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ABSTRACT
This article analyses how global governance networks contest, influence, and shape the Group of Twenty (G20) forum through the latter’s growing inclusivity practices, with important effects on global economic governance norms and practices. These transnational networks include public, intergovernmental, private, and civil society actors that interact through professional ‘ecologies.’ Some network actors participate in the G20’s official engagement forums, others contribute to G20 policy formulation and implementation in other ways, including member-state representatives and officials from international institutions. The research includes evidence from participant observation, semi-structured interviews, public statements, and document analysis, deploying analytical tools from social constructivism, discourse analysis, and the sociology of professions. It examines G20 policy-shaping capacities of global governance networks, especially on macroprudential financial regulation, sustainable economic growth, and sustainable development. The research finds that governance networks have contributed significantly to decentralising global governance authority by diversifying its actors since the 2008 financial crisis.
Acknowledgements
I am very grateful to the Soka University Peace Research Institute for funding some of the research for this article. I am also very grateful to Think 20 (T20) Co-Chair Margo Thomas, for inviting me to participate with the Gender Economic Equity Task Force at the 2018 Buenos Aires T20 Summit. I would like to thank Steve Price-Thomas of Oxfam, for kindly introducing me to several participants and organizers at the 2019 Civil 20 (C20) Summit in Tokyo. I am thankful to Chatham House for inviting me to speak at its 2018 International Policy Forum, ‘No Going Back: Making Gender Equality Happen’, and at a roundtable hosted by the British Embassy in Tokyo for the launch of the Japan host year for Women 20 (W20). I am particularly grateful to Chatham House’s Gender and Growth Initiative Manager Stéphane Dubois and Associate Professor Susan Harris Rimmer (Griffith University) for involving me in these activities. My participation in the events mentioned above provided invaluable research for this study. I thank everyone who agreed to be interviewed, or simply discussed issues related to the Group of Twenty’s engagement and policy processes.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes on contributor
Jonathan Luckhurst (PhD) is Associate Professor of International Relations at the Graduate School of International Peace Studies, Soka University, Tokyo, Japan. His publications related to this article topic include the books, G20 Since the Global Crisis (Palgrave Macmillan, 2016) and The Shifting Global Economic Architecture: Decentralizing Authority in Contemporary Global Governance (Palgrave Macmillan, 2017).
Notes
1 cf. Karlsrud J, Norm Change in International Relations: Linked Ecologies in UN Peacekeeping Operations. New York: Routledge, 2016.
2 Sørensen E & J Torfing, ‘Network governance and post-liberal democracy’, Administrative Theory & Praxis, 27, 2, 2005, pp. 197–237.
3 ‘Semi-state’ or ‘quasi-public’ refer to quasi-autonomous public bodies or government-backed private institutions providing public services.
4 cf. Sørensen E & J Torfing, ‘Introduction: Governance network research: Toward a second generation’, in Sørensen, E & J Torfing (eds), Theories of Democratic Network Governance. Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007, p. 3, pp. 1–24.
5 Seabrooke L, ‘Epistemic arbitrage: Transnational professional knowledge in action’, Journal of Professions and Organization, 1, 1, 2014, p. 53; Seabrooke L, & E Tsingou, ‘Power elites and everyday politics in international financial reform’, International Political Sociology, 3, 4, 2009, pp. 459–60.
6 Baker A and B Carey, ‘Flexible ‘G Groups’ and network governance in an era of uncertainty and experimentation’, in T Payne & N Phillips (eds), Handbook of International Political Economy of Governance. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2014; Eccleston R et al., ‘G20 endorsement in post crisis global governance: More than a toothless talking shop?’ British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 17, 2, 2015, p. 302; Sørensen, & Torfing, ‘Network governance and post-liberal democracy’.
7 Baker & Carey, ‘Flexible ‘G Groups’ and network governance in an era of uncertainty and experimentation’, p. 29.
8 Adler E & V Pouliot, ‘International practices’, International Theory, 3, 1, 2011, p. 6.
9 See Adler E, World ordering: A social theory of cognitive evolution. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019, pp. 30–31.
10 Luckhurst J, The Shifting Global Economic Architecture: Decentralizing Authority in Contemporary Global Governance. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017, p. 2.
11 Rosenau JN, ‘Governance, order, and change in world politics’, in Rosenau, JN & O-E Czempiel (eds), Governance Without Government: Order and Change in World Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, p. 2, pp. 1–29.
12 Cooper AF & R Thakur, The Group of Twenty (G20). New York: Routledge, 2013, pp. 85–86, 134; Kirton JJ, G20 Governance for a Globalized World. Farnham: Ashgate Publishing, 2013, pp. 35, 47; Luckhurst J, G20 Since the Global Crisis. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016a, pp. 141–71; Luckhurst J, ‘The G20 Hub of Decentralizing Global Governance Authority’, International Organisations Research Journal, 14, 2, 2019, pp. 7–30.
13 Harris Rimmer S, ‘A critique of Australia’s G20 presidency and the Brisbane summit 2014’, Global Summitry: Politics, Economics, and Law in International Governance, 1, 1, 2015, pp. 12, 17; Larionova M, ‘From the Mexican to the Russian G20 presidency’, Global Perspective: G20 Update, 2012, p. 4; Slaughter S, ‘The prospects of deliberative global governance in the G20: Legitimacy, accountability, and public contestation’, Review of International Studies, 39, 1, 2013, pp. 72–73.
14 Eccleston R et al., ‘G20 endorsement in post crisis global governance: More than a toothless talking shop?’, pp. 298–317; Kirton, G20 Governance for a Globalized World, p. 35; Stone D, ‘The Group of 20 transnational policy community: governance networks, policy analysis and think tanks’, International Review of Administrative Sciences, 81, 4, 2015, pp. 793–811.
15 Crump L, & C Downie, ‘The G20 Chair and the Case of the Global Economic Steering Committee’, Global Society, 32, 1, 2018, pp. 23–46.
16 Here ‘communities of practice’ are different from ‘global governance networks’. Both are constituted through actors’ shared preferences for particular policy practices. Governance networks are more closely cooperating groups of global governance actors, though they might also be part of broader communities of practice. See Adler E, ‘The spread of security communities: Communities of practice, self-restraint, and NATO’s post-Cold War transformation’, European Journal of International Relations, 14, 2, 2008, pp. 195–230; Adler, World ordering: A social theory of cognitive evolution; Luckhurst, G20 Since the Global Crisispp. 146–7.
17 Slaughter S, ‘Building G20 Outreach: The role of transnational policy networks in sustaining effective and legitimate summitry’, Global Summitry, 1, 2, 2015, p. 172.
18 Eccleston R et al., ‘G20 endorsement in post crisis global governance: More than a toothless talking shop? pp. 299–300.
19 Qin Y, ‘A relational theory of world politics’, International Studies Review, 18, 1, 2016, pp. 35–39.
20 See Baker & Carey, ‘Flexible ‘G Groups’ and network governance in an era of uncertainty and experimentation’; Eccleston et al., ‘G20 endorsement in post crisis global governance: More than a toothless talking shop?’ pp. 298–317; Luckhurst, G20 Since the Global Crisis.
21 See Gilboa E, ‘Searching for a theory of public diplomacy’, The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 616, 1, 2008, p. 59.
22 G20, Leaders’ Statement the Pittsburgh Summit. G20 Leader Forum, 24–25 September, 2009b, accessed 10 May 2019, <http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2009/2009communique0925.html>; G20, G20 Leaders’ Communiqué. G20 Leader Forum, 15–16 November 2014, accessed 10 May 2019, <http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2014/brisbane_g20_leaders_summit_communique.pdf>.
23 Bearce DH & S Bondanella, ‘Intergovernmental organizations, socialization, and member-state interest convergence’, International Organization, 61, 4, 2007, p. 706.
24 Here, strategic authority indicates how state or other actors’ long-term accrued and durable resources, such as military capacities, gross domestic product, natural resources, technology, education, skills, and population, influence perceptions of their competence to act in a given context. Political authority concerns actors’ socially-constructed, in addition to legally-defined, ‘political rights and responsibilities,’ hence those perceived to be their political legitimate competencies. Cognitive authority indicates actors’ authoritativeness due to professional standing and perceived access to information, experience, know-how, and other cognitive status markers. See Ruggie JG, ‘International regimes, transactions, and change: Embedded liberalism in the postwar economic order’, International Organization, 36, 2, 1982, p. 380; Broome A & L Seabrooke, ‘Shaping policy curves: Cognitive authority in transnational capacity building’, Public Administration, 93, 4, 2015, pp. 956–72; Luckhurst, The Shifting Global Economic Architecture: Decentralizing Authority in Contemporary Global Governance.
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30 The BRICS forum consists of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa.
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32 Luckhurst J, G20 Since the Global Crisis, pp. 192–4.
33 Luckhurst J, The Shifting Global Economic Architecture: Decentralizing Authority in Contemporary Global Governance.
34 G20 summits are regularly attended by Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, in recognition of his country’s important role in convening the 3G forum of small states.
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36 Luckhurst J, G20 Since the Global Crisis, pp. 190–6.
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91 This terminology reflects the C20’s usage of ‘working groups’ and the T20’s ‘task forces.’
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97 On leadership élites within larger organised groups, see, for example, Olson M, The Logic of Collective Action. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965.
98 Seabrooke, ‘Epistemic arbitrage: Transnational professional knowledge in action’, pp. 49–64.
99 See ibid., pp. 54–56.
100 Personal communication with the author, September 2018.
101 Interview with the author, August 2015.
102 Harris Rimmer S, ‘A critique of Australia’s G20 presidency and the Brisbane summit 2014’, p. 17.
103 Personal communications with the author, 2018 and 2019.
104 This was evident from private discussions with the author and public statements.
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107 Their different priorities are evident from published documents and discussions at organised events.
108 LGBTQI = Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans, Queer, Questioning, Intersex. See C20, C20 Policy Pack 2019. Tokyo: C20, April 2019, accessed 1 May 2019, <https://civil-20.org/2019/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/C20-POLICY-PACK-2019_web.pdf>.
109 Beisheim M, The G20 and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development Sustainable Development: How to Strengthen Policy Coherence and Accountability. SWP Comments, 16, 2017. Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik -SWP- Deutsches Institut für Internationale Politik und Sicherheit, p. 4, accessed 12 May 2019, <https://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/bitstream/handle/document/52142/ssoar-2017-beisheim-The_G20_and_the_2030.pdf>; Stone D, ‘The Group of 20 transnational policy community: Governance networks, policy analysis and think tanks’, International Review of Administrative Sciences, 81, 4, 2015, p. 800.
110 Luckhurst J, G20 Since the Global Crisis, pp. 118–23.
111 G20, G20 Leaders’ Communique. Antalya Summit, 16 November 2015, accessed 20 March 2019, <http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2015/151116-communique.html>.
112 Personal communication with the author, September 2018.