Chinese Private Security Companies and the limit of coercion

ABSTRACT

This article analyses how China has overcome the limit of coercion through the use of Private Security Companies since the end of the Cold War until 2021. For this purpose, the Security Governance approach was applied to understand how the decentralisation and fragmentation of the security monopoly by the state could result in convenient coercive acts against societies. We point two paths of observation: an international path – the protection of the Chinese diaspora and the Belt and Road Initiative facilities; and a national path – the governmental interests that pave the monitoring and controlling mechanisms of Chinese society.

KEYWORDS:

• Private Security Companies
• security governance
• coercion
• China

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1. Weinbaum, ‘China’s Security Contractors Have Avoided the Fate of Russia’s Military Contractors, So Far’. Also see Berndtsson and Stern, ‘Private Security’, and Spearin, ‘UN Peacekeeping and the International Private Military and Security Industry’.

2. Arduino, ‘China’s Private Security Companies’.

3. Ibid.

4. Abrahamsen and Williams, ‘Securing the City’.

5. Pattison, ‘The legitimacy of the military, private military and security companies, and just war theory’.

6. Arduino, ‘China’s Belt and Road Security’. Also see Yang, ‘China’s Private Security Companies’.

7. Nantulya, ‘Chinese Security Firms Spread along the African Belt and Road’. Also see Legarda, ‘Guardians of the Belt and Road’.

8. Papageorgiou et al., A ‘Soft’ Balancing Ménage à Trois?.

9. Krahman, ‘Conceptualizing Security Governance’.

10. Ibid., 6.

11. Yu and Ziao, ‘Security Governance’. Also see note 9.

12. Sperling and Webber, ‘The European Union: Security governance and Collective Securitisation’. Also see Branovic and Chojnacki, ‘The logic of security markets’; Bénit-Gbaffou et al”, Communities”, Ebo, ‘Non-State Actors, Peacebuilding and Security Governance in West Africa’.

13. See note 11 and note 9.

14. Branovic and Chojnacki, ‘The logic of security markets: Security governance in failed states’.

15. Rasahugan and Khalil, ‘Systematic literature review on private security governance by government’.

16. Leander, ‘Making Markets Responsible’.

17. Peter, ‘Artificial intelligence, big data and autonomous systems along belt and road’. Also see note 11.

18. See note 4 above.

19. Berndtsson and Stern, ‘Private Security Guards’.

20. See note 5 above.

21. See notes 5 and 18 above.

22. See note 4 above, p. 241.

23. Ripstein, ‘Authority and coercion’.

24. See note 4 above, p. 240. Also see note 5 above.

25. See note 19 above.

26. Cockayne, ‘Regulating private military and security companies’.

27. Fitzgibbon and Lea, ‘Privatization and coercion’, p. 2.

28. Chen, ‘Origins of informal coercion in China’.

29. Singh, ‘Private security and crime control’.

30. See note 4 above, p. 242.

31. See note 27 above.

32. Rasahugan and Khalil, Systematic literature review on private security governance by government. Also see note 5 above. Spearin, ‘UN Peacekeeping and the International Private Military and Security Industry’.

33. Leander, ‘Making Markets Responsible’. see also Oliveira, ‘A Guerra Terceirizada’.

34. See note 4 above, p. 239.

35. Abrahamsen and Leander, Routledge Handbook of Private Security Studies.

36. Paoliello, ‘Anatomia de uma Empresa Militar e de Segurança Privada’.

37. Kaldor, ‘In Defense of New Wars’.

38. Oliveira, ‘A Guerra Terceirizada’, p. 67.

39. See note 34 above, p. 20.

40. Østensen and Bukkboll, ‘Russian Use of Private Military and Security Companies’. Also see Allison, ‘Informal but Diverse’. Varga, ‘Hungary’. Terlikowski et al., ‘Poland’. Pop, ‘Romania’.

41. Terlikowski et al., ‘Poland’. Also see note 15 above.

42. Ebo, ‘Non-State Actors’. Also see note 30 above.

43. Leander, ‘The Power to Construct International Security’. Also see Leander, ‘The Market for Force and Public Security’.

44. Ibid.

45. See note 35 above.

46. Arduino, China’s Private Army. Also see note 6.

47. Sukhankin, ‘Chinese Private Security Contractors’, p. 24.

48. Legarda and Nouwens, ‘Guardians of the Belt and Road’.

49. Ghiselli, ‘Diplomatic Opportunities and Rising Threats’.

50. Ibid., 616.

51. Baum, ‘The responsibility of power’. Also see Zou and Jones, ‘China’s response to threats to its overseas economic interests’.

52. Sørensen, ‘That Is Not Intervention’. Also see note 44 above.

53. Kharief, ‘China’s Discreet Game in North Africa’.

54. Ghiselli, ‘Market Opportunities and Political Responsibilities’, p. 7.

55. See note 49 above.

56. Arduino, ‘Chinese private security firms are growing their presence in Africa’. Also see notes 1 and 44 above.

57. See note 1 above.

58. Yang, ‘China’s Private Security Companies’. See notes 1 and 49 above.

59. Yuan, ‘China’s private security companies and the protection of Chinese economic interests abroad’.

60. Li, ‘The Belt and Road Initiative’.

61. Eslami and Kemie, ‘China – Iran’s 25-Year Deal’.

62. CSIS, ‘A Stealth Industry’. Also see Tian, ‘Private Security Companies Emerging Protectors of China’s Overseas Interests’, and notes 1 and 49.

63. Fabbri, ‘Chinese Private Security Companies in Africa’. Also see Papageorgiou and Cardoso, ‘Chinese diplomacy’, and notes 7, 44, and 49.

64. See note 58 above.

65. Ibid.

66. Wang et al., ‘The effect of China’s outward foreign direct investment on carbon intensity of Belt and Road Initiative countries’. p. 792.

67. See note 58.

68. Yau and van der Kley, ‘The Growth’. Also see note 44.

69. See note 58.

70. Sukhankin, ‘The Security Component of the BRI in Central Asia, Part Two’.

71. See note 58.

72. The Diplomat, ‘Will China’s Private Security Companies Follow the Wagner Group’s Footsteps in Africa?’.

73. The Eurasian Times, ‘China “Gobbles” Russia’s Market Share in Africa’.

74. Africa Defense Forum, ‘China’s Plans To Expand Private Security In Africa Could Pose Risks’.

75. Weinbaum et al., ‘Mapping Chinese and Russian Military and Security Exports to Africa’.

76. See note 74 and 72 above.

77. Eslami et al., ‘Sino-Iranian Cooperation in Artificial Intelligence’. Also see Voice of America, ‘China’, and note 57 above.

78. See note 54 above.

79. the Conversation, ‘Chinese Private Security Firms Are Growing Their Presence in Africa’.

80. Ibid.

81. See note 7 above.

82. Tian, ‘Private Security Companies Emerging Protectors of China’s Overseas Interests’. Also see notes 7, 52, 58 above.

83. Dawn, ‘Chinese Nationals Asked to Hire Private Firms for Security’. Also see Republicworld, ‘Peshawar Mosque Suicide Bomber Entered High-Security Zone Dressed in Police Uniform, Says Officer’.

84. Arduino, ‘Security privatisation with Chinese characteristics’. Also see note 6 above.

85. See note 1 above.

86. See note 58 above.

87. RTP, ‘Segurança privada em África começa a falar chinês’.

88. Arduino, ‘China’s Belt and Road Initiative Security Needs’, and notes 2, 7, 52 above.

89. Ibid.

90. See note 58 above.

91. See notes 9 and 50 above.

92. Layton, ‘Artificial intelligence’, p. 892.

93. Ong, ‘Thugs-for-Hire’”.

94. Leibold, ‘Surveillance in China’s Xinjiang region’. Also see Ong, ‘Thugs-for-Hire’: Subcontracting”, Chen”,Origins of informal coercion in China”.

95. Reuters, ‘Erik Prince company to build training centre in China’s Xinjiang’. Also see notes 43 and 49 above.

96. Folha de São Paulo, ‘Estudo aponta que China construiu quase 400 centros de detenção em Xinjiang’.

97. Bigo, ‘Protection’.

98. See note 94 above.

99. the Conversation, ‘Chinese Private Security Firms Are Growing Their Presence in Africa’.

100. C4ADS, ‘ZONED OUT’.

101. CNN, ‘Chinese Private Security Presence Is Growing in Southeast Asia’. Also see note 91 above.

102. Leibold, ‘Surveillance in China’s Xinjiang region’.

103. See note 84 above.

104. Ibid., 879.

105. Ibid., 879–880.

106. Voice of America, ‘Analysts: Beijing Behind Rise of Chinese Private Security Companies Worldwide’.

107. See note 16 above, 138.

108. See note 9 above.

Additional information

Funding

The work was supported by the Foundation of Science and Technology (FCT) Portugal [2021.06700.BD]; Research Centre for Political Science – CICP [BI_CICP_2022(07)].

Notes on contributors

Ricardo Pereira

Ricardo Pereira is a PhD candidate in Politics and International Relations at Dublin City University. Additionally, Ricardo serves as a data coder for the project ”EXCEPTIUS Exceptional Powers in Times of Sars-CoV-2 Crisis.”. His research has primarily revolved around topics, such as Private Security Companies, EU Health Security, and Securitization studies.

Ana Luquett

Ana Luquett has a master’s degree in International Relations from the University of Minho. She also has a specialization on Cultural Management and Communications from the Latin American Faculty of Social Science (FLACSO). Her work relates to themes of International Security, Private Military Companies and Cultural Heritage. Currently, Ana Clara works as an Information Security Analyst at Deloitte Brazil.

Rui Forte

Rui Forte is a researcher at the Department of Political Science of the University of Minho. In 2022-2023 he worked as a research assistant on the project of the Arms Race in the Middle East. His field of study is arms control and nuclear security.

Mohammad Eslami

Mohammad Eslami is a researcher at the Research Center for Political Science at the University of Minho. In 2022, he was a fellow of the Arms Control Negotiation Academy (ACONA) led by Harvard University. His research interest is related to Security Studies.