ANDERSON’S ETHICAL VULNERABILITY

Abstract

Pamela Sue Anderson argues for an ethical vulnerability which “activates an openness to becoming changed” that “can make possible a relational accountability to one another on ethical matters”. In this essay I pursue Anderson’s solicitation that there is a positive politics to be developed from acknowledging and affirming vulnerability. I propose that this politics is one which has a specific relevance for animating the terms of feminist responses to sexual violence, something which has proved difficult for feminist theorists and activists alike. I will demonstrate the contribution of Anderson’s work to such questions by examining the way in which “ethical vulnerability” as a framework can illuminate the intersectional feminist character of Tarana Burke’s grassroots Me Too movement when compared with the mainstream, viral version of the movement. I conclude by arguing that Anderson’s “ethical vulnerability” contains ontological insights which can allay both activist and academic concerns regarding how to respond to sexual violence.

Keywords:

• vulnerability
• sexual violence
• anti-carceral feminism
• transformative justice
• accountability

disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1 Anderson refers to Butler as “a highly significant dialogue partner for my own work on vulnerable life” (“‘Ethical’ Vulnerability” 161).

2 Whilst violence of some degree is inescapable for Butler, being the background condition for subject emergence, Butler’s normative politics is directed towards “ethical proscriptions against the waging of violence” (“Reply” 185). See Gilson (Ethics), especially chapter 2, for a thorough discussion of the dual operation of the norm in Butler’s thought, as well as its relation to violence.

3 See Lloyd for a discussion of the emergence of corporeal vulnerability in the context of the 9/11 terror attacks and the concept’s relation to Butler’s earlier thought.

4 Anderson criticizes Utilitarianism (“‘Ethical’ Vulnerability” 150) as well as the “ethics of justice” (148) for their valorization of moral impartiality and moral invulnerability, and the “ethics of care” for non-reciprocal emphasis on the vulnerability of the other (“Justice and Forgiveness” 130).

5 Anderson stresses the relational character of accountability in order to emphasize that accountability is a two-way process between subjects who interact. Anderson posits a relational ontology in which subjects are bound to and thus dependent on one another. As such, both vulnerability and accountability are necessarily relational. This intersubjective character of both conditions is also what belies their ethical character, and Anderson also refers to “relational accountability” as “ethical accountability.” This amounts to a challenge to dominant ontologies of individualism, in which victim and perpetrator can be treated as discrete, independent subjects. In addition, by distinguishing relational accountability from asymmetrical vulnerability, Anderson is highlighting the importance of attending to relationships, power dynamics, structures, processes and complexities which are often obscured in narrow or decontextualized interpretations of accountability. (See Moncrieffe for a discussion of relational accountability.)

6 When I use the terminology “victim” or “perpetrator” it is simply to refer to how subjects’ role position in an instance of violence or harm has been articulated. These are not intended as identities, and certainly not as discrete, fixed categories. As I employ the terms, one can be a victim or perpetrator of an attack but not more generally; the terms only signify within a specific context. See Beck et al. and Armatta for discussion of the rates of violence in prison.

7 Including South Korea, Japan, Indonesia and Palestine. See <https://MeToorising.withgoogle.com/> (accessed 4 Dec. 2019); Gill and Orgad. Whilst having a near global reach, the movement is also culturally specific. See Hasunuma and Shin for a comparison of the impact of the movement in Japan and South Korea.

8 A year after Milano’s allegations, Bloomberg reports that “The headlines alone are dizzying. Since the New York Times reported allegations of serial predation by movie mogul Harvey Weinstein a year ago, at least 425 prominent people across industries have been publicly accused of sexual misconduct, a broad range of behavior that spans from serial rape to lewd comments and abuse of power.” See <https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2018-me-too-anniversary/> (accessed 4 Dec. 2019).

9 In this way it is somewhat reflective of a “postfeminist” discourse. McRobbie characterized the 1990s as a period in which “feminism is decisively aged and made to seem redundant” (255) and, in its mainstream media instantiation at least, sex has become political, but as distinct from feminism.

10 Burke is ambivalent about #MeToo. Whilst she has worked with it and is frequently positive about its ability to reach a large number of people, she also articulates hesitations, particularly with the movement’s shift of focus from survivors to high-profile individuals (Burke, “On the Rigorous Work”), as well as its neglect of less privileged groups (Burke, “Our Pain”).