Patterns of Ethnic Homogenisation, Fragmentation and Polarisation and the Vote Shares for Nationalist Parties in Latvia

Abstract

The focus of this article is on ethnic diversity and polarisation in Latvia after 1989. Our fundamental question is that if we interpret diversification as a dynamic process, and include polarisation as a potential direction of diversification, how much will the results differ, compared to the explanations usually proposed in the literature? The recognition that apparent homogenisation results, in particular cases, in polarisation (in this case in 35% of Latvia’s entire population) is the major contribution of our empirical analysis. Taking into account the broad scale of the potential impact of polarisation, our findings raise significant questions for the classification mechanisms that may be employed in further investigations.

Notes

1 These three ideal types are ‘absolute homogeneity’ when everybody declares themselves members of the same group; ‘absolute heterogeneity (fragmentation or fractionalisation)’ when each individual belongs to a different ethnic group; and ‘absolute bipolarity’ when only two groups of similar size are present with 50%–50%.

2 In this article the term ‘diversification’ implies four main directions of the change of an ethnic composition. It can shift towards either the absolute homogeneity or the absolute heterogeneity (along a line between the minimum and maximum values of EFI). However, both directions of diversification (that is, homogenisation or heterogenisation) can be coupled with a secondary direction, whereby the ethnic composition may approximate bipolarity as a third ideal type or may instead move away from it. The latter changes can be captured by EPI.

3 Rent-seeking involves seeking to increase one’s share of existing wealth without creating new wealth. A common example of rent-seeking behaviour is political lobbying; it implies gaining benefits for a privileged group, which in return promises political support.

4 Although a prototypical ethnic group is generally characterised by a sense of group belonging, based on common origin, kinship, history, territory and cultural features (language, religion, customs, beliefs, values), given the ‘slippery’ nature of ethnicity, a plausible and universally accepted definition does not exist. In contrast to ‘primordialist’ concepts, ethnic groups are understood nowadays as social constructions, whereby the boundaries between ‘we’ and ‘they’ may shift over time and context. Ethnic identity can be considered a fluid, situational (Tajfel & Turner 1986), multiple and sometimes ‘hybrid’ (Hall 1992) phenomenon.

5 Distinguishing between ‘groups’ and ‘categories’ (Jenkins 2008) is especially important in countries where census categories have artificially created abstract units—such as ‘black Caribbean’ in the UK, ‘Latino’ in the US—which are meaningless in everyday life for many members of those ‘groups’ (DeWind 2009).

6 ‘It may be that ethnicity is simply a convenient—though in certain respects misleading—rubric under which to group phenomena that, on the one hand, are highly disparate and, on the other, have a great deal in common with phenomena that are not ordinarily subsumed under the rubric of ethnicity. In other words, by raising questions about the unit of analysis—the ethnic group—we may end up questioning the domain of analysis: ethnicity itself’ (Brubaker 2002, p. 186).

7 In a historical context, official statistics can be considered only an approximate reference point in the traditionally multicultural ‘Baltic–Slavic contact zone’ stretching from the Vilnius area to Lake Peipsi. Ethnicity has always been a fluid notion here; its different dimensions—ethnic origin, mother tongue, religion, citizenship or even local identity—were layered on each other in various ways and many people already had a hybrid identity in the nineteenth century; for example, Latvian-speaking Jews, Catholic Belarusians and people with Lithuanian ancestry but Polish national identity (Petronis 2007). According to the 2011 census data by mother tongue, ethnic and religious affiliation, hybrid identity seems to still be a common phenomenon in ethnically mixed families in the Latgale region.

8 See, for example, Pelnēns (2010).

9 Other scholars have also drawn attention to the methodological importance of the ideal types, for instance Reilly (2000/2001), Fearon (2003) and Schaeffer (2013).

10 In 2009, the Latvian administrative system changed dramatically: the levels of municipality and county were abolished and new, intermediate units—novads—were created.

11 Geo-referencing is the process of adding geographical information to a topographical map so that GIS software places the image in its appropriate real-world location. In other words, the internal coordinate system of the map is associated with real geographical coordinates in the physical space.

12 Compared to the national average, Latvians have relatively favourable indicators of natural growth and age structure, while other ethnic groups—with the exception of Roma people—fare worse. In relation to this, the majority of Eastern Slavs who emigrated in the 1990s were of reproductive age, thus the population of Russians, Belarusians and Ukrainians who stayed on in Latvia became more elderly (Vītoliņš & Zvidriņš 2002; Vītoliņš et al. 2006).

13 Nearly two thirds of the total population loss of Latvia may be associated with two huge waves of emigration. In the 1990s the emigrants were mainly Russians, Belarusians and Ukrainians. Most of them left Latvia between 1991 and 1994 because of the economic crisis of the transition period accompanied by the shrinking of the industrial sector, a phenomenon that affected mainly settlements with a significant Eastern Slavic population, as well as because of political changes, such as the imposition of relatively strict citizenship regulations (Galbreath & Muižnieks 2009), and a liberal immigration regime in Russia, embodied in the 1991 citizenship law (Shevel 2012). However, we still know little about the second wave of emigration that started with the global financial crisis in 2009, such as information on the ethnic origin of migrants or their intentions to return (Apsīte et al. 2012).

14 Ranking Latvian parties on this scale poses several problems. On the one hand, the nativist, nationalist rhetoric is an established feature of almost all major Latvian parties interested in maintaining the status quo in ethnic policy (Bogushevitch & Dimitrovs 2010). Even the political mainstream tends to use radical language, for example, talk of ‘decolonisation’ or the repatriation of Russian immigrants (Auers & Kasekamp 2013, pp. 243–44). On the other hand, only a few parties are clear-cut examples of such ideal types; sometimes the dividing line between nationalists and moderates, minority-friendly or mainstream cuts right across a political party.

15 National Alliance (Nacionālā Apvienība—NA), a group of three smaller parties All for Latvia!—For Fatherland and Freedom/Latvian National Independence Movement (Visu Latvijai!—Tēvzemei un Brīvībai—LNNK) could be seen as an ideal type of a European radical-right party with a successful master frame including three key themes: nativism, authoritarianism and populism (Auers & Kasekamp 2013). In 2011 they won 13.9% of the vote, and in 2014 16.6%, and became a credible coalition partner of the Latvian government. For Human Rights in a United Latvia (Par Cilvēka Tiesībām Vienotā Latvijā—PCTVL) represents the more radical wing of the Russian-speaking voters. It used to be stronger, but given a lack of effective leadership, fundraising skills and governing experience, the party failed to pass the 5% threshold both in 2011 and 2014 (0.78%, 1.58%), while its former supporters voted presumably for Harmony Centre (Saskaņas Centrs—HC). Although the leftwing HC declares itself a mainstream party, in fact it explicitly aims to represent Russophone interests and therefore has an almost complete monopoly of the Russian-speaker vote (Auers 2012, p. 4). Despite HC’s ambiguous position on the scale of ethnic-oriented political organisations (Bochsler 2007), it would be a mistake to ignore the results of the most important minority party—and the largest party in Latvia—which received 28.4% and 23.0% of the votes in 2011 and 2014.

16 Of course, we are fully aware that this assumption raises some problems. On the one hand, Eastern Slavs are underrepresented in voting in parliamentary elections because a significant proportion of them—29% of Russians, 49% of Belarusians and 48% of Ukrainians—are non-citizens. On the other hand, since HC has been attempting to declare itself as a mainstream leftwing party for a number of years, its support base is not limited to Eastern Slavs. However, the party has, without doubt, a quasi-monopoly of the Russian-speaker vote, thus our simplified assumption does not distort the general picture.

Additional information

Funding

This research was supported by the National Research, Development and Innovation Office—NKFIH, PD 115951.

Notes on contributors

Ádám Németh

Ádám Németh, Institute of Geography and Earth Sciences, University of Pécs, Pécs 7622, Hungary.

Zoltán Dövényi

Zoltán Dövényi, Institute of Geography and Earth Sciences, University of Pécs, Pécs 7622, Hungary. Email: [email protected]