ANDERSON ON VULNERABILITY

Abstract

Recently, feminists have begun to draw attention to the vulnerability of human beings. This theoretical perspective lies in contrast to an element of the philosophical tradition that values autonomy and freedom. I would like, in this paper, to engage with some of the work of the feminist philosopher Pamela Anderson on the notion of vulnerability. I think that Anderson’s recognition of vulnerability is important but I’d like to suggest a different way of thinking about this issue from Pamela’s. I think there are more difficulties than Anderson recognizes with Kant’s view of autonomy. Anderson argues that Kant’s theory can be adapted to cover the relationality of human beings with each other. However, I don’t think that this can be done without distorting Kant. Linked to this, she suggests that feminists ought to take into account existing “narrative identities.” However, these existing “narrative identities” may be detrimental to their interests. Subjects may be “constituted” by injurious social norms. It seems to me that there is an ontological and normative dimension of the problem that is insufficiently articulated in Pamela’s account. Kant’s view of autonomy leaves no room for vulnerability in the sense of relationality. Drawing on Simone de Beauvoir I would like to suggest a different concept of freedom and autonomy from that of Kant that allows for vulnerability. De Beauvoir argues that the freedom of each of us requires the freedom of others. Additionally I will suggest that de Beauvoir offers an account of the conditions for the removal of oppression, including the elimination of ethically detrimental aspects of vulnerability.

Keywords:

• Anderson
• de Beauvoir
• vulnerability
• freedom
• autonomy

disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1 Pamela Anderson, “Autonomy, Vulnerability and Gender,” Feminist Theory (Aug. 2003): 149–64 (152).

2 Ibid.

3 Pamela Anderson, “Arguing for ‘Ethical’ Vulnerability: Towards a Politics of Care?” in Exploring Vulnerability, eds. Heiker Springhart and Günther Thomas (Göttingen and Bristol, VT: Vandenhoeck, 2017) 149.

4 Ibid.

5 Ibid. 150.

6 I am grateful to Luisa Ribeiro Ferreira for reminding me of this.

7 Immanuel Kant, What is Enlightenment? [1784], trans. Ted Humphrey (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1992) 1.

8 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan, 1970) A444/B472.

9 Ibid. A446/B474.

10 Ibid. A447/B475.

11 Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Intro. Christine Korsgaard; trans. Mary Gregor and Jens Timmerman (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2012) 4: 452.

12 Ibid.

13 Alison Jaggar, Feminist Politics and Human Nature (Brighton: Harvester, 1983) 40.

14 Saba Mahmood, Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject (Princeton: Princeton UP, 2004).

15 Ibid. 14.

16 Ibid.

17 Ibid.

18 Pamela Sue Anderson, “Bergsonian Intuition: A Metaphysics of Mystical Life,” Philosophical Topics 43.1–2 (2015): 239–51.

19 Elizabeth Grosz, Becoming Undone: Darwinian Reflections on Life, Politics and Art (Durham, NC: Duke UP, 2011).

20 See Henri Bergson, An Introduction to Metaphysics (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).

21 Ibid. 8.

22 Ibid.

23 Charlotte Alderwick, “Nature’s Capacities: Schelling and Contemporary Power-Based Ontologies,” Angelaki: Journal of the Theoretical Humanities 21.4 (2016): 59–76.

24 Simone de Beauvoir, The Second Sex, trans. H.M. Parshley (London: Vintage, 2011) 37.

25 Simone de Beauvoir, The Ethics of Ambiguity, trans. Bernard Frechtman (New York: Citadel, 1948).

26 Søren Kierkegaard, The Sickness unto Death, trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1980) 13.

27 Søren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, trans. Alistair Hannay (London: Penguin, 2003) 78.

28 Cristina Arp, The Bonds of Freedom: Simone de Beauvoir’s Existentialist Ethics (Chicago: Open Court, 2013) 55.

29 De Beauvoir, Ethics of Ambiguity 21.