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ABSTRACT
The 1975 Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) marked a key period in the Northern Irish Troubles and provided an opportunity for peace to be reached more than 20 years before the Good Friday Agreement would be signed. Past commentaries have argued failure was the result of the PIRA being misled into the ceasefire by the British who falsified their true position, the PIRA leadership being too bound to ideology to appreciate the British negotiating position, and British forces outside of the Prime Minister’s Office creating the perception that the British were not prepared to negotiate. By using prospect theory as an explanation of the PIRA’s decision making, this article argues that the political wing of the organisation, i.e. Sinn Féin, was not developed enough to fully appreciate the political incentives the British Government was offering the PIRA in exchange for a permanent ceasefire.
Acknowledgments
The author would like to thank Dr John Janzekovic, Dr Shannon Brincat, Richard Gehrman, Tamara Cooper, Lucrezia Brown and the two anonymous reviewers for their kind feedback on earlier iterations of this article.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
1. Richards, “Terrorist Groups”, 74.
2. McKearney, The Provisional IRA, 158.
3. Cowper-Coles, “Anxious for peace”.
4. Aveyard, No Solution.
5. See above 3.
6. Ibid, 232.
7. Ibid, 233.
8. White, “Truce in Perspective”, 213–214.
9. White, “Truce in Perspective”, 226–233; Maloney, Secret History, 140–41; Kelley, Longest War, 236–237; Bell, Irish Troubles, 494–495.
10. Hennessay, First Peace Process, 8.
11. Ó Dochartaigh, “Everyone Trying”.
12. Ibid, 56–60.
13. Rees quoted in White, Out of the Ashes.
14. Ó Dochartaigh, “Everyone Trying”, 77.
15. Ibid, 59.
16. Taylor, The Provos, 210–11.
17. White, “Truce in Perspective”, 227; Ó Dochartaigh, “Everyone Trying”, 54.
18. Snidal, “Rational Choice”, 88.
19. Ibid, 86.
20. Whyte, “Escalating commitment”.
21. Farnham, “Roosevelt and the Munich Crisis”; McDermott “Prospect theory in IR”; McDermott and Kugler, “Comparing rational choice”; Richardson, “Avoiding and incurring losses”; Haas, “Prospect theory and the Cuban Missile Crisis”.
22. Masters, “Support and nonsupport”; De Mesquita, McDermott and Cope, “Expect prospects”; Hancock “No alternative”.
23. Kahneman and Tversky, “Prospect Theory”.
24. Ibid.
25. See above 18., 86.
26. Kahneman and Tversky, “Prospect Theory”, 287.
27. Ibid.
28. Green and Shapiro, Pathologies; Quackenbush, “Rationality”; Eriksson, Potential and Limits.
29. Ibid.
30. Caplan, “Terrorism”, 92.
31. See above 10., 159.
32. Taylor and Duddy, Secret Peacemaker.
33. Cowper-Coles, “Anxious for peace”, 232.
34. Aveyard, No solution, 64–67.
35. Instructions, 8 February 1975, JHLA, NUI Galway, POL 28/67.
36. Richardson, “Britain and the IRA”, 70.
37. Cowper-Coles, “Anxious for peace”, 232; Moloney, Secret History, 166.
38. Many of these deaths were the result of the organisation’s own punishment killings. However, 43 deaths have been attributed to the security forces (the British Army and the RUC) and 5 to Loyalist VNSAs. See Sutton, “Sutton Index”.
39. Taylor, Brits, 129.
40. Cowper-Coles, “Anxious for peace”, 232.
41. White, 128.
42. Ibid, 227.
43. Hayes and McAllister, “British and Irish public opinion”, 66.
44. Ibid.
45. Note of Meeting held at 5:30pm, Wednesday 18 December 1974, 18 December 1974, State Papers, NRA DEFE 24/1933.
46. Ibid.
47. White, Out of the Ashes, 121.
48. Letter to Rees, 27 December 1974, State Papers, NRA PREM 16/515.
49. Hennessey, First Peace Process, 164.
50. The IRA Ceasefire Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, 18 February 1975, State Papers, NRA CAB 134/3921.
51. Ibid.
52. Ibid.
53. Ibid.
54. Ibid.
55. White, “Truce in perspective”.
56. Formal Meeting, 2 April 1975, JHLA, NUI Galway, POL 28/67.
57. Maloney and Kinchin-White, “The Nield Letter”.
58. Instructions, 18 April 1975 (approx.), JHLA, NUI Galway, POL 28/67.
59. Tonge and Murray, Sinn Féin and the SDLP, 263.
60. Bean, New Politics, 234.
61. Bourke, “Wilson wanted to disengage.”
62. Ibid.
63. See above 14., 57.
64. Ibid, 73.
65. The Political and Security Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, 3 July 1975, State Papers, NRA CAB 134/3921 IRN (75) 16.
66. Moloney, Secret History, 424.
67. McGarry and O’Leary, Northern Ireland Conflict; Todd, “Institutional Change”.
68. Sutton, “Index of Deaths”.
69. It should be noted that other Republican organisations and semi-organised gangs did perpetrate similar civilian killings to the Loyalist organisations during this time, albeit still not near the same numbers.
70. See above 66., 261.
71. Northern Ireland Act 1974.
72. ARK.
73. Aveyard, No Solution, 85–86.
74. Hennessey, First Peace Process, 196.
75. Aveyard, No Solution, 85.
76. Ibid.
77. Kerr, The Destructors.
78. The Sinn Féin of 1918 in the Republic of Ireland had morphed into Fianna Fail, which would go onto dominate Irish politics during the 20th century. Fianna Fail remained a pro-republican and united Irish party, albeit it abandoned violence and abstentionism as strategies.
79. Sinn Féin, Eire Nua.
80. Cowper-Coles, “Anxious for peace”, 234.
81. McDermott, “Prospect Theory in Political Science”, 304.
82. Levy, “Loss Aversion”, 184.
83. Taliaferro, “Power Politics”, 199.
84. Ibid.
85. See above 56.67.
86. Aveyard, No Solution, 110–11.
87. Cowper-Coles, “Anxious for peace”, 233.
88. Ibid.
89. See above 66., 424.
90. Kerr, The Destructors, 284.