A human security perspective on natural resource governance: What makes reforms effective?

ABSTRACT

As the European Union is intensifying its efforts to curb the negative externalities of natural resource extraction on producing countries, the question arises as to what it can learn from earlier initiatives that have aimed to address the challenges of natural resource governance. Present and former reform schemes alike are based on the premise that changes in natural resource management can enable societies to mitigate the negative effects of global demands for their resources. Based in a critique of formalisation-oriented approaches to resource sector reform, this article employs an analytical perspective of human security to investigate the impact of transformations in resource governance on the wellbeing of populations affected by natural resource extraction. It analyses the successes and shortcomings of reforms in natural resource governance across two cases: the forestry sector in Liberia and the diamond sector in Sierra Leone. The study develops recommendations for future strategies striving to improve resource governance.

KEYWORDS:

• Natural resource governance
• human security
• European Union
• Liberia
• forestry
• Sierra Leone
• diamonds
• West Africa

Acknowledgements

The article was developed at the Peace Academy Rhineland-Palatinate. We are thankful to two anonymous reviewers for their comments on earlier versions on this manuscript.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes on contributors

Nina Engwicht is a post-doctoral researcher at the Peace Academy Rhineland-Palatinate at the University of Koblenz-Landau, Germany. In her work she focuses on natural resource economies in the transition from war to peace, with a focus on West Africa.

Jan Grabek is receiving a PhD stipend from the Gerda Henkel Foundation and researches at the Peace Academy Rhineland-Palatinate, University of Koblenz-Landau, Germany. His work focuses on the political economy of human security and forest governance in Sub-Sahara Africa.

Notes

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58. Personal interview by Nina Engwicht with a senior official of a leading international donor organization involved in mining sector reform, Freetown, 19 April 2013.

59. Government of Sierra Leone, The Mines and Minerals Act. Government of Sierra Leone, Freetown, 2009. The Act replaced the 1994 Mines and Minerals Act and its amendment in 1999.

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64. Ibid.

65. Diamond Development Initiative, MDS in Sierra Leone, accessed 11 March 2019, <http://www.ddiglobal.org/what-we-do/certification/maendeleo-diamond-standards>.

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67. See for instance Bieri 2010; Smillie I, Diamonds, Cambridge/Malden: Polity Press, 2014.

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71. See for instance Pijpers RJ, ‘Mining, expectations and turbulent times: locating accelerated change in rural Sierra Leone’, History and Anthropology, 27, April 2016, pp. 504–20.

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74. See for instance personal interview by Nina Engwicht with a shareholder in an international diamond mining company, Freetown, 9 April 2013.

75. African Union, Africa Mining Vision, 2009, <http://www.africaminingvision.org/amv_resources/AMV/Africa_Mining_Vision_English.pdf>; The Government of Sierra Leone, The Agenda for Transparency: Road to Middle Income Status, <http://www.sierra-leone.org/Agenda%204%20Prosperity.pdf>.

76. Statistics Sierra Leone, Sierra Leone 2015 Population and Housing Census: Thematic Report on Poverty and Durables, 2017.

77. Ibid.

78. UNFPA (United Nations Population Fund), Sierra Leone 2015 Population and Housing Census: Thematic Report on Poverty and Durables, 2017.

79. Statistics Sierra Leone and ICF International, Sierra Leone Demographic and Health Survey 2013: Key Finding, 2014.

80. UNFPA (United Nations Population Fund), Sierra Leone 2015 Population and Housing Census: Thematic Report on Life Tables, 4 December 2017.

81. Kawamoto K, ‘Diamonds in war, diamonds for peace: Diamond sector management and kimberlite mining in Sierra Leone’, in Lujala P & SA Rustad (eds), High-value Natural Resources and Post-conflict Peacebuilding, London: Earthscan, pp. 121–45; Senesse S, ‘Gunfire and curfew, as mine workers strike in Sierra Leone’, Politico, 2012, <http://politicosl.com/node/864>.

82. Interviews by Nina Engwicht in November 2018 in Koidu, Sierra Leone.

83. Engwicht, N, ‘“It can lift someone from poverty”: Imagined futures in the Sierra Leonean diamond market’, The Extractive Industries and Society, Special Issue edited by D´Angelo, L & Pijpers RJ: Mining Temporalities: Extractive Industries and the Politics of Time, 2018.

84. Ibid.

85. Email-correspondence with the DDIs Freetown office on 13 November 2018.

86. For the connection between the international timber industry and diplomatic support for Taylor, see Jay E. Austin EJ & CE Bruch, ‘Legal mechanisms for addressing wartime damage to tropical forests’, Sustainable Forestry, 16, 3–4, 2003, p. 185. And Sesay A et al, Post-war Regimes And State Reconstruction in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Dakar: CODESRIA, 2009, p. 43.

87. The UN ban may not have been instrumental in Taylor’s defeat, but made it impossible for his enemies to mimic his scheme, Harwell E, ‘Forests, state fragility and conflict’, in Harwell E et al. (eds), Forests, Fraglity and Conflict. Washington: PROFOR, 2011, p. 39.

88. The EUTR is part of the EU forest legality, governance and trade (EU FLEGT) action plan of 2003. It was conceived in order to curb the trade in illegal forest products. It called for voluntary partnership agreements (VPAs) – to be signed with timber sourcing countries – and a regulation of the EU’s timber imports, the EUTR. The VPAs are to help reform and formalise forest regimes in timber exporting countries. The EUTR is to ensure that all timber imported into the EU has been sourced and traded according to the laws of sourcing and transit countries. The EUTR came into effect in 2013 and obliges importers of listed timber products to conduct due diligence documentation of chain of custody legality. The EUTR also called for ‘competent authorities’, control procedures and punishments to be set-up by every EU member state. EU (European Union), ‘What ist he EU FLEGT Action Plan?’, 2018, <http://www.euflegt.efi.int/flegt-action-plan>.

89. Altman L et al, ‘Leveraging high-value natural resources to restore the rule of law: The role of the Liberia Forest Initiative in Liberia’s transition to stability’, in Lujala P & SA Rustard (eds), High-value Natural Resources and Peacebuilding. London: Earthscan, 2012, pp. 342–7. IEG, Managing Forest Resources for Sustainable Development: An Evaluation of World Bank Group Experience, February 5th, Washington: World Bank Independent Evaluation Group, 2013, pp. 34–5.

90. Putzel et al., ‘Formalization as development in land and natural resource policy’, Society & Natural Resources, 28, 2015, p. 466.

91. Brack D, ’Excluding illegal timber and improving forest governance: The European Union’s Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade Intitiative’, in Lujala P & SA Rustard (eds.), High-value Natural Resources and Peacebuilding. London: Earthscan, 2012, p. 216. And Independent Evaluation Group (IEG), Managing Forest Resources for Sustainable Development: An Evaluation of World Bank Group Experience, February 5th, Washington: World Bank Independent Evaluation Group, 2013, p. 46.

92. For a description and the original legal text, access: Forest Legality Initiative, ‘Liberia’, January 2014, <https://forestlegality.org/risk-tool/country/liberia>.

93. Ibid.

94. Kamara et al., ‘Chainsaw milling and national forest policy in Liberia’, European Tropical Forest Research Network (ETFRN), ETFRN News, 52, Wageningen: ETFRN, 2010, p. 174. Also see Bickel A & P Cerutti, Liberia: Domestic Timber Value Chains. New York: Building Markets, 2017, p. 7.

95. Bickel A & P Cerutti, Liberia: Domestic Timber Value Chains. New York: Building Markets, 2017, p. 8.

96. Johnston P, ‘Timber booms, state busts: The political economy of liberian timber’, in Abrahamsen R (ed), Conflict & Security in Africa. Rochester: James Currey, 2013, p. 32.

97. Yiah J & J Grabek, Policy Brief 07: Practical Potential Conflict and Implementation Challenges for the CRL and the LRL. Monrovia: SDI (Sustainable Development Institute), February 2019.

98. Ismail O, ‘Power elites, war and postwar reconstruction in Africa: Continuities, discontinuities and paradoxes’, Contemporary African Studies, 26, 3, 2008, p. 273.

99. For colonial and conservationist forest governance see Hiemstra-van der Horst G, ‘We are scared to say o: Facing foreign timber companies in Sierra Leone’s community woodlands’, Development Studies, 47, 4, April 2011, p. 576. For twentieth-century structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) involving the formalization of forest exploitation, trade and community-based natural ressource management (CBNRM), see Putzel et al., ‘Formalization as development in land and natural resource policy’, Society & Natural Resources, 28, 2015, p. 465. Examples: For the DRC see Mbala MS & A Karsenty, ‘Forest revenue decentralization and profits redistribution in the democratic Republic of Congo’, in Germain AL, Karsenty A & AM Tiani (eds), Governing Africa’s Forests in a Globalized World. London: Earthscan, 2010, pp. 168–9. For Mali see Kassibo B, ‘Local governance and forest revenue in Mali: Taxation and decentralized management of forest resources in Siby Rural Commune’, in Germain AL, Karsenty A & AM Tiani (eds), Governing Africa’s Forests in a Globalized World. London: Earthscan, 2010, pp. 199–204.

100. For example: Altman L et al, ‘Leveraging high-value natural resources to restore the rule of law: The role of the Liberia Forest Initiative in Liberia’s transition to stability’, in Lujala P & SA Rustard (eds.), High-value Natural Resources and Peacebuilding. London: Earthscan, 2012, p. 355.

101. For a listing see: Forest Legality Initiative, ‘Liberia’, January 2014, ≤https://forestlegality.org/risk-tool/country/liberia>.

102. Interview by Jan Grabek with NGO Coalition of Liberia spokesperson and SDI forestry experts, Monrovia, November 27; Bickel A & P Cerutti, Liberia: Domestic Timber Value Chains. New York: Building Markets, 2017, pp. 12, 16.

103. JIC (Joint Implementation Committee), ‘Liberia – EU FLEGT Voluntary Partnership Agreement aide memoire: Fifth meeting of the Joint Implementation Committee’, Monrovia, April 2017, p. 1.

104. EU FLEGT Facility (European Union Forest Legality, Governance and Trade Facility), ‘Background: The Liberia-EU voluntary partnership agreement’, 15 November 2017, <http://www.euflegt.efi.int/background-liberia>.

105. Ibid.

106. de Preneuf F, ‘Lessons from the Establishment of a Timber Chain of Custody System in Liberia’, PROFOR, December 2012, <https://www.profor.info/notes/lessons-establishment-chain-custody-system-liberia>.

107. For the exclusion see: European Parliament, REGULATION (EU) No 995/2010 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 20 October 2010 laying down the obligations of operators who place timber and timber products on the market, November 12th 2010, p. 33. For the significance of the exclusion see Dauvergne P & J Lister, Timber. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2011, pp. 3, 10, 122.

108. Interviews and focus group discussions by Jan Grabek with community representatives during field trips undertaken with SDI in Sinoe and Nimba, February 2019.

109. Ibid.

110. For the first and only National Benefit Sharing Trust Board Evaluation Committee report, which has no publication date but covers field research undertaken from 8 April to 30 April 2017, visit the Liberian Forest Development Authority Website: <http://www.fda.gov.lr/partners/national-benefit-sharing-trust-board/>.

111. Field Trip by Jan Grabek and SDI to Central Rivercess in February 2011.

112. Ibid.

113. Observations by Jan Grabek from workshops with forest community representatives in Nimba, February 2019.

114. Interviews by Nina Engwicht with members of forest communities in Sinoe County, June 2018. Interviews and Focus Group Discussions by Jan Grabek with community forest management bodies and community assemblies in Sinoe, Grand Giddeh and Nimba, during field trips with SDI in February 2018.

115. IEG, Liberia Country Program Evaluation: 2004–2011, Washington: World Bank Independent Evaluation Group, 2012, p. XXV.

116. This was the case in at least 4 out of 8 communities visited by Jan Grabek, as corroborated during focus group discussions with community assembly and community forest management body members, as-well as community observers, throughout the South-West of Liberia in February 2019.

117. Focus Group Discussion by Jan Grabek and workshop conducted with Community Assembly and Community Forest Management Body in Nimba together with SDI & written communication by FDA to the forest community, 2019-02.

118. IEG, Liberia Country Program Evaluation: 2004–2011. Washington: World Bank Independent Evaluation Group, 2012, p. 71, confirmed via Interviews and observations by Nina Engwicht in Sinoe County, June 2018, and Jan Grabek in Sinoe, Nimba, Rivercess and Grand Giddeh, February–March 2019.

119. Ford T, ‘Avoiding a “wild west” logging sector in Liberia’, The Guardian, 13 November 2012, <https://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/sustainable-logging-liberia-private-use-permits>.

120. Alley R, ‘Regimes that obstruct: A problem of institutional refurbishment following internal conflict’, Intervention and Statebuilding, 9, 1, 2015, p. 126.

121. Ahadzi B, ‘Failure of Domestic Politics and civil war in Liberia: Regional Ramifications and ECOWAS intervention’, in Omeje K (ed), War to Peace Transition: Conflict Intervention and Peacebuilding in Liberia. Lanham: University Press of America, 2009, p. 43.

122. IEG, Liberia Country Program Evaluation: 2004–2011, Washington: World Bank Independent Evaluation Group, 2012, p. 4.

123. ITTO (International Timber Trade Organisation), ‘Liberia’, Status of Tropical Forest Management, 2005, p. 110.

124. Bertelsman Stiftung, BTI 2016 Country Report – Liberia, Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2016, pp. 3 & 21.

125. IEG, Liberia Country Program Evaluation: 2004–2011, Washington: World Bank Independent Evaluation Group, 2012, p. 68.

126. Former warlords have become financial backers of Liberia’s two post-war presidents: Ismail O, ‘Power elites, war and postwar reconstruction in Africa: Continuities, discontinuities and paradoxes’, Contemporary African Studies, 26, 3, 2008, p. 271. President Johnson Sirleaf used to fund warring factions herself: Ahadzi B, ‘Failure of Domestic Politics and civil war in Liberia: Regional Ramifications and ECOWAS intervention’, in Omeje K (ed), War to Peace Transition: Conflict Intervention and Peacebuilding in Liberia. Lanham: University Press of America, 2009, pp. 49, 52. The Americo-Liberian oligarchy is viewed to have retained control of Liberia’s economy during Johnson Sirleaf’s tenure: Bertelsman Stiftung, BTI 2018 Country Report – Liberia. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018, p. 5. Even wartime criminals such as ‘Prince Johnson’, are now powerful politicians backed by old elites: Bertelsman Stiftung, BTI 2018 Country Report – Liberia. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018, p. 8.

127. Felbab-Brown V & JJF Forest, ‘Political Violence and the Illicit Economies of West Africa’, Terrorism and Political Violence, 24, 5, p. 796.

128. Alley R, ‘Regimes that obstruct: A problem of institutional refurbishment following internal conflict’, Intervention and Statebuilding, 9, 1, 2015, p. 119.

129. Interviews by Jan Grabek with USAID, NGO Coalition and SDI employees in Monrovia, November and December 2018, discussions with community members and community forestry governance body representatives, and observations during field trips in Sinoe and Grand Giddeh, February 2019.

130. Focus group discussions and observations by Jan Grabek in Nimba, Grand Giddeh and Sinoe, February 2019.

131. Iinterviews by Jan Grabek in Grand Giddeh with Community Assembly Members, corroborated during workshop sessions and focus group discussions in Nimba, Grand Giddeh, Sinoe and Rivercess, in February 2019.

132. See for instance Hilson G & Maconachie R, ‘Formalising artisanal and small-scale mining: Insights, contestations and clarifications’, Area 49, 4, 2017, pp. 443–51.

Additional information

Funding

Field research for this article was funded by the Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, the German Foundation for Peace Research, the Gerda Henkel Foundation and the Thomson Reuters Foundation.

Funding

This special issue has been produced with the support of the European Union’s Erasmus+ Programme as a Jean Monnet Activity, through the project ‘The European Union’s Normative Role in African Extractives Governance’, implemented by the South African Institute of International Affairs. The European Commission support for the production of this publication does not constitute an endorsement of the contents which reflects the views only of the authors, and the Commission cannot be held responsible for any use which may be made of the information contained therein.