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Abstract
Disengagement from militant groups has often been explained in individual terms such as battle fatigue or the desire to rejoin family and friends. We seek to examine empirically which other factors, beyond individual-level determinants, have influenced disengagement processes among militants belonging to different types of Chechen militant organisations. Drawing empirical insights from unique in-depth interviews with former members of the Chechen insurgency, their relatives, eyewitnesses to the Chechen wars and experts with first-hand knowledge of the researched phenomena, this study examines disengagement among jihadist and nationalist Chechen militants. Focusing on group-level factors, such as the capacity to resist external pressures, the use of violence, in-group social bonds and group cohesion, this article demonstrates that disengagement has been a less viable course of action for Chechen jihadists than for nationalist militants.
Notes
1 Given the absence of an all-encompassing definition of group-level disengagement that could be applied to broader categories of militants beyond ‘terrorists’ and ‘freedom fighters’, this study endorses the conceptualisation of disengagement as a generic term. In this vein, disengagement is presented here as the process through which members of militant organisations abandon their groups. This definition does not exclude the possibility of disengagement occurring as part of a broader process of demobilisation, such as following amnesties or demobilisation programmes or within the framework of peace-building and rehabilitation processes. Also, it leaves the question of psychological de-radicalisation open (Doosje et al. Citation2016). In fact, individuals might disengage without ever de-radicalising (Altier et al. Citation2014, p. 648).
2 The terms ‘Islamists’ and ‘jihadists’ are used interchangeably.
3 Although Russia and the Russian-backed regime of Ramzan Kadyrov consider that the civil war is officially over, occasional militant attacks on security forces are still occurring in present-day Chechnya.
4 This is particularly relevant for absolutist or universal Islamist groups (Piazza Citation2009), which are pursuing global jihad, as opposed to strategic or instrumental Islamists seeking other goals alongside religious motivation (such as independence or ethnic rights).
5 Thematically and theoretically, this study builds on research published in Souleimanov and Aliyev (Citation2014), while differing in its focus on group-level rather than individual-level disengagement, and on Chechnya alone.
6 In some cases, nationalist and Islamist aspects may overlap in the same organisation; for example, the Palestinian Hamās. In other cases, there are alliances between nationalist and Islamist organisations (Sinno Citation2009; Christia Citation2012). The difference between these two types of organisations may thus be blurred in some contexts.
7 There are exceptions to this presentation. For example, some nationalist organisations are known to have used religion-like dogmas to produce doctrines of self-sacrifice much like the Islamist groups of today (Bartov Citation1992; Hall & Malešević Citation2013).
8 See also Toft and Zhukov (Citation2015, p. 228).
9 For instance, Russian media reported the capitulation of dozens of nationalist insurgents in the period 2003–2006, including well-known insurgent commanders such as Sulim Yamadaev, Magomed Khambiyev, Ruslan Israpilov, Ali Suleymanov and Sulim Eldarov. Even when prominent nationalist commanders refused to capitulate or disengage, many of their foot soldiers did, as was the case of the groups led by nationalists Ruslan Gelayev and Aslan Maskhadov, to name two. See, ‘V Chechne dobrovol’no sdalsya polevoi komandir S. Eldarov’, RBK, 22 May 2004; ‘V Chechne sdalsya byvshii podchinennyi Salmana Raduyeva’, Kavkaz uzel, 14 October 2008; ‘Kadyrovu pod ego lichnie garantii sdalis 49 chechenskikh boevikov’, News.ru, 29 August 2006; ‘Chechnya: Byvshii boevik pomog predotvratit krupnie terakty v stolitse i krupnom raionnom tsentre respubliki’, Regnum, 3 July 2003.
10 Interviews with former insurgents included, inter alia, these major questions: ‘Why did you decide to leave your armed group?’, ‘Was your decision prompted by any event or process?’, ‘What forms did the pressure to stay in your armed group/to leave it take?’; ‘What facilitated/complicated your return to peaceful life?’, ‘What were your major concerns while leaving your group?’, ‘During your time with your armed group, did you stay in touch with your community?’.
11 These interviews were centred around the following questions: ‘Did your community have any contact with nationalist/jihadist insurgents during the 2000s, and why?’, ‘What made insurgents hesitant/willing to return to their/your communities?’, ‘What categories of insurgents were more or less willing to disengage, and why?’. During the interviews, our interlocutors were able to relatively easily identify nationalist and jihadist groups as they were knowledgeable about their dominant ideology, leadership and goals. Although nationalist groups did make extensive use of Islamist symbols to legitimise their fight, our interlocutors were still able to distinguish insurgent groups by their ideological rhetoric and style.
12 Those who allowed themselves to be named include: Lema Tsjabajev (Chabayev), former press secretary of President Aslan Maskhadov at the headquarters of the Chechen Army, currently a Prague-based journalist with the North Caucasus Service of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty; Mairbek Vatchagaev, the former General Representative of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria in Moscow, currently a non-resident fellow of the Jamestown Foundation; Mairbek Taramov, the Baku-based head of the Chechen Human Rights Centre; Usman Ferzauli, the Copenhagen-based ‘Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria’; Abdulla Duduyev, the Moscow-based chief editor of the liberal Chechen journal Dosh; Taus Serganova, a Grozny-based journalist who works with Dosh; Ruslan Tachayev, a former high-ranking officer of the Chechen Army and currently a Vienna-based dissident and human rights activist; Andrei Babitsky, an award-winning journalist, formerly with Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, who covered both Chechen wars on the ground; Varvara Pakhomenko, an analyst with the International Crisis Group’s Russian Justice Initiative, who concentrates on Chechnya and the North Caucasus; Ivan Sukhov, a journalist with Kommersant’’ who covered the Second Chechen War on the ground; and Irina Gordienko, a journalist with Novaya gazeta specialising in the North Caucasus. We discussed various aspects of the violence in the North Caucasus, including the central themes of our article, with Tanya Lokshina of the Moscow branch of Human Rights Watch and Svetlana Gannushkina of the human rights organisation Memorial. In addition, in the period 2007–2016, we carried out discussions with around two dozen, predominantly Russian, specialists who provided subject-matter expertise. These specialists included, among others, Ekaterina Sokirianskaia, the head of the Russia and North Caucasus Programme of the International Crisis Group and a former representative of Memorial, based in Chechnya and Ingushetia; and Alexander Cherkasov, a leading representative of Memorial specialising on Chechnya.
13 Interviews with Mairbek Taramov, the Baku-based head of the Chechen Human Rights Centre, and a former high-ranking officer of the Operative Directorate of the Main Headquarters of the Army of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, currently based in Western Europe, April 2016.
14 Interview with ‘Idris’, a relative of an ex-insurgent, France, August 2009.
15 See also, ‘The “Dirty War” in Chechnya: Forces Disappearances, Torture, and Summary’, Human Rights Watch, 1 March 2001, available at: https://www.hrw.org/report/2001/03/01/dirty-war-chechnya-forced-disappearances-torture-and-summary, accessed 24 September 2015.
16 ‘“Dobrovol'naya sdacha” Magomed Khambieva’, Memorial, 10 March 2004, available at: www.memo.ru/hr/hotpoints/caucas1/msg/2004/03/m13451.htm, accessed 24 September 2013.
17 Interview with ‘Idris’, a relative of an ex-insurgent, France, August 2009.
18 Interview with ‘Aslan’, a relative of an ex-insurgent, France, August 2009.
19 Interviews with former Chechen insurgents, their relatives and eyewitnesses to the Second Chechen War, Western Europe and Turkey, 2007–2015.
20 Interview with ‘Idris’, a relative of an ex-insurgent, France, August 2009.
21 Interview with ‘Magomed’, a former nationalist insurgent, Istanbul, September 2007.
22 Interview with ‘Magomed’, a former nationalist insurgent, Istanbul, September 2007.
23 Interviews with former insurgents, both nationalists and jihadists, their close friends and relatives, Western Europe and Turkey, 2007–2015. This idea relates to Wood’s ‘pleasure of agency’, which is not unique to Islamists (Wood Citation2003), and which goes beyond ‘instrumental reasoning’ (Gutiérrez & Wood Citation2014, pp. 220–21).
24 Interview with ‘Mairbek’, a former jihadist insurgent, Istanbul, May 2009.
25 Exceptions were nationalist insurgents who were driven by their desire for personal retaliation, as part of the local tradition of blood revenge. According to interviewees, such individuals were often willing to sacrifice their lives to avenge their relative’s death, fatal injury or humiliation. Importantly, ‘avengers’, as interviewees usually referred to them, were more likely to be recruited into jihadist than nationalist groups.
26 Online interview with journalist Andrei Babitsky, May 2016.
27 Interviews with former nationalist and jihadist insurgents, Western Europe and Turkey, 2007–2015.
28 Interview with ‘Umar’, a former nationalist insurgent, France, August 2009.
29 Chechnya’s demographics and geography have also contributed to this density of local knowledge. Chechnya is a republic of around 17,000 square kilometres, and episodic insurgent activity is confined to around one quarter of the republic’s territory.
30 Interviews with former nationalist insurgents and eyewitnesses of the Second Chechen War, Western Europe and Turkey, 2007–2015.
31 Authors’ discussions with Russian and Chechen specialists, Western Europe, Czech Republic and via online media, 2015–2016.
32 Interview with ‘Shamil’, a former jihadist insurgent, Paris, December 2015.
33 Interview with a Chechen political scientist, Prague, June 2014.
34 Interview with Lema Chabayev, journalist, Prague, January 2014.
35 Interviews with eyewitnesses of the Second Chechen War, Western Europe and Turkey, 2007–2015.
36 Interview with a Chechen political scientist, Prague, June 2014.
37 Interviews with eyewitnesses to the Second Chechen War, Western Europe and Turkey, 2007–2015.
38 See also Toft and Zhukov (Citation2015).
39 Interview with a Chechen political scientist, Prague, June 2014.
40 Interviews with eyewitnesses of the Second Chechen War, Western Europe and Turkey, 2007–2015.
41 Over time, this isolation from the outside world encouraged jihadists to be less discriminatory in their selection of targets and lethal use of violence, as described in the previous section. They did not have to take into consideration the concerns of the local population that largely disapproved of these tactics. Jihadists’ inclination to use such force therefore antagonised the local population even further.
42 Interviews with former jihadists and eyewitnesses of the Second Chechen War, Western Europe and Turkey, 2007–2015.
43 For example, organisational and operational principles of Chechen nationalists did not significantly differ from other ethno-nationalist and separatist organisations, such as Tamil Tigers (LTTE) and Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). In the same vein, jihadist organisations, such as the Caucasus Emirate, have often emulated tactics and methods of operation of other Islamist organisations, and al-Qaeda more in particular.
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Emil Aslan Souleimanov
Emil Aslan Souleimanov, Charles University Department of Security Studies, Institute of Political Science, Faculty of Social Sciences, U Krize 8, 158 00 Prague 5, Czech Republic. Email: [email protected]
Huseyn Aliyev
Huseyn Aliyev, Lord Kelvin Adam Smith Fellow, Central and East European Studies, School of Social and Political Sciences, University of Glasgow, 9 Lilybank Gardens, Glasgow, G12 8RZ, UK. Email: [email protected]