http://orcid.org/0000-0002-4434-1478
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ABSTRACT
The active participation in international organisations (IOs) is an important condition for the ability of states to exert influence over the content of international norms and rules. Thus, this paper adopts a comparative perspective and examines how active African states are in more than 500 international negotiations and under what conditions they are likely to remain silent. This reveals that diplomatic staff capacities are an essential precondition for active participation, while incentive structures, such as the scope of interests, impact how often states take the floor. An alternative to voicing national interest is to negotiate on behalf of regional organisations or regional groups. This paper shows that especially weaker and smaller African states benefit from regional group membership and use references to them in order to increase their leverage in international negotiations and improve, thereby, their chances to exert influence over the international architecture of rules and norms.
Acknowledgements
The author would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their valuable feedback, as well as the editorial team of the South African Journal of International Affairs for their work and support. She is also grateful to Chiara Fury for proofreading the manuscript.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes on contributor
Diana Panke is Professor of Political Science with a Chair in ‘Multi-Level Governance’ at University of Freiburg. Her research interests include international negotiations, international norms, multilateral diplomacy, comparative regionalism, institutional design of international organisations, small states in international affairs, governance beyond the nation-state, European Union politics as well as compliance and legalisation. In these fields, she has published several monographs and more than 40 peer-reviewed journal articles.
ORCID
Diana Panke http://orcid.org/0000-0002-4434-1478
Notes
1 Boli J & GM Thomas, Constructing World Culture. International Nongovernmental Organizations Since 1875. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999.
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3 Panke D et al., Regional Actors in Multilateral Negotiations. Active and Successful? London: ECPR Press, 2018.
4 IOs are defined as institutionalised forms of cooperation between three or more states. IOs are platforms for member states to negotiate on a regular basis and thereby change or create international rules and norms.
5 Similar to IOs, ROs are defined as institutionalised forms of cooperation between three or more states. Yet, in ROs membership of states is based on geographical criteria, such as proximity. Panke D & S Stapel, ‘Exploring Overlapping Regionalism’, Journal of International Relations & Development, 21, 2018, pp. 635–62.
6 cf Asante SKB, Regionalism and Africa’s Development: Expectations, Reality and Challenges. Houndmills: MacMilllan Press, 2016. Brosig M, ‘Overlap and Interplay between International Organisations: Theories and Approaches’, South African Journal of International Affairs, 14, 2, 2011, pp. 147–67. Cornelissen S et al., Africa and International Relations in the 21st Century. New York: Springer, 2016. Sunkel O & A Inotai, Globalism and the New Regionalism. New York: Springer, 2016. Williams PD, War and Conflict in Africa. London: John Wiley & Sons, 2016. Söderbaum F, The New Regionalism in Africa. London: Routledge, 2017. Panke D et al., Regional Actors in Multilateral Negotiations. Active and Successful? London: ECPR Press, 2018.
7 Alter KJ & S Meunier, ‘The Politics of International Regime Complexity’, Perspectives on Politics, 7, 2009, pp. 13–24. Drezner DW, ‘The Power and Peril of Internaitonal Regime Complexity’, Perspectives on Politics, 7, 2009, pp. 65–70. Hafner-Burton EM, ‘The Power Politics of Regime Complexity: Human Rights Trade Conditionality in Europe’, Perspectives on Politics, 7, 2009, pp. 33–37. Oberthür S & O Schram Stokke, Managing Institutional Complexity: Regime Interplay and Global Environmental Change. Boston: MIT Press, 2011. Betts A, ‘Regime Complexity and International Organizations: UNHCR as a Challenged Institution’, Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations, 19, 2013, pp. 69–81. Morin JF & A Orsini, ‘Regime Complexity and Policy Coherency: Introducing a Co-adjustments Model’, Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations, 19, 2013, pp. 41–51.
8 Eg Brosig M, ‘Overlap and Interplay Between International Organisations: Theories and Approaches’, South African Journal of International Affairs, 18, 2, 2011, pp. 147–67. Brosig M, ‘Introduction: The African Security Regime Complex—Exploring Converging Actors and Policies’, African Security, 6, 2013, pp. 171–90. Chenai M & DJ Hornsby, ‘The International Food Safety Complex in Southern Africa: Cooperation or Competition?’, South African Journal of International Affairs, 18, 2, 2011, pp. 235–56. Masters L, ‘Sustaining the African Common Position on Climate Change: International Organisations, Africa and COP17’, South African Journal of International Affairs, 18, 2, 2011, pp. 257–69. Viljoen F, ‘Human Rights in Africa: Normative, Institutional and Functional Complementarity and Distinctiveness’, South African Journal of International Affairs, 18, 2, 2011, pp. 191–216. van Nieuwkerk A, ‘The Regional Roots of the African Peace and Security Architecture: Exploring Centre–Periphery Relations’, South African Journal of International Affairs, 18, 2, 2011, pp. 169–89.
9 Ibid.
10 Eg Elias TO & R Akinjide, Africa and the Development of International Law. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1988. Makinda SM & F Wafula Okumu, The African Union: Challenges of Globalization, Security, and Governance. London: Routledge, 2007. Panke D, Unequal Actors in Equalising Institutions. Negotiations in the United Nations General Assembly. London: Palgrave, 2013. Panke D, ‘The Institutional Design of the United Nations General Assembly: An Effective Equalizer?’, International Relations, 31, 2017, pp. 3–20, Erickson JL, ‘Saint or Sinner? Human Rights and US Support for the Arms Trade Treaty’, Political Science Quarterly, 130, 2015, pp. 449–74.
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13 Regional groups and organizations can be designed for cooperation among its member states such as developing common rules and policies, or to foster coordination among the member states. Organizations which place emphasis on the former are often labelled as regional organizations (ROs) and organizations with emphasis on the latter are often referred to as regional groups. Examples of ROs include the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the East African Community (EAC), the Communauté économique et monétaire de l’Africque Centrale (CEMAC), the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), the Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries (ECGLC), the Common Market for Eastern and Africa (COMESA). Examples of regional groups include the African group in the United Nations (UN), the African region group in the World Health Organization (WHO), or the African Caribbean and Pacific group of states in the WTO.
14 Söderbaum F, The New Regionalism in Africa. London: Routledge, 2017. Fioramonti L & F Mattheis, ‘Is Africa Really Following Europe? An Integrated Framework for Comparative Regionalism’, JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 54, 2016, pp. 674–90. Lorenz-Carl U & M Rempe (eds), Mapping Agency: Comparing Regionalisms in Africa. London: Routledge, 2016. Shaw TM, Comparative Regionalisms for Development in the 21st Century: Insights from the Global South. London: Routledge, 2016.
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18 Panke D, ‘Getting Ready to Negotiate in International Organizations? On the Importance of the Domestic Construction of National Positions’, Journal of International Organizations Studies, 4, 2013, pp. 25–38.
19 Panke D et al., Regional Actors in Multilateral Negotiations. Active and Successful? London: ECPR Press, 2018.
20 State-like actors that are members of at least one of the IOs in our dataset and voiced positions during the respective international negotiations include the British Virgin Islands, Cook Islands, Curaçao, Faroe Islands, Holy See, Niue, Palestine, Sint Marteen, or Taiwan.
21 c.f. Appendix , also Panke D et al., Regional Actors in Multilateral Negotiations. Active and Successful? London: ECPR Press, 2018.
22 Eg For example, if a diplomat declares that he/she is speaking ‘on behalf of’ an RO, that ‘the RO agrees to/disagrees with/ objects/supports/proposes/recommends’ and so on the speech is counted as voicing an RO position, while the absence of a reference to the regional position or preference is counted as voicing national positions (state activity).
23 There is a total of 3291 national positions, 722 regional positions.
24 In relative terms, Benin is the most strongly regionally oriented state, as it voiced regional positions in 73% of the times it took the floor in the IO negotiations. In this respect, Benin is followed by Uganda (56% regional speeches of all speeches made by this country), Zimbabwe (43% regional positions), Kenia (39% regional positions), Ghana (36 percent regional positions), South Africa (63% regional positions), and Malawi (31% regional positions).
25 Axelrod RA, The Evolution of Cooperation. New York: Basic Books, 1984. Keohane RO & JS Nye, Power and Interdependence. Glenview: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1989. Oye K (ed.), Cooperation under Anarchy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986. Grieco JM, Cooperation among Nations: Europe, America, and Non-Tariff Barriers to Trade. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990. Kremenyuk V (ed.), International Negotiation: Analysis, Approaches, Issues. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1991. Berton P et al. (eds), International Negotiation: Actors, Structure/Process, Values. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999.
26 Panke D, ‘Getting Ready to Negotiate in International Organizations? On the Importance of the Domestic Construction of National Positions’, Journal of International Organizations Studies, 4, 2013, pp. 25–38.
27 Moravcsik A, ‘Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmental Approach’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 31, 1993, pp. 473–524. Moravcsik A, The Choice for Europe. Social Purpose & State Power from Messina to Maastricht. Ithaca and New York: Cornell University Press, 1998.
28 Panke D, Small States in the European Union. Coping with Structural Disadvantages. London: Ashgate, 2010.
29 Schelling T, Micromotives and Macrobehaviour. New York: Norton, 1978. Panke D et al., Regional Actors in Multilateral Negotiations. Active and Successful? London: ECPR Press, 2018.
30 Katzenstein PJ, Small States in World Markets. Industrial Policy in Europe. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1985. Goetschel L (ed.), Small States Inside and outside the European Union: Interests and Policies. Boston: Kluver Academic Publishers, 1998. Hey JAK, Small States in World Politics: Explaining Foreign Policy Behaviour. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003. Ingebritsen C et al. (eds), Small States in International Relations. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2006. Steinmetz R & A Wivel (eds), Small States in Europe. Challenges and Opportunities. Farnham: Ashgate, 2010.
31 Habeeb WM, Power and Tactics in International Negotiation: How Weak Nations Bargain with Strong Nations. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1988. Panke D, Small States in the European Union. Coping with Structural Disadvantages. London: Ashgate, 2010.
32 Eg Triska JF (ed.), Dominant Powers and Subordinate States. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1986. Keohane RO & JS Nye, Power and Interdependence. Glenview: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1989. Leffler MP, The Preponderance of Power. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992.
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34 Panke D, Unequal Actors in Equalising Institutions. Negotiations in the United Nations General Assembly. London: Ashgate, 2010.
35 c.f. Smith KE, ‘Speaking with One Voice? European Union Co-ordination on Human Rights Issues at the United Nations’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 44, 2006, pp. 113–37. Kissack R, Pursuing Effective Multilateralism. The European Union, International Organisations and the Politics of Decision Making. Houndmills: Palgrave, 2010. Delreux T, The EU as International Environmental Negotiator. London: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2013. Burmester N & M Jankowski, ‘Reassessing the European Union in the United Nations General Assembly’, Journal of European Public Policy, 21, 2014, pp. 1497–508. da Conceição-Heldt E & S Meunier, ‘Speaking with a Single Voice: Internal Cohesiveness and External Effectiveness of the EU in Global Governance’, Journal of European Public Policy, 21, 2014, pp. 961–79. Panke D et al., ‘Regional Actors in the United Nations. Exploring the Regionalization of International Negotiations’, Global Affairs, 1, 2017, pp. 431–40.
36 Panke D et al. Regional Actors in Multilateral Negotiations. Active and Successful? London: ECPR Press, 2018. Habeeb WM, Power and Tactics in International Negotiation: How Weak Nations Bargain with Strong Nations. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1988.
37 Keohane RO & JS Nye, Power and Interdependence. Glenview: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1989. Fearon J, ‘Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation’, International Organization, 52, 1998, pp. 269–305. Barnett M & M Finnemore, Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global Politics. Cornell: Cornell University Press, 2004.
38 Schelling T, The Strategy of Conflict. Second ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1980. Busch ML & E Reinhardt, ‘Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: Early Settlement in GATT/WTO Disputes’, Fordham International Law Journal, 24, 1, 2003, pp. 158–72. da Conceição-Heldt E, The Common Fisheries Policy of the European Union: A Study of Integrative and Distributive Bargaining. London: Routedge, 2004.
39 Panke D et al., Regional Actors in Multilateral Negotiations. Active and Successful? London: ECPR Press, 2018. Panke D et al., ‘State & Regional Actors in Complex Governance Systems. Exploring Dynamics of International Negotiations’, The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 19, 2017, pp. 91–112.
40 Panke D et al., ‘State & Regional Actors in Complex Governance Systems. Exploring Dynamics of International Negotiations’, The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 19, 2017, pp. 91–112.
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42 Kaufmann D et al., ‘Governance Matters VIII: Governance Indicators for 1996–2008’, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, 2009.
43 Available under <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/resources/the-world-factbook/index.html>.
44 The dataset is available under <http://www.edac.eu/indicators_desc.cfm?v_id=63>
45 The dataset is available under <https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/dataset/world-development-indicators>.
46 The dataset is available under <https://ucdp.uu.se/>.
47 The dataset is available under <https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/dataset/world-development-indicators> Even if we log the GDP, the findings of the empirical analysis are robust and the implications for the plausibility of the hypotheses do not change (see in the technical appendix).
48 Panke D et al., Regional Actors in Multilateral Negotiations. Active and Successful? London: ECPR Press, 2018.
49 Panke D, ‘Getting Ready to Negotiate in International Organizations? On the Importance of the Domestic Construction of National Positions’, Journal of International Organizations Studies, 4, 2013, pp. 25–38.
50 In line with hypothesis1b, an increase in diplomatic staff robustly and significantly reduces the chances of a state to not take the floor at all in an IO.
51 shows that an increase in population size positively and significantly increases the chance that states take the floor more frequently.
52 Eg Hey JAK, Small States in World Politics: Explaining Foreign Policy Behaviour. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003. Ingebritsen C et al., (eds), Small States in International Relations. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2006.
53 Table 4A in the technical appendix shows that an increase in diplomatic staff significantly reduces the chances for states to remain silent (Hypothesis 1b), while administrative capacities feature the expected sign, but are not significant in Model 1 (Hypothesis 1a).
54 Both models in show that an increase in state power significantly increases the number of national positions voiced. This also holds when we use the log of the GDP instead of GDP (see ).
55 Eg Panke D, Unequal Actors in Equalising Institutions. Negotiations in the United Nations General Assembly. London: Palgrave, 2013.
56 shows that an increase in diplomatic staff significantly reduces the chances that states remain silent in IO negotiations, while an increase in administrative capacities does not have significant effects on the propensity of a country not to voice a position at all.
57 shows that the sign of the RO-chair variable is positive and the finding is robustly significant in both models, which is in line with the expectation of hypothesis 4a.
58 Brosig M, ‘Overlap and Interplay between International Organisations: Theories and Approaches’, South African Journal of International Affairs, 18, 2, 2011, pp. 147–67. Brosig M, ‘Introduction: The African Security Regime Complex—Exploring Converging Actors and Policies’, African Security, 6, 2013, pp. 171–90. Chenai M & DJ Hornsby, ‘The International Food Safety Complex in Southern Africa: Cooperation or Competition?’, South African Journal of International Affairs, 18, 2, 2011, pp. 235–56. Masters L, ‘Sustaining the African Common Position on Climate Change: International Organisations, Africa and COP17’, South African Journal of International Affairs, 18, 2, 2011, pp. 257–69. Viljoen F, ‘Human Rights in Africa: Normative, Institutional and Functional Complementarity and Distinctiveness’, South African Journal of International Affairs, 18, 2, 2011, pp. 191–216. van Nieuwkerk A, ‘The Regional Roots of the African Peace and Security Architecture: Exploring Centre–Periphery Relations’, South African Journal of International Affairs, 18, 2, 2011, pp. 169–89.
59 Brosig M, ‘Overlap and Interplay between International Organisations: Theories and Approaches’, South African Journal of International Affairs, 18, 2, 147–67; Panke D et al., Regional Actors in Multilateral Negotiations. Active and Successful? London: ECPR Press, 2018.
60 Panke D, Research Design and Methods Selection. Making Good Choices in the Social Sciences. London: Sage.
61 Ibid.