Towards extractive justice: Europe, Africa and the pressures of resource dependency

ABSTRACT

The relationship between Europe and Africa, in the context of the extractives sector, is multi-faceted, influenced by historical, political, social, environmental, geographical, religious and cultural factors. It is the premise of this article that Africa can benefit more fully from its mineral resources, and Europe from its investments into minerals and energy in Africa, if strong capacity is developed to create and implement more sound legal frameworks and better governance in the extractives sector. This contribution explores the historical and current asymmetries in resource interdependency between the two continents, as well as the policy tools that must direct future development of the intercontinental relationship in as far as the extractive sector is involved. The article then proposes three ideas about justice key to building a theory of resource interdependency, pointing to three areas that will require further scholarly engagement in imagining a new future relationship between Europe and Africa.

KEYWORDS:

• Resource dependency
• mineral resources
• regulatory frameworks
• law
• extractives

Acknowledgements

The paper originated from a collaborative attempt at formulating a broad, interdisciplinary research project, which involved several colleagues from the Rijksuniversiteit Groningen: Andrej Zwitter, Aurelia Colombi-Ciacchi, Marcel Brus, Jilles Hazendal, and others. We are grateful for the comments and insights they provided on earlier drafts of this work in different form. The work also relies largely on earlier work undertaken with Heleen van Niekerk, and published as: H Mostert & H van Niekerk ‘Disadvantage, Fairness, and Power Crises in Africa’ in Y Omorogbe & A Ordor (eds) Ending Africa’s Energy Deficit and the Law (2018). The Rijksuniversiteit Groningen and the University of Cape Town are gratefully acknowledged. Opinions expressed here, and errors made should not be attributed to either of these institutions.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes on contributors

Hanri Mostert is the DST/NRF SARChI Research Chair: Mineral Law in Africa, University of Cape Town.

Cheri-Leigh Young was, at the time of writing, postdoctoral research fellow at the DST/NRF SARChI Research Chair: Mineral Law in Africa, University of Cape Town, and is now a research affiliate of the same.

Julie L Hassman is a doctoral researcher at the DST/NRF SARChI Research Chair: Mineral Law in Africa, University of Cape Town.

ORCID

Hanri Mostert http://orcid.org/0000-0001-8224-0056

Notes

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19. Mangala J, Africa and the European Union: A Strategic Partnership (2013); Boahen A, African Perspectives on European Colonialism 2ed (2011); Barton B & J Ming, (eds), China and the European Union in Africa: Partners or Competitors, 2013, p. 6; Rodney W, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa (1981). The uneven relationship contributed to the inability of many African countries to build up sufficient national wealth to invest in their own industry and infrastructure (roads, electricity supply), thereby hampering development in Africa. See Chitonge H, Economic Growth and Development in Africa: Understanding Trends and Prospects, 2015, p. 203.

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103. Mostert H & H van Niekerk, ’Disadvantage, Fairness, and Power Crises in Africa’, in Omorogbe Y & A Ordor (eds), Ending Africa’s Energy Deficit and the Law, 2018, part 3.2.

104. See, for example, African Union ‘African Mining Vision’ (2009). <http://www.africaminingvision.org/amv_resources/AMV/Africa_Mining_Vision_English.pdf> (noting the need for legal instruments to facilitate community participation), accessed 9 September 2018.

105. African Union Commission, African Development Bank, and United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, ‘Building a sustainable future for Africa’s extractive industry: From vision to action’ (December 2011). <http://www.africaminingvision.org/amv_resources/AMV/AMV_Action_Plan_dec-2011.pdf>, accessed 9 September 2018.

106. Greenspan E, ‘Free, Prior, and Informed Consent in Africa: An emerging standard for extractive industry projects’ (2014) Oxfam America Research Backgrounder. <www.oxfamamerica.org/publications/fpic-in-africa>, accessed 9 September 2018.

107. See Serra N, S Spiegel & J Stiglitz, ‘Introduction: From the Washington Consensus Towards a New Global Governance’, in Serra N & J Stigltz (eds), The Washington Consensus Reconsidered: Towards a New Global Governance (2008).

108. Support of democratic governance is already factored into European-African relationship-building; but efforts have hitherto fell short of achieving success. A difference of opinion may be found in the degree of self-agency that is expected from African governments for stability in politics and governance. Hackenesch C & S Koch, ‘Partnerschaften sind da, der politische Wille fehlt’, <http://www.zeit.de/politik/ausland/2013-10/europa-afrika-kooperationen/komplettansicht>, accessed 16 April 2015, explain as follows: ‘Interessen der Rohstoffversorgung, der Wirtschafts-, Sicherheits- oder auch Entwicklungspolitik kollidieren nach wie vor häufig mit dem Ziel, demokratische Regierungsführung zu unterstützen. Der Fingerzeig auf Afrika entledigt Europa nicht vom eigenen verantwortungsvollen Handeln.’

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by the South African Research Chairs Initiative of the National Research Foundation, South Africa, in conjunction with the Department of Science and Technology.

Funding

This special issue has been produced with the support of the European Union’s Erasmus + Programme as a Jean Monnet Activity, through the project ‘The European Union’s Normative Role in African Extractives Governance’, implemented by the South African Institute of International Affairs. The European Commission support for the production of this publication does not constitute an endorsement of the contents which reflects the views only of the authors, and the Commission cannot be held responsible for any use which may be made of the information contained therein.