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ABSTRACT
I argue that in Eudemian Ethics II 8 Aristotle provides us with a general definition of force (bia) applicable to all natural phenomena. This definition points us to an important, though rarely noticed, requirement for voluntary action; namely that the impulse acted upon be natural to its possessor. The definition of force is further put to use in the chapter to solve puzzles concerning self-control and the lack of it. In addition to laying bare his solution to these puzzles, I emphasize Aristotle’s keen interest in explaining the mistake of his opponents; namely those who deny that self-control and its lack are voluntary. Most importantly, some of Aristotle's replies work with premisses accepted by, and granted to, his interlocutors to point out their mistakes.
Acknowledgements
I am grateful to audiences which heard versions of this paper at Marquette University and at Yale University for their helpful comments and suggestions, and especially to David Charles for discussion of many topics addressed in this paper.
Notes
1 This is one of the books the EE and the EN have in common. Their original provenance is still in dispute, but there are two stances largely adopted in the contemporary debate: following Kenny, The Aristotelian Ethics (reprinted in 2016) some people emphasise the homogeneity of the common books with the EE (see for instance Inwood and Woolf, Eudemian Ethics, viii–ix); others maintain that while originally written to be part of the EE they were revised to be inserted in the EN (for the first formulation of this idea see Mansion, “La genèse de l'oeuvre d'Aristote d'après les travaux récents”). I take it that either way it is prima facie legitimate to use material from the common books to shed light on the EE, and this is all I rely on in what follows.
2 Moreover, the first commonplace recalled in EN VII about self-control and its lack is that the former receives praise while the latter blame (1145b8-10), and Aristotle thinks that praise and blame are only bestowed upon what is voluntary (1223a15-18).
3 I here follow, somewhat dogmatically, the traditional interpretation of EE II 6. For a different reading, according to which the intent of this chapter and the enquiry into voluntariness is broader as it concerns the domain of agency, see Wolt, “ΑΡΧΗ ΠΡΑΞΕΩΝ in Aristotle’s Eudemian Ethics II 6”, and Wolt, “The Aim of Eudemian Ethics ii 6-9”.
4 Aristotle does not say how he arrived at this list of candidates. Kenny, 1979, argues that it is based on a general classification of mental states; Woods, Eudemian Ethics Books I, II, and VIII, 138, and Cooper, “Aristotelian Responsibility”, 274 that it is based on the principles of action; Rowe, The Eudemian and Nicomachean Ethics, 74, suggested that the successful candidate, namely dianoia, had Academic origins, for it is used to define the voluntary in the pseudo-Platonic Definitions, usually thought to harbour Academic material. If Rowe is right, perhaps then all of the three candidates are inherited from the Academy.
5 See Ackrill, Aristotle's Ethics, 268; Kenny, Aristotle's Theory of the Will, 14–20; Woods, Eudemian Ethics Books I, II, and VIII, 131–5; Simpson, The Eudemian Ethics of Aristotle, 262–6.
6 Here Aristotle’s argument is roughly as follows: (1) some voluntary actions are done on the spur of the moment; (2) no one does anything in accordance with prohairesis on the spur of the moment; thus, (3) some voluntary actions are not in accordance with prohairesis. It is clear already at this stage that Aristotle considers actions done in accordance with prohairesis to be only a subset of the voluntary.
7 Throughout the paper, I use Christopher Rowe’s work-in-progress edition of the Greek text.
8 Scepticism is expressed by Dirlmeier, Eudemische Ethik, 279, who ends up translating the term as ‘Erörterung’ (discussion); similarly, Donini, Etica Eudemia, 208, n. 101.
9 Woods, Eudemian Ethics Books I, II, and VIII, 209 remarks, that at ll. 1224a18-19 “there is no mention of the crucial presence of an external factor”; along similar lines here, see Echeñique, Aristotle’s Ethics and Moral Responsibility, 88.
10 See also the homoiôs at l. 1224a20, the opening of my [A2] below.
11 Emphasis on linguistic usage is conspicuous, see phamen 1224a18, legetai at a19, and finally anônymos hê antithesis at lines 19–20.
12 See, for instance, Müller, “Agency and Responsibility”, 227.
13 Charles, “The Eudemian Ethics on the Voluntary”, 17, and more generally on the importance of nature in the EE, see Donini, Etica Eudemia, xvii–xviii.
14 Most interpreters think in the EE Aristotle does not think that non-rational animals and children share in voluntary action, see for instance, Charles, “The Eudemian Ethics on the Voluntary”, 11; for the opposite view, Cooper, “Aristotelian Responsibility”, 286, n. 6, and Müller,“Agency and Responsibility”.
15 If that is on the right track, it follows that Woods’s bewilderment is unnecessary when he writes that “it is not clear […] that the denial that either reason of desire are natural would cast doubt on the conclusion that they act voluntarily”, see Woods, Eudemian Ethics Books I, II, and VIII, 132.
16 The author of the Magna Moralia has a very similar example featuring a horse being made to operate a volte-face, see MM I 14, 1188b5-6.
17 I, therefore, disagree with Echeñique’s ingenious attempt to supply a plausible sense for why the externality condition is only explicitly mentioned when Aristotle moves on to the case of non-rational animals. (In a similar fashion Woods, Eudemian Ethics Books I, II, and VIII, 209 remarks, that at ll. 1224a18-19 “there is no mention of the crucial presence of an external factor”.) As I have argued above, it is plausible to think that the failure to mention explicitly the externality condition reflects a conscious decision on Aristotle’s part to be generic for the purpose of bringing out the two possible accounts of force that can be derived from the observation of inanimate motion.
18 For, Aristotle quite clearly implies that force is not simple in the case of rational beings, see Sauvé Meyer, “Why Involuntary Actions Are Painful”, 135. I agree with her that what Aristotle means is that in rational beings force arises only if contrariety applies to both reason and desire. The best evidence for this is ll. 1224b11-15. However, this seems to prove too much. Suppose someone is on a diet and is sticking to it. At the same time, he or she craves some chocolate. If he or she were forced to eat chocolate the resulting action would not be a case of force if, indeed, Aristotle thinks that both reason and desire have to be opposite. I take it that what Aristotle needs to say to take care of this case is that force is contrariety to one’s dominant impulse, and contrariety to both impulses if they agree (trivially).
19 Kenny, Aristotle's Theory of the Will, 40 is thus on the right track, but fails to connect this point with the first part of the chapter.
20 Specifically, Aristotle retorted that the uncontrolled acts in accordance with appetite, and hence takes pleasure in the object of their action. As for the self-controlled, they act in accordance with persuasion (peithô), which was presented as opposed to force and compulsion at ll. 1224a13-15.
21 Thus, I disagree with the argument in Sauvé Meyer, “Why Involuntary Actions Are Painful”. Pleasure and pain are used throughout his discussion for aporetic purposes, or to advance in the examination, but eventually Aristotle comes to reject them as necessary conditions for an action to be voluntary by focusing on self-control and its lack. Nor can pleasure and pain be taken to be “a symptom that the movement in question is contrary to impulse” in sentient creatures, see Sauve Meyer, “Why Involuntary Actions Are Painful”, 133. That is ruled out, once again, by self-control and its lack. Sauvé Meyer may well be right that in the EN pain is a requirement for an action to be involuntary, but I do not think that this is the case in the EE. In my view, Aristotle’s greater emphasis on character in the EN would explain this change, but I cannot go into this here.
22 Dalimier, Éthique à Eudème, 119 translates “les deux impulsions étant séparées se repoussent mutuellement” (emphasis added), but that is mistaken as the neuter kechôrismena cannot refer to impulses (hormai).
23 Woods, Eudemian Ethics Books I, II, and VIII, 131. See, along similar lines, Kenny, Aristotle's Theory of the Will, 40.