, ULFA Victims Speak Up.”
50. See note 8 above.
51. Hassan, “The Mizo Exception: State-Society Cohesion and Institutional Capability.”
52. Karjie, “Voting Behaviour in BTAD Elections,” 771.
53. SATP, “United People”s Democratic Solidarity (UPDS) Terrorist Group, Assam.”
54. SATP, “United Liberation Front of Asom-Independent (ULFA-I) Terrorist Group, Assam.”
55. See note 20 above.
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Anns George K G
Anns George K G is a PhD Scholar in Centre for Security Studies at Central University of Gujarat Dr. Sanjay Kumar Jha is the Professor and Dean of School of National Security Studies at Central University of Gujarat