https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9826-1430
![Sample our Politics & International Relations journals, sign in here to start your FREE access for 14 days]({"type":"image" , "src" : "/sda/5947/TOC-Subject-Sample-2021-Politics-International-Relations.jpg"})
ABSTRACT
In the academic literature, it is widely accepted that one of the most difficult steps in a peace process is the reincorporation of former combatants. Colombia is a case in point. After the peace agreement with the former rebel group FARC-EP in 2016, the reintegration process of more than 13.000 ex-combatants has been marred with difficulties, be it half-hearted implementation of the stipulations of the accord from the side of the government or the re-armament of some dissident groups. However, the dynamics of the peace process differ considerably between the national and the local level, offering a wide range of pathways from even more violent confrontation up to successful reincorporation projects. In order to explain this variety, we integrate DDR and rebel governance studies and assume that socio-political orders need to be re-configurated when rebel groups have established strong forms of rebel governance, as was the case with the FARC-EP. We argue that patterns of interaction between local conflict-affected communities and ex-combatants are the key explanatory variables for the dynamics of peace processes at local level. We differentiate between clustered and entrenched post-war orders and demonstrate our argument with two case studies based on comprehensive field research.
Acknowledgments
We are thankful for comments on earlier versions of this paper by the two editors of the special issue, Hanna Pfeifer and Regine Schwab, by Gwen Burnyeat, by Anne Menzel and by the anonymous reviewers of this manuscript. We thank Paula Roth, Johana Botia, Andrés Restrepo and Andrés Escobar for their support for this project and the paper.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Correction Statement
This article has been corrected with minor changes. These changes do not impact the academic content of the article.
Notes
1. There are multiple reasons to explain the causes and dynamics of the armed conflict in Colombia. As explained by the Commission on the History of the Conflict and its Victims (CHCV in Spanish) and the recent final report of the Truth Commission, the conflict was caused by the territorial reconfiguration of the State, centralism, land distribution, political exclusion, and the unequal economic development project, among others. See CHCV (2015); CEV (2022).
2. Azar, The management of protracted social conflict, 93.
3. Comisión para el Esclarecimiento de la Verdad, la convivencia y la no repetición (CEV). Informe final: hallazgos y recomendaciones, 212.
4. Ibid., 215.
5. Ibid., 219.
6. Phelan, “The FARC’s Transition.”
7. Domínguez Cancelado, “Las FARC-ep”; CIDOB, Conflicto en Colombia.
8. Arjona, Rebelocracy.
9. Feldmann, Will Colombia’s peace accord.
10. Torres and Ramirez, “Proceso de paz”; Zambrano Quintero, CIDOB.
11. Estrada Alvarez, El Acuerdo de paz; Rettberg, La construcción de la paz.
12. Universidad Nacional de Colombia, Caracterización comunidad FARC-EP.
13. Even if the term reintegration is used in the literature, in the negotiation process between the Colombian government and FARC-EP, it was agreed the term reincorporation as it highlights the importance of the collective process, the participation of the conflict-affected communities, and to differentiate it from previous reintegration experiences, e.g. with the paramilitary groups.
14. Barrios Sabogal et al., ¡El nivel local; Charles et al., A Criminal Peace.
15. Kasfir, “Rebel Governance,” 24; see also below.
16. E.g. Dirkx, “The Institutional Legacies.”
17. Pfeifer and Schwab, Politicising the rebel governance paradigm, 5.
18. Autesserre, Peaceland; Haer et al., “Studying micro dynamics”; Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence; Mac Ginty, “Everyday peace”; Sambanis, “What Is Civil War?”.
19. Risse, “Limited Statehood”, 153.
20. Pfeifer and Schwab, Politicising the rebel governance paradigm, 1.
21. Boege, “Looking beyond”, 229.
22. Staniland, “States, Insurgents”.
23. Kasfir, Rebel governance.
24. Risse and Stollenwerk, “Legitimacy in Areas”; on classical discussion of legitimacy Nullmeier and Nonhoff, “Der Wandel des Legitimitätsdenkens”; on ANSAs Burns, “Insurgency”; Duyvesteyn, “Rebels & Legitimacy”; Krieger, “International Law”; Podder, “Mainstreaming the non-state”; Schlichte and Schneckener, “Armed Groups”.
25. Schlichte, In the Shadow, 95.
26. Ibid., 96.
27. Arjona, Rebelocracy, 22.
28. Ibid.; see as well Bakonyi et al., Gewaltordnungen; Hensell and Schlichte, „Gewalt und Legitimität“; Krieger, International Law; Schlichte and Schneckener, Armed Groups; Staniland, States, Insurgents.
29. See note 27 above, 27.
30. Schlichte and Schneckener, Armed Groups. Podder, “Understanding the Legitimacy”; Malthaner, “Violence”; Schlichte, In the Shadow.
31. Tilly, “War Making and State Making as Organized Crime”.
32. Kurtenbach, “The challenges”, 98.
33. See note 3 above . 214.
34. Jenss, “Criminal heterarchy”; Wienand, “Legacies of Militias”; Gutiérrez-Sanín, “Organization and Governance”.
35. See note 27 above . 91.
36. Ibid.
37. Ibid., 11.
38. Arjona, Rebelocracy; Staniland, “States, Insurgents”; Brück et al., Measuring Conflict.
39. United Nations, The Role of United Nations Peacekeeping.
40. Hensell and Gerdes, “Exit from war”; Humphreys and Weinstein, “Demobilization and Reintegration.”
41. Wolter, A United Nations for the 21st century.
42. Cox et al., “Introduction”.
43. Tull, “The hidden costs”.
44. Hagman and Nielsen, A Framework; UN, The role of United Nations peacekeeping; UN, Integrated Disarmament.
45. UN, Integrated Disarmament; UNDP, Demobilization.
46. Buxton, Reintegration; UN, Integrated Disarmament; Zirion Landaluze, “Los procesos”.
47. Kaplan and Nussio, “Explaining Recidivism”.
48. Barrios Sabogal, “Beyond victimization”.
49. El Tiempo, “Primer pueblo socialista”.
50. Kurtenbach, „The challenges“.
51. Ansorg and Kurtenbach, Institutional Reforms, 2.
52. Bultmann, “The social structure”, 614.
53. Salazar et al., “Towards violent peace?”, 498; Thomson, “The credible commitment problem”, 1.
54. Thelen et al., “Stategraphy”, 7.
55. Ibid, 4.
56. Salazar et al., “Towards violent peace?”.
57. Gobierno Nacional de Colombia et al., Acuerdo Final; Barrios Sabogal and Richter, “Las Farianas”; Burnyeat, The Face of Peace; McFee et al., “Aprender a ser”; Kurtenbach, “The challenges”; on the demobilization process and the unique approach to collective reincorporation cf Acosta-Navas and Reyes, “From combatants”; Carranzo-Franco, Demobilisation; McFee and Rettberg, Excombatientes.
58. See ARN, Nuestra entidad.
59. Brück et al., Measuring Conflict.
60. Bryman, Social research methods; Eck, “Survey Research”.
61. Taylor, Bogdan and DeVault, Introduction.
62. Freitas et al., The Focus Group; Kitzinger, “Qualitative research”; Morgan, Focus Groups; Sim and Waterfield, “Focus group methodology; Söderström, “Focus Groups”.
63. Gerring and Cojocaru, “Selecting Cases”.
64. See Giraldo Zuluaga, “La historia de violencia”.
65. Vásquez Delgado, Territorios.
66. CINEP, Caso tipo n.° 15 Caquetá.
67. FIP, Conflicto armado.
68. See note 66 above .
69. See note 67 above.
70. CINEP, Caso tipo n.° 15 Caquetá, 27.
71. See note 66 above.
72. See note 67 above.
73. CNHM, Caquetá: conflicto y memoria, 8.
74. Ibid., p. 156.
75. See note 65 above.
76. Interview with Community member 1, Caquetá, 20.02.2018.
77. Interview with Community member 2, Caquetá, 20.02.2018.
78. Ibid.,2018.
79. UNDP, Huila.
80. Ibid.
81. González Posso, Los Focos del Conflicto.
82. Castañeda Hernández, “Estragecias de Resilencia”.
83. Museo de Memoria de Colombia, “Algeciras”; Castañeda Hernández, “Estragecias de Resilencia”.
84. Museo de Memoria de Colombia, “Algeciras”.
85. Montoya Martínez, “Limitaciones”.
86. Vélez, “La última trinchera”.
87. Ibid.
88. We deeply condemned the murder of one of our project partners in Algeciras, Huila.
Additional information
Funding
Notes on contributors
Solveig Richter
Solveig Richter is a Heisenberg Professor for International Relations and Transnational Politics at Leipzig University. Before that, she worked as a Junior Professor for International Conflict Management at the Willy Brandt School of Public Policy in Erfurt and Senior Researcher at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Berlin. Her research interests cover post-conflict dynamics, non-state actors, external democratization, civilian peace missions and perspectives from the Global South. She has gained a regional expertise on Eastern Europe, notably the Western Balkans, as well as on Colombia.
Laura Camila Barrios Sabogal
Laura Camila Barrios Sabogal is Director of the Master’s Program in Conflict, Memory and Peace at Universidad del Rosario and member of the Center for Conflict and Peace Studies. She holds a Master of Public Policy with a specialization in Conflict Studies and Management, Willy Brandt School of Public Policy of the University of Erfurt, Germany. She is as well a bachelor Professional in government and international relations, Universidad Externado de Colombia. She has worked as an advisor in peace building, environment, and economic development for the German Corporation for International Cooperation GmbH for the GIZ’s Country Director in Colombia. Her research interests cover gender, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR), democratization and peace building in post-conflict countries.