Auguste Comte and spiritualism

ABSTRACT

It is well known that Auguste Comte was a persistent opponent of spiritualism, which for him represented the very essence of a superannuated metaphysical philosophy. This article aims to show that this unquestionable opposition between Comtean positivism and the spiritualism of Victor Cousin and Théódore Jouffroy nevertheless covers problems and schemes of thought that are often similar. As a result, these two philosophies mirror each other, rather than being in a situation of radical strangeness. In arguing for this, the focus will be on three main questions, concerning the relationship of philosophy to the natural sciences, knowledge of the mind, and the philosophy of history. However, it was only with the renewal of the spiritualist school, and on the basis of Comte's last philosophy, that a kind of posthumous dialogue became possible. This is illustrated by Ravaisson's critique of Comte, which can be considered as a kind of spiritualist reappropriation of positivism.

KEYWORD:

• French spiritualism
• Auguste Comte
• Victor Cousin
• Félix Ravaisson
• Théodore Jouffroy

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Daniel Becquemont and Vincent Guillin for their careful revision. I am also particularly grateful to Delphine Antoine-Mahut and Mark Sinclair for their helpful suggestions.

Notes

1 It can be said without exaggeration that this survey has paved the way for a wave of new criticisms of Comte within the spiritualist school of the late nineteenth century, mostly by Ravaisson’s students. On Jules Lachelier and Alfred Fouillée in this connection, see Fedi (“Lien social”); on Émile Boutroux, see Rutten (Essai sur la morale, 141–6).

2 This important point is made in a note that Harriet Martineau omitted to translate.

3 For an in-depth study of the positive encyclopaedia, see Petit (Le système d’Auguste Comte).

4 For this topic, see Azouvi (Descartes et la France, 179); on Cousin’s interpretation of Descartes, see Moreau, (“Ajourner l’ontologie”); on Garnier, see Antoine-Mahut (“Bien reçu?”).

5 Difficulties in interpreting the disagreement between Mill and Comte on introspection come from a sort of discrepancy. Comte’s arguments are perfectly adapted to spiritualist claims, and he never updated them, even when Mill, in the correspondence, told him that he considered it as relevant to create a “positive psychology” (Correspondance II, 348). As a result, Mill will later criticise arguments that were not intended for him, and commentators are obliged to reconstruct the Comtean theses to adapt them to this criticism.

6 For a study of Gall’s psychology, see Robert Maxwell Young, Mind, Brain and Adaptation, 11–23; for Comte’s cerebral classification of 1851, see Clauzade (L’organe de la pensée, 226–80).

7 See Discours sur l’esprit positif, §77; Discours, 53; SPPI, 439, 472, 568, 569; Synthèse subjective, 361, 365, 607. Only one occurrence of this pair of notions have a more general meaning (see System IV, 464; SPPIV, 533–4): in this case, since two opposing “intellectual or social” tendencies are involved, “spiritualism” could refer to the French school of psychology.

8 For the historical context, see Cotten: “Victor Cousin: éclectisme, spiritualisme, et ‘pouvoir spirituel’” (Entre théorie et pratique, 95–131). The following analysis rests on Cotten’s chapter.

9 For a definition of this spiritualist positivism (also called spiritualist realism), see Ravaisson, La philosophie en France, 275–83. See also Vieillard-Baron, “Le manifeste spiritualiste”.