A Kantian-Brandomian View of Concepts and The Problem of a Regress of Norms

ABSTRACT

According to the Kantian-Brandomian view of concepts, we can understand concepts in terms of norms or rules that bind those who apply them, and the application of a concept requires that the concept-user be sensitive to the norms governing its application. But this view faces some serious objections. In particular, according to Rosen, Glüer and Wikforss, this view leads to a vicious regress of norms. The purpose of this paper is to defend a version of the Kantian-Brandomian view of concepts against this objection. I argue that we can deal with this problem along the lines of a coherentist account of justification.

KEYWORDS:

• A Kantian view of concepts
• The Wittgensteinian dilemma
• A vicious regress of norms
• a Sellarsian coherence theory
• Brandom
• Glüer and Wikforss

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1. For a detailed defense of this interpretation regarding Kant’s view of concepts, see Ginsborg 1997, esp. 48–52. In addition, see Brandom 2010b, 297: ‘For Kant, intentional contents (whether what is endorsed is a judgeable content or a practical maxim) are articulated by concepts. And concepts are generically rules. That is to say that for Kant, concept is a normative concept. What they are rules for doing is synthesizing a unity of apperception’ (underline in original).

2. In line with this distinction of Kant’s, Brandom (1994, 33) distinguishes between being subject to a norm and being sensitive to a norm.

3. On Kant’s view, the fundamental unit of cognition is a judgment, and we are rationally responsible for our judgments; moreover, concepts are nothing but predicates of possible judgments (see Kant 1998, A69/B94). Thus, for him, a concept is to be understood only in the context of a judgment (see Kant 1998, A68/B93). In this way, on his view, we are rationally responsible for our application of concepts. By contrast, the parrot is not rationally responsible for the sounds it makes.

4. See Wittgenstein (1969, §§ 341–343). In addition, for a detailed discussion and defense of this point, see Lee 2014.

5. For a detailed discussion and defense of a Sellarsian coherence theory of justification, see Lee 2017.

6. As Hilary Putnam (1975) points out, we engage in the social division of linguistic labor. For example, many of us including me cannot tell an elm tree from a beech true. Nonetheless, due to the social division of linguistic labor, I can correctly assert that elm trees are not beech trees, by deferring to some experts on the matter of the norms governing the application of the concept elm or the concept beech. In a similar vein, a person can defer to some members of her linguistic community on the matter of the norms governing the concepts she uses. Therefore, the application of a concept does not require that the concept-user herself be self-consciously aware of the norms governing its application. For the concept-user can engage in the social division of linguistic labor, so that her application of the concept can be guided by the relevant norms by the help of some other members of her linguistic community.