CHINA AND QUAD 2.0: Between response and regional construct

ABSTRACT

The existing literature on the Quadrilateral Initiative or Quad 2.0, has primarily focused on why the US, India, Japan and Australia have been promoting a strategic mechanism and how it could possibly contain an increasingly assertive China in the Indo-Pacific. However, what remains overlooked is the Chinese perception towards the Quad, which remains complex and systemic, underpinned by Beijing’s national interests, national identity in the regional affairs, and a desire to attain the “Chinese Dream”. While the official Chinese reaction to the “Asian NATO” has mainly been dismissive, this paper argues that Beijing’s response to the Quad with its underlying apprehensions, is structurally linked to China’s rise vis-à-vis India, the re-emergence of Japan in Asia and beyond, Australia’s recent firm and calculated approach towards China, and US’ rebuilt Asia strategy extending beyond military connotations.

KEYWORDS:

• Quad 2.0
• China
• Indo-Pacific
• regional construct
• geopolitics

Notes on contributor

Mrittika Guha Sarkar is a research scholar at the Centre for East Asian Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU), New Delhi. Her research areas are India-China relations, East Asia's geo-politics and security studies focusing on regional affairs of China, Japan and Korea. She writes for several journals, newspapers and magazines such as Eurasia Review, WION, Business Today, World Focus, Defense and Security Alert (DSA) and The Pioneer. She has been a Project Assistant for the East Asia Centre at the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA), New Delhi. She is also an editorial assistant for the Series Editor of the Routledge Studies on Think Asia.

Notes

1 .The Indo-Pacific emphasizes on economic, security, and geopolitical elements in the maritime domain between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean creating one single super-region. For more arguments, please read, Robert D. Kaplan, “Center Stage for the 21st Century: Power Plays in the Indian Ocean,” Foreign Affairs, March/April 2009. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/east-asia/2009-03-01/center-stage-21st-century. May 27, 2020.

2 “Commentary: US Dreams of Asian NATO,” China Daily, July 13, 2003. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/en/doc/2003-07/18/content_246008.htm May 27, 2020; Shyam Saran, “The Quadrilateral: Is it an alliance or an alignment?” Hindustan Times, November 25, 2017. https://www.hindustantimes.com/analysis/the-quadrilateral-is-it-an-alliance-or-an-alignment/story- 16CvgQjKHWaayoQjaOl2kM.html. May 27, 2020; Shyam Saran, “How China views Indo-Pacific,” The Tribune, December 18, 2019. https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/how-china-views-indo-pacific-13470 May 27, 2020.

3 “Foreign Minister Wang Yi Meets the Press,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of People’s Republic of China (FMPRC), March 09, 2018. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1540928.shtml May 27, 2020.

4 The Chinese Dream for China holds significant historical connotations, emphasizing on its desire to restore the dignity it deserves in the backdrop of the century of humiliation it experienced at the hands of imperialist powers. If anything, the concept for Xi Jinping is a means to rejuvenate the nation, and not seek hegemony. Please see, “Xi: Chinese Dream by no means hegemonistic,” Xinhuanet, November 22, 2019. http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-11/22/c_138575924.htm. May 27, 2020. However, as per many China observers, the term also acts as a key medium to enhance China’s stature in the global affairs as a “rising superpower,” which could be determined through China’s increasingly assertive efforts to sustain power and control in regions such as Taiwan, Hong Kong, South China Sea, East China Sea, etc. Please read, Robert Lawrence Kuhn, “Xi Jinping’s Chinese Dream,” The New York Times, June 04, 2013. https://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/05/opinion/global/xi-jinpings-chinese-dream.html May 27, 2020; Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom, “he Elusive Chinese Dream,” The New York Times, December 26, 2014. https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/27/opinion/the-elusive-chinese-dream.html May 27, 2020.

5 China Daily, “Commentary: US Dreams of Asian NATO,” 2.

6 Saran, “The Quadrilateral: Is it An Alliance or An Alignment?,” 2.

7 Tanvi Madan, “The Rise, Fall, and Rebirth of the Quad,” War on the Rocks, November 16, 2017. https://warontherocks.com/2017/11/rise-fall-rebirth-quad/ May 27, 2020.

8 Within the Neo-Realist discipline of thought, rational states in an anarchic situation while facing a “security dilemma,” either enhance their economic growth and/or military capabilities (internal balancing) or enter into alliances to check the influence of more powerful states (external balancing) to ensure the Balance of Power (BoP). China, in particular, viewed the Quad proposition as a camouflage for a military alliance, working together to contain the “Rise of China.” For more arguments on alliances in Neo-Realism, please read Kenneth Waltz, “Structural Realism after Cold War,” International Security 25, no. 1 (Summer 2000): 5–41.

9 Siddharth Varadarajan, “China Demarches to 4 Nations,” The Hindu, June 14, 2007. http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-international/Chinese-demarches-to-4-nations/article14777267.ece May 27, 2020.

10 “Confluence of the Two Seas’ Speech by H.E.Mr. Shinzo Abe, Prime Minister of Japan at the Parliament of the Republic of India,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, August 22, 2007. https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/pmv0708/speech-2.html.

11 “A ‘Goodwill’ Joint Naval Drill?” People’s Daily Online, April 21, 2007.

http://en.people.cn/200704/21/eng20070421_368521.html. May 29, 2020.

12 Jagannath P. Panda, “India’s Call on China in the Quad: A Strategic Arch between Liberal and Alternative Structures,” Rising Powers Quarterly 3, no. 2 (2018): 85. https://risingpowersproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/vol3.2-panda.pdf. May 29, 2020.

13 M.H. Tan and N. Hussain, “Quad 2.0: Sense and Sensibilities,” The Diplomat, February 18, 2018. https://thediplomat.com/2018/02/quad-2-0-sense-and-sensibilities/. May 29, 2020.

14 Zhao Minghao, “No Need to Overreact as Quad Ups Gear,” Global Times, September 29, 2019. http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1165867.shtml. May 29, 2020. “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Geng Shuang's Regular Press Conference on November 15, 2017,” Embassy of People’s Republic of China in United States of America, November 16, 2017. http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/fyrth/t1511125.htm May 29, 2020.

15 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of People’s Republic of China, “Foreign Minister Wang Yi Meets the Press,” no. 3.

16 Jagannath P. Panda, “Beijing’s ‘Asian NATO’ Maxim over Quad is Structural,” PacNet Commentary, November 22, 2019, at https://idsa.in/system/files/news/PacNet-Commentary-Beijing.pdf. March 10, 2020.

17 China’s core strategic interests in the Indo-Pacific region pertains to sustaining and enhancing its economic growth and strengthening its Comprehensive National Power (CNP), where Beijing’s trade networks and Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) play a vital role. Subsequently, core strategic ambitions include the imperative to defend China’s national borders and reinforce claims on Taiwan, islands in South China Sea and East China Sea, and push back the influence and presence of the United States in the regional domain, particularly in the pretext of its interventions in the Taiwan Straits. Lastly, China aims to reshape the global order so that its values and interests are globally accepted. Please see, China's Foreign Policy in a Fast-Changing World: Mission and Responsibility – Speech by Vice Foreign Minister Le Yucheng at the Lunch Meeting of the Eighth World Peace Forum”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, July 8, 2019. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1679454.shtml May 29, 2020; “Full Text: China's National Defence in the New Era,” Xinhua, July 24, 2019. http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-07/24/c_138253389.htm. May 29, 2020; Kevin Rudd, “The Coronavirus and Xi Jinping’s Worldview,” Project Syndicate, February 8, 2020. https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/coronavirus-will-not-change-xi-jinping-china-governance-by-kevin-rudd-2020-02 May 29, 2020.

18 Please see, Christian Shephard and Sanjeev Miglani, “Indo-Pacific? Not from where China is sitting … ,” Reuters, November 10, 2017. https://in.reuters.com/article/usa-china-indo-pacific/indo-pacific-not-from-where-china-is-sitting-idINKBN1DA1Y0. May 29, 2020; Rory Medcalf, “The Indo-Pacific: What’s in a Name?” The American Interest 9, no 2 (October 10, 2013). https://www.the-american-interest.com/2013/10/10/the-indo-pacific-whats-in-a-name/. May 29, 2020.

19 Offshore Balancing is a strategic concept in Realism where great powers use favoured powers or their allies to check the rise of potentially hostile powers. For more arguments, please read John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, “The Case of Offshore Balancing: A Superior U.S. Grand Strategy,” Foreign Affairs, (July/August 2016). https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2016-06-13/case-offshore-balancing. May 30, 2020.

20 The term “rebalance” in this perspective was popularized with Barack Obama administration’s “Asia Rebalance Strategy” which implemented a re-invigorated focus on Asia through economic and military means. Please read, Alyssa Ayres, Elizabeth Economy, and Daniel Markey, “Rebalance the Rebalance: China, India and the United States,” Foreign Affairs, July 13, 2016. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2016-07-13/rebalance-rebalance May 30, 2020.

21 Rory Medcalf, “Reimagining Asia: From Asia-Pacific to Indo-Pacific,” The Asan Forum 8, no. 2 (March-April 2020). http://www.theasanforum.org/reimagining-asia-from-asia-pacific-to-indo-pacific/. May 30, 2020.

22 “Annex A—The Beijing Roadmap for APEC’s Contribution to the Realization of the FTAAP,” Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, 2014 http://www.apec.org/Meeting-Papers/Leaders-Declarations/2014/2014_aelm/2014_aelm_annexa.aspx. May 30, 2020.

23 Xi Jinping, “Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era,” Xinhuanet, October 18, 2017. http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/download/Xi_Jinping's_report_at_19th_CPC_National_Congress.pdf. May 30, 2020.

24 Isaac Stone Fish, “A Communist Party Man at Davos: Xi Jinping tries to charm the capitalist elite,” The Atlantic, January 18, 2017. https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/01/china-davos-xi-jinping-trump-globalization/513521/. May 30, 2020; “Full Text of Xi Jinping Keynote at the World Economic Forum,” CGTN America, January 17, 2017. https://america.cgtn.com/2017/01/17/full-text-of-xi-jinping-keynote-at-the-world-economic-forum. May 30, 2020.

25 Michael Clarke, “The Belt and Road Initiative: China's New Grand Strategy?” Asia Policy, no. 24, July 2017, pp. 75–7.

26 “China’s Policies on Asia-Pacific Security Cooperation The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China January 2017,” The State Council, The People’s Republic of China, January 11, 2017. May 30, 2020 http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2017/01/11/content_281475539078636.htm.

27 Please read, Randall L. Schweller, “Rising Powers and Revisionism in Emerging International Orders,” Valdai Papers 16 (2015). http://valdaiclub.com/files/11391/. May 30, 2020.

28 The New Asian Security concept presented by Xi Jinping in 2014 draws its origins back to the “New Security Concept” introduced in 2002, which would seek to “rise above one-sided security and desire common security through mutually beneficial cooperation.” The difference between both the concepts point to the shift in China’s external behaviour and expansion of its regional power configuration. “China's Position Paper on the New Security Concept,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of People’s Republic of China, 2002. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/ceun/eng/xw/t27742.htm May 30, 2020; “New Asian Security Concept for New Progress in Security Cooperation,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, May 21, 2014. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1159951.shtml. May 30, 2020.

29 “China’s Policies on Asia-Pacific Security Cooperation,” State Council, The People’s Republic of China, January 11, 2017. http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2017/01/11/content_281475539078636.htm. May 30, 2020.

30 Spotlight: “China View’ helps build a better world,” Xinhuanet, August 29, 2018.

http://www.xinhuanet.com//english/2017-08/29/c_136565429.htm May 30, 2020; Alice Ekman, “China’s ‘New Type of Security Partnership’ in Asia and Beyond: A challenge to the Alliance System and the ‘Indo-pacific’ Strategy,” Centre for Security Studies, July 22, 2019.

https://isnblog.ethz.ch/security/chinas-new-type-of-security-partnership; ‘Xi Jinping: “Time for China to take centre stage,” BBC News, October 18, 2017. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-41647872. May 30, 2020.

31 Bertil Lintner, “Introduction,” in The Costliest Pearl: China’s Struggle for India’s Ocean (United Kingdom, C Hurst & Co Publishers Ltd, 2019), 4.

32 “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2014,” Department of Defence, United States of America. http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2014_DoD_China_Report.pdf. May 30, 2020.

33 David M. Finkelstein, “Commentary on China’s External Grand Strategy,” The Brookings Institute, July 14–15, 2009, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/20090714_china_finkelstein.pdf. May 30, 2020; Ian Burns McCaslin and Andrew S. Erickson, “The Impact of Xi-Era Reforms on the Chinese Navy,” in Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA, eds. Phillip C. Saunders, Arthur S. Ding, Andrew Scobell, Andrew N.D. Yang, and Joel Wuthnow (National Defence University Press, 2019), 126.

34 Cortez A. Cooper, “The PLA Navy’s New Historic Missions: Expanding Capabilities for a Re-emergent Maritime Power,” The RAND Corporation, June 11, 2009. https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/testimonies/2009/RAND_CT332.pdf. May 30, 2020.

35 Ian Burns McCaslin and Andrew S. Erickson, “The Impact of Xi-Era Reforms on the Chinese Navy,” 33.

36 “China's National Defence in the New Era”, The State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China, July 2019. http://www.china-un.ch/eng/zywjyjh/t1683060.htm. May 30, 2020.

37 Jagannath P. Panda, “China’s Tryst with the IORA: Factoring India and the Indian Ocean,” May 30, 2020 Strategic Analysis 38, no. 5 (2014): 674–6.

38 Panda, “Beijing’s ‘Asian NATO’ Maxim over Quad is Structural,” no. 16

39 Zhao Guojun, “Steering and Prospects of Japan-India Maritime Security Cooperation” (日印海上安全合作转向及前景探析), Institute of International Studies, Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, December 07, 2015. https://iir.sass.org.cn/2015/1207/c444a3548/page.htm. May 30, 2020.

40 The maritime contest in SCS surrounds around the claims by China, Vietnam, Taiwan, Malaysia, Philippines, and Brunei over the Spratley Islands; China, Taiwan and Philippines over the Scarborough Shoal; and China, Vietnam and Taiwan over the Paracel Islands.

41 See, Liu Zhen, “What’s China’s ‘nine-dash line’ and why has it created so much tension in the South China Sea?” South China Morning Post, July 12, 2016. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/1988596/whats-chinas-nine-dash-line-and-why-has-it-created-so. May 30, 2020.

42 “China Adheres to the Position of Settling Through Negotiation the Relevant Disputes Between China and the Philippines in the South China Sea,” The States Council for the People’s Republic of China, July 13, 2016. http://english.www.gov.cn/state_council/ministries/2016/07/13/content_281475392503075.htm. May 30, 2020.

43 “China’s National Defence in the New Era,” The State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China, July 24, 2019. http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-07/24/c_138253389.htm. May 30, 2020.

44 Laura Zhou, “What is the South China Sea code of conduct, and why does it matter?” South China Morning Post, August 3, 2017. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2105190/what-south-china-sea-code-conduct-and-why-does-it. May 30, 2020.

45 As cited in Carl Thayer, “A Closer Look at the ASEAN-China Single Draft South China Sea Code of Conduct,” The Diplomat, August 03, 2018. https://thediplomat.com/2018/08/a-closer-look-at-the-asean-china-single-draft-south-china-sea-code-of-conduct/. May 30, 2020.

46 David Vergun, “Freedom of Navigation in South China Sea Critical to Prosperity, Says Indo-Pacific Commander,” US Department of Defence, November 23, 2019. https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/2025105/freedom-of-navigation-in-south-china-sea-critical-to-prosperity-says-indo-pacif/ May 30, 2020; “How much trade transits the South China Sea?” China Power, 2016, https://chinapower.csis.org/much-trade-transits-south-china-sea/ May 30, 2020.

47 Max Fisher, “The South China Sea: Explaining the Dispute,” The New York Times, July 14, 2016. https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/15/world/asia/south-china-sea-dispute-arbitration-explained.html. May 30, 202.

48 “Joint Statement: First India-Japan 2+2 Foreign and Defence Ministerial Meeting,” Press Information Bureau, Government of India, November 30, 2019. https://pib.gov.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=195235. May 30, 2020.

49 Australian Associated Press, “Australian Warships ‘Challenged’ by Chinese Navy in South China Sea,” The Guardian, April 19, 2018. https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2018/apr/20/australian-warships-challenged-by-chinese-navy-in-south-china-sea. June 16, 2020.

50 Charlotte Gao, “US, Australia, Japan Jointly Challenge China on South China Sea Issue,” The Diplomat, August 09, 2017. https://thediplomat.com/2017/08/us-australia-japan-jointly-challenge-china-on-south-china-sea-issue/. https://thediplomat.com/2017/08/us-australia-japan-jointly-challenge-china-on-south-china-sea-issue/. May 30, 2020.

51 “Statement on Award of Arbitral Tribunal on South China Sea Under Annexure VII of UNCLOS,” Ministry of External Affairs, July 12, 2016. https://mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/27019/Statement_on_Award_of_Arbitral_Tribunal_on_South_China_Sea_Under_Annexure_VII_of_UNCLOS. May 30, 2020.

52 Peng Nian, “US Brings New Partners into South China Sea Drill,” China-US Focus, May 21, 2019. https://www.chinausfocus.com/peace-security/us-brings-new-partners-into-south-china-sea-drill. May 30, 2020.

53 Please see, Zhang Zhihao, “PLA Slams Naval Drills in South China Sea,” China Daily, May 01, 2020. http://global.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202005/01/WS5eab62dca310a8b2411530ee.html. May 30, 2020.

54 Ni Lexiong, “China's ‘maritime lifeline’ issues highlighted (中国“海上生命线”问题凸显),” Together with the Same Boat, Political Consultative Publications, Guangdong Provincial Political Consultative Conference 11 (2009). http://www.gdszx.gov.cn/zxkw/tzgj/200911/201004/t20100402_57346.htm. May 30, 2020.

55 “‘Quad’ reviews situation in Indo-Pacific region,” The Economic Times, November 04, 2019. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/quad-reviews-situation-in-indo-pacific-region/articleshow/71906338.cms?from=mdr. May 30, 2020.

56 “China’s Military Strategy (2015),” The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, May 27, 2015. http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2015/05/27/content_281475115610833.htm. June 16, 2020.

57 “Sri Lanka joins China's Belt and Road with operations of Hambantota Port: PM,” Xinhua, December 09, 2017. http://www.xinhuanet.com//english/2017-12/09/c_136813766.htm. May 30, 2020; Lintner, “Introduction,” no. 31.

58 Edward Wong, “Mike Pompeo Warns Panama Against Doing Business With China,” The New York Times, October 19, 2018. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/19/world/americas/mike-pompeo-panama-china.html. May 30, 2020.

59 “Official Spokesperson's Response to a Query on Participation of India in OBOR/BRI Forum,” Ministry of External Affairs, May 13, 2017. https://mea.gov.in/media-briefings.htm?dtl/28463/Official±Spokespersons±response±to±a±query±on±participation±of±India±in±OBORBRI±Forum. May 30, 2020; Masafumi Lida, “Japan’s Reluctant Embrace of BRI?” SWP Working Papers, October 03, 2018. https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/projekt_papiere/Iida_BCAS_2018_BRI_Japan_6.pdf. May 30, 2020.

60 “2017 Foreign Policy White Paper,” Government of Australia, 2017. https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2017/australia_2017_foreign_policy_white_paper.pdf. May 30, 2020.

61 “Remarks by National Security Advisor Ambassador John R. Bolton on the Trump Administration’s New Africa Strategy,” The White House, December 13, 2018. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-national-security-advisor-ambassador-john-r-bolton-trump-administrations-new-africa-strategy/. May 30, 2020.

62 For more arguments on the “String of Pearls” theory, please read, Christopher J. Pehrson, “String of Pearls: Meeting the Challenge of China’s Rising Power Across the Asian littoral,” Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College (July 2006): 1–36.

63 Lucy Hornby and Archie Zhang, “Belt and Road Debt Trap Accusations Hound China as it Hosts Forum,” Financial Times, April 24, 2019. https://www.ft.com/content/3e9a0266-6500-11e9-9adc-98bf1d35a056. May 30, 2020.

64 In order to diversify the supply chain networks away from China, Japan has set aside $2.2 billion of its Covid-19 stimulus package to assist Japanese companies to relocate production from China. The US is also working to bring its manufacturing back from Beijing. At the same time, some businesses in India are setting up local supply chain operations to de-risk from China. Similarly, a demand for diversification in Australia’s trade and supply chain networks is fast emerging in the context of China’s economic coercive behaviour in response to Canberra’s call for an independent enquiry into Covid-19 outbreak’s origin. This is shaping into a demand for revisiting the economic dependence on China and utilizing the Quad as an optimal medium. “Japan sets aside ¥243.5 billion to help firms shift production out of China,” Japan Times, April 09, 2020. https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2020/04/09/business/japan-sets-aside-%C2%A5243-5-billion-help-firms-shift-production-china/#.XsbDqhMzZQI; Andrea Shalal, Alexandra Alper, Patricial Zengerle, “U.S. mulls paying companies, tax breaks to pull supply chains from China,” Reuters, May 18, 2020. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-china-supply-chains/u-s-mulls-paying-companies-tax-breaks-to-pull-supply-chains-from-china-idUSKBN22U0FH. May 30, 2020; Nishtha Yadav, “Why Businesses in India are Building Local Supply Chain Capacity,” India Briefing, April 08, 2020, https://www.india-briefing.com/news/businesses-india-building-local-supply-chain-capacity-20154.html/. May 30, 2020; Danish Khan, “Lava plans to move export manufacturing base to India,” The Economic Times, May 16, 2020, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/tech/hardware/lava-plans-to-move-export-manufacturing-base-to-india/articleshow/75766598.cms. May 30, 2020 ; Paul Karp, “Coalition eyes Australian ‘economic sovereignty’ with boost to manufacturing,” The Guardian, May 19, 2020. https://www.theguardian.com/business/2020/may/20/coalition-eyes-australian-economic-sovereignty-with-boost-to-manufacturing. May 30, 2020.

65 “How should China Deal with regional challenges toward its rise?” Global Times, May 18, 2020. https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1188674.shtml. June 16, 2020

66 Jagannath Panda and Mrittika Guha Sarkar, “Framing a Eurasian Link in. India-Japan Global Ties,” in Scaling India-Japan Cooperation in Indo-Pacific and Beyond 2025: Corridors, Connectivity and Contours, ed. Jagannath Panda (New Delhi, KW Publishers, 2019), 23–56.

67 “External Affairs Minister in Conversation at Raisina Dialogue 2020: The India Way,” Ministry of External Affairs, January 16, 2020. https://mea.gov.in/interviews.htm?dtl/32305/External_Affairs_Minister_in_Conversation_at_Raisina_Dialogue_2020__The_India_Way. May 30, 2020.

68 Metcalf, “Reimagining Asia: From Asia-Pacific to Indo-Pacific,” no. 21.

69 “‘Indo-Pacific’ over ‘Asia-Pacific’ reflects India's rise: US official,” The Economic Times, July 11, 2018. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/indo-pacific-over-asia-pacific-reflects-indias-rise-us-official/articleshow/61519684.cms. May 30, 2020.

70 “China should take competition from India seriously,” Global Times, May 10, 2017. https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1046327.shtml. June 16, 2020.

71 “ASEAN backs India's Rising Role in Indo-Pacific Region,” The Economic Times, November 03, 2019. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/asean-backs-indias-rising-role-in-indo-pacific-region/articleshow/71881250.cms?from=mdr). May 30, 2020.

72 Balaji Chandramohan, “India’s Strategic Expansion in the Pacific Islands Amid a changing geopolitical situation, India is turning its attention to the South Pacific,” The Diplomat, July 13, 2018. https://thediplomat.com/2018/06/indias-strategic-expansion-in-the-pacific-islands/ . May 30, 2020.

73 Ibid.

74 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “‘Confluence of the Two Seas’ Speech by H.E. Mr. Shinzo Abe, Prime Minister of Japan at the Parliament of the Republic of India,” no. 10.

75 Please read, Wu Xinbo, “The End of the Silver Lining: A Chinese View of the U.S.-Japanese Alliance,” The Washington Quarterly 29, no 1 (2005): 119–30.

76 It is imperative to acknowledge the unresolved territorial dispute between China and Japan over the Senkaku or the Daiyou islands, which has been a major security threat for China. For more arguments regarding this issue, please read Danielle F. S. Cohen (assisted by Dong Jiaxin), “Chinese Interpretations of Japan and Its Role in the Indo-Pacific Region in 2016,” The Asan Forum, June 03, 2016. http://www.theasanforum.org/chinese-interpretations-of-japan-and-its-role-in-the-indo-pacific-region-in-2016/#43. May 30, 2020; Stephen R. Nagy, “Japan's Proactive Pacifism: Investing in Multilateralization and Omnidirectional Hedging”, Strategic Analysis 41, no 3, (2017): 223–235.

77 Chen Hong, “Australia seems to favor prudent China policy,” Global Times, January 2, 2020. https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1175530.shtml. June 16, 2020.

78 Li Yang, “Australia Rejoining Quad Will Not Advance Regional Prosperity, Unity,” Global Times, November 15, 2017. http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1075382.shtml. May 30, 2020.

79 “Defence White Paper, 2013,” Department of Defence, Australian Government, 2013. https://www.defence.gov.au/Whitepaper/2013/docs/WP_2013_web.pdf. May 30, 2020.

80 Elena Collinson, Australian Perspective on the Belt and Road Initiative, The Australia-China Relations Institute, October 30, 2019. https://www.australiachinarelations.org/content/australian-perspectives-belt-and-road-initiative. May 30, 2020.

81 Roland Rajah, Alexandre Dayant, Jonathan Pryke, “Ocean of Debt? Belt and Road and Debt Diplomacy in the Pacific,” Lowy Institute, October 21, 2019. https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/ocean-debt-belt-and-road-and-debt-diplomacy-pacific. May 30, 2020.

82 Karl Wilson, “Australia should learn from the UK on 5G rollout,” China Daily, February 20, 2020. https://global.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202002/20/WS5e4dd35da310128217278d48.html. June 16, 2020.

83 Wang Wenwen, “Australia joins US bandwagon over virus policy,” Global Times, April 20, 2020. https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1186211.shtml. May 30, 2020.

84 “Chinese Ambassador CHENG Jingye’s interview with Australian Financial Review correspondent Andrew Tillett,” Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Commonwealth of Australia, April 27, 2020. http://au.china-embassy.org/eng/sghdxwfb_1/t1773741.htm. June 16, 2020.

85 Michael Mandelbaum, “The New Containment Handling Russia, China, and Iran,” Foreign Affairs, March/April 2019. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2019-02-12/new-containment. May 30, 2020.

86 “National Security Strategy of the United States of America,” Government of United States of America, December 2017. https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf. May 30, 2020.

87 See, Andrea Shalal and Alexander Alper, “US Drops China Currency Manipulator Label Ahead of Trade Deal Signing,” Livemint, January 14, 2020. https://www.livemint.com/news/world/us-drops-china-currency-manipulator-label-ahead-of-trade-deal-signing-11578973455539.html. May 30, 2020.

88 Jennifer Lind, “Asia’s Other Revisionist Power: Why US Grand Strategy Unnerves China,” Foreign Affairs, March-April 2017, p. 74.

89 The term “Thucydides Trap” was coined by Graham Allison in his book, Destined for War in 2017, according to whom, when a great power displaces another great power, war is inevitable. Graham Allison compared the scenario of China and US, where China’s rise was threatening US supremacy, to the rivalry of Athens and Sparta, where the former’s rise threatened Sparta’s military might and caused the Peloponnesian war. Please read, Graham Allison, “The Thucydides Trap,” Foreign Policy, June 09, 2017. https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/06/09/the-thucydides-trap. May 30, 2020.

90 Wang Jiangyu, “US the Real Revisionist Power,” China Daily, June 17, 2019. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/global/2019-06/17/content_37481345.htm. May 30, 2020.

91 “US Shows it's True Colors,” China Daily, April 24, 2014. http://africa.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2014-04/29/content_17472943.htm. May 30, 2020.

92 Indrani Bagchi, “Focus on Covid in Quad Plus Meet,” The Times of India, May 13, 2020. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/jaishankar-discusses-covid-19-with-counterparts-in-us-5-other-countries/articleshow/75702875.cms. May 30, 2020.